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This dissertation is an elaboration of presentations and articles on Frie-
drich List (Cf. Daastøl, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2005, 2007, and 
2013 (forthcoming). 
The inspiration of this dissertation may be illustrated by the following 
quotation from China Daily, which claims that the West has forgotten, 
and needs to relearn the reasons for her former success. China Daily 
writes,  
 
The world is entering a new era, an era marked by two major changes. 
The first is the beginning of the end of Western domination - not the end of 
the West, though. The second is the Asian "renaissance", because the 21st 
century will be the century of Chinese and Indian economies. These are the 
words of Kishore Mahbubani, dean of Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy 
at the National University of Singapore. … 
"This is a Western financial crisis," he says, "because the problems are 
the results of Western leaders' failure to understand that they faced a new 
competition." Western minds couldn't think that other societies were be-
coming more successful than them. People in the US and the EU live be-
yond their means. Does "Western wisdom" say keep borrowing despite 
mounting budget deficits? The West has to "relearn" Western wisdom from 
the East, Mahbubani says.  
"Asian societies are doing well (today) because they understood and ab-
sorbed the main pillars of Western wisdom, including the market, science, 
education and rule of law. But Western societies are gradually walking 
away from these pillars."  (China Daily, 2010, p.9) 
 
This poses the task of finding out more specifically what these pillars 
consisted in. 
The inspiration of this dissertation may also be illustrated by the 
words of the Trygve Haavelmo, who in his lecture notes in 1962 says 
that the really mature scientific approach does not consist only in re-
searching existing conditions, but perhaps even more in clarifying prac-
tical conceivable alternatives. He added that the main task for econom-




... real recognition and understanding of the fundamental features of the 
specific social economy that we live in at any time. (Haavelmo, 1962, p. 6, 
see also p. 10)  
 
Haavelmo then criticises contemporary economic literature of taking 
existing institutional relations and conventions as a positive given, 
thereby limiting the potential for recognition and understanding.  
Trygve Haavelmo was also President of The Econometric Society 
(1957). In his Nobel laureate speech in 1989, he suggests starting with 
the whole, with systems analysis, in other words with methodological 
holism as opposed to the methodological individualism that has ruled 
the subject of economics for centuries, 
 
I believe that econometrics can be useful. But ... , depends on good eco-
nomic theory. ... [and] existing economic theories are not good enough. 
I think it is not unfair to describe a major part of existing economic theo-
ry in the following way. We start by studying the behavior of the individual 
... We then try to construct a model of the economic society in its totality by 
a so-called process of aggregation. I now think that this is actually begin-
ning at the wrong end. (Haavelmo, 1989) 
 





The following section will shortly explain how I decided to study how 
Friedrich List deals with ‗mental capital‘.2 
                                       
1 An internet google search in 2011 for the sentence ―I now think that this is 
actually beginning at the wrong end.‖ produced tree links (in addition to two 
links to the speech itself ) including one link to Michael Hudson‘ use of this 
quotation with a reference to me. (Hudson, 2011) Two links only must be re-
markable for a Nobel Prize speech, even though one link was to an article by 
Professor Timothy P. Roth (Roth, 1999). 
2 Briefly, the concept of ‗Mental Capital‘ refers to all products of mental exer-
tion, such as; morality; co-operation; institutions; and inventions.  
For further discussions on the concept of ‗Mental Capital‘ see especially the 
chapters and sections (Ch.3): Material capital - less important; Exchange value 
versus productive powers; Differentiate kinds of capital; (Ch.4): Capital of mind; 
Accumulated capital of mind: Conservatism and Romanticism; Comments on Cap-
ital of Mind; National innovation systems; and (Ch.5):  Tariffs shall primarily 
promote stability of home markets; The Careys on crisis; Protection, once again? 
To aid understanding of this core concept of ‗Mental Capital‘, a short expla-
nation, with extracts of some larger quotations to come, may be helpful: 
In his American works Friedrich List uses the phrase ‗Capital of Mind‘ and 
―mental capital‖. In his German works List uses the phrase ‗Geistiges Kapital‘. 
Most often the term is translated as ‗intellectual capital‘. But this too has con-
notations that do not quite cover the original meaning.  
The term is perhaps better translated directly, as ‗spiritual capital‘, capital 
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I first studied economics at an elementary and intermediate level, 
specialising in different arrangements of collective wage settlement. I 
then took a B.A. in cultural anthropology, sociology, and philosophy. 
My specialities were, respectively, Africa, organisations and work / in-
dustrial democracy, and philosophy of science / rationality. I finished 
by additionally taking an ‗independent‘ M.A. (actually a more extensive 
‗State Examination‘) in economics only, specialising in the methodology 
of economics.  
My master thesis was intended to deal with the effects of different 
images of man on economic policy. – How our human selfimage is pro-
jected on practical policy – essentially idealism3 versus materialism;4  
Man as ‗spiritual‘ versus ‗mechanical‘. But since few economists deal 
with these issues, the closest option was to deal with the methodology 
                                                                                                                
that is related to the human spirit. In the German language, however, ‗spiritual‘ 
does not have the same connotations as in English, since e.g. the human- and 
social sciences are often all termed ‗spiritual sciences‘ (‗Geisteswissenschaften‘). 
In other words, ‗spiritual capital‘ (‗Geistiges Kapital‘) here refers to what we in 
English would call spiritual-; human-; social-; and intellectual capital.  
But there is more to this issue: In the literature in the English language, one 
often refers to ‗human capital‘, but this is not the same as ―mental capital‖. As 
is explained later in chapter 4 in the sections; Capital of mind and Human Capi-
tal; ‗human capital‘ is referred to as a rather individual matter, whereas Mental 
Capital also encompasses public- and historic capital, which has been accumu-
lated, moulded - and perhaps refined - into its contemporary shape, e.g. a peo-
ple‘s ‗innovative mentality‘ and ability for co-operation (Cf. List, 1841a, p. 140) 
Apart from individual capacities, Mental Capital would therefore include all 
kinds of public immaterial infrastructure such as language, grammar, morality, 
work discipline, contract morality, measurement standards, organisational 
structure, institutions etc. ‗Immaterial capital‘ is therefore a more fitting alter-
native phrase.  
3 Idealism is a philosophical tendency that holds reality to be constructed on 
the basis of spirit, ideas and spiritual relations, and must be explained only in 
terms of spirit. The etymological root is the Greek verb ‗idein‘; to see. 
Furthermore, idealism claims that reality as we can know it, is fundamental-
ly mental, mentally constructed, or otherwise immaterial. This means that the 
moving factor in social and historical change is the individual spirit. Since inten-
tion and meaning therefore are fundamental, social- and collective relations and 
mentality acquire explaining roles.  As a more moderate tendency, it emphasises 
the mental origin and character of phenomena.  
4 Materialism is the philosophy tendency that reality is constructed on the 
basis of matter and material relations, and must be explained only in terms of 
matter. This means that even thought, will, and feeling, must be explained only 
in terms of matter.  The etymological root is the Latin noun ‗mater‘; mother. 
This gives the derivative meaning of ‗source‘; ‗origin‘. The Latin noun ‗materia‘; 
means; thing, stuff, wood, timber- that which things are made from.  
In social philosophy, materialism indicates hedonism, or the belief that 
pleasure and pain are the determining motives for human action. In social biol-
ogy, this driving force for action is reduced to ‗genes‘ and even onwards. As a 




of economics: The contrast between the rationalistically oriented axio-
matic deductive tradition and the empirically oriented inductive- (statis-
tics) and historical traditions. 
The interdisciplinary impressions of my B.A. left me unsatisfied with 
the way economics was taught and practiced, since not only history, 
but also culture; institutions, science & innovation, as well as the 
founding role of the human mind, largely had been left out of econom-
ics. Working on my master thesis in 1992 increased this dissatisfaction.  
This led a determination to study the historical school further. An ar-
ticle written with Prof. Backhaus on the influence of Friedrich List in 
1995, led to closer acquaintance with a writer who suited my demand 
for a grander economic theory, which also dealt with the holes that my 
university curriculum had left out; cultural issues in its many shapes; 
e.g. the empirics of history, reason and innovation, morality and co-
operation, institutions and power. Not that these issues have been left 
out of modern economics entirely, but they have only been dealt with 
ad-hoc, and in a formal way that is removed from the non-formal reality 
of such phenomena. It is therefore not realistic. 
Furthermore, mainstream textbook economics lacks the rational co-
herence of List‘s system, where List explains why progress5 is furthered 
by a row of factors, such as freedom, science, industrialisation, urbani-
sation, transportation, division- and confederation of labour,9*6 trade, 
pragmatic protection and -regulation, and how these factors all join 
forces and fit together into one coherent system, some better than oth-
ers. List also offers a larger and spiritual reason to engage in the pro-
cess of furthering economic growth, although he admittedly is some-
what short also on the definition of progress – which therefore has to be 
seen in the context of his times.  
Searching for a deeper foundation and common denominator in the 
multifarious issues of List‘s ‗National System‘, I concluded by focusing 
on ‗Mental Capital‘.  
 
 
0.02 Recent interest in List 
 
                                       
5 Progress is a highly valued concept by List, although poorly defined. Briefly, 
it refers to improvement in morality and skills. For further discussion on this 
issue, see the sections; (Ch2): Believer in progress; Progress in Western Culture - 
Improvement in morality and skills; and Progress and development. 
6 The concept Confederation of Labour may briefly be described as an inter-
generational ‗national teamwork‘ – which includes both the co-operative aspect 
of society – as well as the competitive aspect. Nevertheless, List For further dis-
cussion on this concept, se especially the sections; (Ch.4):  Confederation of La-
bour; but also the sections; (Ch.4):  Science as elevator of civilisation; Comments 
on List‘s approach to Capital of Mind; List‘s Realism versus British Nominalism; 
Perfecting the balanced harmony of productive powers; Mental side of transporta-
tion; and Communication furthers urbanisation. 
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I later (in 2010) realised that this issue had been dealt with before my 
initial interest, and also had been dealt with in the meantime by other 
writers, such as Daniel Levi-Faur (Levi-Faur, 1997) and Chris Freeman 
(Technological infrastructure and international competitiveness (Freeman, 
1982-2003, a report to the OECD). Freeman has had a critical role in 
shaping the works on ‗National Innovations Systems‘ (Cf. e.g. OECD, 
1997). Freeman writes,  
 
… the central feature of List's doctrine was his belief that economic pro-
gress depended on building up the ‗mental capital‘ and productive powers 
of the nation. (Freeman, 1982-2003, ch. 6, p. 16) 
 
It is my contention that since List based his system on the crucial 
role of Mental Capital, as opposed to Adam Smith‘s materialistic con-
ception of capital, List arrived at conclusions regarding e.g. capital and 
saving, trade regulations, as well as industrial development at large, 
which were markedly different from that of Smith.  
List‘s view on trade policy has been picked up more recently by e.g. a 
number of US citizens, who since the 1980s have criticised the effects of 
free trade and outsourcing for the USA. For instance, one of ―Wall 
Street's big thinkers‖ (Reuters, 2004, see also Forbes 2005), Chris P. 
Dialynas‘7  article, Trouble Ahead - Trouble Behind, Restructuring the 
Global Economy - A New Marshall Plan. Dialynas hailed List‘s insights 
regarding the fundamental reasons for balance of payments problems, 
also contemporary such, 
 
List‘s ideas are of great importance today. The global trade imbalances and 
wealth transfers that concerned List are most prevalent today. (Dialynas, 
2004) 
 
Dialynas on this ground called for a change of US trade policies turn-
ing away from Adam Smith‘s utopian ideas, to List‘s more realistic 
strategies, thereby preventing that the US loose its edge. 
National debt and repayment are to these imbalances closely related 
issues. This concerns Japan‘s and USA‘s financial situation, but also 
e.g. the European efforts to get e.g. Greece out of its debt crisis. Prof. 
Jürgen Backhaus in his 2011 lecture in Greece, Why Greece should be 
bailed out, calls for Listian measures, 
 
… in order to build industrial and commercial, short: productive capaci-
ty, a system of tax credits and incentive taxation should be tried, since a 
transfer union should be avoided. (Backhaus, 2011, abstract) 
 
Overlooked by many historians and economists, is the fact that List‘s 
first book, Outlines of an American Political Economy  (List, 1827), was 
directed precisely at guiding a nation in the same kind of dire straits as 
                                       
7 Chris P. Dialynas is a Managing Director of the US based PIMCO (Pacific 
Investment Management Co), the world‘s largest bond-investment firm. 
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e.g. Latin-America etc. had a few decades ago and much of the West 
and Japan suffers today.  
After the Napoleonic wars the United States of America, showed 
many of the same results of lacking competitiveness and of lacking pro-
ductive capacity: Deficits in trade-, payments-, and revenue, as well as 
banking- and business crises and social despair. The only sensible way 
of getting out of national debt is to produce and export. List‘s whole au-
thorship is a deliberate guide as to how this may be accomplished, by 
elevating the quality of a nation‘s labour. List here excels as a profound 
guide. 
List‘s related view on capital and accordingly on saving, has also 
been little noticed, but has important implications for the problems in 
Western countries regarding national debt and lacking growth. List crit-
icised the materialistic conception of capital with the Physiocrats and 
Adam Smith, which led to undue attention to saving and ignorance of 
the systemic demands of economic circulation. This criticism was re-
peated with Edwin Cannan (Cannan, 1921), and rediscovered by Levi-
Faur (Levi-Faur, 1997). 
List‘s related criticism of Smith regarding gluts and underconsump-
tion and disruption of economic circulation, has also been little noticed, 
but are of similar current interest, especially in Western countries. List 
was here preceded e.g. with Friedrich II of Prussia in his L‘Anti-
Machiavel (Friedrich II, 1740, ch. xvi). It was later taken up by many 
‗technocrat‘s‘ and ‘monetary heretics‘ in the first half of the 19th Centu-
ry, further inspiring economists such as John Hobson, John M. Keynes, 







This dissertation is a systematised and thematic study of Friedrich 
List‘s economic approach, showing: 
1) The fundamental importance of immaterial production factors, and  
2) How ‗mental capital‘ binds a multitude of issues together into a 
coherent system.  
List‘s system is simple in principle, and yet complex:  
The human spirit creates culture which creates wealth – or in more 
detail:  
Mental capital creates innovation, constitutes and reshapes collabo-
ration, which constitutes and reshapes nations and (defines and) cre-
ates wealth. Using List‘s terminology: 
1) The task of political economy is to contribute to individual and so-
cial progress: The goal is elevation of global civilisation by moral and 
material improvement. 
2) Mental capital, individual and collective, is the prime source of 
wealth and constitutes the essence of;  
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3) The Confederation of Labour, which both constitutes and continu-
ously reshapes the nation, both its civic institutions and the State.  
4) The nation is the main vehicle for the individual person‘s quest for 
freedom, happiness and wealth.  
5) The ultimate confederation of Labour lies in global free trade, mak-
ing the selfish colonial system as well as navies obsolete.  
 
Ad 2) ‗Mental capital‘ is the founding stone of List‘s system. It alone 
can utilise the resources given by nature. Searching for List‘s inspiration 
would take us to contemporary German Idealism, and further back into a 
tradition with roots in Cameralist- and Renaissance statecraft, and the 
ancient Greeks.  
Ad 3) Mental capital is the essence of the intergenerational ‗Confeder-
ation of Labour‘: Knowledge, innovation, education, morality, trust, 
credit, social networks, traditions and institutions. Mental capital is 
fragile and needs to be wisely nurtured and protected against the gusts of 
the world markets, payment imbalance and economic crises. Physical 
capital move and perish less easily.   
Ad 4) The Nation delivers collective services that an individual cannot – 
such as traditions, arts, freedom, security, and major investments. The 
nation resembles a large company, constituted by the Confederation of 
Labour.  
It can only develop well through a carefully balanced development of 
all vital sections of agriculture, trade, and industry, and furthermore 
their efficient interconnection through state of the art institutions, 
standards, communications, and the establishment of towns.  
According to List, this Confederation of Labour constitutes the nation 
as a market and as a national system of innovation and production, 
which reaches its furthermost potential in an urban-industrial civilisa-
tion or as List termed it: The Industrial System. 
List claims that because intangible capital largely was ignored by the 
English Classical School, it therefore focused on increased division of 
labour through free trade; on increased accumulation of material capi-
tal through austerity and saving; and curtailing population growth. Ac-
cording to List, Adam Smith‘s materialism led him to gross and fatal 
generalisations and to misunderstand the nature of capital. He ignored 
immaterial factors and therefore the roles of stability; - social cohesion; 
-co-operation; -civil society; - institutions; (such as the nation); and - 
economic regulation. 
Ironically, England was the nation that more than any had used eve-
ry trick in the book of government intervention to promote industriali-





The chapters are ordered in the following fashion. 
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The introduction gives a brief introduction to List‘s system of ideas, 
in order to have a frame in which to put the next chapters. 
The abstract and an introduction will give short summaries of List‘s 
ideas. The abstract focuses more on the logic of List‘s system. 
The first chapter describes his Life and works.  
Chapter two, Inspiration and method, includes a discussion of two 
basic concepts in List‘s authorship; freedom and progress. It also deals 
with List‘s own description of how he arrived at his ideas and how he 
describes his major inspirations like Colbert and Napoleon. Finally, 
there is a discussion of List‘s method. 
Chapter three, Critic of materialism, indirectly gives an idea of List‘s 
own ideas, by exposing List‘s criticism against the ‗radical‘ liberalist 
tradition of free trade, better known as British Classical School.8 This 
concerns in particular Adam Smith, but also David Ricardo and Thom-
as R. Malthus, as well as Jean-Baptiste Say and Thomas Cooper.  
Chapter four, Productive force, describes List‘s national system.  The 
chapter endeavours to explain how mental capital constitutes the ideal-
istic basis of List‘s ideas for entrepreneurship, innovation, trust and 
morality, and therefore for economic development through legal and 
regulatory arrangements, as well as innovative communications, which 
all constitutes the confederation of Labour and consequently the na-
tion.   
Chapter five, Regulation, discusses the reasons for public interven-
tion, in particular regarding market imperfections, public goods and 
transactions costs. Furthermore, List‘s relation to the field of Law and 
Economics is discussed. Although ‗regulation‘ is an important part of 
the productive forces, the theme is large and important enough to quali-
fy for a separate treatment and chapter. 
Chapter six Protection and nurture, discusses protection of the system 
described in the preceding chapter. This concerns the practical ar-
rangements accordingly necessary to elevate national culture and pre-
serve national sovereignty, while at the same time promoting mutual 
international benefits. This especially concerns customs unions, as well 
as international organisations and -agreements.  
Chapter seven, Sovereignty and international power , deals with List‘s 
Realist understanding of the foundations of national sovereignty in an 
international world, being not only geographical preconditions, but also 
mental and institutional.  
Chapter eight, Summary of criticism and conclusion, gives a brief list 
of List‘s possible shortcomings, in particular regarding the subject mat-
ter of ‗Mental Capital‘. The conclusion discusses List‘s criticism against 
the materialism of the Cosmopolitan School of Adam Smith, as well as 
List‘s stress of the immaterial productive forces. 
 
 
                                       
8 Friedrich List also termed this tradition; ‗the School‘, ‗the Popular School‘, 





List may be placed in the tradition of German Idealism around the turn of 
the 19th Century, for instance in the sense that he believes that the mov-
ing factor in historical change is the individual‘s spirit, and that increased 
freedom, morality, innovation, and will to make a change, is the essence 
of progress: Morality, insight and determination: Therefore the title of this 
dissertation is Friedrich List‘s Heart, Wit and Will, with the subtitle Mental 





The year of publication referred to in the quotations, refers to the first 
printing. When quotations are taken from eventual later and changed 
editions, this is mentioned. Whenever a text has been translated into 
English, this publication is listed and this text is used for quotation. 
I have quoted extensively in this dissertation instead of paraphrasing 
extensively. One reason is that the authors quoted normally express 
their ideas best themselves; secondly, extensive quotations better allows 
the reader to check the veracity of claims and also the textual context - 
without having to waste time and money in acquiring the books them-
selves and then search for the quotations; and finally, most of the quo-
tations may eventually be skipped for a speedy read, since most of them 
are preceded with a summary and often a comment.  
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Friedrich List was born into a craftsman‘s family in 1789. He changed 
profession and was educated as a public accountant. He served in that 
profession and He took legal studies, and was eventually appointed as 
Professor of Statecraft in a cultural environment dominated by the 
German Idealist philosophy. He actively promoted industrialisation and 
therefore a German customs union. He was elected to the parliament, 
but due to his promotion of liberal reforms he was imprisoned and im-
migrated to the USA. He was here active as a farmer; mines- and rail-
roads entrepreneur; publisher; and propagandist for the North Ameri-
can customs union. He returned to Germany as a Consul for the USA, 
and established himself as a publisher of several journals. Soon he de-
voted his full time to promote railroads and the further development of 
the German customs union, until he passed away in 1846.   
 
 
1.02 List's background and education  
 
Daniel Georg Friedrich List was born in 1789, as the son of a respected 
tanner in the Southwest German town of Reutlingen, shortly south of 
the capital Stuttgart in the hilly and princely state of Württemberg, 
Germany.  
The ancient trading town of Reutlingen was somewhat exceptional in 
its liberal democratic tradition of administration, to a large extent based 
upon the old guilds. Soon after the Napoleonic wars, the former "free 
imperial town" (subject to the German Empire only and not to local 
states and kings) of Reutlingen came into conflict with Austria, whose 
Prince Metternich (1773-1859) since 1809, desired to impose his will 
upon southern Germany, in the spirit of the Vienna congress.  
After a short and uninspiring period in his father's leather business 
as a tawer - a rather filthy business, List preferred to enter service in 
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state administration as a municipal scribe (―Stadt- und Amtsschreiber‖) 
in 1804. His practical family background is of some interest, as it may 
explain why he took a practical interest in improving the lives if his fel-
low citizens ―here and now‖ - in contrast to Karl Marx‘ academic back-
ground and his ideas which had a more theoretical and utopian charac-
ter. 
List passed his examinations at the Royal Ministry of Finance in 
Württemberg in 1809, and took office as a substitute at the treasury 
office (―Cameralamts-Substitut‖) serving in the nearby towns of Wi-
blingen and Ulm. He was rewarded with a recommendation as ―indis-
pensable‖. He then became an advisor of finance and accounting (―Fi-
nanzrat‖ and ―Rechnungsrat‖). From 1811, List studied law, part time, 
and gave up his position in 1813 in order to concentrate better on his 
studies. He never sat for the final lawyer's examination, but instead 
passed the actuary examination in 1814. He re-entered the administra-
tion as an accountant and was promoted to Chief Examiner of Accounts 
(Ministerial Under-secretary) in 1816, under his mentor, Minister Von 
Wangenheim. Therefore, it is fair to say that Friedrich List was in es-
sence educated and trained as a Cameralist, a state administrator and 
accountant. This is what Small and Zielenzieger refers to as a ‗Cameral-
ist of the bureaus‘ as opposed to a ‗Cameralist of the books‘ (Cf. Small, 
1909; and Zielenzieger, 1914) 
 
 
1.03 Intellectual Environment 
 
The town of Friedrich List‘s studies, Tübingen, is the neighbouring town 
of both his natal town Reutlingen and of Stuttgart, the old administra-
tive town of the State of Württemberg, where List joined the Lower 
House (Chamber) of the State of Württemberg‘s Parliament, as the rep-
resentative of his hometown Reutlingen.  
Several noted thinkers had spent their productive years in Tübingen 
the past Centuries, such as the great shapers of German and European 
popular and academic thought, Melanchton (the pre-Leibniz Aristoteli-
an), the astronomer Johannes Kepler.  
More important in our context, List‘s somewhat older but contempo-
rary inhabitants of Tübingen were well-known leaders of the German 
Idealist movement, such as the philosopher Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph 
Schelling (1775-1854), and his student friends: The poet Johann Chris-
tian Friedrich Hölderlin (1770-1843),9 and the philosopher Georg Wil-
helm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831). 
Also noteworthy in our context, is the renown Scottish Mercantilist 
and economist Sir James Denham-Steuart (1712-1780), who lectured 
in Tübingen a few years before List took residence there and drafter the 
                                       
9 Hölderlin may have been the source of Hegel‘s knowledge of Heraclitus‘ ide-




first two book s of his Principles there in 1759 (Cf. Stuart, 1767). Hegel 
read Stuart‘s Principles in 1799, but his notes have been lost (Cf. Prid-
dat, 1990). 
List‘s successor at the faculty of political science from 1824 to 1845, 
was Robert von Mohl (1799-1875), the creator of the concept 
Rechtsstaat.10 Like Massenbach and List, Mohl lost his position be-
cause of his criticism of the authorities. A later successor after List, was 
Albert Eberhard Friedrich Schäffle (1831-1903). 
Already this indicates that List grew up in a region that was dominat-
ed by liberal political views and a high regard for learned knowledge. In 
fact, he sometimes complained that the latter was overdone.  
 
 
1.04 Political and economic struggle  
  
In these early years of List‘s life, already in 1815, he quite notably wrote 
an anonymous article advocating domestic free trade, export promotion, 
construction of infrastructure and the establishment of a chamber of 
commerce in Frankfurt (Cf. List, 1815a).11 These themes remained close 
to List‘s heart. 
List soon became an ardent supporter of the political liberal move-
ment in the German idealistic tradition of Cusa, Leibniz and Wolff. As 
these, he acted against the arbitrariness and inefficiency of the bureau-
cracy and against the autocratic force of Austria in particular.   
One instance is particularly worth mentioning. In 1815 List co-
operated with the philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, during 
the reforms of the constitution of the State of Württemberg. During an 
attack by anti-royalists, Hegel republished his defence of King Wilhelm I 
of Württemberg, at the request of the republican Friedrich List. This not 
only shows the early connection between these two champions of relat-
ed causes, such as German unity and political freedom. This incident 
also illustrates List‘s pragmatism, where he as a republican defended a 
King - who in this case was a supporter of liberal reforms. 
                                       
10 Meaning ‗rule of law state‘, or ‗constitutional state‘, a concept prepared for 
by ancient Continental tradition and by the contemporary German Idealist tra-
dition, from Kant to Hegel and onwards. Mohl was also a scholar on the Camer-
alist tradition, with his work Political Science according to the Principles of the 
Constitutional State (Mohl, 1832). Mohl inspired Japanese post Meiji reforms 
through the lawyer and statesman Kato Hiroyuki, a scholar in German philoso-
phy. 
11 "Vorschläge, Deutschlands künftigen Handel betreffend." (Allgemeiner 
Anzeiger der Deutschen, 1815, Nr. 209 u. 211): Der anonyme Verfasser for-
dert: freie Ein- u. Durchfahrt von Rohprodukten, Zölle auf ausländische Fab-
rikate, Förderung der Ausfuhr, Aufhebung der Zünfte, Ausbau des Verkehrs-
wesens, Gründung von Aktiengesellschaften zum Kanalbau, Aufhebung von 
Binnenzöllen. Gründung einer Handelskammer in Frankfurt, die Vorschläge 
an die Bundesversammlung bringt. Erwähnung der Navigationsakte.  
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His proposals were multifarious, and e.g. in 1815, he suggested a 
new municipal accounting system (Cf. List, 1815b), a short essay in 
1816 advised on improving authorship by setting up prices (Cf. List, 
1816), and his 1817 report was based on interviews with emigrants, 
from the townships of Heilbronn, Weinberg und Neckarsulm, to the 
United States (Cf. List, 1817a). The latter gave him a detailed impres-
sion of problems that haunted ordinary German people to a degree that 
gave them reason to emigrate.  
List put forward numerous practical reports and suggestions for re-
form of the local inefficient administration and its financial and legal 
system, some really manifestos for reform, such as his outline for a new 
municipal accounting system (Cf. Pausch, 1989).  
These efforts came to the attention of his superiors and made him the 
protégé of Wangenheim who had similar ideas and intentions but this 
activity also gave him enemies, especially within the bureaucracy, to 
which he became especially vulnerable after the resignation of Wangen-
heim. The time was not yet ripe for these liberal reforms.  
One of List‘s forerunners in his quest for liberal reforms in Württem-
berg was the mathematician and military geographer for Friedrich the 
Great of Prussia, Colonel Christian von Massenbach from Heilbronn in 
Württemberg. He was the initiator of the military German General staff. 
Due to his campaign for a liberal parliamentary reform, Massenbach 
was expelled from Württemberg in 1817, and in 1819 he was impris-
oned in Frankfurt a.M. for 14 years. Massenbach might also have in-
spired List by his advanced theories of strategy and space.12 
List's reform efforts were to haunt also him politically and financially 
the rest of his life. He early understood this, and wrote in his offer of 
marriage to Karoline Neidhard that, 
 
I love my country perhaps more than my own happiness … My income 
does not suffice for a very proper support of a family: I will have to put 
aside. (List, 1818b)13  
 
In 1818 Karoline Neidhard (1789-1866) married him still. List also 
wrote a book on the treatment of marriage within Roman law, Grundriss 
des Römischen Rechts (in English: ‗―Outline of Roman Law‖). The date of 
publication is still not known, but it is probably written in his early 
years (Cf. List, 1826). 
List supported the establishment of a chair in economics at the local 
and ancient university of Tübingen (Cf. List, 1817b). He was not ap-
pointed to this chair, but rather to the full-time chair of political admin-
istration ("Staatspraxis") in 1817, although his formal credentials for 
such a position were lacking. In fact, this chair was created for him 
                                       
12 I am indebted to Peter Spengler for his reference to the possible connection 
between List and Massenbach. 
13 The original in German reads; „Ich liebe mein Vaterland vielleicht mehr als 
mein eigenes Glück [...]. Mein Einkommen reicht nicht nur zu sehr anständiger 
Unterhaltung einer Familie aus; ich kann noch zurücklegen.― . (List, 1818b) 
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personally, and he held this professorial chair of Political Science for 
one year. As Professor he published a book based on his lectures on 
political science called Outline of State Knowledge and Practice in Würt-
temberg (‗Die Staatskunde und Staatspraxis Württembergs im Grundriß, 
…‘) (Cf. List, 1818a).  
List was way too energetic to keep away from life outside academia. 
List edited Württembergische Archive until 1817 (Cf. List, 1817c), and 
during 1818-19, he was involved in a reform journal called Friend of the 
People of Schwaben (‗Volksfreund aus Schwaben‘) (Cf. List, 1818-1821), 
to which he contributed articles on reform subjects. 
 In 1819, the German Trade Association (Der Handelsverein.. ) foun-
ded the German Industrial and Commercial Magazine (‚Organ für den 
deutschen Handels- und Gewerbestand‗). It was edited and largely writ-
ten by List who in the columns advocated many reforms. 
List argues for the removal of internal German tariffs and the estab-
lishment of a common tariff against foreign goods. This aimed at the 
abolishment of internal impediments to trade in Germany, and for pro-
tection against foreign manufactured goods, in other worlds a typical 
(State-) Mercantilist programme, promoting a stronger home market 
and -production. He then engaged himself in the establishment of a 
new society for trade and manufacturing, The German Association of 
Trade and Commerce (‗Deutsche Handels- und Gerwerbeverein‘), and 
became its "consular secretary" in Frankfurt am Main. At a fair in 1819, 
he authors a petition to the German parliament promoting a German 
customs union, and gets 5000 signatures (Cf. List, 1819).   
In the 1885 edition of the National System, the introductory Mem-
oir14, has the following text, 
 
It was not until List‘s articles appeared that any public discussion of the-
se questions had taken place in Germany, and to him certainly belongs the 
credit of having first awakened any general public interest in them. 
(Schnitzer, 1851 and quoted in List, 1841a, p. xx,) 
 
His activities provoked his opponents and gave them an excuse to 
demand his resignation from his Professorial Chair, on the grounds that 
it was improper for a civil servant to hold political positions and partly 
because of absenteeism. His opponents were, in particular, Fulda, Prof. 
of Cameral Sciences in Tübingen, and Prince Metternich, Minister of 
State in Austria. Among Austria‘s Ministers, List was branded as a dan-
gerous revolutionary, since he was a peril to Austria‘s interests in 
southern Germany.  
List withdrew from his professorial chair in 1819, and from now on, 
his life was completely devoted to political and economic reform in the 
service of the common good. His financial position was to be, and stay, 
                                       
14 Abridged from Friedrich List, ein Vorläufer und ein Opfer für das Vaterland. 
(Stuttgart, 1877.) (note in List, 1841a, p. xiii)  
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accordingly bad most of his life. List travelled extensively on behalf of 
the Trade Association.  
In 1819 the citizens of his hometown Reutlingen elected him their 
deputy to the state representative assembly of Württemberg, in 
Stuttgart. He then took part of the fight for a constitution for Württem-
berg. In 1820 authors a memo to Prince Metternich (Cf. List, 1820), and 
notably, he met with his adviser, Adam Müller, in Vienna in 1820. He 
authored another petition in 1821 (Cf. List, 1821a), related to the estab-
lishment of a Chamber of Commerce.  
 
 
1.05 Forced emigration – international learning 
 
These reform activities brought him before the court, like Massenbach 
in 1817. List defended himself (Cf. List, 1821b), but was tried and con-
victed for sedition in 1822. He escaped into exile in 1822 to Strasburg, 
and Mühlhausen, was expelled and moved on to Basel, and then to Par-
is in 1824. He there met with the economists Gilbert Motier, Francois 
de Dupin, and with the hero of the American revolutionary wars, Gen-
eral de Lafayette, who later was to become his mentor in the US.  
Visiting London in 1824, he met his opponent John Bowring, a prom-
inent English Member of Parliament, journalist, and economist who ar-
gued for free trade already in the 1820s. In London he for the first time 
became familiar with a revolutionary new mode of transport technology; 
steam-powered locomotives on railways. He was to spend the rest of his 
life furthering their acceptance and implementation, but already in 
1838 he recognised the superiority of electro-magnetic propulsion (Cf. 
List, 1838, p. 7).  
He came back to Stuttgart in 1824, where he was imprisoned for six 
months for ―slander‖ against government institutions: He was charged 
with sedition for his opposition to tariff barriers between the German 
states. In 1825 he was exiled, through the mediation of Johann Frie-
drich Cotta, the publisher of Friedrich von Schiller‘s works. List emi-
grated with his family to the US, following the advice of Lafayette. In the 
US he travelled extensively with Lafayette, carrying a passport signed 
by him, and through him met and became befriended with several lead-
ing political figures like the protectionist and Continentalist, President 
John Quincy Adams, furthermore President James Madison and in 
1830 with the to-be-President Andrew Jackson. He met also with lead-
ing economists of the American System tradition, especially around 
Philadelphia; among these were Daniel Raymond, Hezekiah Niles, Henry 
Clay, and Mathew Carey, with whom he stayed for some time.  
In 1825, he settled in Pennsylvania, and unsuccessfully took up 
farming near Harrisburg. However, the discovery of coal on land that he 
had acquired near Tamaqua, led to the successful development of a coal 
mine.  
From 1828, he was manager and co-owner for a railroad of some 34 
km, which opened in 1831. This was one of the very first railways in the 
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USA, the Tamaqua - Port Clinton railway in Schuylkill County, Pennsyl-
vania. See his Reports on the improvement of the Little Schuylkill (Cf. 
List, 1829a).  
These activities made him wealthy and financially independent for a 
while. He thereby also gathered practical experience with business and 
with innovative transportation, which later resulted in books, journals 
and a myriad of articles on this and related themes. 
List was also more successful, also financially, in Reading from 1826, 
as editor of a German-language newspaper Readinger Adler (meaning, 
Eagle of Reading) (Cf. List, 1826). He also engaged himself in the local 
industrial society, Pennsylvania Society for the Advancement of Manu-
factures and Mechanic Arts.  
At this time, the former capital (until 1800) of Philadelphia was the 
second largest city in the US and Pennsylvania was the centre of indus-
trial activity as well as the centre of German settlement, the largest im-
migration group in the US ever. Accordingly, the newspaper List was 
editing was of considerable importance. Eventually, he lost much of his 
American property in a financial crisis, which gained him experience 
also in this field. Lacking funds, List now requested a position at a uni-
versity in the US, but was turned down. 
List was especially productive in these years. In 1827 List wrote Pro-
posals, for publishing a work, to be entitled The American Economist (Cf. 
List, 1827a). It was never published. 
At the suggestion of Charles Ingersoll, a protectionist and the chair-
man of the above-mentioned Pennsylvania Society, List wrote twelve 
letters to the Philadelphia newspaper National Gazette, one of the most 
prominent newspapers of the time, published in 1827.  
These were then published as Outlines of American Political Econo-
my (Cf. List, 1827b),15 exposing its features and contrasting it with the 
extreme free-trade Elements of Political Economy by the southern se-
cessionist Thomas Cooper. The book was published in 1827 by Samuel 
Parker in Philadelphia and accompanied by an introduction by a fa-
mous hero of the American Revolution, General Lafayette.  
His Outlines were hailed nationally as a textbook of the American 
System (of Economics), as opposed to the British System (non-regulated 
free trade). It was published nationwide in many influential journals 
and did influence the Congress into passing the "Tariff of Abominations" 
in 1828. Thereby, List was in part responsible for the introduction of 
the protectionist US tariff laws of 1828.16  
The conflict between these two strategies was later to be the core rea-
son behind the US Civil War, where the industrial North favoured pro-
tectionism and allied with other developing nations like Russia and Ja-
                                       
15 The title first intended was The American Economist. 
16 Thereby confirming the Hamiltonian protectionist tradition that later was 
renewed with Abraham Lincoln and built the framework of the US industry un-
til 1913, whereafter the system was somewhat dismantled. 
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pan. The agricultural South favoured free trade and allied with the in-
dustrial leader, Great Britain.  
Some of his many letters and articles the few following years were: 
Reports from North America (Cf. List, 1828a), Letters to Governor Miles of 
Virginia (1828b), Harrisburg Address  (Cf. List, 1828c), Remarks on  Mr. 
Cambreleg‘s Report on the Tariff (Cf. List, 1830a), and On a Commercial 
Treaty between France and the United States (Cf. List, 1830b). 
His letters with Joseph von Baader: Canals and Railroads in the Free 
States of America, were published in Ausburger Algemeine Zeitung (Cf. 
List, 1827e).  
List was to spend the rest of his life furthering the ideas of the Ameri-
can System of Political Economy, as in his Outlines .. (Cf. List, 1827b, 
Letter I and IV). In the First Letter of his Outlines... he writes, concern-
ing the first General Convention of Agriculturalist and Manufacturers in 
the US that, 
 
… I believe it to be a duty of the General Convention of Harrisburg, not only 
to support the wool growers and wool manufacturers, but to lay the root at 
the axe of the tree, by declaring the system of Adam Smith to be erroneous 
- by declaring war against it on the part of the American System - … (List, 
1827b, Letter I) 
 
… the Union can grow powerful only by fostering the manufacturing inter-
est. This, Sir, I think the true American political economy. (List, 1827b, Let-
ter IV) 
 
The policy of the American System concerns much more than the 
protectionist label usually thrown upon it. Its history in the US goes 
back to the Massachusetts Bay Colony, and Franklin and Hamilton's 
efforts to establish an American Republic by engaging the spiritual ef-
forts of the individual citizen, utilising the advantages of modern tech-
nology in the interest of the common man as well as of the nation. This 
was to be done through state initiation and channelling of private in-
vestment into public goods activities: education, infrastructure, indus-
try and agriculture. Therefore, as one example, the American System 
also concerns public banking as opposed to private banking. 
List met Andrew Jackson in 1830 and supported him in the presi-
dential election campaign, hoping for an appointment to the Hamburg 
consulate. The Senate did not confirm this appointment, and Hamburg 
refused to accept him as a Consul for the USA. 
 
 
1.06 Return to Europe 
 
List may be described as an American economist, as much as he may 
be described as a German economist. But although he became an 
American citizen in 1830, his heart was always with Germany, as indi-
cated above in his letter of proposal to marriage. And in the preface to 




In writing this preface I am humbly conscious that much fault may be 
found with my work; nay, that I myself might even now do much of it bet-
ter. But my sole encouragement lies in the thought, that nevertheless much 
will be found in my book that is new and true, and also somewhat that may 
serve especially to benefit my German fatherland. (List, 1841a, p. xxx-xxxi) 
 
His endeavours for a foreign market for American coal and his plans 
for railroads in Europe brought List to France in 1830. On his visit to 
Paris in 1830, he met the German poet Heinrich Heine (in 1831 & 
1837), and the revolutionary journalist Ludwig Börne.  
List returned to Germany in 1832, and was confirmed as the Ameri-
can Consul to Leipzig in 1833, and served as U.S. consul at Baden, 
Leipzig, and Stuttgart, although the most powerful man in middle and 
southern Europe tried to prevent his accreditation. This was Prince 
Metternich, Austria‘s Minister of State and host of the 1815 Congress of 
Vienna.  
During 1833-1837, he worked out detailed plans for railroads in 
Prussia, Hamburg, Braunschweig and Baden and wrote On a Saxon 
Railway Network (Cf. List, 1833), which also was a blueprint for the 
Leipzig - Dresden railway. In 1835 he wrote a memoire regarding a rail-
way from Mannheim to Basel (Cf. List, 1835). In 1837, he was thor-
oughly involved in the construction of this first German railroad and 
one of the first on the European Continent. 
He travelled extensively and met with many leading politicians and 
heads of state like King Anthony of Saxony (1833), the Prussian Minster 
of Education, King Ludwig I of Bavaria (1841), Crown Prince Maximilli-
an of Bavaria (1842), Russia‘s Minister of Finance George von Cancrin 
(1843), Bavaria‘s Minister of the Interior Prince von Öttingen-
Wallerstein (1845), Karl Prince von Leiningen (1845), a half-brother of 
Queen Victoria of Great Britain. List also met with people in science 
and the arts - Alexander von Humboldt (1819 and 1834), Klara Wieck-
Schumann (1840), in addition to Heine and Börne as mentioned. On his 
visit to London, just before he died, he met Prince Albert of Great Brit-
ain (1846), the free traders Richard Cobden (1846), John Bowring 
(1846), and John Ramsay MacCulloch, as well as the future Prime Min-
ister Lord Palmerston (1846). 
List wrote extensively for several journals such as the Liberalist En-
cyklopaedie der Staatswissenschaften which he initiated (Cf. List, 
1834), and Cotta‘s Augsburger Algemeine Zeitung (Cf. List, 1839).  He 
also established and wrote extensively in Das Nationalmagazin (Cf. List, 
1834) and the Eisenbahn-Journal (Cf. List, 1835).  
In 1837 he quit his position as US Consul to Leipzig and left for Paris 
where he wrote two treatises for the French Academy of Sciences, The 
Natural System of Political Economy (Cf. List, 1837a)17 and The World 
                                       
17 The sub-title of List‘s treatise was Et la patrie, et l‘humanité (meaning in 
English: ―And the fatherland and the human kind‖). List‘s work was rediscov-
ered in 1925 and published two years later in French and German. The ques-
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Moves (Cf. List, 1837b)18. In these two treatises he treated extensively 
and systematically the protective system, steam power and new 
transport systems, and their relations to the constitutional and legal 
system in general. For instance, in the latter, he repeatedly points out 
not only the need for national unity in policy but also the need to de-
centralise what can be more efficiently done in this way. This concerns 
the so-called subsidiarity principle, discussed by Christian Wolff a cen-
tury before List. The new means of transportation (read: communica-
tion) would alleviate this problem of central as opposed to local control, 
he argues. Today we experience the same phenomenon with the modern 
form of the telegraph, namely the Internet. 
List also discusses the contributions of science, technological pro-
gress, industry, trade, and communication, to social and international 
peace, and to the international promotion of human rights and labour 
conditions, and how the legal systems can be used as an integrated 
part of this agenda (Cf. List, 1837b, p. 133 and 151 ff).  
 
 
1.07 List’s later publications and work 
 
In 1838 he wrote a longer pamphlet, Political and Economic Aspects of 
the German Transport System (Cf. List, 1838). It was originally printed 
as a lengthy article in the Staatslexikon (―Railroads and Canals, Steam-
boats and Steam Wagon Transport‖). 
In 1839 he starts his work with the book The National System. He 
publishes The Nature and Value of a Nation's Forces of Production (Das 
Wesen und der Werth einer nationalen Gewerbsproduktivkraft) (Cf. List, 
1839a), and The Freedom and Restrictions on Foreign Trade, Illuminated 
from an Historical Viewpoint (‗Die Freiheit und die Beschränkungen des 
auswärtigen Handels, aus dem historischen Gesichtspunkt beleuchtet‘) 
(Cf. List, 1839b) and publishes On the Nature and Value of a National 
Productive Force (‗Über das Wesen und den Wert einer nationalen Gew-
erbsproduktivkraft‘) (Cf. List, 1839c).  
In 1840 he receives an honorary doctorate from the University of Je-
na, and turns down an offer of a position in French civil service. In 
1841, List is exonerated in Württemberg, honoured by the Hungarian 
Academy of Science, and publishes The National System of Political 
Economy (Das Nationale System der politischen Oekonomie) (Cf. List, 
1841a). It was an instant success. He also publishes The German Rail-
road-system (Das deutsche Eisenbahnsystem) (List 1841c).  
                                                                                                                
tion posed by the French Academy of Moral and Economic Sciences was: ‗If a 
country proposes to introduce free trade or to modify its tariff, what factors 
should be taken into account so as to reconcile in the fairest manner the inter-
ests of producers with those of consumers?‘ No contester was awarded, but 
List‘s work was among the three mentioned as ouvrages remarquables. 
18 The subtitle of this treatise was On the Effects of Steam Power and the New 
Means of Transportation. Erroneously this treatise was thought lost, for in-
stance by Henderson (Henderson, 1983). 
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In 1841, he turned down an offer to become editor of the Neue 
Rheinische Zeitung, after which Karl Marx took the position. He founded 
and edited the Zollvereinsblatt (Cf. List, 1842-1846), and most of the 
650 articles of this ―Customs Union Journal‖ were written by List. 
 List publishes in 1842 his Agricultural constitution, small business 
and emigration (Cf. List, 1842), which is a layout for necessary legal re-
forms in agriculture. A matter of which he had spoken on in details in 
Philadelphia in 1828 (Cf. List, 1828c).  
In 1843 List founds his Customs Union Journal (‗Zollvereinsblatt‘) (Cf. 
List, 1843-1846), and meets with the Crown Prince Maximilian von 
Bayern. In 1844 he makes several trips to Vienna and Hungary, and 
writes On the German Railroad Question (‗Zur deutschen Eisen-
bahnfrage‘) (Cf. List, 1844a), and On the Connections of German Agricul-
ture to Industry and Trade (‗Über die Beziehungen der Landwirtschaft 
zur Industrie und zum Handel‘) (Cf. List, 1844b).  
In 1845 he writes On the National Economic Reform of the Kingdom of 
Hungary (‗Über die national-ökonomische Reform des Königreichs Un-
garn‘), an economic plan built around massive construction of a railway 
network (Cf. List, 1845). Prince Öttingen-Wallerstein and Karl Fürst von 
Leiningen, a half-brother of Queen Victoria of Great Britain, proposes 
that List go to London.   
In 1846 he writes The Political-Economic National Unity of the Ger-
mans (‗Die politisch-nationalökonomische Nationaleinheit der Deutschen‘) 
(Cf. List, 1846b) which includes the so-called Factory Bill manuscript 
(Cf. List, 1846a). 
 
During his stay in London, he again meets with John Bowring, and 
with John Ramsay MacCulloch, leader of the Ricardian School in eco-
nomics. He also writes the memorandum On the Value and Conditions 
of an Alliance between Great Britain and Germany (Cf. List, 1846c). List 
here suggests that England can only defend her Empire by letting Ger-
many develop under the leadership of Prussia, and letting her build a 
railroad from Berlin to Bombay in India. The proposal is presented to 
the governments of England and Prussia, but is turned down by Lord 
Palmerston and Sir Robert Peel.  
During his 3 months‘ stay in London, ill health eventually overtakes 
him. List returns to Augsburg, travelled to Munich and then to 
Kufstein, Austria, and on the 30th of November 1846, he brings his life 
to an end by his own hand in Kufstein, allegedly in order not to trouble 
his family with his illness. The King of Prussia had sent for List, in or-
der to have him work in his administration, but it was too late for List 
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Friedrich List early on experienced that life could be tough for many 
people, and he devoted himself to come to their aid. His family‘s craft 
was tanning, a dirty business. As a public clerk he experienced the sor-
ry state of the country, which pushed tens of tens of thousands to emi-
grate. He also experienced the sorry state of public affairs, unable to 
help people in practice, dominated as it was by absolutism and corrup-
tion. 
He took a keen interest in economic affairs, and at first was im-
pressed the liberal trade theories of Adam Smith and Jean-Baptiste 
Say, as was normal in Germany at the turn of the 19th Century and af-
ter. The contemporary devotion to Cosmopolitan ideas and freedom 
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from political absolutism and from theoretical and religious dogma 
made a lasting impression on List.  
Nevertheless, the sorry practical results for Germany of the dissolu-
tion of Napoleon‘s Continental System, made him change his mind and 
promote temporary trade protection and a German customs union. 
His studies in the economic and cultural history of Europe, deepened 
his new conviction, and he was impressed by the partial success of the 
city states of Venice, the Hanse, and the Dutch. What impressed him 
more, were the partial success of France, and the full success of Eng-
land as a liberal and urban-industrialised nation. The progressing suc-
cess of the American System that List witnessed with his own eyes con-
vinced him further of the value of a pragmatic and empirically based 
strategy. He keenly noted how American lack of manufacturing led to 
financial imbalances and crises. He furthermore noted the destructive 
effects of this instability, and the need for protection to stabilise home 
markets and nurture feeble but promising industries to correct trade- 
and payment imbalances. In America he also became aware of the revo-
lutionary potential of modern communications. 
As a young man he was influenced by theories, but soon practical 
experience took the leading role and historical reading served as sup-
plement. Theories then served List to explain the observable real world. 
Nevertheless, the liberal and Idealist ideas that impressed the mind of 
his youth never let go. 
List‘s method came to be practical, learning from his own experience 
and then from historical experience. He intuitively compared the results 
of various economic policies as any practical person would do. He devi-
ates thoroughly from contemporary economists abroad by regarding 
immaterial factors as primary and determinant in economic develop-
ment. The reason was most likely that List had been impressed by con-
temporary Idealist philosophy, entrenched in German popular thought. 
There are many scholarly variants of Idealism, but in popular thought 




2.02 The moral base for industrialisation and urbanisation 
 
Most of those who know a little of List, know that he promoted German 
unification and therefore promoted practical integration of Germany 
through the construction of a network of railroads, and German cus-
toms union, in order to build a nation strong enough to withstand for-
eign pressure and violations.  
Some also know that his plans went further and aimed at the similar 
integration of Europe and eventually the world through e.g. interna-
tional trade agreements and permanent international trade associa-
tions, and that he more fundamentally was a modernist and promoted 
industrialisation and urbanisation - all in order to promote stability, 
welfare and freedom for the citizens.  
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Few economists, however, reflect on the deeper spiritual reasons em-
bedded in List‘s system. 
In order to industrialize, any given government would need to develop 
consciously the country‘s infrastructure in all ideal and material as-
pects: its educative, communicative and administrative system, includ-
ing the legal system, which was indeed to have the pivotal role.   
List's eagerness to promote19 through regulation20 general and indi-
vidual freedom21 of thought and action, was the major reason why he 
was so eager to industrialise22 and urbanise.23 And high morality and 
skill would require general welfare,24 and vice versa, industrialisation 
makes precisely this possible.25 
In fact his reasons for promoting freedom, may have been quite phil-
osophical if not even religious, apart from being a reaction to the per-
sonal persecution he experienced. List often points to the positive ef-
fects of religion, but likewise to the positive effects of reason and reli-
gious freedom, as opposed to doctrinaire religion.26 
 
 
2.03 List - a practical Idealist 
 
                                       
19 The brief quotations following in the following footnotes are extracts of 
larger quotations that have been used elsewhere in this dissertation. 
20 ―Every law, every public regulation has a strengthening or weakening ef-
fect on production or on consumption or on the productive forces.‖ (List, 
1841a, p. 307). 
21 ―.. liberty and civilisation have everywhere and at all times emanated 
from towns…‖ (List, 1841a, p. 204) 
―The spirit of enterprise, economic progress, technical knowledge, and artis-
tic skill develops only in countries enriched by political and religious freedom.‖ 
(List, 1837a, p. 164) 
― … restriction is only the means, and freedom is the end― (List, 1841b, Intro-
duction, in Hirst, 1909, p. 292) 
22 ―Manufactories and manufactures are the mothers and children of munic-
ipal liberty, of intelligence, of the arts and sciences, of internal and external 
commerce, of navigation and improvements in transport, of civilisation and po-
litical power.‖ (List, 1841a, p. 140) 
23 ―… liberty and civilisation have everywhere and at all times emanated 
from towns…‖ (List, 1841a, p. 204) 
24 ―It is essential that the workers of a country which is becoming industrial-
ised should be well paid and well fed.‖  (List, 1837a, pp. 120-121) 
25 ―… in flourishing manufacturing States the workman, …  accomplishes a 
far larger day's work …‖ List, 1841a, pp. 202-203) 
―Such people are now able to command higher salaries and wages than was 
formerly possible.‖ (List, 1837a, pp. 66-67) 
26 ―The people must have high moral and religious standards so that super-
stition, prejudice and vice can be rooted out.‖ (List, 1837a, p. 185) 
―… the great wealth of England … . The people's innate love of liberty and of 
justice, the energy, the religious and moral character of the people, have a 
share in it.‖ (List, 1841a, p. 49) 
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An idealistic spirit runs through all writings of List, in the moral sense 
(as well as in the philosophical sense). He praises the traditional values 
of community, honesty, trust, diligence, perseverance, thoroughness, 
precision, and not least the liberal value of individual will and power, as 
well as the common will to progress towards these values. 
This as opposed to ‗the dismal science‘ of the Cosmopolitical School, 
which forgot the early refinements of Bernard Mandeville and Adam 
Smith etc., and came to hold material egotism and sensualism to be the 
guiding stars for investigations into economic relations.27  
The Idealists, however, saw the logical social result of a materialist 
and individualist approach, as social implosion and -self-destruction.28 
Nevertheless, we should not be misled into believing that the Idealists 
forgot the daily life of the ordinary Man. As in the Idealistic Renaissance 
spirit, quite the opposite was the case. This is evident e.g. in Fichte‘s 
The Closed Commercial State, where he suggests practical remedies, 
such as a national trade policy and paper money (Fichte, 1800, e.g. p. 
47) and in his The Vocation of Man, where he claims that the human 
vocation lies outside himself and argues that scholars and statesmen 
have a public duty for national education.29 
Nevertheless, as we shall see, he also saw them as the prime instru-
ments in elevating agriculture and the rural districts, thereby establish-
ing a balanced development. In this way, industrialisation and urbani-
sation served the spiritual goal both directly through their ―inherent‖ 
creativity and indirectly by providing the material basis for both creativ-
ity and morality. Industrialisation and urbanisation were therefore 
means to develop the spiritual characteristics of Man, by offering prac-
tical possibilities for the creation, implementation and exchange of ide-
as, including morality.30  
In this same way, money as a means of exchange may certainly be 
said to fill the same spiritual function, by making division and co-
operation of labour possible so that everybody may work with their spe-
ciality, and simultaneously work for everybody else. In this light, it is 
evident that monetary institutions also may be arranged in counter-
productive ways, making other roles of money counter the co-operative 
function, such as hoarding and narrow-minded speculation, which both 
may disrupt regular economic flows.  
 
 
                                       
27 Cf. Schumpeter, 1912, p. 87; and Windelband, 1893, pp. 523-514. For 
quotations, see this section below, and the section; List‘s Realism versus Brit-
ish Nominalism. 
28 Cf. e.g. Hegel, 1936, p. 263; and Fichte, 1806, Dreizehnte Rede (‗Thir-
teenth Address‘), § 204. 
29 Cf. Fichte, 1799, e.g. Book I, section I; and Book III, section II. 
30 Cf. e.g. the discussion of communication in List, 1837b, Ch. 1. 
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2.04 The core of List’s ideas: Freedom31 
 
List promotes progress because it will lead to freedom, for the nation 
and thus for the individual. One example is his warning against debt 
bondage as a consequence of lacking productivity.32 Conversely, he 
promoted freedom because it led to progress; freedom and progress 
constitute an inseparable pair of Siamese twins (Cf. List, 1837a, p. 
153).  
 In his National System ... List describes how England benefitted from 
her freedoms and stability; and the lack of freedom elsewhere: Compe-
tent immigrants brought England to flourish, 
 
Most conspicuous was the advantage accruing to the English 
manufacturing interest during the Continental wars, … Great, however, as 
have been the advantages heretofore mentioned, they have been greatly 
surpassed in their effect by those which England derived from immigrations 
attracted by her political, religious, and geographical conditions.  From 
Spain and Portugal came persecuted Jews; from the Hanse Towns, and 
from Venice in her decline, merchants who brought with them their ships, 
their knowledge of business, their capital, and their spirit of enterprise. Still 
more important were the immigrations of capital and of manufacturers in 
consequence of the Reformation and the religious persecutions in Spain, 
Portugal, France, Belgium, Germany, and Italy; as also of merchants and 
manufacturers from Holland … (List, 1841a, pp.55-56) 
 
List points out how political commotion, wars, insecurity and lack of 
freedom elsewhere brought England beneficial immigration of capital 
and talents,  
 
Every political movement, every war upon the Continent, brought Eng-
land vast accessions of fresh capital and talents, so long as she possessed 
the privileges of freedom, the right of asylum, internal tranquillity and 
peace, the protection of the law and general well-being. So more recently 
did the French Revolution and the wars of the Empire; and so did the polit-
ical commotions, the revolutionary and reactionary movements and the 
wars in Spain, in Mexico, and in South America By means of her Patent 
Laws, England long monopolised the inventive genius of every nation. (List, 
1841a, p. 56) 
 
Throughout his life, List propagated ideas which had followed him 
from his youth. They were outlined already in 1816: Political freedom, 
political unification and economic development, supplemented with 
railroad construction and protection of manufacture, as some instru-
                                       
31 See also the discussion of the relations between ‗Freedom‘ and ‗Civil Socie-
ty‘ in the section Conservative liking for Civil Society, in chapter 5. 
32 For a deeper discussion of this, see e.g. chapter 4: Especially the subsec-
tions; Industrialisation fosters freedom - a humane civilisation and Urbanisation 
furthers communication, innovation and freedom. 
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ments among many, all in the tradition of the potential Harmony of In-
terests.  
Although the goals of his efforts were laid out early, he spent many 
years in finding the tools that would help achieve those goals. The most 
important tool was the (mental) recognition of the productive forces be-
hind progress, and then use of the regulatory system to promote pro-
gress in practice. 
He named his system accordingly, the system of productive forces, the 
manufacturing system, and the industrial system, as opposed to Mercan-
tilism and to British Liberalism (which he termed the theory of ex-
change values or the Cosmopolitan School). To understand List, it is 
therefore crucial to understand what he saw as the most important 
productive forces. 
The core of List‘s ideas is the immaterial production factors, and ac-
cordingly the resulting confederation of labour into a nation, and even-
tually the world. We may also see and denote the immaterial productive 
forces as ―culture‖, which determines trust; work ethics; contract eth-
ics; administration; communication; innovation; etc. It is noteworthy 
that in today‘s world, the term ―culture‖ often takes on ‗collective‘ con-
notations, which would miss List‘s (Christian-Idealistic) focus on the 
importance of the single individual. 
 
 
2.05 Freedom in the German tradition  
 
Friedrich List‘s emphasis on freedom demonstrates in the economic 
field, a direct parallel and result of similar ideas in the German cultural 
life dominated by Idealism in e.g. philosophy. To a large extent, the 
modern German philosophical quest has been to unite order, freedom 
and creativity. Freedom is particularly seen as freedom of the mind, 
promoting creativity.  
 In Germany's Balanced Development: The Real Wealth of a Nation, 
Kaevan Gazdar starts the fifth chapter (Gazdar, 1998, p. 141), with a 
quotation that indicates the Lutheran tradition of commitment to the 
ethics of work – as benevolent prayer, or compassion in practice,33  
 
Men are born to work, just as the birds are born to fly. 
- Martin Luther 
 
In the chapter mentioned above, The Cultural Roots of Order and 
Commitment, Gazdar continues by giving a description of what he de-
scribes as Germany‘s most important revolutionary, Martin Luther. 
 
Germany has often been characterized as a country lacking a revolution: 
a drastic change of the old order as in the French and American revolutions 
or a more evolutionary change as in England's Glorious Revolution. In ac-
                                       
33 This compassion follows logically from the division of labour, which makes 
each individual a worker for the other. 
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tual fact, Germany's religious Reformation was less spectacular but more 
profound. Its great Reformer, Martin Luther, founded a work ethic that the 
sentence quoted above sums up. (Gazdar, 1998, p. 141) 
 
Gazdar then describes the strong religious legitimation that Luther 
gave to individual freedom,  
 
Luther's profound importance for German history lies in his fateful dis-
tinction between the power of the state and the freedom of the soul. "The 
laws of worldly rule do not cover more than bodies, properties, and other 
worldly things. God will not tolerate anyone other than himself to rule over 
the soul," he observed in his tract on the "Legitimation of Worldly Authori-
ty," published in 1523. He thus founded two worlds: that of the outside and 
of the inside. The inner world of the soul--Innerlichkeit--is the key to Ger-
man cultural identity. 
Worldly authority should not dictate the life of the soul. Conversely, the 
reformer calls on believers to accept and support worldly power - and if 
necessary to suffer injustice without actively resisting. (Gazdar, 1998, p. 
141) 
 
Luther‘s translation of the Bible into German was also a huge contri-
bution to individual freedom through democratisation of reading and 
writing and thereby knowledge. This had vast economic consequences.  
This commitment to individual freedom was continued e.g. with Kant, 
Hegel, and Steiner: In his essay, What is Enlightenment, the philosopher 
Immanuel Kant claims that the most profound revolution is internal, 
and propelled by political freedom,  
 
Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-incurred immaturity. 
Immaturity is the incapacity to use one's intelligence without the guidance 
of another. … The motto of enlightenment is therefore: Sapere aude! Have 
courage to use your own understanding! 
… 
A revolution may well put an end to autocratic despotism and to rapa-
cious or power-seeking oppression, but it will never produce a true reform 
in ways of thinking. Instead, new prejudices, like the ones they replaced, 
will serve as a leash to control the great unthinking mass. 
For enlightenment of this kind, all that is needed is freedom. And the 
freedom in question is the most innocuous form of all freedom to make 




There is only one Innate Right, the Birthright of Freedom. (Kant, 1790, F 2, 
B 2) 
 
The most renowned German philosopher after Kant continues in the 
same direction in his ―Philosophy of History‖, hailing the ideal of indi-
vidual ―Spiritual Freedom‖. After describing the Oriental, Greek and 
Roman worlds, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel deals with ―The German 




The German Spirit is the Spirit of the new World. Its aim is the realiza-
tion of absolute Truth as the unlimited self-determination of Freedom - …. 
The destiny of the German peoples is, to be the bearers of the Christian 
principle. The principle of Spiritual Freedom - … (Hegel, ch. IV, 1837; 2001, 
p. 358) 
 
Ernst Cassirer comments in his The Logic of the Humanities, that He-
gel regarded the conception of freedom with Kant and Fichte purely as 
an impotent ideal, 
 
Hegel's philosophy of history sees in freedom the truly great theme of world 
history and it defines the latter as "progress in the consciousness of free-
dom."… Hegel demands that philosophy do more than merely assert this 
thesis, that it proves it. And he insists that it can be proved only by means 
of the dialectic method, through the logical necessity inherent in this meth-
od. According to him, Kant and Fichte were unable to furnish proof of this 
thesis regarding the freedom of the mind. For them, freedom remains simp-
ly an ideal which, left as such, they condemned to the "impotence of the 
mere ought. (Cassirer, 1961, pp. 29-30) 
 
In any case, the philosopher Rudolf Steiner sought to establish free-
dom in the practical world, and formulates a foundation already in his 
dissertation The Philosophy of Freedom (Steiner, 1894). In the practical 
world, he is preoccupied with ‗The Social Problem‘ in Capitalism, from 
an Idealistic point of view. He regards the basic problem to be spiritual, 
and as much a problem for each and every individual as much as a so-
cial problem. Steiner wishes to cure the social ills of Capitalism whilst 
retaining its creativity, and liberate creativity further - from commercial 
and governmental abuse. He argues that true individual freedom is re-
alised not in consumption but in creative production, i.e. work. So in 
this certain sense work liberates (―Arbeit macht frei‖)34 and as a conse-
quence; there is no conflict between individual freedom and the com-
munity as in traditional (Materialist) Liberal thought. In the Preface of 
his book Die Kernpunkte der Sozialen Frage (‗The Core Points in the So-
cial Question‗), Steiner writes,  
This book must assume the unpopular task of showing that the chaotic 
condition of our public life derives from the dependence of spiritual life on 
the political state and economic interests. It must also show that the libera-
tion of spiritual life and culture from this dependence constitutes an im-
portant element of the burning social question. (Steiner, 1919, p. 12) 
                                       
34 At the same time work is directed to satisfy the needs of the other 
through a division of labour, and depending on the system of reward; or dis-
tribution, this is compassion in practice. And according to Steiner, the task is 
therefore to organise society to allow for the greatest possible creative freedom 
in economic life, and just rewards. This is done by bringing production under 
the control of self-governing ―economic associations‖ or charities, and by dis-
solving the bond between production and distribution, between work and re-




Arguing against the ideas of the ‗unitary state‘, and for educational, 
scientific and spiritual independence and freedom, Steiner says, 
 
There is only one possible healthy form of development for spiritual life: 
what it produces shall be the result of its own impulses and a relationship 
of mutual understanding shall exist between itself and the recipients of its 
achievements. (The development of the individual abilities present in society 
is connected to the development of spiritual life by countless fine threads.) 
The conditions described here for the healthy development of spiritual-
cultural life are not recognized today because powers of observation have 
been clouded by the fusion of a large part of this life with the political state. 
This fusion has come about in the course of the past centuries and we have 
grown accustomed to it. There is talk, of course, of 'scientific and educa-
tional freedom'. It is taken for granted however, that the political state 
should administer the 'free science' and the ‗free education'. It is not under-
stood that in this way the state makes spiritual life dependent on state re-
quirements. People think that the state can provide the educational facili-
ties and that the teachers who occupy them can develop culture and spir-
itual life 'freely' in them. This opinion ignores how closely related the con-
tent of spiritual life is to the innermost essence of the human being in 
which it is developing, and how this development can only be free when it is 
introduced into the social organism through the impulses which originate 
in spiritual life itself, and through no others. (Steiner, 1919, pp. 77-78) 
 
Steiner argues that the Social Democrats have taken over the illiberal 
ideas of the old ruling class, and that these ideas of the ‗unitary state‘ 
will destroy spiritual freedom (and hence the creativity) the arts and 
sciences. Regarding the Marxist of his day, he says, 
 
He has noticed how certain aspects of human thought are determined by 
state requirements which correspond to the interests of the ruling classes. 
The thinking proletarian saw therein a reflection of material interests as 
well as a battle of conflicting interests. This created the feeling that all spir-
itual life is ideology, a reflection of economic organization. This desolating 
view of human spiritual life ceases when the feeling can arise that in the 
spiritual sphere a self-containing reality, transcending the material, is at 
work. It is impossible for such a feeling to arise when spiritual life is not 
freely self-developing and administering within the social organism. …  Art, 
science, philosophical world-views, and all that goes with them, need just 
such an independent position in human society, for in spiritual life every-
thing is interrelated. The freedom of one cannot flourish without the free-
dom of the other. Although the content of mathematics and physics cannot 
be directly influenced by state requirements, what develops from them, 
what people think of their value, what effects their cultivation can have on 
the rest of spiritual life, and much more, is conditioned by these require-
ments when the state administers branches of spiritual life. It is very differ-
ent if a teacher of the lowest school grades follows the impulses of the state 
or if he receives these impulses from a spiritual life which is self-contained. 
The Social Democrats have merely inherited the habits of thought and the 
customs of the ruling classes in this respect. Their ideal is to include spir-
itual life in social institutions which are built upon economic principles. If 
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they succeed in reaching their goal, they will only have continued along the 
path of spiritual depreciation. (Steiner, 1919, pp. 77-78) 
 
Regarding Friedrich List, the anti-unitary ideas of Rudolf Steiner are 




2.06 Progress in Western Culture 
  
- Improvement in morality and skills 
 
List believes in the good of progress in material and immaterial culture 
to such as degree that he takes it as a given goal. Apparently he sees no 
reason to justify progress as a goal, and he does not. To understand 
List‘s emphasis on progress, we may benefit from having a look at the 
traditional use of the concept. 
Belief in progress is not ‗given by nature‘, since it is just one of many 
possible and actual world views. As opposed to the Western dissatisfac-
tion with the present and high valuation of change and progress,  Aus-
tralian Aborigines believe in preserving the perfect present and have no 
words for ‗time‘, ‗history‘, ‗future‘ or ‗progress‘ as implying a different 
state and situation.35 Expressed in ideal types the difference is this: 
Whereas the daily task for the individual in traditional societies is to 
confirm the collectively given, the task in modern societies is to negate 
the given.  
                                       
35 Are these traditional cultures therefore primitive? The Australian Aborigi-
nes have survived in extremely harsh environments for 55 000 years, and 
proves that these cultures are sustainable. Their system of family relationships 
with more than 100 concepts is by far the most complex in the world. Their my-
thology with thousands of nature spirits is also complex and penetrates their 
daily life.  Here, human beings are caretakers of nature in a mutually beneficial 
symbiosis. All human individuals live in a parallel dreamworld before and after 
earthly life, and communication with the forefathers guides daily life. Their 
closely related social codes of behaviour are correspondingly intricate. Similar 
perceptions of time, nature, mythology, and daily life can be found for instance 
with tribes in western Amazonas, Brazil. 
The culture of these tribes is not primitive in the sense of being simple. They 
just happen to have a different understanding of what the world is and there-
fore carry different values.  Their ontology is different, and their individual and 
social goals and evaluations are adjusted to this. Their material technology can 
also be complex and sophisticated, such as the making of a multi-material, 
multilayer and ―sandwiched‖ hunting bow in the Amazon River delta, a highly 
impressive work of technical insight and handicraft. Their culture is different, 
but not primitive in the sense of being simple. Their culture is rather traditional 
and is therefore primitive in the sense of being first, as in the Latin "primus‖, 
since it has not changed (for a long time). Their focus is on conservation rather 
than change, as in modern societies. 
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In traditional societies, the satisfied and social individual seeks to 
maintain society‘s repetitious path, whereas in modern societies the 
dissatisfied and lonely individual seeks to change society‘s and history‘s 
repetitious path. 
With List‘s strong emphasis on progress and synonymous terms like 
advancement, improvement and betterment, he belongs to an ancient 
tradition in Western thought that basically values change, deeming the 
present as imperfect. In List‘s contemporary Germany belief in progress 
had taken a turn that valued progress on immaterial areas especially 
much, such as individual freedom and morality (Cf. Kant, 1784 and 
1790, F 2, B 2).  
A scholar in the study of the concept of progress, the sociologist Rob-
ert Alexander Nisbet writes,   
 
For two Centuries the dominant philosophy in Western Europe had been 
progressive. There were exceptions, … But … these occasional doubts are 
negligible. (Nisbet, 1966, p. 266) 
 
Nisbet later elaborated further on this problem in his book Social 
Change and History: Aspects of the Western Theory of Development 
(Nisbet, 1969), and wrote in 1980 in his History of the Idea of Progress 
that, 
 
No single idea has been more important than...the Idea of Progress in 
Western civilization for three thousand years. (Nisbet, 1980, p. 4) 
 
In Nisbet‘s article The Idea of Progress he asks for the content of this 
concept,  
 
The essence of the Western idea of progress can be simply stated: man-
kind has advanced in the past, is now advancing, and may be expected to 
continue advancing in the future. But what, it will be asked, does "advance" 
mean? (Nisbet, 1979) 
 
Nisbet defines five "crucial premises" of Idea of Progress: 
1. Value of the past 
2. Nobility of Western civilization 
3. Worth of economic/technological growth 
4. Faith in reason and scientific/scholarly knowledge obtained 
through  
reason 
5. Intrinsic importance and worth of life on earth. 
 
We shall not delve too long on this issue, but since ―progress‖ is the 
founding stone of all Western economic growth- and development theo-
ry36 as a road to ―modernity‖, we can hardly escape dealing with the is-
                                       
36 ―Progress‖ also was a core of all the political ideologies from the 17th to the 
21th Centuries, such as Mercantilism, Liberalism, and (national and interna-
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sue. The word ―progress‖ is only secondarily derived from the Latin 
word progressus, meaning ―advance‖. ―Modernity‖ 37 implies a renuncia-
tion of the past, and therefore indirectly ―progress‖. 
For our purpose it is interesting to note that the Greek Stoics38 used 
the original term prokoptein39 to denote improvement in morality and 
skills. This usage which focused on personal attributes became the 
normal interpretation of the term for more than one millennium within 
Christian Europe. 
Social progress indicates dynamism and is derived from change over 
time. Theories of change that strive to introduce mental order into the 
sensually perceived chaos, can be cyclical, as in ancient societies like 
with the Stoics in Greece. Such mental efforts can also lead to linear 
theories of progress or dialectical theories, as with Hegel and Marx. The 
modern Western conception is linear.  
 
 
2.07 Progress and development 
 
Let us have a look at a core concept in economics, namely ―develop-
ment‖, which will bring us closer to the core of List‘s project. List has 
been characterised as, 
 
… a prophet of the ambitions of all underdeveloped nations. (Laue, 1963, p. 
57) 
 
Who has the legitimate authority to define (the content of) progress 
and development for others? This is often put forward as a reason that 
industrialised countries should not tell less industrialised countries 
that they lack something and therefore are of less value, somehow. Alt-
hough this may be a good point, it is still an extremely superficial point 
of view, if deeper and more principal matters are not reflected upon 
Development is by itself a relatively empty concept, and does not 
mean much more than change, pure and simple. It may be twisted into 
any shape and content we might prefer. What therefore must be em-
                                                                                                                
tional) Socialism. 
37 The term "modern" is derived from Latin modernus, with its roots in modo, 
meaning ―just now‖. It was used in the fifth century, distinguishing the Chris-
tian era from the Pagan era, then in the seventeenth-century, debating whether 
Modern culture was superior to Classical culture, etc. 
38 To the Stoics, prokoptein means approaching the divine state of the Sage 
(Sophos), a Stoic wise man who's happiness (eudaimonia) is based entirely on 
personal virtue, unaffected by circumstances. According to Plato (in his Sym-
posiym, the Sage had the wisdom the philosopher was searching for. (Plato, 
360 BC). 
39 The further origin of progress is disputed but most scholars agree that it 
may be derived from prokoptein, or prokope, a Greek word that literally means 
to cut away the trees and the undergrowth and remove obstacles from a road, 
making travel easier.  
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phasised and questioned is the goal of development, the deliberate con-
tent of development that we decide upon. The concept of ‗progress‘, 
however, has more meaning since it implies advance, perfection to-
wards a goal. This was also the concept that List preferred. 
Furthermore, the methods to get there are called into question, and 
thereby the ethics of action. Thus, we enter the philosophical and reli-
gious arenas. These questions of goal and method can neither be decid-
ed by social scientists as such, nor by any other scientist - in a more 
proper understanding of the word. This concerns the Image of Man, the 
meaning of our short and limited life on earth. In Germany at his time 
the philosophical school of so-called German Idealism was dominant to 
a degree we can hardly imagine today. Respect for this tradition was 
grand among the German peoples and especially so with German acad-
emicians and economists who were far more philosophically inclined 
than today.  
The question that must be asked was: What is Man, and do we want 
her to be? The answer would have to be somewhere between Man as 
spirit and as matter- situated between God and Animal, although ad-
mittedly many animals share a considerable amount of spirit. 
The answer would have dire consequences for Man's individual free-
dom since the image and goal, Man as Animal, would leave out individ-
ual freedom and instead let collective biological instincts dominate – in 
other words focus on consumption. On the other hand, the goal: Man 
as God, pure spirit or reason, would direct attention to the potential of 
in principle limitless creativity, i.e. individual freedom – in other words 
focus on production.   
We notice at once the contrast to British Utilitarianism (e.g. J. Ben-




2.08 Believer in progress 
 
Friedrich List is a true believer in progress, and that Man can change 
immaterial and material conditions for the better. This is a deep rooted 
concept in Western thought, permeating Christianity, and perhaps 
Protestantism exceptionally so40 
What did List mean by progress? He does not seem to define the con-
cept, but uses it in connection with advance, improvements and re-
finements in morality, intellect and matter. It can be assumed from the 
quotations below that List is a firm believer in progress and the likes: 
Growth, betterment and advancement, besides enlightenment, civilisa-
tion, modernity and freedom.  
List‘s lacking discussion of the issue may have roots in List‘s con-
temporary society, which in many respects differs significantly from the 
                                       
40 Cf. e.g. Houston, 1988, p. 35; and Windelband, 1893, p. 427, see quota-
tion in the section Perfecting the State, in chapter 5. 
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relative opulence; indolence; and value-relativity of modern industrial 
nations today (or at least until recently, before the consequences of the 
crisis of 2007). 
Within a culture permeated with Christian devotion, as in List‘s time, 
it was most likely seen as superfluous even to question progress in mo-
rality and civilisation as a goal. In an age of physical toil, incurable ill-
nesses, and short life-spans, it was most likely seen as superfluous to 
question technological progress as a goal. In an age of material want, it 
was most likely seen as superfluous to question material progress as a 
goal. Furthermore, material progress was seen also by List as a precon-
dition for cultural progress.  
By promoting a progressive state and a progressive nation (Cf. List, 
1837a, p. 44 and List, 1841a, Introduction, in Hirst, 1909, pp. 287-288), 
List makes it clear that he wants progress to be a continuous and on-
going process with no end, reaching ever higher levels. 
In the texts List wrote himself in English (List, 1827b) he uses the 
world progress, and in French likewise (List, 1837a). In German (e.g. 
List, 1841a,) he uses the word ―Fortschritt‖, which literary translated 
means ‗forward step‘, aka. to ‗step forward‘, in the sense of advance-
ment and make headway. In the translations into UK English and US 
English, the German word ―Fortschritt‖ is translated as the English 
word ‗progress‘. 
His writings are flooded with evidence of the fundamental role that 
progress plays in his view of life and the world, and therefore in his the-
ories. I will use a few quotations to illustrate this, but will first mention 
that he uses the term ‗progress‘ more than four times more often, after 
returning to Europe from his stay in America, even when adjusting for 
the length of the books:41 
 
Outlines (1827): progress: 6; advance: 26; improve 28 
Natural System (1837): progress: 89; advance: 68; improve 45 
National System (1841): progress: 136; advance:  112; improve 107 
 
The quotations below have been structurally arranged according to 
themes (my emphasis, with bold letters). The quotations have not been 
chosen to give a representative resume of List‘s system, but simply to 
illustrate some of his uses of the concept of progress. 
List sees progress in civilisation and material circumstances as 
praiseworthy, and regards the standards of education, morality and po-




Industry and technology as culture 
 
                                       
41 The National System is about 80 % longer than The Natural System and 
four times longer than Outlines. 
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German industry, … made admirable progress … (List, 1827b, p. 173) 
 
When the highest degree of progress in navigation and maritime power 
has been reached, a new era will set in, no doubt; … (List, 1841a, p. 45) 
 
Finally, a nation should not regard the progress of industries from a 
purely economic point of view. Manufactures become a very important part 
of the nation‘s political and cultural heritage. (List, 1837a, p. 39) 
 
Liberty - in economics and politics 
 
… Following these examples every responsible government should strive 
to remove those obstacles that hinder the progress of civilisation and 
should stimulate the growth of those economic forces that a nation carries 
in its bosom. (List, 1837a, pp. 42-43) 
 
Quoting Jean-Baptiste Say, List comments, 
 
―It is only indirectly that political liberty may be more favourable (than a 
dictatorship) to economic prosperity - or for that matter to the progress of 
cultural activities". All history refutes this notion. The truth is the very op-
posite. (List, 1837a, p. 40, fn.1) 
 
Education, morality, and politics  
 
Educational facilities will be extended and better standards of morality 
will be established. Political institutions, too, will be improved. In this way a 
backward nation can develop into a progressive state. (List, 1837a, p. 44) 
 
List points to the need for regulations,  
 
But politics demands, in the interests of each separate nation, guaran-
tees for its independence and continued existence, special regulations to 
help its progress in culture, prosperity, and power, to build its society into a 
perfectly complete and harmoniously developed body politic, self-contained 
and independent. (List, 1841b, Introduction, in Hirst, 1909, p. 291) 
 
The Nation and the individual 
 
The progress of the individual is dependent on the progress of the whole 
nation.  
From the nation they draw all the benefits of civilisation, enlightenment, 
progress, and social and political institutions, as well as advances in the 
arts and sciences. (List, 1837a, p. 30) 
 
We have already observed that the fortunes or misfortunes of individuals 
are dependent upon the maintenance of the independence and progress of 






Nations should aid each other in the process of progressing. Towards 
England, List is critical as well as grateful, 
 
It is indeed strange to see at the same time the present Ministry of Eng-
land ... jealously watch to prevent every progress of other rival nations, par-
ticularly of the United States. (List, 1827b, p. 246) 
 
It is no more than fair that England, now that she has attained the 
culminating point of her industrial growth and progress, should restore 
again to the nations of Continental Europe a portion of those productive 
forces which she originally derived from them. (List, 1841a, p. 56) 
 
The world has not been hindered in its progress, but immensely aided in 
it, by England. (List, 1841a, p. 365) 
 
List warns the USA against diluting the union,42 
 
As the Roman military power was weakened by the extension of their ter-
ritory, so, I fear, the power, the progress of civilization, the national 
strength of this union would be checked by an additional accession of 
states. (List, 1827b, p. 200) 
 
Free trade  
 
List sees a need for poor nation to learn from more developed nations 
through free trade, and Russia progressed in this way, but Germany 
has developed to such a degree in commercial policy that she will not be 
fooled, 
 
The economic betterment of a nation which is at a low level of intelligence 
and culture, or in which the population is small in relation to the extent 
and productivity of its territory, is best accomplished through free trade 
with highly cultivated, rich, and industrious nations. In the case of such a 
country every restriction of trade, intended to plant manufacturing industry 
within its borders, is premature and injurious, not only to the welfare of 
mankind in general, but to the progress of the nation itself. Only when the 
intellectual, political, and economic education of the nation has so far ad-
vanced as a result of free trade that its further progress would be checked 
and hindered by the import of foreign manufactures and the lack of a suffi-
cient market for its own goods, can protective measures be justified. . (List, 
1841b, Introduction, in Hirst, 1909, p. 312) 
 
Russia owes her first progress in civilisation and industry to her 
intercourse with Greece, to the trade of the Hanseatic Towns with Novgorod 
and (after the destruction of that town by Ivan Wassiljewitsch) to the trade 
which arose with the English and Dutch, in consequence of the discovery of 
the water communication with the coasts of the White Sea. (List, 1841a, p. 
68) 
 
                                       
42 This warning is as timely for the EU 150 years thereafter. 
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For even now we Germans have made sufficient progress in commercial 
politics to make the idea that we can be paid in moonshine and empty 
promises seem absurd and insulting. (List, 1841b, Introduction, in Hirst, 




List underlines the danger of falling behind, the reason being that this 
would undermine a nation‘s independence and freedom of action, as 
well as its future well-being. And the danger is larger the more the rest 
of the world advances, 
 
For the more rapid the growth of a spirit of industrial invention and im-
provement, of social and political reform, the wider becomes the gap be-
tween stationary and progressive nations, and the more dangerous it is to 
remain on the further side. (List, 1841b, Introduction, in Hirst, 1909, pp. 
287-288) 
 
… every nation which makes no forward progress sinks lower and lower, 
and must ultimately fall (List, 1841a, p. 8) 
 
 
2.09 List’s partial conversion from ‘free trade’ – according to List 
 
Studying the development of List‘s ideas is an interesting illustration of 
what it often takes to change a person‘s mind. At first List was a free 
trader; Trade without internal restrictions within the divided Germany 
was the road to national prosperity and progress. Most people in the 
German speaking areas had become followers of Adam Smith, under 
influence of the dominating Cosmopolitan and universally oriented phi-
losophy of the late 18th Century‘s Enlightenment. Furthermore, Napole-
on‘s imposed protectionist ―Continental System‖ had been a disap-
pointment to many non-French. The general mood therefore was for lib-
eralism, freedom, and national emancipation.  
List says in 1841, that when he started to doubt the free trade dog-
ma, it was the state of Germany that triggered him to change his views 
and continued to do so, 
 
It was the state of his own country which more than twenty years ago 
roused in him the first doubts in its infallibility. It has been the state of his 
own country which has induced him since then, in many unsigned articles, 
and, finally, in longer essays under his own name, to develop views opposed 
to the prevailing theory. And to-day it is still mainly the interests of Germa-
ny which have emboldened him to come forward with this book, although 
he cannot deny that a personal consideration has also influenced him. This 
is, the obligation he feels to make clear through a work of some length that 
he is not entirely unqualified to speak a word on questions of political econ-




List starts his third letter in 1827 by describing the impolite manners 
of his opponents such, 
 
The system of Adam Smith has assumed so great an authority that those 
who venture to oppose it, or even to question its infallibility, expose them-
selves to be called idiots. Mr. Say, throughout his whole work, is in the hab-
it of calling all objections to his sublime theory the opinion of the rabble, 
vulgar views, etc., etc. Mr. Cooper on his part, probably finding it not quite 
proper to speak in this country as much as the Parisian about rabble popu-
lation, etc., uses the term ‖ignorance." He regrets very much that both the 
Pitts, as well as Mr. Fox, were such blockheads as not to conceive even the 
fundamental principle of the sublime theory. These infallible theorists as-
sure us, as gravely as modestly, that minds like those of Edward III., Eliza-
beth, Colbert, Turgot, Frederick II., Joseph II., Pitt, (i) Fox, Napoleon Bona-
parte, Washington, Jefferson, Hamilton, a chart of the minds of the most 
enlightened men of all ages, were not enlightened enough to comprehend 
the true principles of political economy. (List, 1827b, Letter 3, p. 41) 
 
List then describes his gradual conversion from a free trader to what 
I prefer to call a pragmatist, and I find his personal description of the 
background for his conversion to be of great importance,  
 
Though, therefore, an opponent of Mr. Say finds himself in tolerable good 
company amongst the ignorant, yet I consider it necessary to state that, 
during many years I was not only a very faithful disciple of Smith and Say, 
but a very zealous teacher of the infallible doctrine; that I not only studied 
the works of the masters, but also those of their ablest disciples in England, 
Germany, and France, with some assiduity and perseverance, and that I did 
not become a convert till arrived at the age of maturity. I saw then in my 
native country the admirable effects of what is called the continental system 
and the destroying effects of the return of what they call trade after the 
downfall of Napoleon. (List, 1827b, Letter 3, p. 41) 
 
List then describes in some detail the development of the German 
economy, as the reason for his conversion, 
 
German industry, though fostered but partially by the continental sys-
tem, because enjoying protection only against English competition and re-
maining exposed to French competition, whilst the borders of France were 
closed to it, made admirable progress during that time, not only in the dif-
ferent branches of manufactured industry, but in all branches of agricul-
ture, which, though labouring under all the disadvantages of the wars and 
of French despotic measures, were flourishing. All kinds of produce were in 
demand and bore high prices, and wages, rents, interest of capital, prices of 
land, and of every description of property were consequently enhanced. But 
after the downfall of the continental system, after having acquired the en-
joyment of English goods a great deal cheaper than the nation could manu-
facture them, the manufactures languished. The agriculturists and noble 
land proprietors were at first much pleased to purchase at so low a price, 
particularly the wool growers who sold their wool to England at very high 
prices. The principles of Smith and Say were highly talked of. But the Eng-
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lish, after having acquired the German market for their manufactures, did 
not hesitate to foster their landed interests too by corn and woollen bills; 
the price of wool and grain, and in consequence rents, wages, and property 
in Germany sunk more and more, and the most ruinous effects followed. 
(List, 1827b, Letter 3, pp. 41-42) 
 
List admits his failure to understand and from this concluded to con-
vert from being a free trader, not from pure theoretical analysis but ra-
ther since ―I judged the tree by its fruit‖, 
 
The contemplation of these effects induced me first to doubt of the infal-
libility of the old theory. My eyes being not sharp enough to discover at a 
glance the errors of a system so ingeniously built up and supported by so 
many valuable truths, I judged the tree by its fruit. I conceived that, as a 
theory in medicine, however ingeniously invented, and however supported 
by brilliant truths, must be fundamentally erroneous if it destroys the life of 
its followers, so a system of political economy must be wrong if it effects 
just the contrary of that which every man of common sense must be sup-
posed to expect from it. (List, 1827b, Letter 3, p. 43) 
 
List then describes the start of the national movement for a new eco-
nomic policy, in which he took a central part, 
 
In consequence of this conviction I came out openly against the followers 
of this theory, and so popular was this opposition that in a few weeks a so-
ciety of many thousands of first-rate manufacturers, merchants, etc., dis-
persed throughout the whole ancient German Empire, was founded, for the 
purpose of establishing a system of German national economy. Elected 
their counsellor I visited, accompanied by deputies of the society, the differ-
ent courts of Germany (and the Congress of German Ministers held at Vi-
enna in 1820) in order to induce the several Governments of the necessity 
of such a system. All people, in the interior, were convinced at last of this 
necessity, agriculturists, wool growers, proprietors of estates, as well as 
manufacturers.  
No opposition was heard anywhere, except in the Hanse towns and in the 
city of Leipzig, and even there none but the agents of English firms and the 
bankers, whose momentary interests were at stake, took part in this oppo-
sition. These adversaries of the common welfare were headed and support-
ed by a few learned disciples of Smith and Say, who, either offended in their 
literary pride by the opposition against a theory, the development and illus-
tration of which formed their literary renown, or bound by personal inter-
ests and by their situation, still rode on the old hobby-horse of free trade, 
and harped upon its beneficial effects, whilst free intercourse was checked 
in every possible way by foreign restrictions.  
The most enlightened theorists of the interior, on the contrary, gave way 
to the principles of the society, …. (List, 1827b, Letter 3, pp. 43-45) 
 
It is therefore evident that List changed his mind while living in Ger-
many, and based on German experience.  We may therefore not say, as 
some do, that List had changed his mind after his contact with the 
American economists and -experience, and thereafter argues for protec-
50 
 
tion, as in his Outlines (Cf. List, 1827b). Nevertheless, he may be said to 
have sharpened and broadened his argument with time. One instance 
of the influence of this experience (as well as his visit in London in 
1824), and according to his own words, it was in the USA that his eyes 
were opened to the importance of internal communication, concerning 
the matter of promoting a national (home) market and transport being a 
productive force in its own.  
Quite consistent with the views of Adam Smith (Smith, 1776, book 
IV, ch. II, p. 39, p. 468 in the Liberty edition), List suggested, in his pe-
tition to the German Federal Assembly in Frankfurt a. M. (Cf. List, 
1819), that Germany should establish a national customs union and 
abolish the 38 customs borders in order to establish an efficient inter-
nal free trade.  
Furthermore, he suggested that it adopt an external policy of retalia-
tory duties, as this would be a good policy in order to force other trad-
ing nations to comply with free trade. Whereas Smith argues for retalia-
tion as a temporary measure, List argues for retaliation as a permanent 
measure. In practice, however, the difference might be negligible.  Later, 
however, List argues strongly against such retaliatory practices (Cf. 
List, 1841a, ch. 18, pp. 318-319) and claimed that any arrangement of 
duties, customs should serve the long-term needs of the productive 
powers. It is clear that already in his early period, the ultimate goal of 
this policy was an elevated civilisation through the instrument of free 
trade. We can also notice the early ideas on a stage theory, when he ar-
gues for  
 
… the cause of general free trade, by which Europe alone can reach the 
highest stage of civilisation. (List, 1819, p. 492) 
 
In the so-called Vienna Memorandum and letters to Count Metternich 
(Cf. List, 1820), List argues likewise, 
 
… and alone in this way can we achieve world free trade which uniquely 
seems to represent means through which we may reach the highest stage of 
human welfare. (List, 1820, p. 539) 
 
His writings referred to above point out the injustice that whereas ex-
ternally produced British goods were imported more or less freely to the 
German states, ―internally‖ produced German products were faced with 
considerably higher duties. He also argues for imposition of a general 
externally oriented duty.  
 
 
2.10 The Mercantile- and the Manufacturing System  
 
List writes in the preface to The National System that although he was 





I have been accused by the popular school, of merely seeking to revive 
the (so-called) ‗mercantile‘ system. But those who read my book will see 
that I have adopted in my theory merely the valuable parts of that much-
decried system, whilst I have rejected what is false in it; … (List, 1841a, p. 
xxx) 
 
Of interest to the student of international law concerning interna-
tional economic co-operation, List argues that a mutually beneficial pol-
icy of a harmony of interests had to be regulated on both the national 
and the international arenas. Following Italian economists, he distin-
guishes between two types of economic policy historically before Smith; 
that of the mercantile system and that of the manufacturing system (Cf. 
List, 1837a, p. 178). He favours the latter. I might prefer to call the two 
systems variations within the mercantile system as this would be more 
consistent with historical practice. I would prefer to call these two vari-
ants Prosper They Neighbour Policy and Beggar Thy Neighbour Policy 
while admitting that there is no exact delineation between these.43 List 
may have a heuristic point, though, when singling out one "moral" and 
one "immoral" system, in naming these with entirely different names. 
List writes, 
 
THE TWO FUNDAMENTAL principles of the mercantile system were that 
a country can prosper only at the expense of another country and that na-
tional wealth consists purely of precious metals. … This policy is derived 
from the myopic view of merchants …  
It would be a mistake to confuse the "mercantile system" with the 
"manufacturing system" with the "manufacturing system" and to condemn 
them both in the same breath. The manufacturing system was described by 
certain writers before Colbert's day. It was first practised by the English 
government and was later copied by Colbert. The Italians called this system 
"Colbertism" and they differentiated between the "mercantile system" and 
the "manufacturing system". Supporters of the "manufacturing system" do 
not suggest that a country can prosper only at the expense of another 
country. Their object is to enrich all the citizens in a country … (List, 
1837a, p. 178) 
 
 
2.11 Colbert’s legacy  
 
The French Minister of Finance under Louis XIV is often put forward as 
the archetype of protectionism against which Smith rebelled. It ought to 
be remembered that there were geopolitical aspects embedded in this 
economic strife and –debate. There was accordingly every reason for the 
British to ridicule a man who managed to strengthen Britain‘s arch-
enemy.  
                                       
43 This would be in line with the names chosen by Prime Minister Mahathir 
in his address at the annual conference of the IMF and IBRD (World Bank) in 
Hong Kong 1997. 
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List claims that Colbert‘s project was adopted from British practice 
but doomed on French soil because of the lack of political freedom, 
 
Colbert appears to us not to have been the inventor of that system which 
the Italians have named after him; for, as we have seen, it was fully elabo-
rated by the English long before his time. Colbert only put in practice what 
France, if she wished to fulfil her destinies, was bound to carry out sooner 
or later. If Colbert is to be blamed at all, it can only be charged against him 
that he attempted to put into force under a despotic government a system 
which could subsist only after a fundamental reform of the political condi-
tions. (List, 1841a, p. 114)  
 
And, continues List, had Colbert‘s system been allowed to continue, 
France might not have had a revolution and established herself as an 
efficient competitor to the dominance of England, 
 
But against this reproach to Colbert's memory it may very well be argued 
that, had his system been continued by wise princes and sagacious minis-
ters, it would in all probability have removed by means of reforms all those 
hindrances which stood in the way of progress in manufactures, agricul-
ture, and trade, as well as of national freedom; and France would then have 
undergone no revolution, but rather, impelled along the path of develop-
ment by the reciprocating influences of industry and freedom, she might for 
the last century and a half have been successfully competing with Eng-
land… (List, 1841a, p. 114) 
 
List defends Colbert against Adam Smith‘s accusations, and against 
later censorship of Colbert, in the following way, 
 
When this great statesman took office the French fleet had been ruined. 
The state no longer protected industry. There was a depression in agricul-
ture. Commerce was restricted by provincial customs duties. The public fi-
nances were in a state of disorder. (List, 1837a, p. 141) 
 
Colbert had the courage to grapple single-handed with an undertaking 
which England could only bring to a successful issue by the persevering ef-
forts of three centuries, and at the cost of two revolutions. 
A century later, the economists have sharply censured Colbert, and 
maintained that this statesman had been anxious to promote the interests 
of manufactures at the expense of agriculture: a reproach which proves 
nothing more than that these authorities were themselves incapable of ap-
preciating the nature of manufacturing industry.(2*) (List, 1841a, p. 69) 
 
List then describes how French statesmen fooled themselves into 
adopting free trade, ―in opposition to Colbert's policy‖, 
 
The melancholy condition to which the industry and the finances of 
France had been reduced by a long course of misgovernment, and the spec-
tacle of the great prosperity of England, aroused the emulation of French 
statesmen shortly before the French Revolution. Infatuated with the hollow 
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theory of the economists, they looked for a remedy, in opposition to Col-
bert's policy, in the establishment of free trade. (List, 1841a, p. 71) 
 
In The Natural System of Political Economy, List also defends Colbert, 
 
If ever a man has been accused of crime when, in fact, he showed the 
qualities of the highest statesmanship, that man was Colbert. But the ar-
guments of his critics are either senseless or are founded upon erroneous 
premises.44 To do full justice to Colbert it should be remembered that agri-
culture in France was hampered by a thousand restrictions during the pe-
riod of his great reforms. … (List, 1837a, pp. 142-143)  
 
After Colbert‘s death all the capacities of the country were monopolized 
by the royal court. …The fanaticism and extravagance of Louis XIV were 
enough to destroy the work of ten Colberts. … Colbert died in 1683 and two 
years later Louis XIV revoked the edict of Nantes. (List, 1837a, p. 144) 
 
It is most unfair to Colbert to blame him for the faults of the French con-
stitution, the stupidity of the government, the lack of patriotism of the aris-
tocrats, and the fury of the religious fanatics. (List, 1837a, p. 145) 
 
List also defends Colbert‘s forerunners, Cardinal Mazarin (1602 –
1661 and his mentor Cardinal Richelieu (1585-1642). Richelieu has of-
ten been ridiculed as an evil man in novels like Alexandre Dumas‘ The 
Three Musketeers and The Black Tulip (Dumas, 1850). List writes, 
 
                                       
44 2: We cite here Adam Smith‘s judgement of Colbert. In view of what we 
have said above we do not consider that we need to comment upon Adam 
Smith‘s criticism. Adam Smith wrote in The Nature and Causes of the Wealth 
of Nations: "Mr Colbert, the famous minister of Louis XIV, was a man of probi-
ty, of great industry, and knowledge of detail; of great experience and acute-
ness in the examination of public accounts, and of abilities in short, every way 
fitted for introducing method and good order into the collection and expendi-
ture of the public revenue. That minister had unfortunately embraced all the 
prejudices of the mercantile system, in its nature and essence a system of re-
straint and regulation, and such as could scarce fail to be agreeable to a labo-
rious and plodding man of business, who had been accustomed to regulate 
the different departments of public offices, and to establish the necessary 
checks and controls for confining each to its proper sphere. The industry and 
commerce of a great country he endeavoured to regulate upon the same model 
as the departments of a public office; and instead of allowing every man to pur-
sue his own interest in his own way, upon the liberal plan of equality, liberty, 
and justice, he bestowed upon certain branches of industry extraordinary privi-
leges, while he laid others under as extraordinary restraints. He was not only 
disposed, like other European ministers, to encourage more the industry of the 
towns than that of the country; but, in order to support the industry of the 
towns, he was willing even to depress and keep down that of the country". (Eve-




After he had suppressed the nobles Cardinal Richelieu turned his atten-
tion to the economy and he tried to expand the expansion of trade and in-
dustry. … Cardinal Mazarin promoted the establishment of cloth workshops 
…. But all Mazarin‘s efforts had insignificant results compared with the 
achievements of Colbert in Louis XIV‘s reign. (List, 1837a, p. 141) 
 
List claims that if Colbert been allowed to proceed, the Physiocratic 
system would never have come to light, since it applied only to tempo-
rary circumstances in France, 
 
Had the great enterprise of Colbert been permitted to succeed -- had not 
the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, the love of splendour and false ambi-
tion of Louis XIV, and the debauchery and extravagance of his successors, 
nipped in the bud the seeds which Colbert had sown -- if consequently a 
wealthy manufacturing and commercial interest had arisen in France, if by 
good fortune the enormous properties of the French clergy had been given 
over to the public, if these events had resulted in the formation of a power-
ful lower house of Parliament, by whose influence the feudal aristocracy 
had been reformed -- the physiocratic system would hardly have ever come 
to light. That system was evidently deduced from the then existing circum-
stances of France, and was only applicable to those circumstances. (List, 
1841a, p. 343) 
 
The Physiocrats were the sworn enemies of the State Mercantilist J.B. 
Colbert, and had reacted against Colbert's encroachment on the liber-
ties and privileges of the French landed interest as well as on the ex-
cesses and corruption of the French administrative system, mainly after 
the time of Colbert. Likewise, A. Smith, the student of Physiocracy, of-
ten criticises Colbert for his mercantilist and regulatory-dirigist policies.  
But List claims, that while the Physiocrats attacked Colbert‘s system, 
in reality they dealt a sound blow at the privileges of the landowners, 
 
The great merit of this system was, that it bore the appearance of an at-
tack made on the policy of Colbert and on the privileges of the manufactur-
ers, for the benefit of the landowners; while in reality its blows told with 
most effect on the special privileges of the latter. Poor Colbert had to bear 
all the blame of the sufferings of the French agriculturists, while neverthe-
less everyone knew that France possessed a great industry for the first time 
since Colbert's administration; and that even the dullest intellect was aware 
that manufactures constitute the chief means for promoting agriculture and 
commerce. The Revocation of the Edict of Nantes -- the wanton wars of Lou-
is XIV -- the profligate expenditure of Louis XV -- were utterly ignored by 
these philosophers. (List, 1841a, p. 345) 
 
 
2.12 Napoleon’s legacy 
 
List claims that in spite of the wars of the revotionary period and 
therafter, the industry which was protected by Napoleon‘s continental 




Notwithstanding that the commotions of the Revolution and the 
incessant wars of Napoleon could not have been favourable to the 
prosperity of French industry notwithstanding that the French lost during 
this period most of their maritime trade and all their colonies, yet French 
manufactories, solely from their exclusive possession of their home 
markets, and from the abrogation of feudal restrictions, attained during the 
Empire to a higher degree of prosperity than they had ever enjoyed under 
the preceding ancien régime. The same effects were noticeable in Germany 
and in all countries over which the Continental blockade extended. (List, 
1841a, p. 72) 
 
List admires Napoleon‘s insight in economic affairs and his economic 
policy, which promoted  manufacture, credit, inventions and internal 
communication - and furthermore was critical to the policy of free 
trade. Therefore, List regrets the unfair judgment this ―enlightened‖ and 
―great genius‖ had received, 
 
Napoleon said in his trenchant style, that under the existing 
circumstances of the world any State which adopted the principle of free 
trade must come to the ground. In these words he uttered more political 
wisdom in reference to the commercial policy of France than all 
contemporary political economists in all their writings. We cannot but 
wonder at the sagacity with which this great genius, without any previous 
study of the systems of political economy, comprehended the nature and 
importance of manufacturing power. Well was it for him and for France that 
he had not studied these systems. 'Formerly,' said Napoleon, 'there was but 
one description of property, the possession of land; but a new property has 
now risen up, namely, industry.' Napoleon saw, and in this way clearly 
enunciated, what contemporary economists did not see, or did not clearly 
enunciate, namely, that a nation which combines in itself the power of 
manufactures with that of agriculture is an immeasurably more perfect and 
more wealthy nation than a purely agricultural one. What Napoleon did to 
found and promote the industrial education of France, to improve the 
country's credit, to introduce and set going new inventions and improved 
processes, and to perfect the means of internal communication in France, it 
is not necessary to dwell upon in detail, for these things are still too well 
remembered. But what, perhaps, does call for special notice in this 
connection, is the biassed and unfair judgment passed upon this 
enlightened and powerful ruler by contemporary theorists. (List, 1841a, p. 
73) 
 
Nevertheless, List was not devoid of criticism towards Napoleon‘s 
Contentental Alliance, and argues that Napoleon replaced English 
dominance with French dominance. This provoked the other Conti-
nental nations to the degree that he contributed to a long-lasting na-
tionalist renaissance,  
 
… it must not be ignored that Napoleon desired to give effect to this idea 
(right in itself) in a manner which was contrary to the independence and to 
the interests of the other Continental powers. The Continental system of 
Napoleon suffered from three capital defects. In the first place, it sought to 
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establish, in the place of the English maritime supremacy, a French Conti-
nental supremacy; it sought the humiliation, or destruction and dissolu-
tion, of other nationalities on the Continent for the benefit of France, in-
stead of basing itself on the elevation and equalisation of the other Conti-
nental nations. Furthermore, France followed herself an exclusive commer-
cial policy against the other countries of the Continent, while she claimed 
for herself free competition in those countries. Finally, the system almost 
entirely destroyed the trade between the manufacturing countries of the 
Continent and tropical countries, and found itself compelled to find a reme-
dy for the destruction of this international trade by the use of substituted 
articles. (List, 1841, pp. 421-422)45 
 
 
2.13 The American System 
 
The American System can shortly be described as an economic strategy 
that uses 1) High tariff walls to protect domestic production; 2) A na-
tional bank to secure a stable domestic currency; and both were in-
tended to finance internal improvements like transport and education. 
As mentioned in chapter one, List wrote twelve letters to the National 
Gazette, which then were published as Outlines of American Political 
Economy (Cf. List, 1827b), hailed nationally as a textbook of the Ameri-
can System (of Economics), as opposed to the British System (non-
regulated free trade). This influenced Congress in passing the "Tariff of 
Abominations" in 1828, making List partially responsible for the intro-
duction of the protectionist US tariff laws of 1828, which opened the 
possibility of public nurture of infant industries, and thereby laid the 
basis for the industrialisation of North America.  
List also contributed to US policy on a number of economic issues 
through his meetings, letters and speeches in the US, such as Letters to 
Governor Miles of Virginia (1828b), Harrisburg Address  (1828c), Re-
marks on Mr. Camreleg‘s Report on the Tariff (Cf. List, 1830a), and On a 
Commercial Treaty between France and the United States (Cf. List, 
1830b).  
List spent the rest of his life furthering the ideas of the American Sys-
tem of Political Economy, and his magnum opus The National System 
(Cf. List, 1841a) as well as the forgotten The German National-Transport-
System (Cf. List, 1838) were really efforts to transfer the US continental 
experience onto the European continent.   
List started out as a Liberal Nationalist, but in the US he soon be-
came a Liberal Continentalist. In addition to being termed a national 
strategy, The American System was often termed a continental strategy, 
since many held the opinion that the United States could only survive 
the political and economic pressure from the British Empire by expand-
ing across the North-American continent, opinions held by e.g. US Pres-
                                       
45 For more comments on Napoleon‘s system, see Ch. 6 in the section, A Eu-
ropean defence union. 
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ident John Quincy Adams. Friedrich List later held the similar opinions 
concerning Europe (Cf. List, 1841a, p. 270) 
Therefore List could also be termed a Continentalist, like Alexander 
Hamilton, John Quincy Adams and later James Knox Polk and Abra-
ham Lincoln.46 
In his Outline of an American Political Economy List forcefully defends 
the American System, and complains about the arrogance of his oppo-
nents who were motivated by private interests, 
 
… I confine my exertions, … , solely to the refutation of the theory of Adam 
Smith and Co., the fundamental errors of which have not yet been under-
stood so clearly as they ought to be.  
It is this theory, sir, which furnishes to the opponents of the American 
System the intellectual means of their opposition. It is the combination of 
the soi-disant theorists with those who believe themselves interested in the 
soi-disant free commerce, which gives so much seeming strength to the op-
posite party. Boasting of their imaginary superiority in science and 
knowledge, these disciples of Smith and Say are treating every defender of 
common sense like an empiric whose mental power and literary acquire-
ments are not strong enough to conceive the sublime doctrine of their mas-
ters.  
Unfortunately, the founders of this dangerous doctrine were men of great 
minds, whose talents enabled them to give their castles in the air the ap-
pearance of strong, well-founded buildings. The important truths they 
brought to light were the unhappy cause which gave to their whole system 
the credit of a doctrine too elevated to be questioned by future generations. 
This doctrine, sir, was embraced by the greater part of those who made pol-
itics their particular study, and after having admired a doctrine for ten or 
twenty years, found it difficult to divest themselves of it. It requires a mind 
of perfect independence to acknowledge that for so long a time we gave full 
credit to an erroneous system, particularly if that system is advocated by 
private interests. (List, 1827b, Letter I, pp. 17-19) 
 
List then declares war on behalf of the American System, by calling 
for theoretical efforts to combat the opponents of the American Sys-
tem, and develop an alternative.47  
The American System was a strategy that formulated a cluster of 
strategies for social modernisation in a globalised world, at the time 
when the world was dominated by the British Empire. It was an anti-
imperial strategy for national economic independence, as a prerequisite 
for political independence and freedom.  
                                       
46 Hamilton even signed many of his articles in the press with ―The Continen-
talist." Adams openly argued for a unification of the whole North-American Con-
tinent and Polk saw to the enlargement of the union by the inclusion of new 
territories like the states in the north east, Texas and California. Lincoln inte-
grated the continent by keeping the union intact and pressing forward con-
struction of the transcontinental railroads. 
47 Cf. List, 1827b, Letter I, p. 17-19; quoted in Ch. 3, in the section, Develop 
theory against Smith. 
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―The American System‖ has been seen as a reaction to ―The British 
System‖ of Free Trade, and is indeed seen as such by List. This is only 
correct within a narrow geographical frame and within a narrow time 
frame, between 1846 and 1873, and perhaps not even then, since on 
closer examination we see that the American System was moulded on 
the British System of national (imperial) self-sufficiency, 
 
It should be understood that fundamentally the elaborate system of eco-
nomic controls that were supposed to bind the British Empire in 1763 was 
in essence not only a protectionist system but one designed to make the 
Empire as nearly as possible economically self-contained. (Gipson, 1954, p. 
25) 
 
On the background of statistics, in his The Coming of the Revolution, 
1763-1775, Gipson claims that the American colonies were among the 
chief economic beneficiaries. Therefore, argues Gipson, the origin of the 
war of independence must be sought in political reasons, 
 
These trade statistics attest the fact that the British colonials of North 
America in 1763 were among the most fortunate people in the world and al-
so among the most enterprising. (Gipson, 1954, p. 19) 
 
While it is true that much has been written against the system, it is diffi-
cult to visualize one that would under given conditions have been better 
adapted to serve the ends of preserving and nurturing the colonies em-
braced within the old British Empire before 1763. That they themselves 
were among its chief beneficiaries can hardly be questioned in view of the 
impressive evidence of their unprecedented development in the course of 
the eighteenth century.  
But by 1763 the old British continental colonies were arriving not only at 
economic maturity, but at political maturity as well. (Gipson, 1954, pp. 26-
27) 
 
Without going further into this complex and heated debate, regarding 
trade policy it will serve our purposes to suggest that The American 
System was a copy of the British System, with two major differences. 
First, instead of making Britain the hub of the empire, the colonies 
themselves were to be the hub of their own system and secondly, the 
American System would promote universal progress as opposed to the 
British mercantilist System of ―beggar thy neighbour‖. But the latter 
was more a statement of intention than an engraved part of the system, 
and with time the international results of US policy were to be … let us 
say, debatable. 
We should nevertheless note that there is more to the American Sys-
tem than trade policy. List sees the English policy as imperial and de-
pendence-creating, whereas the American policy is seen as anti-
imperial and independence-creating, 
 
American national economy, according to the different conditions of the 
nations, is quite different from English national economy. English national 
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economy has for its object to manufacture for the whole world, to monopo-
lize all manufacturing power, even at the expense of the lives of the citizens, 
to keep the world and especially her colonies in a state of infancy and vas-
salage by political management as well as by the superiority of her capital, 
her skill and her navy. American economy has for its object to bring into 
harmony the three branches of industry, without which no national indus-
try can attain perfection. It has for its object to supply its own wants, by its 
own materials and its own industry — to people an unsettled country — to 
attract foreign population, foreign capital and skill — to increase its power 
and its means of defence, in order to secure the independence and the fu-
ture growth of the nation. It has for its object lastly to be free and inde-
pendent and powerful, and to let everyone else enjoy freedom, power and 
wealth as he pleases. 
English national economy is predominant; American national economy 
aspires only to become independent. (List, 1827b, Letter 2, p. 37) 
 
Furthermore, List argues that the American System also encourages 
the Christian idea of co-operation and harmony between capital and 
labour within the nation, serving to create a decent standard of living 
for the common workingman,  
 
As there is no similarity in the two systems, there is no similarity in the 
consequences of it. The country will not be overstocked with woollen goods 
any more than it is now overstocked with cabinet ware; the manufactories 
will not produce vice, because every labourer can earn enough to support 
his family honestly; nobody will suffer or starve from want of labour, be-
cause if the labourer cannot earn enough to support his family, otherwise 
he can cultivate the earth — there is yet room enough for hundreds of mil-
lions to become independent farmers. (List, 1827b, Letter 2, pp. 37-39) 
 
By providing labour with ample bargaining power and thus buying 
power, the American System contributes to avoid the ever returning 
problem of capitalism, namely underconsumption crises – or ‗overpro-
duction‘ as it is normally termed by Marxists. Therefore it also tends to 
reduce the drive for empire, intended to provide markets for the super-
fluous products. In other words, a balanced market and harmony at 
home leads to harmony abroad.  
The hub of this system and the intended effect would therefore be 
how to do exactly that; provide labour with ample buying power. And 
the solution was protection; protection against cheap labour - to im-
prove the position of national Labour, both regarding her skills and her 
bargaining power. These matters are tightly related: List emphasises 
that the workman is more efficient in manufacturing states, his time is 
therefore higher valued with higher wages. Higher wages makes it pos-
sible to entertain a better living standard and produce higher quality 
goods. 48  
                                       
48 This matter is also discussed in Chapter 4; in the section Social well-being 
improves economic efficiency. 
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As List pointed out (List, 1841a, p. 307), protection makes it more lu-
crative to establish oneself inside the tariff barriers - like e.g. the Japa-
nese did in the EU in the 1980s; and the industrial world‘s manufac-
turers thereafter did in China. Protection thus reverses the stream of 
Capital flight under free trade, to e.g. low wage countries, and partly 
makes it unnecessary to install Capital controls.  This potentially gives 
increased investment; another boost to the demand for Labour; and in-
creases her bargaining power, which spills back into increased demand 
for consumer products and potential profit for the investor.  
The prime reason for protection and the American System was pre-
cisely to secure labour and the established skills, and more so even ele-
vate them. The title of one of Horace Greeley‘s49 books is telling: Essays  
…. Serving To Explain and Defend The Policy of Protection to Home In-
dustry, As a System of National Cooperation For True Elevation of Labor 
(Greeley, 1875). By using the phrase ‗elevation‘, Greeley gives away the 
deeper intentions of the system: The task was to protect and improve 
mental capital. 
List developed much of his theory before he went to the USA. But he 
was severely influenced by his stay in the US, and gathered tools with 
which to strengthen his arguments. His later system can therefore only 
to some degree be seen as an adaption of the American modernisation 
strategy to Germany and other circumstances, 
 
List was a citizen of two worlds, the old and the new. He was not only the 
first German to have explored the economy of the United States scientifical-
ly, but, as an educator, he also made his own impression upon the cultural 
type in America then in the process of generation. And in the workshop of 
the new world, where he was welcomed to collaborate without prejudice, he 
wrought the armaments which enabled him to intervene in the cultural 
work of the old world with rekindled power. Thus, List is a mediator be-
tween Germany and the United States: both have a right to claim him, and 
both can be proud of him, but both also owe him the greatest gratitude. (In-
troduction, List, 1929-36, Werke, Vol. 2, p. 61)  
 
Alexander Hamilton is often regarded as a forerunner of F. List. 
Herbert Schneider writes of A.Hamilton, 
 
He called himself a "continentalist" and, ... Hamilton's economic 
nationalism ... certainly established American capitalism. ... Hamilton was 
exceptional in his time not only in being an ardent nationalist but also in 
basing his theory on political economy rather than on "the science of 
government." ... He had studied the classics, ... but his ideas were for the 
most part hammered out of military experience.  ... More significant than 
Hamilton's view of federalism was his analysis of politics in terms of power 
and of power in terms of money. During the dark days of the war, when he 
shared Washington's concern for the demoralized remnants of the army, he 
                                       
49 Another man was later named after Horace Greely; Hjalmar Horace Greeley 




became convinced that military power could only be revived on the basis of 
financial power. ... Political power is ultimately, according to Hamilton, 
based on credit. It was no jest when he insisted that a public debt is a 
public asset or when he defended an expensive government on the ground 
that since it needed more taxes it would get more power. He thought of 
government less in terms of legislation than of taxation. Maddison 
complained that Hamilton had no objection to using the "general welfare" 
clause of the Constitution for whatever concerns the "general interests of 
learning, of agriculture, of manufactures, and of commerce, ... as far as 
regards an application of money." Thus, to conceive of government as the 
active promotion of "general interests," instead of limiting it to "justice and 
equality," was indeed revolutionary in American Political theory. But it was 
the very essence of Hamilton's program, and he at once gave "to that 
government a tone and energy far beyond what was intended by the 
founders." 
From the point of view of money power Hamilton envisaged the nation, 
bound in "strict and indissoluble Union," as primarily a union of credit and 
of commerce. To fund the public debt, "consolidate" and expand credit in 
the hands of the Federal Government, seemed to him an elementary 
business necessity, and the objection that this would enrich speculators 
was no real objection to his mind. Fluid capital for industrial expansion was 
his prime concern, and if this power were concentrated in the hands of 
bankers and other investors, so much the better. Not the distribution of 
wealth, but the direction of wealth was what mattered in the end. 
Hamilton's great idea was to encourage manufacturing. ... The benefits of 
manufacturing, he argued, would be nationwide. In his famous Report on 
Manufactures (1791) he conspicuously applied Adam Smith's arguments for 
the diversion of labor on a national scale. Let the labor of America  be 
diversified, let the government give encouragement to those forms of labor 
that most need it, let there be free trade within the Union, and let America 
thus become an independent world power. (Schneider, 1946, pp.90-93) 
 
As is natural with List‘s far more extensive works, he discussed a 
broader range of issues than Hamilton, and had a more developed 
economic sociology than Hamilton‘s simple and mechanical perception 
of the productive powers, especially the innovative and co-operative 
aspects of economics, a matter which lies at the heart of understanding 
economic development.50 
The similarities between Hamilton and List are nevertheless many. 
Like Hamilton, List was occupied with the power- and military aspect of 
economics, and List also regarded the direction of wealth; into 
manufacturing, as of primoridial importance. Hamilton‘s focus on the 
financial side of power corresponds to that of List, as evident especially 
in List‘s National System .., Chapter 23: The Manufacturing Power and 
the Instrument of Circulation. (Cf. List, 1841a) and List also sees the 
remarkable portential in public credit.51 
                                       
50 These matters regarding the productive forces and Hamilton are discussed 
further in Chapter 4, in the sections Comments on List‘s approach to Capital of 
Mind and Confederation of Labour (Cf. List, 1841a). 





2.14 The Industrial System - and national unity 
 
After returning to Europe, List preferred to term his preferred economic 
policy not ‗the American System‘, but rather ‗the industrial system‘, and 
he differentiates it from Mercantilism.52 In his chapter on the industrial 
system (in National System), he writes of its three major benefits: These 
are an emphasis on manufacture, the means to attain manufacture, 
and both based on the idea of ‗the nation‘ and its changing conditions, 
 
The merits of the Industrial System as compared with later ones, are: 
1. That it clearly recognises the value of native manufactures and their 
influence on native agriculture, commerce, and navigation, and on the civi-
lisation and power of the nation; and expresses itself unreservedly to that 
effect. 
2. That it indicates what is in general the right means whereby a nation 
which is qualified for establishing a manufacturing power, may attain a na-
tional industry.(1*) 
3. That it is based on the idea of 'the nation,' and regarding the nations 
as individual entities, everywhere takes into account the national interests 
and national conditions. (List, 1841a, p. 339) 
 
List praises the national unity that the rise of monarchy led to, as 
opposed to the disunity under feudalism and aristocracy, leading to 
much greater efficiency, 
 
… This was an immeasurably more perfect commonwealth than the pre-
viously existing one, because the manufacturing power, which in the mu-
nicipal republic had been confined to a narrow range, now could extend it-
self over a wider sphere; because now all existing resources were placed at 
its disposition; because the division of labour and the confederation of the 
productive powers in the different branches of manufactures, as well as in 
agriculture, were made effectual in an infinitely greater degree; because the 
numerous classes of agriculturists became politically and commercially 
united with the manufacturers and merchants, and hence perpetual con-
cord was maintained between them; the reciprocal action between manu-
facturing and commercial power was perpetuated and secured for ever; and 
finally, the agriculturists were made partakers of all the advantages of civi-
lisation arising from manufactures and commerce. (List, 1841a, p. 339) 
 
List explains that the nation state is like an extended city, whose 
foundation lies in the mental powers, and as an effect in the political 
institutions etc., 
 
                                                                                                                
chapter 4 (Cf. also List, 1841a). 
52 In his National System, the title of Chapter 29 is The Industrial System 
(Falsely Termed by the School 'The Mercantile System') (List, 1841a, p.337). 
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The agricultural-manufacturing-commercial State is like a city which 
spreads over a whole kingdom, or a country district raised up to be a city. 
In the same proportion in which material production was promoted by this 
union, the mental powers must necessarily have been developed, the politi-
cal institutions perfected, the State revenues, the national military power, 
and the population, increased. Hence we see at this day, that nation which 
first of all perfectly developed the agricultural, manufacturing, and com-
mercial State, standing in these respects at the head of all other nations. 
(List, 1841a, p. 339) 
 
List‘s agricultural-manufacturing-commercial State is related to the 
Mercantilist nation state, as Arno Mong Daastøl writes,  
 
These city-states mostly functioned as enclave economies, which func-
tioned relatively, isolated from the hinterland. The first volume of 
Heckscher‘s (Heckscher, 1931) Mercantilism is appropriately entitled ‗Mer-
cantilism as a Unifying System‘ following Gustav Schmoller‘s first focus on 
this side to mercantilism (Schmoller, 1884). In its pursuit of power and 
wealth, state mercantilism fused the monarchic and municipal mercantilist 
traditions. This alliance between the King and the middle class - opposed to 
the feudal aristocracy - created a powerful instrument: The Nation-State.   
At the same time the expansion of markets through improved communi-
cation allowed for greater possibility of economics of scale, higher diversifi-
cation and production for niche markets and higher production for a mone-
tary market - as opposed to the barter market. The economies of scale al-
lowed for improved technology and made it possible for a higher percentage 
of the population to engage in new activities, again contributing to diversity, 
division of labour and economics of scale in a positive feed-back circle. The 
mercantilists‘ promotion of manufacturing also intended to emulate these 
positive effects of the city modelled as a huge productive machinery: the 
factory.  (Daastøl, 2000) 
 
Gustav von Schmoller in 1884 describes how Mercantilism was an 
absolutist state policy of unification and essentially; state making, 
 
Only he who thus conceives of mercantilism will understand it; in its in-
nermost kernel it is nothing but state making - … (Schmoller, 1884, p. 50) 
 
What, to each in its time, gave riches and superiority first to Milan, Venice, 
Florence, and Genoa; then, later, to Spain and Portugal; and now to Hol-
land, France, and England, and, to some extent, to Denmark and Sweden, 
was a state policy in economic matters, as superior to the territorial as that 
had been to the municipal. … (Schmoller, 1884, p. 48) 
 
…. It is now to be noticed that it was the ―enlightened,‖ more or less despot-
ic, monarchy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by which this 
movement was initiated and pushed forward. (Schmoller, 1884, p. 52) 
 
Schmoller furthermore describes how this unifying Mercantilism re-
sulted in ―the total transformation of society‖ and ―liberated a thousand 




The essence of the system lies not in some doctrine of money, or of the bal-
ance of trade; not in tariff barriers, protective duties, or navigation laws; 
but in something far greater: — namely, in the total transformation of socie-
ty and its organisation, as well as of the state and its institutions, in the re-
placing of a local and territorial economic policy by that of the national 
state. With this accords the fact, recently pointed out with regard to the lit-
erary history of the movement, that what is peculiar to all the mercantilist 
writers is not so much the regulations of trade which they propose for the 
increase of the precious metals as the stress they lay on the active circula-
tion of money, especially within the state itself.153  
The struggle against the great nobility, the towns, the corporations, and 
provinces, the economic as well as political blending of these isolated 
groups into a larger whole, the struggle for uniform measures and coinage, 
for a well-ordered system of currency and credit, for uniform laws and uni-
form administration, for freer and more active traffic within the land, - this 
it was which created a new division of labour, a new prosperity, and which 
liberated a thousand forces towards progress. (Schmoller, 1884, p. 51) 
 
 
2.15 Economic Nationalism  
 
- as a logical and practical response to economic pressure from abroad 
 
List claimed that ‗the Industrial System‘ (or ‗economic nationalism‘) was 
a natural and practical response to economic pressure from abroad. 
In his path breaking book, Marxism, China, & development: reflections 
on theory and reality, James A. Gregor (Gregor, 2000), points out the 
legacy of Mary Matossian‘s article Ideologies of Delayed Industrializa-
tion: Some tensions and Ambiguities (Matossian, 1966).  
Like List suggests concerning the Industrial System, Matossian 
claims that certain economic strategies must be understood as a logical 
response to certain pressures. Gregor explains, 
 
… In the 1960s, Mary Matossian argued that some of the most significant 
revolutionary ideologies of the twentieth century might best be understood 
as common functional responses to determinate historic, social, and eco-
nomic challenges. Some of the most important of those challenges arise 
when an industrially backward nation finds itself in sustained contact with 
those industrially advanced. The cultural, political, economic, and strategic 
disabilities associated with such contact produces a native intelligentsia in-
creasingly sensitive to their nation's vulnerabilities. Afflicted with a painful 
sense of inadequacy, they become increasingly receptive to the conviction 
that their community requires large-scale industrialization and moderniza-
tion if it is to regain control of its destiny.8  
Matossian argued that the ideologies emerging out of such circum-
stances display certain similarities. Among those ideologies sharing a family 
                                       
53 1) This is the main point in Bidermann‘s instructive lecture Ueber den 





resemblance, she identified Marxism-Leninism, Italian Fascism, Kemalism, 
Gandhism, the Indonesian Pantjasila, the Egyptian Philosophy of the Revo-
lution, and Sun Yat-sen's Saimin zhuyi. The suggestion was that Sun's ide-
ology might best be understood in broad comparative context, since it 
shares certain defining properties with a number of other contemporary 
doctrines. The similarity of ideas that animate such ideologies are conceived 
more than the consequence of personal contacts and mimetism; they are a 
function of a common collective psychology born of common problems and 
shared socioeconomic influences. None of this appears in Marxist theory, 
neither in the Marxist theory of revolution nor in the standard Marxist in-
terpretation of fascism. (Gregor, 2000, p. 51) 
 
A similar argument has been used to explain Syndicalism (trade un-
ion Socialism), that it is a so-to-speak ‗organic‘ response to economic 
pressures or to be more specific, a practical rank-and-file learning-by-
doing strategy. This as opposed to a more theoretical Marxist strategy 
developed in more or less academic circles.  
 
List describes what he calls Industrial System and claims that it was 
not described before Steuart. Although List is not explicit about this, it 
is fairly clear that this is supposed to be the same as the Manufacturing 
System. List explains that the Industrial System developed not as a 
theoretical system but as a system of practice, and that even James 
Stewart did not treat it in a scientific way, 
 
The Industrial System was not defined in writing, nor was it a theory de-
vised by authors, it was simply acted upon in practice, until the time of 
Stewart, who deduced it for the most part from the actual English practice, 
just as Antonio Serra deduced his system from a consideration of the cir-
cumstances of Venice. Stewart's treatise, however, cannot be considered a 
scientific work. The greater part of it is devoted to money, banking, the pa-
per circulation -- commercial crises -- the balance of trade, and the doctrine 
of population: -- discussions from which even in our day much may be 
learned, but which are carried on in a very illogical and unintelligible way, 
and in which one and the same idea is ten times repeated. The other 
branches of political economy are either superficially treated, or passed over 
altogether. (List, 1841a, p. 339)  
 
List argues that Steuart‘s analysis ignores most branches, and is lim-
ited to English circumstances,  
 
The other branches of political economy are either superficially treated, 
or passed over altogether. Neither the productive powers, nor the elements 
of price, are thoroughly discussed. Everywhere the author appears to have 
in view only the experiences and circumstances of England. In a word, his 
book possesses all the merits and demerits of the practice of England, and 
of that of Colbert. (List, 1841a, pp. 339-340) 
 
List in fact criticised even the industrial system for generalising pro-
tection and to encourage a prohibiting system of ineffective monopolies. 
Note in particular point 4, where he says that the system misleads peo-
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ple in unflavoured climates to adopt manufactures (Cf. tropical nations 
like Brazil and Indonesia today). The final point 7 concerns the system 
refusal to see a necessary future world government and universal free 
trade. List argues that this system is chargeable with the following chief 
faults: 
 
1. That it does not generally recognise the fundamental principle of the 
industrial development of the nation and the conditions under which it can 
be brought into operation. 
2. That it consequently would mislead peoples who live in a climate un-
suited for manufacturing, and small and uncivilised states and peoples, in-
to the adoption of the protective system. 
3. That it always seeks to apply protection to agriculture, and especially 
to the production of raw materials -- to the injury of agriculture -- whereas 
agricultural industry is sufficiently protected against foreign competition by 
the nature of things. 
4. That it seeks to favour manufactures unjustly by imposing restrictions 
on the export of raw materials, to the detriment of agriculture. 
5. That it does not teach the nation which has already attained manufac-
turing and commercial supremacy to preserve her own manufacturers and 
merchants from indolence, by permitting free competition in her own mar-
kets. 
6. That in the exclusive pursuit of the political object, it ignores the cos-
mopolitical relations of all nations, the objects of the whole human race; 
and hence would mislead governments into a prohibitory system, where a 
protective one would amply suffice, or imposing duties which are practically 
prohibitory, when moderate protective duties would better answer the pur-
pose. 
Finally. 
7. That chiefly owing to his utterly ignoring the principle of cosmopolitan-
ism, it does not recognise the future union of all nations, the establishment 
of perpetual peace, and of universal freedom of trade, as the goal towards 
which all nations have to strive, and more and more to approach. (List, 
1841a, pp. 340-341) 
 
List often criticised the (bad sides of the) mercantile system, but he 
also defended some aspects of it for the sake of historical truth, 
 
The Ministers of George I when they prohibited (in 1721) the importation 
of the cotton and silk fabrics of India did not assign as a reason for that 
measure that a nation ought to sell as much as possible to the foreigner, 
and buy as little as possible from him; that absurd idea was grafted on to 
the industrial system by a subsequent school; what they asserted was, that 
it is evident that a nation can only attain to wealth and power by the export 
of its own manufactured goods, and by the import from abroad of raw ma-
terials and the necessaries of life. England has followed this maxim of State 
policy to the present day, and by following it has become rich and mighty; 
this maxim is the only true one for a nation which has been long civilised, 
and which has already brought its own agriculture to a high degree of de-




2.16 Theory and practice 
 
Scientific method was close at heart to List, as was economic practice. 
He starts his 1837 treatise on the Natural System by discussing how 
economic theory has failed to improve economic practice, and gives 
three reasons why practical people should not listen to theoreticians,  
 
There are three reasons why men in public life, who shoulder great re-
sponsibilities, are justified in rejecting the principles laid down by doctri-
naire writers which are obviously incompatible with experience in everyday 
life. 
1. A great many economic doctrines have been put forward and the author 
of the newest theory always denounces the ideas of his predecessors as 
inadequate and erroneous. 
2. Since Colbert‘s day no one has succeeded in putting a new economic 
doctrine into practice. 
3. Economists never agree among themselves. (List, 1837a, p. 18) 
  
As a constructive alternative, List calls for a symbiosis where econo-
mists elaborate useful rules that can aid practical people, and practical 
people provide economists with facts, 
 
IN THE SCIENCE of economics, theory and practice are virtually divorced 
from one another - to the detriment of both. Economists condemn practical 
men as mere followers of routine who fail to appreciate either the truth or 
the grandeur of the doctrines enunciated by economists. Practical men, on 
the other hand, regard economists as mere doctrinaires who ignore the 
facts of life and inhabit a dream world of economic theories that exists only 
in their imagination. 
Consequently the science of economics has failed to achieve its noblest 
aim which should be to elucidate economic practices and to show how they 
can be improved. And for their part practical men have not changed since 
they are as much children of routine today as they always have been in the 
past. 
It is therefore certain that, in a more perfect world, economists would 
enunciate correct, reasonable and useful rules for practical men to fellow, 
while practical men would provide economists with facts and results which 
would confirm their theories and enable them to discover new doctrines. 
Anyone who is both an economist and a practical man cannot deny that 
errors have been committed by both parties.  … (List, 1837a, p. 17) 
 
 
2.17 Comparative- and historical method  
 
List‘s pioneering paper on land reform54 (Cf. List, 1842) is not only a 
layout of necessary legal reforms in agriculture. Its method is also in-
teresting, since it was a comparative empirical country study of law, 
before most accepted forerunners of historical jurisprudence adopted 
                                       
54 Die Ackerverfassung, die Zwergwirtschaft und die Auswanderung. (In Eng-
lish: ‗Agricultural Constitution, Small Business and Emigration‘). 
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the same method (except Savigny and Eichhorn). List had since long 
been occupied with this matter, which he had spoken on in details in 
Philadelphia in 1828 (Cf. List, 1828c). 
In his major works, like the Natural System (Cf. List, 1837a) and the 
National System (Cf. List, 1841a), List repeatedly compares countries 
and situations throughout history, and whilst judging and taking due 
notice of different circumstances and situations, he tries to understand 
patterns of economic development and formulate tendency ―rules‖, but 
never strict ―laws‖, exemplified with his theory of stages. In other words, 
he tries to generalise somewhat based on careful empirical observa-
tions. In 1841 List explains his method as based on historical studies, 
in order to extract principles that can be used to analyse present prob-
lems, 
 
In direct antagonism to the theory, the author first seeks the lessons of 
history, deduces from them his fundamental principles, develops them, 
subjects previous systems to a critical examination, and  finally (since his 
aim throughout is practical) explains the present position of commercial 
policy. (List, 1841b, Introduction, in Hirst, 1909, pp. 300-301) 
 
 List claims that his investigations followed an empirical- and real-
istic method, in the sense that his system is based on historical experi-
ence, - and it is not a rationally system based on ―a priori‖ axioms. List 
writes that he based his system on observations of ―actual life‖ and ―the 
real world‖, 
 
When afterwards I visited the United States, I cast all books aside - they 
would only have tended to mislead me. The best work on political economy 
which one can read in that modern land is actual life. (List, 1841a, p. xxix) 
 
We have not made any a priori assertions and then attempted to prove 
them. We have arrived at our conclusions by proving the truth of principles 
derived from what actually happens in the real world. (List, 1837a, p. 189) 
 
With his historical approach, he continues the evolutionism in the 
natural sciences of German Idealism, of e.g. Leibniz, Kant, Goethe, 
Schelling and Oken (Cf. Windelband, 1893, p. 656)55, and in particular 
the evolutionism in the social sciences of Hegel, who became the great-
est inspiration for the school in economics that succeeded List in Ger-
many, the Ethical-Historical School.  
With his realistic-, historical-, and ethical approach, List laid the 
foundations of the German Historical School of Economics, also called 
‗ethical-historical‘. These are all terms that later German economists 
                                       
55 Wilhelm Windelband here points out that the natural science of Galileo 
and Newton had been mechanically oriented, and that Darwin with his evolu-




used to characterise their approach, as pointed out by Wilhelm 
Roscher,  
 
The prevailing and dominant direction of economics has rightly been 
called Realistic.  … 
 When this direction possibly is carried through consequently, it must 
become historical. …  
This historical-realistic direction can also be called ethical. (Roscher, 
1874, pp. 1032-1034, my translation)56 
 
 
2.18 Realist and Idealist Methods 
 
To understand the logic of method in science it is helpful to observe the 
dichotomy, the principles or extremes pitted against each other. Materi-
alism versus idealism; one explains in terms of matter; individual 
things - and the other explains in terms of ideas; meanings in a struc-
tured setting. 
Materialism leads to nominalism and to methodological individualism 
because there is no inherent meaning in matter. A ―heap‖ of matter is 
thus haphazard and does not have anything but a random structure. 
For the same reason, materialism also leads to atomism; reductionism 
and focus on the primary sense data. 
One reason for the poor understanding of List and of economics is 
that unlike e.g. Gustav von Schmoller, Joseph Alois Schumpeter and 
Ludvig von Mises, few economists today have a good background in the 
philosophy of science. It is important to set the philosophical platform 
(read: scientific foundation) right from the beginning. ―Main stream" 
economists have been much wrong in their assessments of the practical 
world, much because they adhere to a tradition that got this theoretical 
foundation precisely wrong from the beginning.  
 
 
a) Descriptive versus normative - Knowledge versus ethics 
 
                                       
56 In his Geschichte der National-Ökonomik in Deutschland  (‗History of Eco-
nomics in Germany‗) Roscher writes:  
„Die jetzt auf unseren Universitäten vorherrschende Richtung der National-
ökonomik ist mit Recht eine realistische genannt worden. Es will die Men-
schen so nehmen, wie dieselben wirklich sind: von sehr verschiedenen, auch 
nichtwirtschaftlichen Motiven zugleich bewegt, einem ganz bestimmten Volke, 
Staate, Zeitalter angehörig u. vgl. m. Die Abstraktion von alle dem, welche so 
manchen, auch großen National-Ökonomen zu schweren Irrtümern verleitet 
hat, bleibt also nur für des Studium der Vorarbeiten gestattet;  aber für die 
fertige Theorie ebenso wenig, wie für die Praxis.  
Wird diese Richtung irgend consequent durchgeführt, so muß sie historisch  
werden. --- 
Aber auch ethisch kann diese historisch-realistische Richtung heißen.― 
(Roscher, 1874, pp. 1032-1034) 
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List has been called a Realist, regarding his "cynical" approach to power 
in international relations - as opposed to Idealism in political science  
This means that he recognised that selfishness and brute force histori-
cally had been the main driver in international political relations. He is 
often mentioned along with three other authors in the Realist tradition 
of political science, standing in a successive line from them, namely 
Niccolò Machiavelli (Cf. Machiavelli, 1513), Thomas Hobbes (Cf. Hobbes, 
1651) and Alexander Hamilton (Cf. Hamilton, 1790).  
Realism indicates a descriptive and empirical approach that focuses 
on the desire for military and economic power or security, rather than 
ideals or ethics. Realism related to List, thus concerns his descriptive 
approach regarding international power.  
List can also be called an Idealist ethically and thus also in political 
science, since he continuously promoted peace and justice through the 
rule of law nationally and internationally – as opposed to selfishness 
and violence.  
Regarding ethical goals, he is normatively an Idealist. In his descrip-
tive approach to knowledge, his epistemology, he is a Realist.  
In practice however, he advised a mixed policy; to aim for the philo-
sophical and ethical goals in the long run, but in the short run never to 
forget the harsh and cynical realities of international power. The alter-
native to such moderate Realism would be self-annihilating. 
Realism also relates to a core question in the philosophy of science 
concerning the status of theories. It concerns to List‘s epistemological 
search for ‗true‘ or ‗real‘ theories, as opposed to instrumental theories 
(‗mere tools‘) as witnessed in Milton Friedman‘s approach (Friedman, 
1953).57 58 
                                       
57 See also the section below, English Nominalism versus List‘s Realism. 
58 Realism therefore also relates indirectly to the parallel philosophical 
struggle over the status of Universal (general) concepts, where Realism (‗true 
references‘) stood  opposed to Nominalism (‗mere names‘). This was a scientific 
discussion regarding metaphysics that not only took place in late Medieval 
times but also in Antiquity.  
These problems, regarding the status of concepts and of theories, share a 
similar characteristic; both concepts and theories are heuristic tools that con-
tribute to create order out of individual chaos. They are therefore ‗ideal repre-
sentations‘ or ‗generalisations‘, and they as such they are ‗per definition‘ 
doomed to be ‗wrong‘, regarding a realistic description of the factual world‘s 
individual nuances – just as any empirically related scientific endeavour is.  
This is however, no principal barrier for the pursuit of ―the truth‖ by various 
methods. In other words, denying that any ‗truth‘ has been established at any 
given time does not preclude continuing a search for it. 
These discussions also have close affinities to discussions between the An-
cient ontological positions of Idealism and Materialism: What exists ‗for real‘ in 
the world: General ideas or individual matters? With the destruction of the Gali-
lean-Newtonian world view, starting in earnest perhaps with James Maxwell in 
1887, these questions got even more mind boggling. This involved the on-going 
development of relativity-, quantum-, and string theories - which predict e.g. 





b) Empirical Idealism 
 
Although List's system is an empirically based system, it is none-the less 
a rather logical and coherent system. List can also be called an Idealist, 
where idealism not only relates to List‘s morality and humanitarian 
goals, but also concerns his method, which is related to – if not totally 
and consciously based upon – an Idealistic philosophical approach to 
the philosophy of Science, as opposed to a Materialistic approach alleg-
edly employed by Marx.  
In short, the issue concerns the pre-eminence of spirit over matter as 
the prime moving force in social and economic development. This issue 
has a long tradition, dating back to pre-Socratic natural philosophy‘s 
debate of ‗thought‘ versus ‗world-stuff (Cf. e.g. Windelband, 1893, p. 
31ff). Here the primary moving factor in historical change is the individu-
al - and collective spirit: Morality, insight and will.59  
Through German Idealism (e.g. Kant, Fichte, Hegel) List had ties to 
the Hindu-related and Neo-Platonic tradition of the Renaissance (e.g. 
Cusa, Leibniz, Wolff, Kepler, and Bruno), as opposed to the ―materialist 
/ biological‖ schools (e.g. Hobbes, Locke, Hume, and Newton). As a 
child of German Idealism List was also a child of the Renaissance.60  
Therefore, List, a public accountant by profession, may be right in 
several matters regarding the method of science, but to some degree 
―unconsciously‖ so, perhaps mainly due to the circumstances of his 
time with the dominant tradition in Germany having been Idealistic in 
character for centuries.61 One cannot understand the depth of List‘s 
method unless one keeps these roots in mind. 
During the Renaissance, and due to a Neo-Platonic and therefore 
(like in Hinduism) a Pantheist understanding of the World and Man as 
imbued by God, God was sought by studying nature and the historical 
development of nature, thereby giving birth to empiricism and modern 
                                       
59 Therefore, the title of this dissertation is Friedrich List‘s Heart, Wit and Will. 
60 Windelband describes German Idealism‘s roots in the Renaissance such, 
―This brilliant phenomenon had its general cause in the incomparable vigour 
and spirit with which the German nation at that time took up again with new 
strength, and carried to its completion, the movement of civilisation which 
began in the Renaissance and had been interrupted by external force. Germa-
ny attained the summit of its inner development at the same time that its out-
er history reached its lowest condition, a process that has no equal in history.‖ 
(Windelband, 1893, pp. 529-530) 
61Rudolf Steiner may be, however, consciously right in many of these matters 
regarding the ideal basis for economics. Being a philosopher by profession, he 
staked out the course already in his dissertation (Steiner, 1894) and later ap-
plied this angle for his social policy, economics and finance (Steiner, 1922 etc.). 
Adam Müller is ironically an instance of being called a ‗reactionary‘ economist, 
who at the same time is considered ‗modern‘ in his monetary analysis, due 
however to his Idealist point of view, that money in principle is an idea. 
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science. The Renaissance brought about an empirical approach, whilst 
retaining the spiritual goals from the Medieval Age, thereby producing 
an empiricism, which included spiritual phenomena. This is also, what 
List promotes. A philosophical Idealist, would have to argue that the 
personal heart, wit and will of individuals is the prime mover in history 
and therefore also in economics. List‘s final word in his magnum opus, 
the National System is quite therefore fittingly,  
 
… all that is required of the Governments can be expressed in one word, 
and that is – ENERGY. (List, 1841a, p. 435)62 
 
The historical approach of the empirical school of the German  Re-
naissance, was mainly idealistic-spiritual in orientation, to a large de-
gree focusing on the importance of beliefs and institutions. This may be 
illustrated e.g. with Friedrich List‘s emphasis on law and regulation as 
well as on the ―Confederation of Labour‖; Gustav Schmoller‘s strong 
emphasis on habit and custom (in German: ‗Sitten‘); Georg Simmel‘s 
view of money as institutional symbols; and the emphasis on religion by 
Max Weber and Werner Sombart. 
List‘s focus is also the individual in the sense that freedom of the in-
dividual, in the widest sense including the moral aspect, was the goal of 
his efforts. Nevertheless, he saw the nation, in the widest sense, as the 
precondition for the existence of the individual, like Hegel and other 
Idealists. List therefore spent considerable time sorting out the precon-
ditions for the nation‘s continued existence and growth. Like Kant and 
Hegel, List always kept clearly in sight the goal of promoting individual 
freedom.  
A philosophical materialist, on the other hand, would have to argue 
that the role of a person is negligible, and that neither the duty nor the 
possibility for an individual to change the world, do exist. Free will, re-
sponsibility and morality are accordingly only illusions. 
There is therefore, in very general terms, a deep cleavage between the 
German tradition and the Anglo-French traditions, which we may term 
‗empirical idealism‘ versus ‗rationalistic materialism‘, or perhaps more 
appropriately ‗inductive idealism‘ versus ‗logical materialism‘. 
 
 
2.19 The rational, materialist, and analytical method 
 
List was one of the earliest and severest critics of what he labelled Cos-
mopolitical School of Economics63, i.e. the tradition following the Physi-
ocrats and Adam Smith, The Classical School of Economics.  
                                       
62 This little quote has also been used elsewhere;  in the section; Critic of Mal-
thus‘ materialism, in chapter 3; and in the sections Capital of mind, and Imma-
terial forces as basis for entrepreneurship, in chapter 4 
63 Depending on the context, List also called it The Popular School, The Ex-
change Value School and The Prevalent School. 
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The philosophical background for List‘s ―Idealistically‖ oriented criti-
cism, is that Nominalism dominated English philosophy, in particular, 
during the formative years of English Classical Economics. As we shall 
see below, the epistemological and, as a consequence, the social ideas 
of Smith and Say were built on ideas from Isaac Newton and the ex-
pressed Nominalists Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. This became the 
basis for the dominating tradition of English Classical and Neo-
Classical economics.  
As opposed to the evolutionary and historical approach in within the 
historical school, the a-historical approach of the rationalistic school of 
the Anglo-British Enlightenment was instead rather materialistic in 
orientation. (‗Empirical‘ and ‗rationalistic‘, understood here as in their 
epistemological orientations).  
This school followed a rationalist a priori method of axiomatic-
deduction, which List also criticised (Cf. List, 1837a, p. 189). Since the 
‗rationalistic‘ tradition sought to find (general) economic laws, Karl 
Knies calls it ‗absolutism‘.64  
The analytical and ‗rational system‘ of René Descartes was rational in 
the sense that one established a few theoretical axioms a priori, based 
on  simple "clear and distinct" facts (Cf. Descartes, 1637, e.g. pp. 65, 
163), and therefrom deduced logical conclusions about the real world.65 
Thus, one assumed that a scientific system could be derived from intro-
spection. For much this reason, Smith and even more so his followers 
have often been charged with starting their investigations, methodologi-
cally speaking, in the wrong end (Blaug, 1980, p. 57; and Schumpeter, 
1954, p. 538n). Trygve Haavelmo added the same criticism of modern 
mainstream economics in his Nobel Speech in 1989.66  
Adam Smith was a child of the rationalist Enlightenment, whereas 
List was a child of the empirical (German) Renaissance. The materially 
oriented Enlightenment ―de-spiritualised‖ the empiricism of the Renais-
sance, by reviving ideas from pre-Socratic natural- and social philoso-
phy: Scepticism, atomism and mechanical materialism.  
In his classic The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Sci-
ence, Edwin Burtt, writes that Newton‘s main source of inspiration was 
Hobbes who applied the mechanical model of causal explanation. Burtt 
writes that Hobbes demonstrated,  
 
… the first important attempt to apply the new assumptions and method of 
Galileo universally. This explanation, … is of profound significance in the 
early development  of the new doctrine of the human mind, and represents 
                                       
64 Cf. Knies, chapter 8: Der Absolutismus der Lösungen―, 1853-1883. 
65 The reason for this approach was based on the sceptical pre-Socratic ob-
servation that one cannot fully trust one‘s senses, and that reason only is 
trustworthy. This insight was re-born during the Enlightenment, in particular 
with John Locke and with e.g. René Descartes who twisted St. Augustine‘s 
religious argument of the soul‘s self-certainty into the epistemological argu-
ment ‗cogito sum‘ (Cf. Windelband, 1893, p. 392). 
66 Cf. Haavelmo, 1989, see quotation in the Preface. 
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Hobbes' chief importance in the current which leads on to the metaphysics 
of Newton.  (Burtt, 1924, p. 122) 
 
Thomas Hobbes was a devoted materialist and nominalist who fol-
lowed Descartes' and Galileo's Euclidean and mechanistic theories in 
developing theories also of the human mind (Cf. Burtt, 1924, pp. 128-
129, and 132-133). Burtt writes,  
 
Locke, the next great psychologist followed Hobbes still more explicitly 
and in even greater detail. (Burtt, 1924, p. 134) 
 
The analytic model, prescribed by René Descartes, using ―clear and 
distinct‖ facts as a starting point for axiomatic-deduction. Adam Smith 
desired to become to economics what Newton was to astronomy, creat-
ing a system that revolved around not gravity as with Newton, but ra-
ther around self-interest as the principal axiom. Describing Smiths 
main books (Cf. Smith, 1759; and 1776) Mark Blaug writes that,  
 
Given the pivotal role of sympathy for other human beings in The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments and that of self-interested behavior in The Wealth of Na-
tions, both of these books must be regarded as deliberate attempts by 
Smith to apply this axiomatic method, first to ethics and then to economics 
(Skinner, 1974, pp. 180-1). … he stressed the advantage of being able to 
explain different phenomena by a single familiar principle such as gravity 
almost as much, if not more, than the capacity to make accurate predic-
tions.‖ (Blaug, 1980, p. 57) 
 
 
a) Sense data and measurement 
 
Mistaking economics for a natural science, instead of being social sci-
ence that deals with e.g. institutions, economics has mistakenly fo-
cused mainly on material factors. It appears that ―mainstream‖ econo-
mists until recently have tended to deal with superficial and formal 
phenomena that can be measured, rather than the deeper, fundamen-
tal, and informal structures of economics. 
A related reason for this focus on material factors is that that they 
have been easier to measure. Therefore, for a long time economists have 
had trouble in incorporating immaterial production factors into formal 
models; like trust, morality, social stability, as well as culture, motiva-
tion, incentives, know-how and innovation. Such institutional and or-
ganisational factors are normally treated as ad hoc to the basic formal 
economic models, which still by far form the core of student textbooks. 
These issues are especially important when dealing with economics of 
development and the economics of ―information society‖.  
During the late Renaissance and the Enlightenment, one assumed 
that ‗measurement‘ of ‗clear and distinct facts‘ was a precondition for 
certainty and scientific quality. Accordingly, there was a discussion over 
which impressions, or which sense data, that were certain and scien-
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tific, and which not. The focus on measurability and formalisation led 
Enlightenment philosophers, like Galileo, Descartes, Voltaire, Newton, 
and Locke, to claim the superiority of so-called primary sense data like 
size, weight, movement, since these were ―objective‖ and "scientific" – 
since they were measureable.67 Only the phenomena that were physi-
cally measurable were taken into account, in the pursuit of ―objectivity‖ 
and ―scientific‖ understanding.  
However, there were many phenomena such as taste, smell, heat, 
sounds, and colour, which were not measurable, due to the contempo-
rary primitive status of science and instruments.68 These were thus re-
garded as imaginary, subjective, uncertain, and inferior, and according-
ly they were classified as unscientific secondary sense data. We may of 
course today measure many of these, but not during ―the dark age of 
Enlightenment‖.  
This Enlightenment point of view was opposed by Renaissance-
inspired thinkers like G. Berkeley in Ireland, G. Vico in Naples, G. W. 
Leibniz and J. W. Goethe in Germany, all during the late 17th and early 
18th Century. The Idealists Vico and Berkeley argued that also the 
measurable (primary) sense data were subjective since human experi-
ence in general was subjective. Later, Fichte also drew this conclusion. 
 
 
b) Measurement and egotism69 
 
With time, in physics, Descartes‘ analytic method based on ―clear and 
distinct‖ facts, combined with Descartes‘ revival of ancient mechanistic 
materialism based on atoms (from Greek ‗atomos‘; uncuttable), while 
somewhat peculiarly; they were not observable and ―clear and distinct‖ 
facts. 
In economics, the ―clear and distinct‖ facts came to be perceived as 
hedonistic ‗pain and pleasure‘, and accordingly material ‗self-interest‘. 
The materialist faction in the discussion over natural rights thus saw 
Man as an egotistic and emotional animal.70 On this basis Descartes 
developed a mechanical system of emotions (Cf. Windelband, 1893, p. 
412), related to Adam Smith‘s axiomatic-deductive system of ‗sympa-
                                       
67 Cf. Hegge, 1996; Hegge, 1957: Knowledge and Reality. A Contribution to the 
Criticism of the Theory of the Subjectivity of Sense Data; as well as Burtt, 1924, 
p.20; and Ch. 3c: The Subjectivity of Secondary Qualities;  Ch. 5b: Treatment of 
Secondary Qualities and Causality; and Ch. 6e: Insistence on Reality of 
Secondary Qualities - Conception of Man. 
68 On the other hand, modern science often makes ―observations‖ dependent 
on complex instruments and theories, and therefore also exposed to uncertain-
ty. 
69 See also the section, Natural Rights and ‗the selfish system‘, in chapter 5, 
and the section Ricardo‘s monetary abstraction, in chapter 3. 
70 The Idealist counter-faction, saw the perfection of reason and morality as 
their beacon. For a more thorough discussion, see the section, Natural Rights 
and ‗the selfish system‘, in chapter 5. 
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thy‘, more than one century later (Cf. Smith, 1759). Windelband writes 
that this selfish system of utilitarian ethics lent itself to quantification, 
 
The thought of Hobbes and Locke, of grounding a knowledge of a strictly 
demonstrative ethics upon the utilitarian principle, seemed thereby to have 
found a definite form, welcome to the natural-science mode of thinking. 
This enticement was pursued by Bentham, … [who] … sketches a scheme of 
a pleasure and pain balance for reckoning the useful and injurious conse-
quences of human activities and institutions. As with Hume … the reckon-
ing of the ethically valuable falls to the province of the measuring intellect; 
but the factors with which it operates in this process are solely the feelings 
of pleasure and pain. (Windelband, 1893, p. 513) 
 
The materialistic and eudemonic approach of the Enlightenment 
opened the road to formalisation, which became the golden cage of sci-
ence, and in particular economics. Economics thus was to be trapped 
in its own toolbox for a long time. 
The point of departure for the Cosmopolitical School therefore be-
came the egotistical individual and an analysis of her material values 
and needs. The image of Man as a biological being became a trademark 
of the Enlightenment and was perhaps most explicit with J. Bentham, 
who considered human actions to be governed by pleasure and pain 
alone, an idea that for a long time has dominated materialist econom-
ics. Ethics was to be replaced by calculations, and measurement of the 
sensations of pleasure and pain. 
An ironic twist to this focus on the measurable, was in economics the 
focus on money, since money – ―value in exchange‖ - was relatively easy 
to measure. Money, however, is not a material thing. Money is an idea, 
since like all credit it denotes an institutionalised debt relationship be-
tween debtor and creditor, and in this case between the issuing office 
and the receiving public. 
The focus of the German cultural tradition on ideas and symbols had 
important consequences for the monetary approach of German thought. 
Money and credit were correctly seen from an immaterial point of view, 
as symbols of social relations and therefore as community building 
powers. 
 
List‘s conception of Man and economics is more realistic but less 
easy to formalize, since the social world hardly lends itself to simple 
and discrete numbers, as the mathematician Nicolas Georgescu-Roegen 
points out, 
 
Arithmomorphic models, to repeat, are indispensable in economics, no 
less than in other scientific domains. That does not mean they can do all 
there is to be done in economics. For, as Schrödinger argued in the case of 
biological life, the difficulty in the subject of economics does not lie in the 
mathematics it needs, but in the fact that the subject itself is "much too in-
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volved to be fully accessible to mathematics‖. 71 (Georgescu-Roegen, 1971, 
p. 341)72  
 
These strategies of making formal models realistic will, however, tend 
to become unmanageable, as Wilhelm Roscher wrote as a criticism of 
David Ricardo). And as Wilhelm Roscher pointed out in his Principles; 
although abstraction is indispensable - real life is too complicated for 
mathematical models, 
 
... the advantages of the mathematical method of expression diminish as 
the facts to which it is applied become more complicated. This is true even 
in the ordinary psychology of the individual. How much more, therefore, in 
the portraying of national life! ... The abstraction ... must pass as an 
indispenable stage in the preparatory labors of political economists. ... But 
it should never be lost sight of, that such a one is only an abstraction after 
all, for which, not only in the transition to practice, but even in finished 
theory we must turn to the infinite variety of real life (Roscher, 1877,  § 22) 
 
As matters turn out, obviously, economists and accordingly economic 
theory are products of society in general. In other words, economic in-
sight tends to be bad if society at large suffers from poor ‗basic philoso-
phy‘; a deprived culture. Therefore, to encourage and produce good 
economists and theories, society at large must be dominated by gener-
ally good and profound understanding and education.  
 
 
2.20 Reductionism  
 
To achieve knowledge with the analytic method, one isolates the im-
portant facts and analyses the remaining in order to find recognisable 
patterns that may aid understanding, prediction, and control - like Ad-
am Smith does regarding ‗sympathy‘ (Cf. Smith, 1759) and ‗self-interest‘ 
(Cf. Smith, 1776). 
Taking individual ‗clear and distinct facts‘ as the point of departure 
for analysis, is a way to reduce the complexities of life into manageable 
entities. An analysis is thus carried out by a separation of a given ―to-
tality‖ into individual parts. The process of separation is a convenient 
tool used to identify individual factors within a causal analysis.   
Descartes thus desired to explain (reduce) phenomena on higher lev-
els and complexity by pointing to characteristics at lower levels (Cf. 
Descartes, 1637, e.g. pp. 65, 163), and he thus provided a frame of ex-
                                       
71 E. Schrödinger: What Is Life?, Cambridge 1944. (Georgescu-Roegen‘s note) 
72 Nevertheless, formally oriented theorist might claim that some driving forc-
es can be dealt with through a formalist approach, as it is possible to bend this 
approach in many ways, for instance with the use of dummy variables in econ-
ometrics. This approach goes even for List‘s reference to honour and compas-
sion as driving forces, and has for instance been used in econometrics regard-
ing ―democracy‖ and ―governance‖.  
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planation that was used by mechanistic oriented sciences during the 
Enlightenment and well into the 19th Century, putting its stamp also on 
economics in her formative years. This mode of explanation potentially 
ends in materialistic determinism, as has been discussed concerning 
modern genetics. 
When Adam Smith chooses self-interest to be the axiomatic ‗clear 
and distinct fact‘ of his analysis, he assumes that the characteristics of 
a simple aggregate will reflect the characteristics of the whole. 
It therefore matters is how or what ‗reality‘ is reduced to, and this 
depends upon the inquirer‘s ‗Image of Man‘ and views of society and the 
world; involving both epistemology and ontology. One has to pose the 
critical question of what to generalise or reduce reality to; Exactly which 
aspects of reality are central; and more particularly; central for the in-
vestigation at hand, and for instance central for whom? This question of 
the nature of reduction, or ‗reductionism‘, is crucial as this reveals ones 
interpretation of which aspects of the phenomena are that important in 
economics. When e.g. a ‗non-spiritual‘ factor like egotism (or later; ‗utili-
ty maximation‘) is taken as the axiomatic starting point in the economic 
science, one ignores important factors that create progress, such as in-
novation and co-operation. This is hardly a realistic representation of 
the world. 
Furthermore, a problem arises when a few parts mistakenly are seen 
as representing the whole through generalisation, and where the char-
acteristics of a multifarious whole so to speak is reduced to the charac-
teristics of a few parts only. In the philosophy of science, ‗reductionism‘ 
was hotly debated after Darwin in the 19th Century, and in the 1970s 
and 1980s. Thus, the ―anti-Darwinist‖ Hjalmar Hegge writes that char-
acteristics on macro- and micro levels are not interchangeable,73  
 
… In the contemporary debate in the philosophy of science, this has been 
named the "problem of reductionism"--the classical philosophical problem 
as to whether phenomena at a higher level of organization can be "reduced," 
in some sense of the word, or "related back to," those at a lower level. … 
It is not meaningful to "reduce" organic phenomena at the macrolevel 
(e.g., the forms, colors, behavior of organisms) to microphenomena such as 
genes or their combinations. The latter do not "explain" the former. A de-
scription of the properties of phenomena at the macrolevel and a presenta-
tion of their coherence (regularities) are not interchangeable with those that 
apply to phenomena at the microlevel.  
Organic (biological) properties and their coherence that are specific to the 
macrolevel are in no respect of secondary status and are thus equally real 
as those at the microlevel. Thus, of genetic and mutational research in biol-
ogy we must say, as did the physicist and philosopher Ernst Mach, refer-
                                       
73 Referring to classic works by Carl Hempel, Ernst Mach, David Hull, Mi-
chael Polanyi and other philosophers of natural science, regarding e.g. physics, 
biology, and chemistry. 
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ring to mechanics in his time, that it "apprehends neither the basis for nor 
a part of reality, but only an aspect of it" (8).74  
In discussing the problem of reductionism, Hempel (among others) points 
out that "the logical situation is the same" as, for example, in the kinetic 
theory of gases in physics, where it is meaningless to speak of observational 
phenomena at the macrolevel such as pressure, volume, and temperature 
as having a secondary status in relation to molecular movements in a gas 
(9).75  … 
Such reductionism is not even valid between phenomena within the mi-
cro-perspective, as, for example, when Hull proves this reductionism inap-
plicable to the relation between classical Mendelian genetics and molecular 
genetics (12).76 Michael Polanyi even shows that neither is there any struc-
tural likeness between the so-called chemical genes of molecular genetics 
and purely chemical processes. …. (13).77 (Hegge, 1996, in the section Mac-
rolevel Versus Microlevel Phenomena) 
 
Adam Smith assumes that circumstances and conclusions on one 
level of argument (private economy) may automatically be transferred to 
another level (national economy). Smith writes, 
 
What is prudence in the conduct of every private family can scarce be folly 
in that of a great kingdom. (Smith, 1776, book IV, ch. II, p. 457) 
 
Adam Smith here makes the classic ‗mental jump‘, known in the lit-
erature of philosophy of science as a ‗fallacy of the wrong level‘; or simp-
ly ‗level fallacy‘; or more specifically as ‗Fallacy of Composition‘ or the 
‗Reductionist Fallacy‘. 
In science in general, ‗reductionism‘ means that the study of a ‗com-
pound‘, an ‗entity‘, is based on studies of individual relations between 
smaller units, whether spatial or organizational. These relations are then 
somehow ―aggregated‖ in order to explain the compound. Already Plato 
discussed the issue of part and the whole, in his dialogue Theaititos (Cf. 
Plato, 360 BC). Aristotle also pointed out that all levels of existence have 
specific and different characteristics. Aristotle writes,  
 
… the state is by nature clearly prior to the family and to the individual, 
since the whole is of necessity prior to the part; for example, if the whole 
body be destroyed, there will be no foot or hand, except in an equivocal 
                                       
74 8. Ernst Mach, Die Mechanik in ihrer Entwicklung (Leipzig: F. A. Brock-
haus, 1908), p. 554 (italics mine). (Hegge‘s note) 
75 9. Hempel, p. 104. The point here is that the theoretical combination of 
the two different levels depends in both cases upon so-called "bridge princi-
ples" which say nothing as to whether the observable phenomena at the mac-
rolevel have a secondary or derived status. (Hegge‘s note) 
76 12. Hull, pp. 39ff., where it is proven that "the relation between Mendeli-
an and molecular predicate terms express many, many prohibitively complex 
relations [i.e., it cannot be defined "extensionally"] and that "reduction is 
[hence] impossible." . (Hegge‘s note) 
77 13. Michael Polanyi, "Life transcending Physics and Chemistry," Chemical 
and Engineering News, 45, No. 35 (1967), p. 64. (Hegge‘s note)  
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sense, as we might speak of a stone hand; for when destroyed the hand will 
be no better than that. But things are defined by their working and power; 
and we ought not to say that they are the same when they no longer have 
their proper quality, but only that they have the same name. The proof that 
the state is a creation of nature and prior to the individual is that the indi-
vidual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing; and therefore he is like a part in 
relation to the whole. But he who is unable to live in society, or who has no 
need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god: he 
is no part of a state.‖ (Aristotle, 350 BC, Book 1.2).  
 
Dealing generally with teleological causation, the humanistic sciences 
thus have the advantage of allowing ‗subjective‘ ‗interpretation‘ of ac-
tions considered within a setting that gives meaning.  This enables syn-
thesis of parts into a totality - a whole, holism.  
We thus have the two positions of ‗reductionism‘ - versus ‗holism‘. 
This is an issue that also concerns the different kinds of causation - 
and not only ‗material causation‘ (such as the mechanics of ‗energy‘ and 
‗movement‘) but also ‗teleological causation‘ (such as ‗intention‘ and 
‗self-realisation‘).78 Hegge thus argues that,  
 
We may summarize this in an analogy: the relation between music and 
the grooves in a record. Any attempt to derive musical tones and their in-
tervals directly from the grooves would be absurd, as would any attempt to 
derive organic forms at the macrolevel from genes and their combinations. 
The latter are far from being the "primary" phenomena--quite the contrary. 
Just as musical tones are what create groove configuration, genetic struc-
tures at the microlevel must be regarded as determined by organic forms at 
the macrolevel. "Morphology is the framework," insists Polanyi (14).79 
(Hegge, 1996, in the section Macrolevel Versus Microlevel Phenomena) 
 
The  nominalist (―individualist‖ and reductionist) conception of reality 
has for some time been also challenged even in the world of natural sci-
ence, as e.g. swarm- and herd behaviour seems to pool individual intel-
ligence into a collective ‗super-brains‘, as e.g. with wildebeest, birds, 
fish, bats, and insects; and especially so with ants.  
Neo-Kantian philosophers tended to separate human and natural 
sciences since they had a non-material view of Man, but followed New-
ton‘s image of Nature. They denied that the humanistic sciences were 
―secondary‖ in scientific value to the natural sciences, and claimed a 
separate and ―interpretative‖ method for the humanistic sciences.80  
                                       
78 Cf. e.g. Windelband, chapter 15; Mechanism and Teleology, p. 174. 
79 14. Polanyi. See note 13.  (Hegge‘s note) 
80 Reinert and Daastol describe this polarisation in their Exploring the Gen-
esis of Economic Innovations; ―In the ‗physics envy‘ of neo-classical economics, 
economics and the social sciences are ‗soft‘ disciplines, which are in some way 
inferior to the ‗hard‘ natural sciences. The Leibniz-Wolff tradition, continued in 
the works of philosophers like Wilhelm Dilthey and Hans Georg Gadamer, re-
fuses any such subordination. In Dilthey‘s view, the social sciences, concerned 
with the ends and values instead of laws, should aim to understand (ver-
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This separation is slowly about to give way, and open up for a non-
material image of both Man and Nature, as illustrated also with 
Hjalmar Hegge‘s discussion above. 
Summing up; by reducing the kinds of causation to one, and fur-
thermore reducing the factors of causation; the reductionism inherent 
in abstraction always assumes a simplistic model of reality, which may 
not correspond well to e.g. the realities of human nature. Furthermore, 
when in a social study the most characteristic ‗part‘ is ignored - the 
quality of Man, innovation and co-operation - reductionism is likely to 
make this kind of economics irrelevant. - Or put even simpler; material-
ist reductionism breeds ignorance of reality. 
 
 
2.21 English Nominalism versus List’s Realism  
 
a) English Nominalism 
 
The foundation for English Classical Economics was Nominalism and 
Materialism, and the ―founding fathers‖ had less faith in the human 
rational abilities for inventiveness, and therefore for technological pro-
gress, than philosophers and economists who stood in the tradition 
from the ancient Greek, Heraclitus.81  
Both the methodology and the "empirical" assumptions82 of British 
Classical Economics are contrary to the idea that man is capable of 
creative, innovative thought and deep altruistic relations. From Hobbes 
and onwards with John Locke etc., it was basically assumed that man 
in principle is a shrewd egotistic beast, rather than created in the image 
of a rational and passionate God, as e.g. Cusa and Leibniz argued.  
In Nominalism, relationships between phenomena are seen as based 
on external properties based on resemblance i.e. more spatial or 
superficial relations. This paved the ground for the focus on 
measurability and the mechanistic formalism of the materialist 
Enlightenment. The focus of measurability and of randomness suggests 
that a scientific effort in this direction would take the course of pushing 
to establish tendency ―laws‖ of a stochastic and statistical character - 
                                                                                                                
stehen). The natural sciences, on the other hand, aim mainly to describe and 
conceptualise (begreifen). Qualitative relationships are at the core of the 
Gesteiswissenschaften - the Humanities, or literally, sciences of the mind. A 
crucial aspect of these sciences is therefore their irreducibility to natural sci-
ence. … In the German economic tradition, the inner unity (Strukturzusam-
menhang) of the Geisteswissenschaften - its refusal to isolate ‗economic man‘ 
from the rest of the human being - shines through from Leibniz to Max Weber. 
(Reinert and Daastol, 1996, pp. 135-136) 
81 The tradition was continued e.g. via Plato and the Stoics, further with Cu-
sa, Bruno, Kepler, and Leibniz, to Kant, Fichte, and Hegel. 
82 These are generally regarded as material ‗self-interest‘ as the main motiva-
tional factor for action, and ‗decreasing returns‘ in agriculture. 
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as opposed to laws of a "necessary" nature: Only individual things are 





Nominalism has implications for our understanding of society and the 
social sciences, in particular for sociology - the study of modern society 
at large,83 and in particular of the informal aspects of civil society, 
which constitutes the core study theme of sociology. 
Nominalism in social philosophy indicates ‗social atomism‘, that so-
cial cohesion is externally forced upon persons. There exists no inner 
cohesion between persons, morality, that bind them together. Accord-
ingly, institutions, such as nations, have an accidental and haphazard 
existence. This implies an external point of view in which the world has 
no internal ordering and rather is accidental, random. Relations or 
connections between phenomena are seen as based on external proper-
ties based on resemblance i.e. more spatial or superficial relations, 
leading on to formalism and emphasis on measurability and ―monetar-
ism‖ as the practical method (in the sense of analysing most issues in 
terms of money). 
 
 
c) Nominalism in Economics 
 
A debate on nominalism and its effects, is completely absent in text-
books in economics. It is generally treated as an ―odd‖ Medieval discus-
sion of ―little consequence" today. It was, however, ―accidentally‖ a core 
issue in the debate between List and the Cosmopolitan School, and re-
emerged in the public eye with Lady Margaret Thatcher‘s famous state-
ment that ―there is no such thing as ‗society‖ (Cf. Thatcher, 1987).84 
Few economists today have much knowledge of the profound impact 
of Nominalism85 for the understanding of theoretical questions regard-
ing philosophy of science, and also concerning the role of civil society 
and therefore has importance for economics.  
The economic sociology of e.g. motivation and co-operation is a foun-
dation in economic theory. Schumpeter scorchingly describes the Eng-
lish classical school‗s treatment of this issue as ‖unsurpassed in its 
baldness, shallowness and its radical lack of understanding‖, 86 
                                       
83  Whereas political science tends to be the study of modern societies‘ more 
formal organisation, and cultural-anthropology tends to be the study of ―tradi-
tional societies‖. 
84 To be fair, the quotation was largely taken out of context by the press, 
since the intention was that ―there is no such thing as ‗society‘‖ to be blamed, 
but rather only responsible individuals can be blamed. 
85Derived from nomos or nómos = greek  for convention, custom, law.  
86 - after first discussing the French Physiocrats‘ lack of philosophical and 




… the individual, fleeing from pain and seeking satisfaction, is the scientific 
nucleus of this strictly rationalist and intellectualist system of philosophy 
and sociology which, unsurpassed in its baldness, shallowness and its rad-
ical lack of understanding for everything that moves man and holds togeth-
er society, ... It was from this source that many classical economists indu-
bitably derived their sociology … (Schumpeter, 1912, p. 87)87 
 
In the English Classical School of political economy, collective entities 
like people, society and nations tend to be considered as mere nominal 
abstractions. Within the Realist camp, however, collective entities have 
real meanings and functions of their own.  
List‘s adversary in the US was the English born, Thomas Cooper, who 
was an expressed Nominalist. Accordingly, they regard institutions as 
fictions, mere ‗names‘. This tradition of social atomism goes back the 
Epicureans in ancient Greece.  
A very central role in List system is held by the concept of the confed-
eration of labour, which to a large part is constituted precisely by civil 
society. For List, Civil Society is so to speak constituted within the Con-
federation of Labour, which again is constituted with the Nation. In his 
National System attacks Smith‘s Nominalism and -methodological indi-
vidualism on numerous accounts, e.g. in most of Chapter 31: The Sys-
tem of Values of Exchange, 
 
                                                                                                                
of the English Classical School. 
87 A larger extract from Schumpeter reads: ―The English classical econo-
mists present a different picture. Above all, a definite general trend of ideas, 
Utilitarianism, has always been associated with their doctrine. In comparison 
with this the influence of the 'professional philosophers' like Reid and Hamil-
ton meant little and even that of Dugald Stewart receded into the background, 
though the latter was a 'side line economist' and very successful as a teacher.  
The roots of Utilitarianism reach far back, but it was Bentham who first 
turned it into a vitally influential movement. It is a branch from the tree of 
Natural Law, but in making this statement we must not forget that it is strictly 
true only with the assumption that our conception of the Law of Nature is it-
self accepted. Under the same assumption what has been said about the Law 
of Nature applies equally to Utilitarianism. The conscious will of the individu-
al, fleeing from pain and seeking satisfaction, is the scientific nucleus of this 
strictly rationalist and intellectualist system of philosophy and sociology 
which, unsurpassed in its baldness, shallowness and its radical lack of un-
derstanding for everything that moves man and holds together society, was 
with a certain justification already an abomination to the contemporaries and 
to an even larger extent to later generations in spite of all its merits. It was 
from this source that many classical economists indubitably derived their so-
ciology and the means for the satisfaction of their philosophical needs which 
for the most part were rather modest.‖ (Schumpeter, 1912, p.87 ) 
See also the sections Epistemology and the English Classical School, and 
Malthus‘ heirs in the English Classical School in chapter 3; and Natural Rights 
and ‗the selfish system‘ in chapter 5. 
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For him no nation exists, but merely a community, i.e. a number of 
individuals dwelling together. … (List, 1841a, p. 348)88 
 
This entire nullification of nationality and of State power, this exaltation 
of individualism to the position of author of all effective power, ... (List, 
1841a, p. 349)89 
 
Regarding human economics, List argues that the individualist point 
of view is nothing but an individual shopkeeper‘s point of view, 
 
… this system at bottom is nothing else than a system of the private 
economy of all the individual persons in a country in a country, or of the 
individuals of the whole human race, as that economy would develop and 
shape itself, under a state of things in which there were no distinct nations, 
...  This system regards everything from the shopkeeper's point of view. 
(List, 1841a, p. 350)90 
 
List‘s criticism of Adam Smith‘s methodological individualism is too 
general, in the sense that he does not explicitly differ between a materi-
alist and an idealist point of view; as in individualism in consumption 
versus individualism in production (which is more creative, and there-
fore a better expression of personal individuality). 
In his Outlines …, List argues strongly against Nominalism as a way 
of understanding society, such as in chapter 6; Individual Economy is 
not Political Economy (Cf. List, 1827b, ch. 6). Here List contrasts the 
American System with the English System, the latter illustrated by the 
extreme free-trade book Elements of Political Economy by Thomas 
Cooper (Cooper, 1826).91 List‘s English-American adversary, Professor 
Thomas Cooper, was also a philosopher, an expressed Materialist and 
Nominalist, deeply influenced by the philosophy of the nominalist John 
Locke, and thereby of Thomas Hobbes. Three of Cooper‘s essays illus-
trate this, the first and second his materialist and nominalist points of 
view92 and the third his ―nominalist affiliation‖ to Locke.93  
List spends half of chapter 6 of his Outlines … arguing specifically 
against Thomas Cooper‘s Nominalism. List quotes Cooper who argues 
that it is important that we understand that the nation has no real ex-
                                       
88 A more extensive quotation may be found in chapter 3, in the section 
Smith‘s system, according to List. 
89 A more extensive quotation may be found in chapter 3, in the section 
Smith‘s system, according to List. 
90 A more extensive quotation may be found in chapter 3, in the section 
Smith‘s system, according to List. 
91 Professor Cooper of South Carolina was originally an Englishman, then a 
southern secessionist, and highly esteemed by Thomas Jefferson, one of the 
most central of the US founding fathers. 
92 The Scripture Doctrine of Materialism (Cooper, 1831a) and View of the Met-
aphysical and Physiological Arguments in favor of Materialism (Cooper, 1831b) 
93 Outline of the Doctrine of the Association of Ideas (Cooper, 1831c) 
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istence and merely is a name, a convention of speech, a grammatical 
convention, 
 
"Hence the moral entity - the grammatical being, called a nation, has 
been clothed in attributes metamorphose a word into a thing, and convert a 
mere grammatical contrivance into an existing and intelligent being. It is of 
great importance that we should be aware of this mistake, to avoid limita-
tion, description and periphrasis - grammatical contrivances and no more; 
just as we use the sign's and letters of Algebra to reason with, instead of 
the more complex number they represent.‖  (See p. 19)94 (List, 1827b, pp. 
87-89)  
 
List comments by saying that contrary to what Cooper claims, the 
nation of the United States is indeed more than a name, and indeed is a 
reality that has rights and duties and possesses force to upkeep its in-
terests as a legal subject, even at the mouth of a canon, 
 
The more I am convinced of the superior talents and of the great learn-
ing of President Cooper, the more I am astonished to see him build up on 
such false ground, a system of political economy … Mr. Cooper confounded 
a grammatical being with a moral being, …  With this false foundation the 
whole system of Mr. Cooper falls to pieces. … What would Mr. Cooper, as 
Attorney-General, have said, if the counsel of a defendant had opposed to 
one of his indictments, that the American nation is a mere grammatical be-
ing, …  and which therefore cannot prosecute a lawyer before a court?95  
 
 
2.22 Methodological individualism and instrumentalism96 
 
One outcome of this Nominalism is an individualistic methodology (Cf. 
Windelband, 1893, p. 296). According to Nominalism, only individual 
phenomena really exist. However, Nominalists do use abstraction, and 
in particular mathematics as in monetary theory. The use of 
abstraction and generalisations assumes that individual phenomena 
can be classified into groups, using a taxology. But to be true to 
Nominalism such classification can only be based on external 
characteristics, and not based on some inner and deeper function or 
meaning, as in Realism. This differentiation was inherent already in the 
debate of the Universals in Antiquity and Medieval times.  
Nominalism also gives rise to methodological instrumentalism. The 
nominalist insistence that only individual phenomena are real while 
still using generalisation, abstractions and laws implies inconsistency, 
unless one gives up all claims to the truth for scientific theories. When 
this takes place conceptual nominalism has passed over into 
                                       
94 Cf. Cooper, 1826, p. 19. (List‘s note) 
95 A larger quotation may be found in Appendix 3: Larger quotations from 
Friedrich List. 
96 See also the section, Promoting reductionist individualism - ignoring institu-
tions, in chapter 3. 
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methodological instrumentalism, the idea that theories do not pertain 
to say anything about the real world; they are only practical and 
convenient tools, (as concepts also are nothing but convenient tools). 
Claims of any kind concerning ―reality‖, then turn into claims about 
stochastic relations, void of any claims to truth, regarding e.g. causal 
directions. In a Socratic understanding of science and morality this is 
unethical, since morality requires knowledge. Windelband writes,  
 
4. Thus all courses of Sophistic thought issued in giving up truth as un-
attainable. Socrates, however, needed truth, and on this account he be-
lieved that it was to be attained if it were honestly sought for. Virtue is 
knowledge; and since there must be virtue, there must be knowledge also. 
Here for the first time in history the moral consciousness appears with 
complete clearness as an epistemological postulate. Because morality is not 
possible without knowledge, there must be knowledge; and if knowledge is 
not here and now existent, it must be striven for as the lover seeks for the 
possession of the loved object. Science is the yearning, struggling love for 
knowledge ... ― (Windelband, 1893, p. 94) 
 
The instrumentalism of ‗as-if‘ is nevertheless a precondition for mod-
elling, e.g. when Labour and Capital are regarded as homogenous, as 
when Marx writes,  
 
The labour, however, that forms the substance of value, is homogeneous 
human labour, expenditure of one uniform labour-power. (Marx, 1867, Vol. 
1, Ch. 1) 
 
The debate over nominalism versus realism has continued in modern 
times, and in 1980, Mark Blaug attacks the Realists of the Idealist tra-
dition, characterising it as ‗essentialism‘,  
 
This is perhaps as good a place as any to say a few more words about the 
philosophy of essentialism, which will raise its ugly head once or twice more 
in the course of our discussion. Essentialism goes back to Plato and Aristo-
tle for whom knowledge or ―science‖ begins with observations of individual 
events and proceeds by simple inductive enumeration until grasping by in-
tuition that which is universal in the events - their ―essence‖ – which is 
then enshrined in a definition of the phenomenon in question. The doctrine 
that it is the aim of science to discover the true nature or essence of things 
and to describe them by means of definitions had an enormous influence 
on Western thought right up to the nineteenth century. Popper contrasts 
this brand of methodological essentialism with the methodological nominal-
ism that came into scientific debates with Newton, according to which the 
aim of science is to describe how things behave in various circumstances 
with the aid of universal laws, and not to determine what they really are.  
Popper has long argued that essentialism has damaging effects on social 
theories because it encourages an antiempirical tendency to solve problems 
by the use of definitions. (Blaug, 1980, p. 125) 
 
Blaug here argues for methodological nominalism, also termed in-
strumentalism, and that it is sufficient to know that the cat actually 
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catches mice and not why it catches mice. This was also the approach 
of Milton Friedman‘s instrumentalism (Cf. Friedman, 1953), which 
dominated economics for a long time afterwards, long after philosophers 
of science had abandoned it. This problem can be illustrated by statis-
tics, where you may have (external) co-variance of factors, but you will 
have no way of telling the direction of causation unless you do under-
stand the (internal, essential) reason of causation. To do this you have 
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97 A section containing List‘s criticism of Smith is also found in chapter 7, 
Smith as regulator and protectionist. 
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List‘s criticism against Smith can be summarised as criticism of his ma-
terialism and tendency to generalise overly, thereby laying the founda-
tion for modern abstraction in economics; the Ricardian Vice; and 
―monetarism‖,98 which led to a myopic exclusion of factors of im-
portance, and an understatement of the need for public regulation.  
List claims, that immaterial production factors largely were ignored 
by the British Classical School, which therefore focused on curtailing 
population growth, increased division of labour through free trade and 
on increased accumulation of material capital through saving and aus-
terity. In essence, List argues that ignoring immaterial factors allowed 
disguising the role of institutions. According to List, precisely England 
was the nation that more than any had used every trick in the book of 
government intervention to promote industrialisation and then to pre-
vent other nations from doing the same. 
Friedrich List was originally a great admirer of Adam Smith‘s theo-
ries, but practical experience made him revalue.99 List came to see the 
basic fault in Smith‘s system in his nominalism and more basically, in 
his materialism.  
Smith‘s focus on material self-interest and failure to value immaterial 
qualities, leads him to make a long range of generalisations about the 
economic system. These generalisations largely serve to downplay the 
need for institutions, such as the nation, and government interference 
in the market is therefore not advisable.  
More specifically, when Smith claims self-interest to be the only 
wealth creative motive, Smith ignores the inner qualities of Man, the 
intelligence and the morality that creates the inner social cohesion that 
constitutes the confederation of labour.  
                                       
98 I.e. ―monetisation‖ of economic theory; using ‗money‘ or ‗exchange value‘, 
as the common denominator of all factors. 
99 List‘s criticism is primarily of interest to us here, in order to illuminate 
List‘s own ideas. Whether he was correct and objective in his description of 
Smith is only of secondary interest here. 
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Smith‘s nominalism, or social atomism, likewise prohibits Smith of 
acknowledging this inner social cohesion and confederation of labour. 
Smith‘s nominalism prevents him from recognising institutions and 
specifically the nation as a reality and an active agent in economic de-
velopment. Therefore, there is no time in Smith‘s system and no na-
tions, and accordingly there is no politics, no power, no difference be-
tween manufactured goods and raw materials, no difference between 
branches of production, no difference between nations - such as agri-
cultural and manufacturing nations, no learning, no development, nor 
any stages of development. Furthermore, there is no difference between 
public interests and national affairs, and a science of private affairs, a 
merchant‘s pecuniary bookkeeping, apply equally well to national af-
fairs. 
All in all, Smith‘s materialism makes him ignore all the nuances and 
differences that constitute reality, and his policy recommendation ac-
cordingly becomes void: laissez faire. 
Smith argues that the source of wealth is due to the ‗external‘ and 
‗mechanical‘ division of labour, which is dependent on the size of the 
market and on the amount of capital available. The measures to in-
crease wealth therefore are on the one hand free trade, domestically 
and internationally, and on the other hand saving of capital (austerity 
measures).  
Smith‘s nominalism leads him to regard everything from an external 
point of view without being able to recognise inner qualities and quality 
differences. He therefore generalises and lays the foundation for ab-
straction as a method.  
When Smith only regards wealth as material, he comes to regard 
money as the abstract numerator that measures an economy‘s success 
and or failure. Economics thereby becomes an abstract science of ex-
change value, a science preoccupied with monetary issues in a superfi-
cial manner, rather than a science of the productive forces. Smith is 
therefore an early creator of ‗monetarism‘ or as List says the true origi-
nator of ‗the mercantile system‘. Smith and Say are only interested in 
objects and services that are exchangeable on a market and have mone-
tary value. Smith focuses more upon material objects, rather than on 
immaterial forces of production.  
Smith regards wealth as material and the sources as material. This 
failure to value the inner qualities of Man, leads him to ignore Man‘s 
dynamic ability to learn and to innovate, and how this ability has to be 
nurtured and protected to flourish.  
List‘s criticism against Ricardo is that he makes Smith look like an 
empirically inclined person in comparison. List‘s criticism against Say, 
is that his corrections of Smith are of little importance, since he stayed 
true to the materialist principle of only recognising exchange value as 
wealth. List‘s criticism against Malthus is that he lacks trust in Man‘s 
creative capabilities. 
Polanyi deepens this criticism by claiming that Malthus and Ricardo 
used a reductionist method, they reduced Man to an animal, and 
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thereby put social laws under the laws of nature. Thereby, they con-
tributed to the ideology of radical liberalism that dominated Britain and 
much of Europe during the late 19th Century, and put the social market 
under the law of the jungle. 
 
 
3.02 Develop theory against Smith 
 
In order to act wisely one must first understand, and List therefore ar-
gues that less developed nations must criticise Smith‘s system, inform 
the public, publish books, and establish their own doctrine of the Amer-
ican System, also in the universities, 
  
I believe it to be a duty of the general Convention at Harrisburg, not only 
to support the interests of the wool growers and wool manufacturers, but to 
lay the axe to the root of the tree, by declaring the system of Adam Smith 
and Co. to be erroneous — by declaring war against it on the part of the 
American System — by inviting literary men to uncover its errors, and to 
write popular lectures on the American System — and, lastly, by requesting 
the governments of the different states, as well as the general government, 
to support the study of the American System in the different Colleges, Uni-
versities, and literary institutions under their auspices. … 
And if the supporters of the American System are convinced of the supe-
riority of their doctrine, is it not their duty to go on theoretically as well as 
practically? Ought they not to procure for the people, and especially for the 
youth of their country, elementary works and professional teachers, ex-
plaining the principles of political economy according to their own system, 
which must ultimately prevail in proportion as the national legislature be-
come convinced of its propriety? (List, 1827b, Letter I, p.19) 
 
This call for action had to some degree ben met already before List 
particularly in US,100 and was then followed up especially in the then 
developing nations like the USA, Germany and later Japan (Cf. e.g. 
Wendler, 1996). 
In the USA the tradition of the American System was established,101 
and was to some degree continued by the American Institutional 
School.102 
In Germany the tradition of the Historical Schools was established;103 
was continued after WW I; and to some degree even after WW II. 
                                       
100 By US economist economists such as: Alexander Hamilton, (1755-1804); 
Daniel Raymond (1786-1849); Henry Clay (1777-1852); and Mathew Carey 
(1760-39). 
101 Including economists such as: Henry Carey (1793-1879); Erasmus 
Peshine Smith; Horace Greeley (1811-1872); Francis Bowen (1811-90); Simon 
Patten (1852–1922); and Richard T. Ely (1854–1943), (Cf. e.g. Hudson, 1975) 
102 Including economists such as: Thorstein Bunde Veblen (1857-1929); Wes-
ley Clair Mitchell (1874-1948); John R. Commons (1862-1945) and John Ken-
neth Galbraith (1908-2006) 
103 Including economists such as: Wilhelm Roscher (1817-94), Bruno Hilde-
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In Great Britain and the dominions,104 the Historical School also 
made a remarkable impression with economists and statisticians.105  
Furthermore, several European nations established ‗historical 
traditions‘ of their own before WW I, followed by institutional 
approaches before and after WW I.106  
 
 
3.03 Smith’s system, according to List  
 
- The System of Values of Exchange is the true Mercantile System 
 
Most of this section will quote at length chapter 31 of List‘s National 
System: The System of Values of Exchange (Falsely Termed by the 
School, The 'Industrial' System) -- Adam Smith.  
List‘s text will only be broken up by my short summary introduc-
tions. List here describes Adam Smith‘s motivation, and he comprises 
into a few paragraphs Smith‘s system in its entirety, as understood by 
List. 
 
                                                                                                                
brand (1812-78) and Karl Knies (1821-98) in the Older Historical School, and in 
the Younger Historical School, economists like Albert E.F. Schäffle (1831-03); 
Georg Hanssen (1809-1894); Lujo Brentano (1844-1931); August Meitzen 
(1822-1910); Ernst Louis Étienne Laspeyres (1834-1913); Georg Fridrich Knapp 
(1842-1926); not least Gustav Schmoller (1838-1917); and Karl Bücher (1847-
1930), and finally in the Youngest Historical School, economists like Max Weber 
(1864-1920), Werner Sombart (1864-1941) and Arthur Spiethoff (1873-1957). 
(Cf. e.g Grimmer-Solem, 2003) 
104 Especially; Australia with David Syme (1827–1908) (Cf. Groenewegen 
and McFarlane, 1990), and Canada with Vincent Wheeler Bladen (1900-1981) 
and Harold Adams Innis (1894-1952). (Cf. e.g Goodwin, 1961) 
105 Including economists such as: Bonamy Price (1807-1888); John Kells In-
gram (1823-1897); James Edwin Thorold Rodgers (1823-90); Thomas E. Cliffe 
Leslie (1826-1882); Henry Fawcett (1833-1884); Herbert Somerton Foxwell 
(1849-1936); John Atkinson Hobson (1858-1940) - including historians such 
as; William Cunningham (1849-1919); Arnold Toynbee Sr.(1852-1883); William 
James Ashley (1860-1927); Langford Lovell Frederick Price (1862-1950); Wil-
liam Alfred Samuel Hewins (1865 – 1931) and Halford John Mackinder (1861-
1947) - and including statisticians, such as: Thomas Tooke (1774–1858); Wil-
liam Newmarch (1820–1882); Leone Levi (1821-1888); Sir Robert Giffen KCB 
(1837–1910);  Sir Arthur Lyon Bowley (1869-1957); and Charles Booth (1840–
1916). (Cf. e.g. Coleman, 1987) 
106 Economists with institutional approaches have published e.g. in Journal 
of Economic Issues (JEI) published by The Association for Evolutionary Econom-
ics (AFEE) in the US; in Europe in the Journal of Institutional Economics (JOIE) 
published by The European Association for Evolutionary Political Economy 
(EAEPE), and more recently in the Real-World Economics Review (formerly, the 
Post-Autistic Economics Review) published by the World Economics Association. 
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a) Promoting reductionist individualism - ignoring institu-
tions107 
 
List praises Adam Smith for founding economics as an analytic science, 
and claims that precisely this analytic ability of Smith was the very rea-
son that he was unable to see society and its economy in its totality. 
List refers to Smith‘s first biographer, Dugald Stewart, who saw this as 
central part of Smith‘s personal character (Cf. Stewart, 1793, Section V, 
and List, 1841a, pp. 351-352).  
List in effect therefore accuses Smith of being a reductionist,108 who 
reduced society singularly into the motive of self-interest, being unable 
to maintain a holistic view of society, 
 
Notwithstanding, we would by no means deny the great merits of Adam 
Smith. He was the first who successfully applied the analytical method to 
political economy. By means of that method and an unusual degree of sa-
gacity, he threw light on the most important branches of the science, which 
were previously almost wholly obscure. Before Adam Smith only a practice 
existed; his works rendered it possible to constitute a science of political 
economy, and he has contributed a greater amount of materials for that ob-
ject than all his predecessors or successors. 
 But that very peculiarity of his mind by which, in analysing the various 
constituent parts of political economy, he rendered such important service, 
was the cause why he did not take a comprehensive view of the community 
in its entirety; that he was unable to combine individual interests in one 
harmonious whole; that he would not consider the nation in preference to 
mere individuals; that out of mere anxiety for the freedom of action of the 
individual producers, he lost sight of the interests of the entire nation. He 
who so clearly perceived the benefits of the division of labour in a single 
manufactory, did not perceive that the same principle is applicable with 
equal force to entire provinces and nations. 
 With this opinion, that which Dugald Stewart says of him exactly agrees. 
Smith could judge individual traits of character with extraordinary acute-
ness; but if an opinion was needed as to the entire character of a man or of 
a book, one could not be sufficiently astonished at the narrowness and 
obliquity of his views. Nay, he was incapable of forming a correct estimate 
of the character of those with whom he had lived for many years in the 
most intimate friendship. 'The portrait,' says his biographer, 'was ever full 
of life and expression, and had a strong resemblance to the original if one 
compared it with the original from a certain point of view; but it never gave 
a true and perfect representation according to all its dimensions and cir-
cumstances.'  (List, 1841a, pp. 351-352) 
 
List argues that the Cosmopolitan School argues as if history was 
made of unrestrained individuals, and that the national wealth simply 
was an aggregation of individual wealth. We may add that this atomistic 
                                       
107 See also the section, Methodological individualism and instrumentalism, in 
chapter 2. 




individualism was a natural result of the Smith‘s nominalism, where 
social relations and even society and the nation are seen as accidental 
and haphazard. List on the other hand argues that wealth is a social 
phenomenon and results from the joint action of a nation, are more 
particularly the nation‘s productive powers,  
 
It is a further sophism, arrived at by confounding the theory of mere val-
ues with that of the powers of production, when the popular school infers 
from the doctrine, 'that the wealth of the nation is merely the aggregate of 
the wealth of all individuals in it, and that the private interest of every indi-
vidual is better able than all State regulations to incite to production and 
accumulation of wealth,' the conclusion that the national industry would 
prosper best if only every individual were left undisturbed in the occupation 
of accumulating wealth. That doctrine can be conceded without the conclu-
sion resulting from it at which the school desires thus to arrive; for the 
point in question is not (as we have shown in a previous chapter) that of 
immediately increasing by commercial restrictions the amount of the values 
of exchange in the nation, but of increasing the amount of its productive 
powers. But that the aggregate of the productive powers of the nation is not 
synonymous with the aggregate of the productive powers of all individuals, 
each considered separately -- that the total amount of these powers de-
pends chiefly on social and Political conditions, but especially on the degree 
in which the nation has rendered effectual the division of labour and the 
confederation of the powers of production within itself -- we believe we have 
sufficiently demonstrated in the preceding chapters. (List, 1841a, ch. 14, 
pp. 169-170) 
 
b) Promoting a passive state – ignoring regulation 
 
List claims that, Smith‘s system is an individualistic denouncing of 
State power and ability, where the State is only an aggregate of individ-
uals that hinders progress, 
 
In the passage above quoted from Dugald Stewart, Adam Smith's whole 
system is comprised as in a nutshell. The power of the State can and ought 
to do nothing, except to allow justice to be administered, to impose as little 
taxation as possible. Statesmen who attempt to found a manufacturing 
power, to promote navigation, to extend foreign trade, to protect it by naval 
power, and to found or to acquire colonies, are in his opinion project mak-
ers who only hinder the progress of the community. For him no nation ex-
ists, but merely a community, i.e. a number of individuals dwelling togeth-
er. These individuals know best for themselves what branches of occupa-
tion are most to their advantage, and they can best select for themselves 
the means which promote their prosperity. (List, 1841a, pp. 348-349)109 
 
According to the Cosmopolitan School, List writes, what matters for 
the individual agent is therefore (in the short term) to save money and 
                                       
109 A part of this quotation has also been used in the section English Nomi-
nalism versus List‘s Realism, in chapter 2. 
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buy cheap from abroad, rather than to waste money on developing pro-
ductive power (for the long term) and secure the nation‘s future, 
 
The establishment of powers of production, it leaves to chance, to nature, 
or to the providence of God (whichever you please), only the State must 
have nothing at all to do with it, nor must politics venture to meddle with 
the business of accumulating exchangeable values. It is resolved to buy 
wherever it can find the cheapest articles -- that the home manufactories 
are ruined by their importation, matters not to it. If foreign nations give a 
bounty on the export of their manufactured goods, so much the better; it 
can buy them so much the cheaper. In its view no class is productive save 
those who actually produce things valuable in exchange. It well recognises 
how the division of labour promotes the success of a business in detail, but 
it has no perception of the effect of the division of labour as affecting a 
whole nation. It knows that only by individual economy can it increase its 
capital, and that only in proportion to the increase in its capital can it ex-
tend its individual trades; but it sets no value on the increase of the pro-
ductive power, which results from the establishment of native manufacto-
ries, or on the foreign trade and national power which arise out of that in-
crease. What may become of the entire nation in the future, is to it a matter 
of perfect indifference, so long as private individuals can gain wealth. (List, 
1841a, pp. 350-351) 
 
Similarly, List claims (since there was no effective real estate market 
in England at the time) that the system neither pays regard to the value 
of land nor to market fluctuations, 
 
It takes notice merely of the rent yielded by land, but pays no regard to 
the value of landed property; it does not perceive that the greatest part of 
the wealth of a nation consists in the value of its land and its fixed proper-
ty. For the influence of foreign trade on the value and price of landed prop-
erty, and for the fluctuations and calamities thence arising; it cares not a 
straw. (List, 1841a, p. 351) 
 
c) Promoting Free Trade – ignoring the Nation 
 
According to List, Smith was carried away by the dogma of free trade 
that he inherited from the Physiocrats and by his lack of empirical in-
vestigation to see whether there are reasons to accept this policy. List 
writes, 
 
Adam Smith's doctrine is, in respect to national and international condi-
tions, merely a continuation of the physiocratic system. Like the latter, it 
ignores the very nature of nationalities, seeks almost entirely to exclude 
politics and the power of the State, presupposes the existence of a state of 
perpetual peace and of universal union, underrates the value of a national 
manufacturing power, and the means of obtaining it, and demands abso-
lute freedom of trade. 
 Adam Smith fell into these fundamental errors in exactly the same way 
as the physiocrats had done before him, namely, by regarding absolute 
freedom in international trade as an axiom assent to which is demanded by 
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common sense, and by not investigating to the bottom how far history sup-
ports this idea. (List, 1841a, p. 347) 
 
According to List, Dugald Stewart, Smith‘s biographer, writes that 
Smith already in 1755 had shaped his theory of governments‘ unnatu-
ral and tyrannical interference with markets and that a minimum state 
would provide wealth creation best, 
 
Dugald Stewart (Adam Smith's able biographer) informs us that Smith, 
at a date twenty-one years before his work was published in 1776 (viz. in 
1755), claimed priority in conceiving the idea of universal freedom of trade, 
at a literary party at which he was present, in the following words: 'Man is 
usually made use of by statesmen and makers of projects, as the material 
for a sort of political handiwork. The project makers, in their operations on 
human affairs, disturb Nature, whereas people ought simply to leave her to 
herself to act freely; in order that she may accomplish her objects. In order 
to raise a State from the lowest depth of barbarism to the highest degree of 
wealth, all that is requisite is peace, moderate taxation, and good admin-
istration of justice; everything else will follow of its own accord in the natu-
ral course of things. All governments which act in a contrary spirit to this 
natural course, which seek to divert capital into other channels, or to re-
strict the progress of the community in its spontaneous course, act contra-
ry to nature, and, in order to maintain their position, become oppressive 
and tyrannical.' (List, 1841a, pp. 347-348)110 
 
The Economist reveals similar attitudes in our times,  
 
                                       
110 Karl Marx proved that List on several occasions misquoted his adversaries 
(Marx, 1845). Although List here has gotten Smith‘s message correctly, it does 
not seem like List has quoted Stewart accurately, perhaps due to translation 
and re-translation.  I therefore quote Dugald Stewart directly: ―I am aware that 
the evidence I have hitherto produced of Mr Smith's originality may be objected 
to as not perfectly decisive,  … . There exists, however, fortunately, a short 
manuscript drawn up by Mr Smith in the year 1755, and presented by him to a 
society of which he was then a member; in which paper, a pretty long enumera-
tion is given of certain leading principles, both political and literary, to which he 
was anxious to establish his exclusive right;…   I should not have even alluded 
to it, if I did not think it a valuable document of the progress of Mr Smith's po-
litical ideas at a very early period. Many of the most important opinions in The 
Wealth of Nations are there detailed; but I shall quote only the following sen-
tences: 'Man is generally considered by statesmen and projectors as the materi-
als of a sort of political mechanics. Projectors disturb nature in the course of 
her operations in human affairs; and it requires no more than to let her alone, 
and give her fair play in the pursuit of her ends, that she may establish her own 
designs.' -- And in another passage: 'Little else is requisite to carry a state to the 
highest degree of opulence from the lowest barbarism, but peace, easy taxes, 
and a tolerable administration of justice; all the rest being brought about by the 
natural course of things. All governments which thwart this natural course, 
which force things into another channel, or which endeavour to arrest the pro-
gress of society at a particular point, are unnatural, and to support themselves 
are obliged to be oppressive and tyrannical.‖ (Stewart, 1793, Section IV) 
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The most important lesson governments can learn about growth may be 
that, if they want to promote it, they must give up their desire to control it. 
(Economist, 1995, p.110) 
 
d) Focus on material wealth; Value of exchange  
 
According to List, Smith tried to make this denouncing of institutions 
and the Nation plausible by ignoring the dynamic and mental powers, 
focusing only on static matter. Or in greater detail and with List‘s 
terms: This individualism denouncing of the power of the State and of 
the confederation of Labour, is made plausible by ignoring immaterial 
forces, therefore institutions and  nations - and therefore ignoring pow-
er, focusing only on material wealth in its monetary form, and on the 
accumulation of capital by saving. Since private interest or egotism is 
the sole creator of monetary wealth, the task of the State is solely to 
uphold the social order, by supplying peace and justice, 
 
This entire nullification of nationality and of State power, this exaltation 
of individualism to the position of author of all effective power, could be 
made plausible only by making the main object of investigation to be not 
the power which effects, but the thing effected, namely, material wealth, or 
rather the value in exchange which the thing effected possesses. Material-
ism must come to the aid of individualism, in order to conceal what an 
enormous amount of power accrues to individuals from nationality, from 
national unity, and from the national confederation of the productive pow-
ers. A bare theory of values must be made to pass current as national 
economy, because individuals alone produce values, and the State, incapa-
ble of creating values, must limit its operations to calling into activity, pro-
tecting, and promoting the productive powers of individuals. In this combi-
nation, the quintessence of political economy may be stated as follows, viz.: 
Wealth consists in the possession of objects of exchangeable value; objects 
of exchangeable value are produced by the labour of individuals in combi-
nation with the powers of nature and with capital. By the division of labour, 
the productiveness of the labour is increased; capital is accumulated by 
savings, by production exceeding consumption. The greater the total 
amount of capital, so much the greater is the division of labour, and hence 
the capacity to produce. Private interest is the most effectual stimulus to 
labour and to economy. Therefore the highest wisdom of statecraft consists 
in placing no obstacle in the way of private industry, and in caring only for 
the good administration of justice. (List, 1841a, p. 349) 111 
 
e) Promoting a private shopkeeper’s system - a  true mercantile 
system 
 
The Cosmopolitan School therefore have created a system of private 
economics, not of political economics as it relates to whole nations. Ac-
cordingly, by totally ignoring politics, both in history, now and in the 
                                       
111 A part of this quotation has also been used in the section English Nomi-
nalism versus List‘s Realism, in chapter 2. 
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future, they do not bother to explain ―by what means those nations 
which are now prosperous have raised themselves‖. Nor do they con-
cern themselves with the future of ―what means are to be adopted in 
order to bring the natural powers belonging to any individual nation 
into activity and value‖, 
 
This system everywhere takes into its consideration only individuals who 
are in free unrestrained intercourse among themselves, and who are con-
tented if we leave everyone to pursue his own private interests according to 
his own private natural inclination. This is evidently not a system of na-
tional economy, but a system of the private economy of the human race, as 
that would constitute itself were there no interference on the part of any 
Government, were there no wars, no hostile foreign tariff restrictions. No-
where do the advocates of that system care to point out by what means 
those nations which are now prosperous have raised themselves to that 
stage of power and prosperity which we see them maintain, and from what 
causes others have lost that degree of prosperity and power which they 
formerly maintained. We can only learn from it how in private industry, 
natural ability, labour and capital, are combined in order to bring into ex-
change valuable products, and in what manner these latter are distributed 
among the human race and consumed by it. But what means are to be 
adopted in order to bring the natural powers belonging to any individual 
nation into activity and value, to raise a poor and weak nation to prosperity 
and power, cannot be gathered from it, because the school totally ignoring 
politics, ignores the special conditions of the nation, and concerns itself 
merely about the prosperity of the whole human race. (List, 1841a, ch. 14, 
pp. 170-171) 
 
According to List, the result is a consistent system that at bottom is a 
theory of exchange values (a theory of money), a shopkeeper‘s theory, 
with the object if accumulating money instead of a theory of how to im-
prove productive powers, 
 
And hence also it is folly to induce the subjects of a State, by means of 
State legislative measures, to produce for themselves anything which they 
can buy cheaper from abroad. A system so consistent as this is, which sets 
forth the elements of wealth, which so clearly explains the process of its 
production, and apparently so completely exposes the errors of the previous 
schools, could not fail, in default of any other, to meet with acceptance. The 
mistake has been simply, that this system at bottom is nothing else than a 
system of the private economy of all the individual persons in a country, or of 
the individuals of the whole human race, as that economy would develop and 
shape itself, under a state of things in which there were no distinct nations, 
nationalities, or national interests -- no distinctive political constitutions or 
degrees of civilisation -- no wars or national animosities; that it is nothing 
more than a theory of values; a mere shopkeeper's or individual merchant's 
theory -- not a scientific doctrine, showing how the productive powers of an 
entire nation can be called into existence, increased, maintained, and pre-
served -- for the special benefit of its civilisation, welfare, might, continu-
ance, and independence. This system regards everything from the shop-
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keeper's point of view. The value of anything is wealth, according to it, so its 
sole object is to gain values. (List, 1841a, pp. 349-350)112 
 
This is the real mercantile system, as opposed to Colbert‘s industrial 
system, List claims, 
 
The exchange theory of Smith and J. B. Say regards wealth from the nar-
row point of view of an individual merchant, and this system, which would 
reform the (so-called) mercantile system, is itself nothing else than a re-
stricted mercantile system. (List, 1841a, p. 354) 
 
Accordingly, List accordingly finds it rather strange that Colbert‘s na-
tional industrial system was termed ‗mercantilist‘ instead of Adam 
Smith‘s system with its focus on the value of exchange for the individu-
al shopkeeper, 
 
In short, this system is the strictest and most consistent 'mercantile sys-
tem,' and it is incomprehensible how that term could have been applied to 
the system of Colbert, the main tendency of which is towards an 'industrial 
system' -i.e. a system which has solely in view the founding of a national 
industry -- a national commerce -- without regarding the temporary gains 
or losses of values in exchange. (List, 1841a, p. 351) 
 
The reason for the misnaming of ‗National Mercantilism‘ has been 
discussed e.g. by Lars Magnusson in his The Tradition of Free Trade) 
pointing to the origin in France. The tradition was known in Germany 
as Cameralism and in France as système Colbert113, but was practiced 
already by the Phoenicians in the 13th Century BC, and most probably 
before them.114 
At least starting with Marquis de Mirabeau in 1763, the system was 
referred to as système mercantile, referring to a one specific idea, name-
ly, 
 
… the idea that a nation may profit from an importation of money. … 
As Adam Smith was familiar with Mirabeau's Philosophic Rurale (1763) it 
is highly likely that he picked up this idea from this book. (Magnusson, 
2004, p. 70) 
 
                                       
112 A part of this quotation has also been used in the section English Nomi-
nalism versus List‘s Realism, in chapter 2. 
113 Although the system was certainly older even in France; as it was developed 
before, under and after Cardinal Richelieu (Cf. e.g. Franklin Charles Palm‘s The 
Economic Ideas of Richelieu, 1922). 
114 In his classic History of Phoenicia, George Rawlinson describes classic 
mercantilist trade strategies; ―Phœnicia expected to derive, primarily, from 
each colony the commodity or commodities which had caused the selection of 
the site. In return she supplied the colonists with her own manufactured 
articles; ...  In her trade with the nations who peopled the coasts of the 
Mediterranean, the Propontis, and the Black Sea, … Underselling the native 
producers, she soon obtained a monopoly … ―(Rawlinson, 1889, Ch. IX) 
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The idea that a nation may profit from having ample supply of trade 
liquidity (coinage), when paper money was not trusted (often due to 




3.04 Materialism ignores mental powers  
 
List‘s focus on immaterial factors by far exceeds the emphasis that Ad-
am Smith and Alexander Hamilton put upon them. List says that Smith 
ignores the intellectual power that lies behind the productive powers, 
 
Adam Smith regarded the physical labour which produces goods having 
exchange value as the sole source of goods and he failed to examine the ori-
gins that enable this work to be done. From this failure came his serious 
mistake of ignoring the intellectual resources that lie behind the creation of 
productive powers. (List, 1837a, 186) 
 
List admits that Smith recognised the importance of skills concerning 
the division of labour, but claims that he failed to develop this insight. 
The same can be claimed about Alexander Hamilton, who followed 
Smith here. Hamilton‘s virtues are to be found elsewhere, namely in his 
theories of public credit. List claims that Smith sunk into materialism, 
particularism and individualism by ignoring the mental powers, 
 
Adam Smith has on the whole recognised the nature of these powers so 
little, that he does not even assign a productive character to the mental la-
bours of those who maintain laws and order, and cultivate and promote in-
struction, religion, science, and art. His investigations are limited to that 
human activity which creates material values. With regard to this, he cer-
tainly recognises that its productiveness depends on the 'skill and judg-
ment' with which it is exercised; but in his investigations as to the causes of 
this skill and judgment, he does not go farther than the division of labour, 
and that he illustrates solely by exchange, augmentation of material capital, 
and extension of markets. His doctrine at once sinks deeper and deeper in-
to materialism, particularism, and individualism. (List, 1841a, p. 137) 
 
List writes that in addition to using a rationalistic and anti-empirical 
method, the Cosmopolitan system has adopted materialistic axioms and 
consequently cannot fathom the science of productive powers, whose 




3.05 Material capital - less important 
 
                                       
115 Cf. List, 1837a, pp.180-181, quoted below in the section, Epistemology 




List criticises Smith‘s understanding of capital as being much like that 
of an accountant who think in terms of aggregated capital, without con-
sidering this real world of mental and bodily abilities. It is a static 
world.  
The focus of List's argument was to improve the productive powers of 
a nation, to cultivate the tree that would bring fruits in the future. 
Stronger productive powers would later secure tax-revenues for the fis-
cal budget far greater than the original cost of the protection for the 
public. In order words, the costs of protection were seen as an invest-
ment. To improve the productive powers, List advocated strengthening 
mental and bodily abilities and powers, in a dynamic world of learning. 
List writes, 
 
It is firstly to be remarked in opposition to this reasoning, that Adam 
Smith has merely taken the word capital in that sense in which it is neces-
sarily taken by rentiers or merchants in their book-keeping and their bal-
ance-sheets, namely, as the grand total of their values of exchange in con-
tradistinction to the income accruing therefrom. 
He has forgotten that he himself includes (in his definition of capital) the 
mental and bodily abilities of the producers under this term.  
He wrongly maintains that the revenues of the nation are dependent only 
on the sum of its material capital. His own work, on the contrary contains a 
thousand proofs that these revenues are chiefly conditional on the sum of 
its mental and bodily powers, … (List, 1841a, p. 226) 
 
In List‘s Outlines of American Political Economy (Cf. List, 1827b), List 
claims that material capital is not as omnipotent as Say and Smith 
claim, and since most capital is mental – intellectual and social - there 
is no restriction of productive force due to scarcity of capital,   
 
It is not true that the productive power of a nation is restricted by its 
capital of matter. Say and Smith having only in view the exchange of matter 
for matter, to gain matter, ascribe to the matter an omnipotent effect which 
it has not. Greater part of the productive power consists in the intellectual 
and social conditions of the individuals, which I call capital of mind. (List, 
1827b, p. 63) 
 
In List‘s later books, Natural System (Cf. List, 1837a) and National 
System (Cf. List, 1841a), the translations of List‘s concept of Geistiges 
Kapital116 do not use the term ―capital of mind‖ but instead use the 
term ―Mental Capital‖.117 In any case, he continues to point to the im-
portance of immaterial production factors. 
List claims that Smith got the issue of capital wrong because of his 
narrow material focus. List counters the claim of capital scarcity, by 
emphasising that most capital is capital of mind, the intellectual re-
                                       
116 Literary translated as ‗spiritual capital‘. 
117 The concepts of ‗mental capital‘ and ‗human capital‘ have been dealt with 
in several sections in chapter 4: Capital of mind; Accumulated capital of mind; 
Human Capital; Knowledge and information economics; etc. 
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sources, and increasingly so in industrialised nations. Lists claims that 
the growing importance of capital of mind will cause capital of matter to 
accumulate increasingly fast, making Smith‘s argument even less rele-
vant, 
 
… how far wrong Smith and Say are in asserting that capital of matter in-
creases only slowly. (List, 1827b, p. 29)118 
 
This was true in former times when industry was checked in every way, 
when the new powers of chemistry, of mechanics, etc. etc., were not yet in 
existence; it was true in old settled countries, where nearly all natural 
means were already used; but it is not true in a new country, where not the 
tenth part of the capital of nature is in use, where new inventions do won-
ders, where industry is delivered of all hindrances, where in short a new 
state of society has formed a capital of mind never experienced. If popula-
tion increases in such a [new] country in a degree never experienced, the 
increase of capital of matter will outstrip even the increase of population, if 
the community be wise enough to employ its capital of mind in order to de-
velop and use the capital of nature with which it is blessed. (List, 1827b, p. 
67) 
 
The speedy recovery of Japan and Germany after the utter devasta-
tion during WW II may be a good illustration of this point, as with 
South-Korea after their war. 
When Sebastian Dullien contests that lack of capital is a limiting fac-
tor to growth in less developed economies, as is often claimed in mod-
ern textbooks, he could have connected himself to a tradition that at 
least goes back to List. Dullien writes, 
 
Most of the standard macroeconomic textbooks119 today argue in the ex-
position of long-run growth that the central limiting factor to economic de-
velopment is the lack of capital endowment in less developed countries. 
This conclusion is usually reached both using a traditional neoclassical 
growth framework based on Solow (1956) seminal work as well as modern 
endogenous growth models which broaden the term "capital" to explicitly 
include human capital and knowledge capital. (Dullien, 2009, p. 2) 
 
 
                                       
118 (6) Capital of matter. . . slowly. Smith, "Wealth of Nations," II. chap. iii. 
"The progress is frequently so gradual that, at near periods, the improvement is 
not only not sensible, but . . . there frequently arises a suspicion that the riches 
and industry of the whole are decaying." Also Say, ‖Principles," I. chap. ii. "The 
increase of capital is naturally slow of progress; for it can never take place with-
out actual production of value, and the creation of value is the work of time and 
labour besides other ingredients.‖ (List‘s note) 
119 For example, Mankiw (2006), but also Romer (2007) or Barro and Sala-I-
Martin (2003). Note, however, that textbooks which explicitly focus on devel-
opment economics such as Thirwall (2006) or Todaro and Smith (2003) focus 
much less on the neoclassical growth model. (Dullien‘s note) 
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3.06 Physiocratic materialism: No-money, barter economics 
 
The classical school has often been accused of being a study primarily 
of a barter economy. Ironically, and somewhat puzzling, although Ri-
cardo was a ‗money-changer‘ by birth and occupation, he used the 
Physiocratic notion of a farm based on barter as model for a national 
market economy. Although Ricardo did mention money in his Principles, 
we cannot say that this was a central part of his theory, whether in its 
early- or late versions.   
As mentioned, List criticises Smith for ignoring immaterial factors, 
and therefore institutions like the nation. For much the same reason, 
Smith also has a materialistic view of capital and money, and concludes 
that growth depends upon saving, in principle an austerity policy. 
Although the financial sector had been thoroughly studied by Mer-
cantilists like Mun, Malynes, Child, Locke, Newton, Steuart, it was for-
gotten with Smith and the Classical school, and for which Thornton 
criticised them in 1802. What List wrote in 1841a, was supported by 
others also regarding finance, 
 
Adam Smith's doctrine is, in respect to national and international condi-
tions, merely a continuation of the physiocratic system. (List, 1841a, p. 
347) 
 
Smith, and then Ricardo, in essence took over the economic model of 
the Physiocrats based on barter with corn. The Labour Fund theory is 
one illustration of this, corn must be saved to feed the next season of 
labourers. The title of the neo-Ricardian Piero Sraffa‘s book is tellingly 
in this tradition; Production of Commodity by Means of Commodities 
(Sraffa, 1960). 
Like the Physiocrats Smith tends to regard capital as matter, ‗stock‘ 
as in ‗stockroom‘ and storage room. Adam Smith often writes of money 
and capital as ‗stock‘. Edwin Cannan, the editor of the 1904 ―definitive‖ 
version of The Wealth of Nations, writes in his article Early History of the 
Term Capital that Smith often mixes and confuses the usage of these 
terms, 
 
Instead of making the capital a sum of money which is to be invested, or 
which has been invested in certain things, Smith makes it the things them-
selves. Instead of being a sum of money expended on the acquisition of 
stock, it is part of the stock itself. But the change is not pointed out to the 
reader in anyway, and Smith was doubtless quite unconscious of having 
made it. He constantly drifts back into expressions which are only appro-
priate to the older conception. … If Smith had recognized … much subse-
quent confusion would have been avoided. (Cannan, 1921) 
 
This view of capital as stock, affects his view of capital as something 
that must be saved, stored in a stock in advance, before investments 
can be made. This materialist view of capital is then used on capital as 
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money; money is material and must be stocked and saved in order to 
achieve growth.  
In essence, the material ‗stock‘ view of capital and money is a rem-
nant from a pre-financial barter economics. In a market economy, how-
ever, money is an institution based in legal relations. Money – ‗value in 
exchange‘ - is relatively easy to measure, but money is not a ‗stock‘ or a 
material thing, as Smith evidently thought. Money is an idea, since it 
denotes an institutionalised debt relationship. Unlike a true barter 
economy, a market economy has institutionalised credit and thereby a 
financial economy at its core.  
The financial market consists of debt relationships, claims account-
ing, which by definition consists in social and institutional relations, 
which in essence are ‗ideal‘ relations or ‗mental‘ relations. 
The financial system is a record of the claims to resources, including 
the results of production, and exists in parallel to the social and mate-
rial system of production. National authorities are supposed to regulate 
these two parallel systems so that claims and production balance. 
Money is an impersonal and universalised kind of credit, and as 
such, it is an accounting concept. From a bank‘s point of view and even 
more from a nation‘s point of view, money is nothing one has to save in 
order to create investment. Money is an idea, an idea that can be creat-
ed out of thin air or in cyberspace – and it can evaporate into thin air - 
or in cyberspace. 
This issue influences policies on crucial matters like currencies, bal-
ance of payments, debts, savings, pensions, and investments which 
―main stream‖ tend to believe concern material matters rather than ide-
as, immaterial and ideal matters, or more precisely institutional, rela-
tional and judicial phenomena.  
Like Smith who insists on accumulating capital by saving, many 
economists are stuck in the conceptions of a barter economy, having 
not grasped ‗in practice‘ that a market economy essentially is depend-
ent on a financial economy, where new debt relationships involving 
money can be created at will. As we shall see below, the misunder-
standing of the act of saving will illustrate this point. To be somewhat in 
progress of this and hint at one important issue, we may look at eco-
nomic pension policies. Future retirees will have to live off future pro-
duction, and to render this possible a nation has to invest today in or-
der to produce tomorrow. Instead, today‘s policies largely consist in 
‗saving‘ in (private and public) funds that invest in the established and 
―secure‖ bonds, stocks and real estate. This contributes to asset infla-
tion, which is a costly burden on production, thereby undermining to-
morrow‘s pensions. In other words, lacking a simple and fundamental 
analysis most pension policies, advised by economists, are directly 
counterproductive. 
There is another flaw in Smith‗s analysis. When he asserts that funds 
must be saved in order to provide capital for the labourer, he assumes 
away the time that is needed for saving (and ‗storing‘ this capital stock), 
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and instead assumes instant exchanges. Some Capital is therefore 
withdrawn from circulation, creating a relative shortage in demand.120 
 
 
3.07 Counterproductive saving 
 
Adam Smith argues that growth in wealth comes from enlarged markets 
that allow further division of labour, which can be aided by free trade. 
The second source of growth of wealth is growth in capital, which only 
come from savings. List criticises Smith‘s theory of capital and growth, 
and quotations Smith such,  
 
The industry of the community can only be augmented in proportion as 
its capital increases, and the capital of the community can only increase in 
accordance with the savings which it gradually makes from its income. 
(Wealth of Nations, book IV, ch. ii) (List, 1841a, p. 225)121 
 
Smith also says that parsimony and not industry increases capital, 
 
As the capital of an individual can be increased only by what he saves 
from his annual revenue or his annual gains, so the capital of a society, 
which is the same with that of all the individuals who compose it, can be 
increased only in the same manner. 
 Parsimony, and not industry, is the immediate cause of the increase of 
capital. Industry, indeed, provides the subject which parsimony accumu-
lates. But whatever industry might acquire, if parsimony did not save and 
store up, the capital would never be the greater. (Smith, 1776, book II, ch. 
III) 
 
                                       
120 Smith must either assume away time needed for saving enough capital, 
or he must assume that the saved capital immediately can be used to buy 
suitable fixed capital, meaning that the extra capital needed is infinitesimal 
small, and that this is so for all producers. Obviously either assumption is 
empirically wrong, time exists and some investments are large. Therefore, 
some purchasing power is always and in an increasing degree withheld from 
demand, thereby creating increasing deflation. This relation tends to make 
underconsumption (and deflation) a chronic state.  
Other factors pull in the opposite direction, creating inflation, such as un-
productive creation of credit. An effective financial sector may, however, only 
partly ameliorate the problem, by lending ‗our‘ manufacturer‘s saved capital to 
other users until he has enough capital to make the purchase.  
121 Again List fails to quote correctly, but this may be due to the translation 
into German and then back into English, and also due to differences in the 
handful editions of Smith‘s Wealth of Nations. In any case, the meaning is cor-
rect. This is Smith‘s original text: ―The industry of the society can augment 
only in proportion as its capital augments, and its capital can augment only in 
proportion to what can be gradually saved out of its revenue.‖(Smith, 1776, 
book IV, ch. II) A more extended quotation can be found in chapter 3 under 
Differentiate actual from potential – irrelevance of natural advantages. 
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List comments Adam Smith‘s theory of growth, accumulation and 
saving, saying that it is a private theory of a private rentier rather than 
that of a nation, 
  
He reduces the process of the formation of capital in the nation to the 
operation of a private rentier, …. who can only increase his income by sav-
ings which he again turns into capital. 
… this theory of savings, …. if followed by a whole nation must lead to pov-
erty, …, the mental power required for production vanishes. …. Where eve-
ryone saves and economises as much as he possibly can, no motive can ex-
ist for production. … The building up of the material national capital takes 
place in quite another manner than by mere saving as in the case of the 
rentier, namely, in the same manner as the building up of the productive 
powers, … (List, 1841a, pp. 227-228)122 
 
In the section, called When Saving is Injurious Roscher says that, 
 
The act of saving, if the consumption omitted was a productive one, is 
detrimental to the common good; because a real want of the national 
economy remains unsatisfied. (Roscher, 1877, § CCXX) 
 
This insight was also realised before List by e.g. Friedrich II of 
Prussia, who in his L'Anti-Machiavel wrote, 
 
Any private individual and any king who does nothing but pile up and 
bury money, understands nothing of the art of enrichment: it is necessary 
to make the money circulate to be really rich. (Friedrich II, 1740, ch. xvi) 
 
Later, a number of economists such as Ragnar Frisch have 
understood this,123  
 
It is only by a productive arrangement that society as a whole can 
implement saving. (Frisch, 1947) 
 
 
Terence Hutchison notifies us that also Eugen Böhm von Bawerk in 
his classic analysis, Positive Theory of Capital (Cf. Böhm-Bawerk, 1889) 
reversed Adam Smith‘s understanding of capital and growth, but he 
then slipped back into Smith‘s error. The error was, Hutchinson writes, 
that Böhm-Bawerk ―was dealing with the case where all savings in a 
period are invested and there is full employment‖. In other words, 
Böhm-Bawerk ignored the possibility of ‗hoarding‘ and unemployment, 
which precisely is what make these issues both difficult and interesting. 
Hutchinson writes,  
                                       
122 An extended quotation may be found in Appendix 3.   
123 Cf. Appendix 4. Underconsumption and credit, which is also highly 






Böhm-Bawerk closes this part of his work with a section on the formation 
of capital, or saving and investment. For the formation of capital the nega-
tive element of saving must be joined by the positive element of investing, or 
employing intermediate products, (p. 139.) Not only does Böhm-Bawerk dis-
tinguish the two processes in this way, but he corrected Adam Smith's long 
dominant dictum that 'parsimony and not industry is the immediate cause 
of the increase of capital'. 'To be correct', Böhm-Bawerk emphasizes, 'this 
must be precisely reversed. The direct cause for the existence of capital 
goods is production, the indirect cause is the previous saving.' However, af-
ter this promising emphasis Böhm-Bawerk reverts to the Smithian concept 
of the invariable (or inevitable) linking of saving and investment. He exam-
ines what happens in a free market economy when aggregate saving in-
creases. …   
(pp. 149-50.) …  
Without any particular warning as to any degree of abstraction in-
volved, Böhm-Bawerk, as we shall see again later, was dealing with the case 
where all savings in a period are invested and there is full employment. 
(Hutchison, 1953, p. 63-64) 
 
 
3.08 Introduction of money - hoarding 
 
The introduction of money as an exchange medium, made market 
transactions and resource allocation more efficient than a barter econ-
omy. However, by the introduction of money as an intermediate be-
tween production and consumption, potential disturbance is intro-
duced. because money is also allowed to serve other purposes that con-
flict with its role as a clearing tool for markets. 
When money serves several roles, it brings with it a potential for dis-
ruption of the whole economic system. This happens if money is allowed 
to leave the circulation process between production and consumption. 
The intended role as a claim on production then ceases.  This money 
becomes ‗dead‘ instead of serving as an active medium. This was a point 
Malthus made, and the central point of the many monetary heretics in 
the interwar period, in the 1920s and 1930s. 
As noted by Roscher, financial investments are a kind of sterile stor-
age until channelled into consumption of kinds. When, however, money 
is channelled into ‗non-productive‘ and ‗non-consuming‘ speculation, in 
e.g. established financial assets or established real estate; it is still ster-
ile and only potential. Its role as a claim on production has still not 
been activated.  This is a potential disturber of the peaceful balance and 
equilibrium in the model of the classical school. The money heretics 
pointed out that this disturbance was due to the different roles of mon-
ey, as exchange medium, as value measurer, and as wealth storage me-
dium.  
These different roles are repeatedly pointed out in textbooks, but the 
inherent potential for conflict is glossed over to the degree that it is not 
mentioned at all. The conflict is non-existent, it is assumed. 
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Roscher follows Malthus‘ argument and says quite plainly that the 
invention of money renders the abstract theory (of Ricardo, J.S. Mill 
and J-B. Say) useless, since hoarding of money reduces demand for 
production, 
 
Lastly, the mere introduction of trade by money destroys as it were the 
use of the whole abstract theory. [Footnote: Malthus, Principles, II, ch. I, 3] 
So long as original barter prevailed, supply and demand met face to face. 
But by the intervention of money, the seller is placed in a condition to pur-
chase only after a time, to postpone the other half of the exchange-
transaction as he wishes. Hence it follows that supply does not necessarily 
produce a corresponding demand in the real market. And thus a general 
crisis may be produced, especially by a sudden diminution of the medium 
of circulation.' And so, many very abundant harvests, which have produced 
a great decline in the value of raw material, and no less so a too large fixa-
tion capital which stops before its completion,' may lead to general overpro-
duction. In a word, production does not always carry with itself the guaran-
ty that it shall find a proper market but only when it is developed in all di-
rections, where it is progressive and in harmony with the whole national 
economy. … There will be a stagnation of the entire business, because part 
of its capital is paralyzed, and all the workmen will suffer damage.124 
(Roscher, 1877, Book IV, Ch. I, § CCIX) 
 
 
3.09 No gluts in the classical school 
 
List (and Roscher) paid much attention to the causes and effects of dis-
ruptions of consumption and production, and List complains that 
Smith‘s followers never bothered to investigate the sources and effects 
of commercial crises, 
 
Through their position as the manufacturing and commercial monopo-
lists of the world, their manufactories from time to time fall into the state 
which they call 'glut,' and which arises from what they call 'overtrading.' 
….The English nation merely sees the fire and hears the report of the explo-
sion; the fragments fall down in other countries, … … The prevailing eco-
nomical school has never deemed it expedient to elucidate the causes and 
effects of such commercial crises. (List, 1841a, pp. 146-147. On dumping, 
see also p. 299, quoted above) 
 
Adam Smith and the main stream of the Classical School tended to 
ignore both the existence and the explanation of commercial crisis, 
such as theories of phenomena like oversaving, over-accumulation, 
overproduction, underconsumption, and under-spending. A reason was 
the crisis of this kind was illogical according to Smith‘s system, since it 
                                       
124 On the special pathology and therapeutics of this economic disease, com-
pare Roscher, Die Produktionskrisen, mit besonderer Rücksicht auf die letzen 
Jahrzente in die Gegenwart, Brockhaus, 1849, Bd. III, 721 ff., and his Ansich-
ten der Volkswirtschaft, 1861, 279ff. (Roscher‘s footnote) 
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would imply a surplus of capital, and of money, that were not directed 
into efficient demand.  
As we have seen, this is rooted in Smith‘s view of capital as material, 
a stock to be saved - as opposed to the view of Capital as an idea – a 
legal institution for the accounting of debt- and credit relations.  
Smith saw the problem of growth as insufficient capital and argued 
in favour of increased accumulation of capital. Over-accumulation of 
capital was therefore not likely. In the tradition after Smith, instability 
as a result of over-accumulation or hoarding of money was thereby 
more or less ignored.  
Moreover, since Smith and his followers largely ignored distribution 
and consumption, there was logically and consequently no search for-, 
nor any observation of any such mismatch between production and 
consumption. The classical school was thereby unable to explain cer-
tain instability phenomena related to consumption or rather the lack of 
it - underconsumption. The flip of the coin to over-accumulation is un-
derconsumption and therefore declining investments, -growth; -
employment of Labour and Capital, -tax-revenue, and -welfare.  
Henry Fawcett (Marshall's predecessor at Cambridge) has left us one 
example of the classical mode of thought following Say's Law of market 
equalisation: Products will always find consumers. Fawcett neglects the 
financial sector, in particular credit based consumption, which List 
pointed to. Fawcett furthermore, believes in the self-equalising markets 
through of the price mechanism. Fawcett writes in the classic belief that 
prices are infinitely flexible, that consumption and investment is price-
flexible, that banks will give credit also in a crisis, and that capital al-
ways will be reinvested in production of some sort – immediately. This 
contrasts e.g. with Hilferding‘s concept of fallow or idle capital (Cf. 
Hilferding, 1910, ch. 4), and contrasts e.g. with the experience during 
the banking crisis in 2008. Fawcett writes, 
 
All political economists who preceded James Mill and Ricardo, and many 
who have succeeded them, seem to anticipate a general over-production of 
commodities as a possible or even probable contingency. Dr Chalmers and 
Mr Malthus went so far as to impress upon all, the duty of exercising a 
moral restraint with regard to the accumulation of capital; for if this was 
not done, they feared that wealth would not only be created to be wasted, 
and that it would be impossible to consume a great portion of the 
commodities produced. Sismondi was actually opposed to the use of 
machinery, because he believed that if the production of wealth was so 
much facilitated there would inevitably ensue a general over-production of 
all commodities. … yet it can be proved that there never has been, and 
never will be, overproduction in the sense that more commodities are 
produced than people will consume. …there would be no difficulty whatever 
in selling the goods if they were only offered at a sufficiently low price. …  
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It therefore appears that, however great may be the accumulation of 
capital, commodities are sure not to be produced to be wasted; there will 
always be persons ready to consume the commodities which are produced, 
if the price at which they are old is sufficiently low. Consequently the 
accumulation of capital, as pointed out in the last chapter, may reduce 
profits, but never causes a superfluous production of capital. (Fawcett, 
1883, ch.6, pp.472-476) 
 
 
3.10 Consumption and dissatisfaction is key, not saving  
 
Consumption holds a key role in List‘s system, saving does not. It is 
commonplace to regard List as a production oriented economist. This is 
only partially correct, since List never stops reminding the reader of the 
tight connection between activities and the need for balance between 
them. He therefore often pointed out the crucial role of consumption.  
List argues that social inequality and public display of it spurs indi-
vidual efforts to rise in consumption and thereby in social standing. Dif-
ference in social rank act as an inducement and stimulus to exertion, 
inventiveness, and cause a nation to improve its productiveness,125 
 
What immense performances in both mental and material production 
arise out of the endeavour to move in better society! 
We can live as well in a house made of boards as in a villa, we can pro-
tect ourselves for a few florins against rain and cold as well as by means of 
the finest and most elegant clothing. Ornaments and utensils of gold and 
silver add no more to comfort than those of iron and tin; but the distinction 
connected with the possession of the former acts as an inducement to exer-
tions of the body and the mind, and to order and thrift; and to such in-
ducements society owes a large part of its productiveness. (List, 1841a, p. 
303) 
 
List argues that the opportunity for the individual to raise oneself in 
social rank is the most potent stimulus a political system can give its 
economy, whereas a lack of opportunity produces idleness, 
 
Among the most potent stimulants are those afforded by the civil and po-
litical institutions of the country. Where it is not possible to raise oneself by 
honest exertions and by prosperity from one class of society to another, 
from the lowest to the highest; ... , there the most important motives for 
consumption as well as for production are wanting. (List, 1841a, p. 303) 
 
… restrictions on luxury have destroyed wholesome emulation in the large 
masses of society, and have merely tended to the increase of mental and 
bodily idleness.  (List, 1841a, p. 306) 
 
                                       
125 See also the section, Colonies, division of labour and free trade; under the 
subsection, Colonial goods as a catalyst for activity, in chapter 7. 
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Production is a tool, to enable consumption, but not for material rea-
sons alone. In List‘s view, production is also a tool in a non-economic 
sense, because production elevates civilisation. Therefore, elevation of 
civilisation is the goal, consumption and production are only intermedi-
ate tools, of which consumption is primary; Trigger consumption and 
human inventiveness will produce. Trigging in particular the consump-
tion of luxury products, and human inventiveness will produce the 
most exquisite products.126 
Consumption therefore holds the primary role and production holds 
the secondary role.  
 
 
Consumption and the Balance of Trade - and Debt 
 
In sharp contrast to Smith (Smith, book IV, ch. II, part II), List is also 
extremely focused on the importance of a balance of trade. This balance 
parallels in the exterior trade the domestic trade balance between con-
sumption and production.  
List‘s trade theory or more precisely his argument for protection is 
not for the protection of production. No, in the first instance it is con-
sumption that needs to be protected: Production needs to be demanded 
through consumption, in order to complete and continue the economic 
circulation process. List‘s whole argument for the creation, mainte-
nance and protection of the home market is based on the key role of 
consumption, within the economic system as a circulating process, 
 
Production renders consumption possible, and the desire to consume in-
cites to production. The mere agricultural nation is in its consumption de-
pendent on foreign conditions, and if these are not favourable to it, that 
production dies out which would have arisen in consequence of the desire 
to consume. But in that nation which combines manufactures with agricul-
ture in its territory, the reciprocal inducement continually exists, and there-
fore, also, there will be continuous increase of production and with it aug-
mentation of capital on both sides. (List, 1841a, p. 233) 
 
One of Roscher's chapters has the telling heading Necessity of the 
Proper Simultaneous Development of Production and Consumption 
(Roscher, 1877, Book IV, Ch. I, § CCXV). After a discussion of the two 
phenomena, he claims that consumption and production must balance 
(!), 
 
There is no production possible without consumption.  (Roscher, 1877, § 
CCXI) 
 
                                       
126 This issue was Werner Sombart elaborated on this issue in ‗Luxury and 
Capitalism‘ (Sombart, 1913) 
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Hence, one of the most essential conditions of a prosperous national 
economy is that the development of consumption should keep equal pace 
with that of production, and supply with demand. (Roscher, 1877, § CCXV) 
 
List argues that often consumption precedes production by using 
credit and that this has made agricultural nations indebted to manu-
facturing nations and likewise domestically, credit: This has made the 
agricultural countryside indebted to manufacturing cities, and stimu-
lates the agriculturalist to greater production, 
 
In any case products must be created before they can be consumed, and 
thus production must necessarily generally precede consumption. In popu-
lar and national practice, however, consumption frequently precedes pro-
duction. Manufacturing nations, supported by large capital and less re-
stricted in their production than mere agricultural nations, make, as a rule, 
advances to the latter on the yield of future crops; the latter thus consume 
before they produce -- they produce later on because they have previously 
consumed. The same thing manifests itself in a much greater degree in the 
relation between town and country: the closer the manufacturer is to the 
agriculturist, the more will the former offer to the latter both an inducement 
to consume and means for consumption, the more also will the latter feel 
himself stimulated to greater production. (List, 1841a, p. 306) 
 
 
3.11 Productive consumption  
 
In the chapter The Manufacturing Power and the Inducement to Produc-
tion and Consumption, List argues that creation of inducement to con-
sumption is a productive activity, 
 
In society man is not merely productive owing to the circumstance that 
he directly brings forth products or creates powers of production, but he 
also becomes productive by creating inducements to production and to 
consumption, or to the formation of productive powers. (List, 1841a, p. 303) 
 
List argues that unproductive consumption may be productive, or 
more precisely, unproductive consumption in a small setting may be 
productive in a larger setting. This happens when e.g. consumption for 
education incites production in the future, thereby increasing the na-
tional productive force, 
 
The greatest portion of the consumption of a nation is used for the edu-
cation of the future generation, for promotion and nourishment of the fu-
ture national productive powers. (List, 1841a, p. 139) 
 
This also happens when consumption incites new production more 
immediately, thereby increasing the national productive force, 
 
We cannot agree with the defenders of unproductive expenditure, namely 
of that incurred by wars and the maintenance of large armies, nor with 
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those who insist upon the positively beneficial character of a public debt; 
but neither do we believe that the dominant school are in the right when 
they contend that all consumption which is not directly reproductive - for 
instance, that of war - is absolutely injurious without qualification. The 
equipment of armies, wars, and the debts contracted for these purposes, 
may, as the example of England teaches, under certain circumstances, very 
greatly conduce to the increase of the productive powers of a nation. Strictly 
speaking, material wealth may have been consumed unproductively, but 
this consumption may, nevertheless, stimulate manufacturers to extraordi-
nary exertions, and lead to new discoveries and improvements, especially to 
an increase of productive powers. This productive power then becomes a 
permanent acquisition; it will increase more and more, while the expense of 
the war is incurred only once for all.127 And thus it may come to pass, un-
der favouring conditions such as have occurred in England, that a nation 
has gained immeasurably more than it has lost from that very kind of ex-
penditure which theorists hold to be unproductive. (List, 1841a, p. 55) 
 
Wilhelm Roscher also asserts that consumption may be productive, 
 
There are different degrees of productiveness in consumption also. … 
(Roscher, 1877, § CCXI) 
 
Likewise, in his A Study in Public Finance, Arthur Cecil Pigou 
therefore argues that with the realisation that much consumption is an 
investment in human capital, especially concerning children, then the 
delineation between productive investment and unproductive 
consumption becomes blurred,  
 
There is such a thing as investment in human capital as well as 
investment in material capital. So soon as this is recognised, the distinction 
between economy in consumption and economy in investment becomes 
blurred. For, up to a point, consumption is investment in personal 
productive capacity. This is especially important in connection with 
children: to reduce unduly expenditure on their consumption may greatly 
lower their efficiency in after-life. Even for adults, after we have descended 
a certain distance along the scale of wealth, so that we are beyond the 
region of luxuries and "unnecessary" comforts, a check to personal 
consumption is also a check to investment. (Pigou, 1928, p. 29) 
 
 
3.12 Smith ignores distribution and consumption  
 
In List‘s system, individual dissatisfaction and consumption is the driv-
er of individual efforts to elevate one‘s social standing (Cf. List, 1841a, 
p. 303). List often discusses the need to secure stable consumption, in 
order to secure production and the productive forces. He repeatedly 
discusses disruptions of consumption, especially abroad since these 
markets were under foreign command, and outside the range of domes-
                                       
127 (List‘s note, omitted here) 
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tic control. List‘ intent was to bring these markets 'home‖ and ―domesti-
cate‖ them, in order to get them under control. 
Therefore, List argues that development of stable and uninterruptable 
domestic consumption is important to secure domestic production, 
both in manufacture and in agriculture. 
 
In like manner the entire manufacturing industry of a State in connec-
tion with its agricultural interest, and the latter in connection with the for-
mer, will prosper the more the nearer they are placed to one another, and 
the less they are interrupted in their mutual exchanges with one another. 
The advantages of their confederation under one and the same political 
Power in times of war, of national differences, of commercial crises, failure 
of crops, &c., are not less perceptible than are the advantages of the union 
of the persons belonging to a pin manufactory under one and the same 
roof. (List, 1841a, p. 151) 
 
In footnote 8, also Roscher declares that Adam Smith neglected 
consumption, 
 
The necessity of an equilibrium between production and consumption 
was pretty clear to many of the older political economists. Thus, for 
instance, Petty calls the coarse absence of the feeling of higher wants 
among the Irish the chief cause of their idleness and poverty.  Similarly 
Temple,  ……According to Berkeley, … the awakening of wants is the most 
probable way to lead a people to industry. And so Hume, … The 
Physiocrates were in favor of active consumption. … 
 The moderns have frequently inequitably neglected the doctrine of 
consumption. Thus it appears to be a very characteristic fact that in Adam 
Smith's great book, there is no division bearing the title "consumption" and 
in the Basel edition of 1801, that word does not occur in the index. Droz 
says that in reading the works of certain of his followers, one might think 
that products were not made for the sake of man but for their own sake. 
But on the other hand there came a strong reaction with Lauderdale … 
Sismondi … Ganilh … but especially, and with important scientific 
discoveries, Malthus …St. Chamans … And so according to Carey, 
Principles, ch.35, § 6, the real difficulty does not lie in production but in 
finding a purchaser for the products. But he overlooks the fact here that 
only the possessor of other products can appear as a purchaser. From 
another side, most socialists think almost exclusively of the wants of men, 
and scarcely consider it worth their while to pay any attention to the means 
of satisfying them. (Roscher, 1877, § CCXVn) 
 
In the Editorial Introduction to the Wealth of Nations, Edwin Cannan 
says that Smith here, as opposed to in his Lectures, ignored 
consumption and distribution and thereby started at least a century of 
ignorance, 
 
Besides consumption, two other subjects, stock-jobbing and the 
Mississippi scheme, which are treated at some length in the lectures, are 




These changes do not make so much real difference to Smith's own work 
as might be supposed;… the theory of distribution, though it appears in the 
title of Book I., is no essential part of the work and could easily be excised 
by deleting a few paragraphs in Book I., chapter vi., and a few lines else-
where; if Book II. were altogether omitted the other Books could stand per-
fectly well by themselves. But to subsequent economics they were of fun-
damental importance. They settled the form of economic treatises for a cen-
tury at least. (Cannan, 1904, p. 1.49) 
 
 
3.13 Generalisation and abstraction 
 
List praises the Cosmopolitan system for restoring to industry a central 
role in economic theory, but criticises its unrealistic and dogmatic ma-
terialism. The economists of the Cosmopolitan system first assert a 
principle, free trade, they then look for facts that fit that preconceived 
conclusion, and consciously ignore facts such as the existence of na-
tions, national rivalry and wars. Instead, they should have researched 
how to unite the productive powers of individuals to their mutual ad-
vantage. By ignoring reality, their conclusions are worthless, List says, 
 
We now come to the "cosmopolitan system‘‘. We can think of no better 
name for the doctrines advocated by Adam Smith and J. B. Say. The sup-
porters of these doctrines recognise that the arguments of the Physiocrats 
are untenable and they have restored industry to its rightful place in the 
economy. And they have shown that industry is mainly responsible for the 
development of a prosperous agriculture. 
Blinded by the cosmopolitan doctrine of free trade the supporters of the 
"cosmopolitan system" have taken the wrong road to achieve their purpose. 
They have fallen into the same trap as the Physiocrats by first asserting a 
principle and then looking for evidence to support it. They have not appre-
ciated the significance of the fact that humanity is divided into various na-
tions, each with its own individuality. They have failed to recognise the ex-
istence of a problem posed by nature itself - namely how to unite the "pro-
ductive powers" of all individuals so that they can pursue a common goal to 
their mutual advantage. Since such unwelcome facts are incompatible with 
the "cosmopolitan principle" they have simply been ignored. The supporters 
of the "cosmopolitan principle" have silently averted their eyes from the ob-
vious fact that nations exist and they have simply imagined the existence of 
a world republic. 
At the same time they have also been forced to ignore wars and the con-
sequences of wars or at any rate they have had to postulate the absence of 
such disagreeable events. They regard tariffs as the result of a mistaken fis-
cal policy whereas they are really brought about by the division of mankind 
into independent sovereign states. Supporters of the cosmopolitan doctrine 
are treading a path that ignores reality and they pretend that what in fact 
exists is not there at all. Consequently all their conclusions are absolutely 
worthless in practice. On the other hand practical men have to accept the 
fact that national rivalries and international conflicts do exist and they have 




In relation to generalisations and materialism, List himself sometimes 
exaggerates. He also blames Smith when in reality it was Smith‘s ardent 
students who were more to blame. But to make a point, and indeed to 
popularise and entertain, by telling a good story as List intended, one 
cannot allow oneself the luxury of being too detailed and nuanced. On 
the other hand, List very often quotes Smith, and sometimes duly 
praises his former hero.  
A key to understanding List‘s criticism of Smith and his followers is 
to observe how he criticized the strategy of Smith as being too generaliz-
ing and abstract, disregarding the empirical and historical facts and 
particulars of each practical phenomenon (Cf. List, 1841a, pp. 171, 
224ff, and 316).  
Contrary to the common opinion among adherents of Smith, Smith is 
therefore one originator of the so-called Ricardian vice of oversimplifica-
tion, as Schumpeter notes (Schumpeter, 1912, pp. 70 and 81; and 
Schumpeter, 1954, pp. 472-473).  
It may be argued that Smith as opposed to Ricardo was a man of the 
practical world, since The Wealth of Nations is littered with real world 
descriptions (Smith, 1776). The deeper fact may be that he was a Ra-
tionalist arguing from a priori assumptions, and not the empirically in-
clined scientist, or perhaps he was both, but at different times? Mark 
Blaug, offers the following interesting observation that Smith, 
 
... in fact employed radically different modes of reasoning in different parts 
of his works. Books I and II of The Wealth of Nations make liberal use of the 
method of comparative statics later associated with the work of Ricardo, 
whereas Books III, IV, and V of The Wealth of Nations, am most of The Theo-
ry of Moral Sentiments, exemplify the very different methods of the so-called 
Scottish historical school. (Blaug, 1980, p. 56) 
 
Compared to Ricardo‘s formalised and Euclidian puppet theatre, 
Schumpeter argues that Smith‘s analysis looks less abstract due to the 
amount of facts included, but in reality Smith‘s ―reasoning is not less 
abstract than ... Ricardo‘s‖, 
 
This is so important as to justify repetition: Smith`s work looks less 
"abstract" because it includes so much factual information that the 
specialized later works on economic theory did not include - but left for 
other specialized works to provide. But where he does not move within the 
orbit of economic theory, his reasoning is not less abstract than say, 
Ricardo`s. With the latter, "abstractness" shows more because he confines 
himself to topics of an "abstract" nature, and does not provide illustrative 
foliage, but that is all. (Schumpeter, 1954, p. 538n) 
 
The Rationalist Smith provided Ricardo with the spur for his more ex-
treme abstractions. Schumpeter puts it this way, 
 
Ricardo grapples with the basic theoretical problem and appears to us for 
this reason particularly 'abstract'. Smith quietly seizes on masses of facts of 
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the most varied character and in consequence appears to many as 'induc-
tive'. (Schumpeter, 1912, p. 81) 
 
List often points to issues where Smith clearly showed sensible in-
sights, but then ‗failed‘ to draw the right conclusions. Sometimes List 
expresses wonder why Smith is so one-eyed and focuses on matter and 
money, since he clearly is aware of the role of immaterial production 
factors like morality, intelligence and skill.  
List concludes that Smith is caught up in his quest for fame, and 
therefore his preconceived opinions rules out inconvenient facts, 
According to List, Smith established an axiom (universal freedom of 
trade) (Cf. List, 1841a, pp. 347-348), which would fit a ‗scientific‘ and 
axiomatic-deductive method in the economic area. List writes,  
 
Adam Smith set out from this fundamental idea, and to prove it and to il-
lustrate it was the sole object of all his later works. He was confirmed in 
this idea by Quesnay, Turgot, and the other coryphaei of the physiocratic 
school, whose acquaintance he had made in a visit to France in the year 
1765. 
Smith evidently considered the idea of freedom of trade as an intellectual 
discovery which would constitute the foundation of his literary fame. How 
natural, therefore, it was that he should endeavour in his work to put aside 
and to refute everything that stood in the way of that idea; that he should 
consider himself as the professed advocate of absolute freedom of trade, 
and that he thought and wrote in that spirit. 
How could it be expected, that with such preconceived opinions, Smith 
should judge of men and of things, of history and statistics, of political 
measures and of their authors, in any other light than as they confirmed or 
contradicted his fundamental principle? (List, 1841a, p. 348)128 
 
This ‗discovery‘ was supposed to establish him as the Newton of eco-
nomics. In parallel to Newton‘s first axiom on gravity (Cf. Newton, 
1687), Smith tried to create a mechanical model of the world of econom-
ics similar to what Newton had created for astronomy.  
According to Blaug, however, Smith based his system upon self-
interest as the basic axiom of economics (Cf. Smith, 1776), just as 
Smith had given (irrational) human sympathy an axiomatic role in the 
ethics of his Theory of Moral Sentiments (Cf. Smith, 1759; and Blaug, 
1980, p. 57).129  
Smith may also have used his empirical examples in books 3, 4, and 





                                       
128 See also the subsection above, Promoting Free Trade. 
129 See also the section The rational and analytical method, in chapter 2; and 
the section Natural Rights and ‗the selfish system‘, in chapter 5. 
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3.14 The paradox of generalisations – appropriate question  
 
List‘s methodological criticism against Adam Smith concerned the many 
generalisations that Smith made, which especially enabled him to play 
down the role of state regulation.  
As we know, paradoxically, any generalisation is per definition a lie, 
and a refutation of empirical facts. Any assertion is a distortion of the real 
world and therefore a lie to the extent that it uses generalisations. - And 
since any human concept and symbol and indeed the any human lan-
guage itself, and indeed the core of science itself consist of generalisa-
tions, or universals, so even List cannot avoid making generalisations.  
The key is therefore to generalise at an appropriate and adequate level. 
But since there is no-one to say a-priori what the right level of generalisa-
tion is, the key seems to be to generalise according to the question one 
intends to answer.  
On this background, it is only fair to ask whether Smith and List asked 
and were trying to answer different questions. And indeed they were, 
since Smith and List were trying to solve the problems of two different 
countries separated not only by some 50-60 years, and in addition sepa-
rated by different situations. Britain was even in 1776 an economic lead-
er, whereas Germany was a follower. Furthermore, in Smith‘s time the 
economic peculiarities of industry in general may have been less obvious 
than they were in List‘s time, when List was observing not only Germa-
ny‘s situation but also the history of Britain. Furthermore, England was 
indeed a rare case institutionally as e.g. Polanyi points our regarding the 
lacking labour market (Polanyi, 1944, p. 84), and the lacking market in 
land as List points out (Cf. List, 1827b, p. 135).  
 
 
3.15 Real estate - the forgotten market 
 
One example of ill-suited generalisations may be the different circum-
stances of- and the different treatment of real estate markets. List spent 
a lot of energy in describing the real estate market in his Outlines (Cf. 
List, 1827b) and his Harrisburg address (Cf. List, 1828c). Later, in 
1841, he stated that most of the material value of a nation was tied up 
in real estate, 
 
… we shall find that the greatest part of the wealth of the nation shows it-
self in the thus increased value of landed property. (List, 1841a, p. 238) 
 
In every nation the value of landed property, of dwelling houses in rural 
districts and in towns, of workshops, manufactories, waterworks, mines, 
&c. amounts to from two-thirds to nine-tenths of the entire property of the 
nation. (List, 1841a, p. 230) 
 
In the National System, List argues that the market value of real es-
tate is capitalised rent or ―discounted rental income‖, which depended 
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on mental and material capital, but he thereby neglects the expected 
price-gain from asset-price inflation. 130   
 
The selling value of landed property is nothing else than capitalised rent; 
it is dependent, on the one hand, on the amount and the value of the rent, 
but, on the other hand, and chiefly, on the quantities of mental and materi-
al capital existing in the nation. (List, 1841a, p. 235) 
 
List ends the 10th letter of the Outline… by criticising the Cosmopoli-
tan school for not discussing the real estate market, which constitutes 
the greater part of the national wealth. Moreover, according to List, the 
reason for this oblivion was that the English real estate market was 
practically non-existent. The Cosmopolitan School therefore limited its 
analysis to rents and excluded any discussion of property prices (and 
Say uncritically follows Smith, although under very different French 
circumstances), 
 
The founders of the cosmopolitical system forgot entirely to say anything 
about the causes of the rise and fall of land prices, and about the conse-
quences of it. This is the more astonishing, as the prosperity of the greater 
part of a nation depends upon the steadiness of the prices of land and 
property (which forms the greater part of the riches of a nation). The cause 
of this omission is, however, obvious. In those countries in which Mr. Smith 
composed his system, the greater part of land property, forming life estates, 
is not in free commerce, and therefore he only perceived alterations in 
rents131 and not in land prices, Mr. Say, who lives in a country in which 
nearly all real estates are in free commerce, overlooks the omission by 
blindly following his master, as he always does, except in some matters of 
little consequence. (List, 1827b, p. 135) 
 
We here see a parallel to Karl Polanyi‘s criticism of Malthus and Ri-
cardo (and the English classical school), which according to Polanyi 
generalised from a peculiar English situation with a non-existent labour 
market, 
 
It follows that neither Ricardo nor Malthus understood the working of the 
capitalist system. (Polanyi, 1944, p. 123)  
 
If we acknowledge the criticism of both List and Polanyi, we have a 
situation where the English Classical School after Malthus and Ricardo, 
                                       
130 Michael Hudson reminded me about this point. List must have been 
thinking of a sounder capitalist market, where assets are valued for their pro-
ductive value - as opposed to a financial capitalism were assets are valued for 
their speculative value. The real world is a mixture of both these idealised 
types, however. 
131 (1) Mr. Smith . . . rents. But see the passage Book II. chap, iv., on "The 
Ordinary Market Price of Land." Say also in his  ‖Principles," Book II. chap, ix., 
discusses the price of land in relation to rent and profit. (List‘s note) 
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generalises about capitalism from circumstances where markets for la-
bour and real estate are absent.  
In addition, capital mobility across national borders was to a large 
extent ignored by the Classical School, although not by Smith, due 
mainly to risk and legal obstacles. In the days of Adam Smith, capital 
mobility was in practice limited to transfers between the mother coun-
try and her colonies. The successors of Adam Smith did not have this 
excuse for their ignorance. 
As the central Trotskyite theoretician Ernest Mandel indicates, the 
Classical School thereby left out a core ingredient of the capitalist mode 
of production, since mobility of capital is (or rather became) the motive 
force of capitalism, 
 
In simple commodity production, … The mobility of labour is the only dy-
namic factor in the economy. As Engels pointed out in his Addendum to 
Capital Vol. III (Marx, g, pp, 1034-7), in such an economy, commodities 
would be exchanged at prices which would be immediately proportional to 
values, to the labour inputs they embody. 
But under the capitalist mode of production, this is no longer the case. 
Economic decision-taking is not in the hands of the direct producers. It is 
in the hands of the capitalist entrepreneurs in the wider sense of the word 
(bankers - distributors of credit - playing a key role in that decision-taking, 
besides entrepreneurs in the productive sector properly speaking). Invest-
ment decisions, i.e. decisions for creating, expanding, reducing or closing 
enterprises, determine economic life. It is the mobility of capital and not the 
mobility of labour which becomes the motive force of the economy. Mobility 
of labour becomes essentially an epiphenomenon of the mobility of capital. 
(Mandel, 1990, ch. 4) 
 
All in all, the version of capitalist market economics left standing by 
the Classical School is amputated indeed, dealing with a very different 
kind of market economics than what later emerged. Thus Polanyi‘s ver-
dict stands firm (Polanyi, 1944, p. 123) and so do List‘s words that,  
 
… political economy must ...  adapt its measures to the … particular cir-




3.16 Epistemology and the English Classical School 
 
List claims that the Cosmopolitan System epistemologically is based on 
Rationalism, starting with a priori assumptions about the real world. 
These assumptions or axioms are materialistic,133 that production is 
caused by (manual) labour and the value of material things. Therefore 
                                       
132 Cf. a more extensive quotation above in the section Differentiate future 
from present. 
133 See also the section Natural Rights and ‗the selfish system‘, in chapter 5. 
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the system applies only to already produced material goods, and not the 
ability to produce them, the productive force,134 
 
Moreover the "cosmopolitan system" is a purely materialistic conception 
which fails to take account of the human spirit - and the human power- 
that lie behind material things. At best the "cosmopolitan system" lays far 
greater stress upon material objects than upon the creative power which 
makes possible the production of material goods. The supporters of the 
"cosmopolitan system" make this mistake - just as they made the funda-
mental mistake which we have already mentioned - because they lay down 
a priori doctrines and then try to prove them.135 They consider it axiomatic 
that all production depends upon labour and upon the value of material 
things. But as soon as they attempt to develop and to elucidate these prin-
ciples in conformity with what happens in the real world it becomes crystal 
clear that their doctrines can be applied only to material goods that have al-
ready been produced and cannot be applied to productive powers which 
obey entirely different laws. 
This has led the supporters of the "cosmopolitan system" to reach certain 
erroneous conclusions. (List, 1837a, pp. 180-181) 
 
As noted,136 Smith is therefore one originator of the so-called 
Ricardian vice of oversimplification. 
Subsuming matter under money opened up for the formalisation and 
abstraction that became the trademark of the Ricardian tradition, and 
the Ricardian vice that later was continued and overdone through the 
useful but often misused tool of econometrics. 
The vice of being too general, may have its origin in the specific 
English Mercantilist tradition which to a very large extent focused on 
money and currency, whereas the parallel German Mercantilism focused 
on more practical matters such as forestry, mining, and transport. Such 
practical issues are close to non-existing in the English literature. 
Matters of taxation and revenue they have in common. 
The merit of focusing on money is that many issues in economics can 
be subsumed under a common denominator, or in other words, we have 
a common denominator for many phenomena in money. The drawback is 
that the generalisation is not suited for all purposes and issues, since 
the tool will only answer some questions and not all. For instance, a long 
                                       
134 We may comment that a rationalist position might as well have started 
with assumptions that are not materialistic, and instead idealistic. What List 
probably wanted to express is his conviction that an empirical approach would 
instead have led to an idealist point of view, as could be argued has been the 
case with modern conceptions of knowledge economy, information economy 
and the like. 
135 1. Droz (Econ. polit., introduction vi) vigorously criticises those who do not 
take the trouble to distinguish between what is known and what is not known -
and this is the only way to arrive at the truth. [The full reference is Joseph 
Droz, Economie politique ou principes de la science des riches (Paris, 1829)]. 
[List‘s note, with an additional comment by Henderson, not reproduced here] 
136 In the section above; Generalisation and abstraction. 
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term perspective on the creation of productive competence is a matter 




3.17 Towards ‘monetarism’: The theory of ‘values of exchange’  
 
List claims that since Adam Smith fails to come to terms with the deep-
er mental causes of national wealth, his theory is nothing but a theory 
of value of what already is produced, a ‗theory of exchange values‘, (in 
other words a theory of prices of goods, labour, capital etc.). Smith‘s 
ignorance of the mental powers misled him into making economics into 
a study of money instead of being a science of the productive powers, 
 
… If he had followed up the idea 'productive power' without allowing his 
mind to be dominated by the idea of 'value,' 'exchangeable value,' he would 
have been led to perceive that an independent theory of the 'productive 
power,' must be considered by the side of a 'theory of values' in order to ex-
plain the economical phenomena. But he thus fell into the mistake of ex-
plaining mental forces from material circumstances and conditions, and 
thereby laid the foundation for all the absurdities and contradictions from 
which his school (as we propose to prove) suffers up to the present day, and 
to which alone it must be attributed that the doctrines of political economy 
are those which are the least accessible to the most intelligent minds. That 
Smith's school teaches nothing else than the theory of values, is not only 
seen from the fact that it bases its doctrine everywhere on the conception of 
'value of exchange,' but also from the definition which it gives of its doc-
trine. It is (says J. B. Say) that science which teaches how riches, or ex-
changeable values, are produced, distributed, and consumed. This is un-
doubtedly not the science which teaches how the productive powers are 
awakened and developed, and how they become depressed and destroyed. 
M'Culloch calls it explicitly 'the science of values,' and recent English writ-
ers ' the science of exchange.' (List, 1841a, pp. 137-138) 
 
Jean-Baptiste Say, who List also attacks, was closer to List in both 
time and space, as he was writing in France only a few decades before 
List. Nevertheless, and similar to his criticism of Smith, List also here 
points out that due to his materialistic basis, Say is doomed ‗forget‘ the 
power of the (immaterial) productive forces and to focus only on (mate-
rial) exchange value, 
 
Our critics cannot accuse us of failing to appreciate the significance of 
Adam Smith‘s book although we have rejected his view that labour is the 
origin of wealth. J.B. Say has shown that Adam Smith‘s definition of "la-
bour" is much too narrow. We believe that we have shown that the concep-
tion of "industrious classes" that Say puts in place of Adam Smith‘s "la-
bour" is also a very narrow definition which interprets productive powers in 




List claims that since Say is purely concerned with wealth as money 
(exchange value), Say thereby suggests that producers of cultural val-
ues do not contribute to the wealth of the nation, 
 
Since his doctrine is entirely materialistic in conception he is concerned 
only with the "exchange value" of material goods - he tries to justify his view 
by defining the activities of these producers in purely materialistic terms. 
Say argues that these producers create only "immaterial values" which are 
consumed as soon as they are made. If this were really the case the pro-
ducers in question would be engaged in a truly empty sort of production 
which would hardly be worth discussing at all. Say also argues that the 
producers of "cultural values" receive "exchange values" for their services. 
This argument, too, falls to the ground since it implies that the producers of 
"cultural values" make no contribution to the wealth of the nation.  
The foundation of Say‘s doctrine is the conception of material wealth. His 
whole system is based upon it. Consequently he concentrates his attention 
upon the theory of value and he is interested in productive forces only inso-
far as they can be brought into direct association with his doctrine. (List, 
1837a, pp. 37-38) 
 
Edwin Cannan writes in his Editor‘s Introduction to the 1904 edition 
of The Wealth of Nations, that Smith considered industry as non-
productive and the only productive activities were those that directly 
produced vendible objects, 
 
As to unproductive labour, he was not prepared to condemn the whole of 
Glasgow industry as sterile, but was ready to place the mediæval retainer 
and even the modern menial servant in the unproductive class. He would 
even go a little farther and put along with them all whose labour did not 
produce particular vendible objects, or who were not employed for the mon-
ey-gain of their employers. (Cannan, 1904, p. 1.51) 
 
 
3.18 Ricardo’s monetary abstraction137 
 
Ricardo has often been considered the economist of distribution and 
not of growth. This is partly a misunderstanding since Ricardo saw 
proper distribution as a precondition for the growth of an economy 
focusing on the propensity to accumulate of the various production 
factors, following Smith‘s materialistic focus on accumulation. 
Therefore, Ricardo‘s focus is not on distribution as a channel to 
consumption, but as a channel to accumulation and growth.  
Mark Blaug offers a description of Ricardo that almost presents his 
theories as abstractions devoid of realism, 
 
                                       
137 See also the section Measurement and egotism, in chapter 2, and b) ‗the 
selfish system‘ of irrational man, in chapter 5. 
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In Ricardo, the historical, the institutional, and the factual, which had 
figured so prominently in the writings of Adam Smith, faded into the back-
ground, … (Blaug, 1980, p. 58) 
 
Unlike Malthus, David Ricardo elaborated the reductionist and ana-
lytic method of Smith (Cf. Blaug, 1980, p. 57) into an abstract method. 
Nevertheless, he accepted Malthus‘ assumption of decreasing returns 
and made it the core piece of his pessimistic system, which became a 
centre piece of British Classical School and for Marginalism.138 List 
writes that the School has made itself irrelevant and akin to astrology 
than to science, 
 
At present the Theory of Exchangeable Values has so completely lost its 
influence, that it is almost exclusively occupied with inquiries into the na-
ture of Rent, and that Ricardo in his 'Principles of Political Economy' could 
write, 'The chief object of political economy is to determine the laws by 
which the produce of the soil ought to be shared between the landowner, 
the farmer, and the labourer.' 
While some persons are firmly convinced that this science is complete, 
and that nothing essential can further be added to it, those, on the other 
hand, who read these writings with philosophical or practical insight, main-
tain, that as yet there is no political economy at all, that that science has 
yet to be constructed; that until it is so, what goes by its name is merely an 
astrology, but that it is both possible and desirable out of it to produce an 
astronomy. (List, 1841a, p. 361)139 
 
The different evaluations of Ricardo by List and by Schumpeter illu-
minate what value they placed on abstraction in the monetary dimen-
sion, as a scientific method. More fundamentally, their different evalua-
tions illuminate which problems and questions they focused on.  
List describes the practice of focusing on exchangeable values, mon-
ey, as a shopkeeper‘s theory of economics that had nothing to do with 
national economics.  Schumpeter agrees with List‘s opinion of Adam 
Smith as primarily preoccupied with ‗exchange value‘, 
 
                                       
138 ―In Ricardo the marginal analysis exists only in a rudimentary form.‖ 
(Schumpeter, 1912, p. 73n1) Malthus and Ricardo‘s assumption concerning 
agriculture led to the invention of Marginalism. Often the assumption of given 
and stable production factor relations is also present, assuming a lack of in-
ventiveness.  
139 Again List fails to quote correctly, but this may be due to the translation 
into German and then back into English, and also due to differences in the 
handful editions of Smith‘s WoN. In any case the meaning is correct. Ricardo 
writes, ―But in different stages of society, the proportions of the whole produce 
of the earth which will be allotted to each of these classes, under the names of 
rent, profit, and wages, will be essentially different; depending mainly on the 
actual fertility of the soil, on the accumulation of capital and population, and 
on the skill, ingenuity, and instruments employed in agriculture. 
To determine the laws which regulate this distribution, is the principal 
problem in Political Economy: …‖ (Ricardo, 1817, Preface) 
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It is above all necessary to bear in mind clearly that most— and all the 
leading—classical economists had a much narrower aim in view than some 
of the earlier and many of the later thinkers. Already Adam Smith did not 
intend to compose a social universal science out of economic material; even 
the Wealth of Nations defines its subject-matter as a specialized branch of 
science to be distinguished from the general framework of economic life. 
(Schumpeter, 1912, p. 80) 
 
Schumpeter likewise describes Ricardo‘s method as an abstraction 
and reduction of economics into an analysis of values in exchange, 
 
Ricardo set himself even narrower limits; fundamentally he merely in-
tended to clarify the conception of what in modern German economic theory 
is sometimes called the economy of exchange (Verkehrswirtschaft) and to elu-
cidate general forms of the economic process within this economy of ex-
change. (Schumpeter, 1912, p. 80) 
 
Nevertheless, as opposed to List, Schumpeter admires Ricardo‘s ab-
straction and reduction of economics into an analysis of values in ex-
change and concludes regarding Ricardo‘s method that this ‗monetar-
ism‘ is the right way to go for the economic science, 
 
In theoretical problems, however, it is possible to be less precise and pro-
found than was Ricardo, but in essence it is impossible to proceed in a way 
that is different from his. (Schumpeter, 1912, p. 81) 
 
Unfortunately, once again,140 Schumpeter offers us no explanation 
and reasons for his opinion here, but it is obvious that he favoured a 
formal approach to economics. 
 
 
3.19 Exchange value versus productive powers 
 
List‘s criticism of Adam Smith can be summarised, as a tendency of 
Smith‘s to generalise overly, thereby laying the foundation for modern 
abstraction in economics, the Ricardian Vice, and the ―monetisation‖ of 
economic theory (using money as the common denominator of all fac-
tors).  
The deeper reason for these generalisations and also for Smith‘s mis-
takes of seeing results as causes, are rooted, according to List, in 
Smith‘s materialism, which ignores the immaterial factors that consti-
tute the core of the productive powers, the catalyst so to speak. Capital, 
and thereafter money, was conceived materialistically as ‗stock‘. 
This has since been typical within this tradition, instead of focusing, 
as the idealist tradition, on the productive power of a nation, in particu-
                                       
140 Another example of Schumpeter‘s missing argument, is his distaste for 




lar, on the immaterial forces that primarily shape this power: creativity 
and morality.  
In an often quoted passage, List points to the importance of immate-
rial products. He ridicules the school of Adam Smith, claiming that 
their theories concerned only with value of exchange imply that a don-
key is more productive than a scientist such as Kepler,  
 
The man who breed pigs is, according to this school, a productive mem-
ber of the community, but he who educates men is a mere non-productive. 
... 
A Newton, a Watt, or a Kepler is not so productive as a donkey, a horse 
or a drought-ox ... (List, 1841a, p. 142) 
 
After listing numerous ―immaterial‖ professions that promote the 
productive power of the future, such as teachers, lawyers, physicians, 
administrators, artists and priests, List continues, 
 
In the doctrine of mere values, these producers of the productive powers 
can of course only be taken into consideration so far as their services are 
rewarded by values of exchange.  ...  
But whenever our consideration is given to the nation (as a whole and in 
its international relations) it is utterly insufficient  
... The prosperity of a nation is not, as Say believes, greater in the propor-
tion in which it has amassed more wealth (i.e. values of exchange), but in 
the proportion in which it has more developed its powers of production.  
(List, 1841a, p. 144) 
 
Wilhelm Roscher likewise claims in this regard that value in ex-
change only has an interest from the point of view of the private busi-
nessman and little interest from the national point of view. Roscher 
writes in great detail that,  
 
If, now, we were to estimate the resources of an entire people, or even of 
the world, by summing up the value in exchange of their several component 
parts, many very important elements would be left out of the account en-
tirely; as for instance, harbors, navigable streams,  numberless relations 
which have, indeed, no value in exchange whatever, but which are of the 
highest importance, because promotive of the economy of the nation. 
(Roscher, 1877, § 8 ff) 
 
The (materialist) classical school and the (materialist) Marx focused 
on physical labour and -capital and largely missed the point made by 
the idealist school about the importance of the mental capital of indi-
viduals, institutions, and society.  
The focus on measurability inherited from the nominalist point of 
view, led these economists of the British Classical School to focus on 
money, since this was easily measurable.  
Roscher points to the Italian-English traditions‘ preoccupation with 
monetary phenomena such as prices – as opposed the French-German 
preoccupation with law, taxation, science and ‗physical economy‘, such 
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as forestry, canals, irrigation and crafts. Roscher furthermore claims 
that the Italian-British liberalist tradition of economics originated with 
the merchants whereas the Continental (Europe and US) tradition orig-
inated with the Treasury: 
 
Political Economy in Germany developed out of the science of law and the 
cameralistic sciences, while in England and Italy it had its origin chiefly in 
the study of questions of finance and foreign commerce. (Roscher, 1877, §19) 
 
Roscher‘s claim may be true generally speaking, but there are several 
(early) Italian and (early) English economists that fit the French-
German statecraft traditions of Colbertism and Cameralism, such as 
Thomas Gresham (1519-1579) in England, and later Antonio Serra 
(1568-1620) in Italy.  
 
 
3.20 Smith’s inability to differentiate: Generalisations  
 
A key to understand List's criticism of A. Smith and his followers is that 
he criticised the strategy of A. Smith as being too generalising, disre-
garding the empirical and historical particulars of each practical phe-
nomenon (Cf. List, 1841a, pp. 171, 224ff. and 316).  
Generalisation reflects unwillingness or an inability to differentiate, 
and with Smith, this can be observed on a number of issues, which will 
be dealt with below. In most instances, the reason for Smith‘s 
generalisations is his materialism, which prevents him from considering 
immaterial- and dynamic factors. 
 
  
3.21 Differentiate global- from national economics  
 
List claims that because Smith and Say ignore the institution of the 
nation, and they are unable of differentiating cosmopolitan economics 
from national economics, and therefore they are unable to see or and 
acknowledge the role that power plays in the international world, 
 
The idea of independence and power originates in the very idea of 'the 
nation.' The school never takes this into consideration, because it does not 
make the economy of the separate nation, but the economy of society gen-
erally, i.e. of the whole human race, the object of its investigations. If we 
imagine, for instance, that all nations were united by means of a universal 
confederation, their individual independence and power would cease to be 
an object of regard. The security for the independence of every nation would 
in such a case rest on the legal provisions of the universal society, just as 
e.g. the security of the independence of the states of Rhode Island and Del-
aware lies in the union of all the free states constituting the American Un-
ion. Since the first foundation of that Union it has never yet occurred to any 
of these smaller states to care for the enlargement of its own political power, 
or to consider its independence less secured than is that of the largest 





3.22 Differentiate exchange value from productive powers  
 
List claims that since Smith and Say are unable of differentiating the 
theory of exchange value from the theory of productive powers, they use 
- and confuse - arguments from one theory into the other,  
 
… Say clearly included the theory of value in his definition of "political 
economy" which, in his view, was that branch of knowledge which examines 
the production, division, and consumption of wealth. But this definition 
shows that Say does not propose to discuss how productive power is estab-
lished, how they develop, or how they can be destroyed. 
We do not deny that Adam Smith and J.B. Say recognise the significance 
of productive power for the creation of material wealth. But we hope to 
show that they have failed to recognise the difference not only between the 
two doctrines which we have mentioned but also between the theories of 
cosmopolitan and national economics. These writers confuse the two theo-
ries, and when they seek to support the policy of free trade they are quite 
capable of using propositions derived from one doctrine as arguments 
against the other doctrine. (List, 1837a, p. 37) 
 
 
3.23 Differentiate cause from effect: Mental powers 
 
Regarding Smith‘s theory of the division of labour, List criticises Smith 
for being a superficial materialist, and that Smith confuses cause and 
result. Skill and judgement is the true cause of wealth, not division of 
labour per Ce.141 
List evaluates at length Smith‘s conception of the causes of wealth. 
List argues that Smith was too preoccupied with the mechanical divi-
sion of labour, as a source of wealth, as to understand the powers of 
production and the underlying immaterial causes for wealth. List 
writes,  
 
It is evident that Smith was too exclusively possessed by the cosmopoliti-
cal idea of the physiocrats, 'universal freedom of trade,' and by his own 
great discovery, 'the division of labour,' to follow up the idea of the im-
portance to a nation of its powers of production. …  
However, we on our part believe ourselves able to prove that just this zeal 
to put the important discovery 'division of labour' in an advantageous light, 
has hindered Adam Smith from following up the idea 'productive power' 
(which has been expressed by him in the introduction, and also frequently 
afterwards, although merely incidentally) and from exhibiting his doctrines 
in a much more perfect form. By the great value which he attached to his 
                                       
141 One may argue that List‘s criticism is unfair, since Smith does mention 
skill etc. as important, but on the other hand what is at issue here is the main 
tendency of Smith, not individual instances where he may have diverted from 
his main path. 
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idea 'division of labour' he has evidently been misled into representing la-
bour itself as the 'fund' of all the wealth of nations, although he himself 
clearly perceives and also states that the productiveness of labour princi-
pally depends on the degree of skill and judgment with which the labour is 
performed. We ask, can it be deemed scientific reasoning if we assign as the 
cause of a phenomenon that which in itself is the result of a number of 
deeper lying causes?  (List, 1841a, ch. 12: The Theory of the Powers of Pro-
duction and the Theory of Values, pp. 134-136) 
 
List answers by claiming that the human spirit; the social order; the 
powers of nature; are the sources of wealth, 
 
What else can it be than the spirit which animates the individuals, the 
social order which renders their energy fruitful, and the powers of nature 
which they are in a position to make use of? (List, 1841a, p. 137) 
 
List asks, ―If work produces wealth, what produces work?‖, and an-
swers, ―some inner urge‖,  
 
It is meaningless to claim that the work people do is the origin and cause 
of wealth. Is there no difference between the work performed on a steam-
ship by the boy who handles the rudder and by the engineer? … Again 
there is a difference between the output the output of demoralised supersti-
tious slaves and of free, enlightened, cultured, and intelligent workers.  
 To obtain a clear and accurate picture of productive powers - and of the 
means by which those powers can be developed and protected - it is neces-
sary to ask the question: If work produces wealth, what produces work? … 
We always find that there is some inner urge which sets the human body in 
motion. … (List, 1837a, p. 184)142 
 
Nevertheless the individual human spirit is a product of human col-
lective circumstances; cultural- and social-,  
 
… However, most depends in all these respects on the conditions of the so-
ciety in which the individual has been brought up, and turns upon this, 
whether science and arts flourish, and public institutions and laws tend to 
promote religious character, morality and intelligence, security for person 
and for property, freedom and justice; whether in the nation all the factors 
of material prosperity, agriculture, manufactures, and trade, have been 
equally and harmoniously cultivated; whether the power of the nation is 
strong enough to secure to its individual citizens progress in wealth and 
education from generation to generation, and to enable them not merely to 
utilise the natural powers of their own country to their fullest extent, but 
also, by foreign trade and the possession of colonies, to render the natural 
powers of foreign countries serviceable to their own. (List, 1841a, p. 137) 
 
 
                                       
142 A snippet of this quotation has been used in the section, Immaterial forces 
as basis for entrepreneurship, in chapter 4. 
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3.24 Differentiate cause from effect: Civilisation 
 
List claims that the Orthodox School errs in believing that the cause of 
progress in civilisation is trade. List instead rather finds that it is in-
dustry that is to be thanked, both for progress in civilisation and in 
trade, 
 
The popular school has attributed this civilising power to foreign trade, 
but in that it has confounded the mere exchanger with the originator. For-
eign manufactures furnish the goods for the foreign trade, which the latter 
conveys to us, and which occasion consumption of products and raw mate-
rials which we give in exchange for the goods in lieu of money payments. 
(List, 1841a, p. 142) 
 
List attributes this confusion of cause with effect to the materialism 
of the Orthodox School, 
 
We now see into what extraordinary mistakes and contradictions the 
popular school has fallen in making material wealth or value of exchange 
the sole object of its investigations, and by regarding mere bodily labour as 
the sole productive power. (List, 1841a, p. 142) 
 
 
3.25 Differentiate cause from effect: Nation 
 
List claims that the Orthodox School thinks that civilisation and pros-
perity emerges from the solitary individual and therefore seeks to ex-
clude the power of the state. List sarcastically comments that if, accord-
ing to the School, individuals are more productive without interference 
from the State then savage nations must be the most productive. He 
might have added that if this were correct there would have been little 
reason for individuals to unite in companies, 
 
Everywhere it seeks to exclude the action of the power of the State; eve-
rywhere, according to it, will the individual be so much better able to pro-
duce, the less the power of the State concerns itself for him. In fact, accord-
ing to this doctrine savage nations ought to be the most productive and 
wealthy of the earth, for nowhere is the individual left more to himself than 
in the savage state, nowhere is the action of the power of the State less per-
ceptible. (List, 1841a, p. 171) 
 
List‘s view was the opposite, that a strong civilised state gives an im-
mense boost to the potential liberty of the individual person, the na-
tional culture enables him to express himself in numerous ways, in-
creases his productivity and his welfare, 
 
Union of individual faculties in pursuit of a common end is the most ef-
fective means of obtaining individual happiness. Alone and apart from his 
fellows the individual is weak and helpless. The greater the number of those 
to whom he is socially united and the more complete the union, the greater 
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and more complete is the resulting moral and physical welfare of the indi-
vidual members.  
The highest union of individuals realized up to the present under the 
rule of law is in the State and the nation. The highest imaginable is the un-
ion of all mankind. (List, 1841b, Introduction, in Hirst, 1909, p. 301) 
 
 
3.26 Differentiate cause from effect: History 
 
In essence, List claims that Smith disregards history because he disre-
gards mental powers and thereby learning.  
List argues that regarding the contemporary wealth of Britain, Smith 
and his followers confuse causes and effects, by ignoring history. They 
mistook the reasons for the supremacy of Britain, by regarding the con-
temporary free trade policy of Britain (if this was descriptive) as the cause 
of prosperity (Cf. List, 1841a, p. 126).  
List argues that the cause rather was the history of regulation of the 
past four centuries since Edward III. More specifically, he argues that the 
present policy of free trade was a result of the success of the former policy 
of ordered regulation of economic and social affairs. Among these instru-
ments Britain utilised protection of manufactures, since Britain formerly 
was subordinate to other nations (the Hanse and then Holland), but since 
she now had gained supremacy she could utilise, or at least claim to uti-
lise, free trade. List claims that the radical free traders would have been 
right if the world had been a perfect political union,  
 
If, as the prevailing school [of political-economic thought] requires, we 
assume a universal union or confederation of nations as the guarantee for 
an everlasting peace, the principle of international free trade seems to be 
perfectly justified, … (List, 1841a, p. 123) 
 
List criticises the claim by radical free traders that a political union 
will result from free trade, however, this prevailing thought is contrary 
to the prevalent political situation. The free trader, 
 
… assumes the existence of a universal union and a state of perpetual 
peace, and deduces therefrom the great benefits of free trade. In this man-
ner it confounds effects with causes. (List, 1841a, p. 126) 
 
This prevailing thought is also contrary to historical experience where 
political union precedes commercial union. List explains that,  
 
Among the provinces and states which are already politically united, 
there exists a state of perpetual peace; from this political union originates 
their commercial union. All examples which history can show are those in 
which the political union has led the way, and the commercial union has 
followed. Not a single instance can be adduced in which the latter has tak-




Ironically, the effect of List‘s efforts was to make the counter-
historical come true, as Sampson S. Lloyd, the translator of the Nation-
al Systems in 1885, comments in a footnote,  
 
This statement was probably accurate up to the period when List wrote, 
but a notable exception to it may now be adduced. The commercial union of 
the various German states under the Zollverein preceded by many years 
their political union under the Empire, and powerfully promoted it. -- TR. 
(Lloyd, 1885, in List, 1841a, p. 126) 
 
Lloyd forgets that the Zollverein was no fully fledged economic union. 
Although, the same ―exception‖ later happened in South Africa and Eu-
rope, the cross-border rivalries in S.A. did not stop until after a forced 
political union came about in 1902-1910 (after the Anglo-Boer war of 
conquest), 
 
The first considerable factor in determining the financial position of the 
four colonies had been the customs union, which was concluded almost 
immediately after the close of the war. (Goodfellow, 1931, p.197) 
 
Even the protectionist economic policy of Imperial Preference was 
forced, 
 
 ... in 1903 Mr. Chamberlain, through Lord Milner, forced South Africa to 
start a fresh experiment in Preference against the wish of the Government 
of Cape Colony, … (Evans, 1912, p. 97) 
   
Furthermore, the present troubles in the monetary union of the EU 
may yet prove List right … 
 
 
3.27 Smith’s short-sightedness 1-4 
 
List‘s criticism was generally directed against the inclination to short-
term evaluations and the related narrow-mindedness in economic af-
fairs. His criticism had four specific targets:  
 
1) Landed interests (particularly England) 
2) Merchant interests (particularly Holland and Britain) 
3) Public regulation (in general, both the lack of it, and its excesses)  
4) International politics (particularly England, being the most power-
ful and influential nation at the time, as with the US today.) 
 
List criticises England and her moral misuse of her powers since she 
was the most powerful and influential nation at that time. He mentions 
the Hanse, Venice and Holland as similar historical examples of misuse 




In all these cases, List pointed out the international aspect of the 
problems. In addition, in all these cases, he insisted in a Socratic man-
ner that the actors who were his targets did not have a sufficient un-
derstanding of their own interests, nor of how they would benefit from 
contributing to the interests of other actors. They therefore acted con-
trary to their own interests.  
His suggestion for remedying this was in part through legal and regu-
latory arrangements as well as education and moral enlightenment. He 
focused on the gains to welfare to be earned by everyone from a more 
long-term and wider-minded approach, so to say within a positive sum 
game. This constitutes Man's unified effort to gain power over nature.  
On the other hand, he criticised a policy devoted to Man's power over 
Man. This kind of power struggle is by definition a zero-sum game, 
where one Man's gain is the other's loss. In the long run, this will be 
destructive.  
List recalled the Italians who termed these two traditions respectively 
the manufacturing system143 and the mercantile system, and favoured 
the former (Cf. List, 1837a, p. 178). Most likely, he saw A. Smith's posi-
tion as a continuation of the latter. In addition, historians have argued 
that liberalism is a child of a power-oriented and beggar thy neighbour 
type of mercantilism as opposed to a ‗prosper thy neighbour‘ type of 
mercantilism - of the leading nation. In all cases, his suggestions for 
remedies of these long-term, market inefficiencies were of a legal na-
ture.  
 
1) Concerning the (English) landed aristocracy, protection should be 
lifted and implementation of manufactured inventions promoted. 
This would raise industrial production, demand for agricultural 
products, and landed rent. Instead, the English landed aristocracy;   
 
... killed the hen that had laid the golden eggs. (List, 1841a, p. 370) 
 
2) Concerning the (Dutch) merchants, economic integration should be 
encouraged through law-enforced investments in communications 
and through trade agreements, where the Dutch were to buy more 
from Germany and less from England in order to benefit their local 
industrial base for trade. Internal trade barriers were to be lifted 
and limited and differentiated external ones created.  
3) Concerning governmental regulation and lacking investments into 
infrastructure, he suggested establishment of schools, scientific 
academies and journals, telegraphs, harbours, railroads etc. 
through public regulation and administration. For industry he ad-
vocated instruments like differentiated cheap credit, differentiated 
tariff protection, monopolies limited in time, differentiated subsi-
dies, grants, patent-laws, prizes, and exhibitions, and in particular 
                                       
143 Elsewhere List calls his preferred tradition The Industrial System. 
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taxation arrangements which he claimed to be of far higher signifi-
cance than any other intervention into industrial matters.  
4) Concerning international politics and the role of England, List ar-
gues that England should not trip the other nations up as it had so 
far, and as the towns of the Hanse, the Italians and the Dutch be-
fore it. Instead, England should encourage the industrial develop-
ment of its potential competitors since this would create markets 
for advanced export products and promote cultural advance in 
England. 
 
In most of these cases, List intended to regulate using law (national 
and international) and the price mechanism as prime instruments. 
 
 
The above four points, List treats in the following way: 
 
a) Ad 1 and 4):  The landed interests - the case of Britain 
 
It was central to his charge, that landed interests were to blame for the 
backwardness not only of Germany and Russia, but also for the lack of 
progress in Britain. Instead of protecting their high grain prices and 
farming interests, List said, English landowners and politicians ought 
to agree to liberalise grain trade (the later repeal of the Corn Laws) and 
import grain from Germany and Russia. These nations now instead of 
earning an income on grain export had to protect their industries in or-
der to keep up the balance of trade and payments, thereby damaging 
English industrial export.  
Liberalising English grain trade would lead to lower food prices in 
England, as Ricardo and Cobden argued, and promote industrialisation 
and urbanisation of the England. Eventually, this would eventually lead 
to higher food and real estate prices and therefore higher rents from the 
land of the landowners, which would by far outweigh the initial loss 
from lower grain prices. The failure of the landowners lay in their short-
term approach to profit, and this damaged themselves and English so-
ciety in general, as well as other nations. He warned that this failure to 
further the long-term harmony of interests, would instead favour a 
clash of interests that in the end would have disastrous effects. (Cf. 
List, 1841a, ch. 20: The Manufacturing Power and the Agricultural Inter-
est, especially pp. 238, 240, 244, 247, 248, 250) 
List may have had overly optimistic ideas concerning the will and 
even the possibilities of the representatives of the British landed inter-
ests to implement an enlightened policy of this kind. It is very likely 
that these interests would have been broke before they would have the 
opportunity to reap the benefits of the former preferred policy. In order 
to implement this kind of policy, a transferral of resources to compen-
sate intermediary loss would have been necessary. For instance, Ger-
man and British authorities might have compensated the British land-
owners with subsidies, financed from increased industry. This would 
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have been, however, a rather unlikely arrangement due to state budget-
ary problems, as well as due to the short-term mentality of politicians 
and industry, even before the dawn of democracy.  
 
 
b) Ad 2 and 4): The merchant interests - the Dutch case 
 
List charged the Dutch merchant regimes of short-sighted selfishness to 
the detriment not only of the German people but also to themselves. 
After the Dutch independence from Germany (the "Holy Roman Empire 
of the German Nation"), the pivot point of control over the main trans-
portation artery was taken away from Germany, by crucial intervention 
of Elisabeth I of England (Palmer and Colton, 1986, p. 131). The Dutch 
thereafter imposed taxes on all German traffic passing through on the 
river Rhine, as well as that of the French and Belgian traffic on the riv-
ers Maas and Scheldt. List used a kind of supply-side ‗Reaganomics‘ 
argument".  
He argues that that the Dutch should lower their taxes on German 
traffic and started to buy German goods instead of the less expensive 
and better English goods. This would over time result in so much 
growth in Germany that it would increase the traffic immensely and 
thereby lead to far higher profits for the Dutch merchants than the pre-
sent arrangement. Again, time, power, and on the other hand, short-
sightedness were crucial parts of his argument. And again, his sugges-
tion for a remedy of the inefficient situation was that of a change in the 
administrative and legal arrangement.  
List discussed how to force the Dutch into an ―agreement‖ of mutual 
beneficial character (Cf. List, 1841a, p. 407), but once again did not 
mention the likely and severe losses the Dutch merchants would have 
to suffer in the intermediate period. Nor did he discuss a strategy of 
compensation where Germany might have paid Holland. As in the Brit-
ish case of the Corn Laws, this would most likely have been a compli-
cated and perhaps impossible strategy, involving state budgetary bal-
ances etc. List could, as both a German and a humanist, however, not 
refrain from pointing out the matter of long-term interests. 
List's description of the relation between the Netherlands and Ger-
many touches upon his ideas of the prerequisites of a sovereign and 
therefore viable nation, reminding us also of the present situation of 
many smaller states within the EU. 
 
 
c) Ad 3 and 4): Public regulation of the merchant interest144 
 
                                       
144 See also the section below; Differentiate private versus community inter-
ests, and chapter 5; Regulation, law and economics. 
136 
 
List sees radical free trade policy as in the interest of one special social 
group, the merchants, in which he includes what we may call the mon-
ey managers. List exclaims,  
 
Free trade is the fantasy of the merchants engaged in foreign commerce, 
(List, 1837a, p. 58) 
 
According to List, the Cosmopolitan school does not differentiate be-
tween the interests of the nation and that of the merchant, whose inter-
est may be very different from- and even contrary, to that of the nation, 
 
The school does not discern that the merchant may be accomplishing his 
purpose (viz. gain of values by exchange) at the expense of the agricultur-
ists and manufacturers, at the expense of the nation's productive powers, 
and indeed of its independence. It is all the same to him; and according to 
the character of his business and occupation, he need not trouble himself 
much respecting the manner in which the goods imported or exported by 
him act on the morality, the prosperity, or the power of the nation. He im-
ports poisons as readily as medicines. … It is therefore evident that the in-
terest of individual merchants and the interest of the commerce of a whole 
nation are widely different things. … Commerce emanates from manufac-
tures and agriculture, and no nation which has not brought within its own 
borders both these main branches of production to a high state of develop-
ment can attain (in our days) to any considerable amount of internal and 
external commerce. (List, 1841a, pp. 259-260) 
 
At the same time List finds the merchant amusing when he like a 
Chameleon changes from a free trader to an adherent of state aid, as it 
suits his interests, 
 
The most remarkable characteristic of the merchant who is mainly in-
volved in the sort of commercial transactions that endanger the productive 
powers of his country and who is the sworn enemy of monopolies, privileg-
es, restrictions and tariffs to protect what he calls ―private industry‖ is the 
very person who leaves no stone unturned to secure for himself such aids 
from the state as soon as they happen to coincide with theirs own private 
interests. (List, 1837a, p. 103) 
 
Henderson‘s criticises List‘s tendency to interpret historical events in 
a way that suited him, and his tendency of making assertions without 
making much effort to show their correctness (Henderson, 1983, p. 
163), and Henderson may well be correct in many instances. Henderson 
also claims that List as a consequence (or as a reason…) overstated the 
capability and power of governments to steer economic development, 
which may well be true as well, but still not a valid reason for refraining 
to try.  
Henderson (Henderson, 1983, p. 12) repeatedly criticises List for his 
condemnation of the merchant‘s role in industry. But although a firm 
adversary of the using the merchant principle in national economic af-
fairs, List‘s view of the private merchant is rather sober, explaining that 
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the merchant is simply doing his job: ―a merchant should not be criti-
cised … It is the nature of things.‖ In the chapter called, How do the In-
terests of Commerce differ from the interests of Individual Merchants?, 
List claims that, 
 
… His object is simply to make money by exchanging products and it is 
quite immaterial to him whether this exchange harms the productive pow-
ers of a nation or the whole world. 
But a merchant should not be criticised for being indifferent to the harm 
that he may inflict upon a nation‘s productive powers because these activi-
ties are an integral part of his business. It is the nature of things that he 
must buy in the cheapest markets and sell in the dearest. (List, 1837a, p. 
99) 
 
List thoroughly praises the merchant for his contributions that stim-
ulate advance and counter, 
 
 … prejudice, fanaticism, … idleness, … privileges …, and .. arbitrary rule. 
(List, 1837a, p. 98)145 
 
Nevertheless, it is not trade, but rather production that matters for 
freedom and progress, according to List, 
 
Merchants on the whole demand "freedom" in the very widest sense - il-
legal and harmful freedom as well as lawful and useful freedom. But, in 
comparison with manufacturers, they cannot do very much to promote the 
development of freedom and the progress of science. (List, 1837a, p. 102) 
 
List delivers a long list of merchant ―offences" against the public in-
terest, in peace and in war, 
 
A merchant would have no scruples in selling factories to foreigners. …  
using the money by buy cheaply in a foreign country goods … then dump the-
se goods in his own country and condemn thousands of workers to unemploy-
ment and starvation. … 
It is in the very nature of things that a merchant should defend absolutely 
unrestricted freedom of trade in this way, even if his actions are utterly at vari-
ance with the interests of commerce in general. …  
The merchant appeals to "natural law" to condemn anything which ham-
pers his business. …  
It has been repeatedly observed that merchants engaged in foreign trade 
will inevitably side with their country‘s enemies as soon as they see that such 
a course of action will benefit them financially. 
A merchant, unlike a philosopher, is no citizen of the world. If his own 
country sinks into a wretched and shameful state of bankruptcy and slavery, 
a merchant will take himself off to a foreign country with all his possessions. 
… Adam Smith has no illusions concerning the behaviour of merchants (see 
Book III, chapter 4). (1) (List, 1837a, pp. 100-101)146 
                                       
145 See a more extensive quotation in Appendix 3. 




The translator, W.O Henderson, has here included a footnote (1), 
which illustrates how List was aware of the nuances in Adam Smith‘s 
arguments, and his realistic views of the merchant, 
 
1. [The passage which List had in mind was probably the following: "A 
merchant, it has been said very properly, is not necessarily the citizen of 
any particular country. It is in a great measure indifferent to him from what 
place he carries on his trade; and a very trifling disgust will make him re-
move his capital, and together with it all the industry which it supports, 
from one country to another. No part of it can be said to belong to any par-
ticular country, until it has been spread as it were over the face of that 
country, either in buildings or in the lasting improvement of land ... The or-
dinary revolutions of war and government easily dry up the sources of that 
wealth which arises from commerce only" (The Wealth of Nations, Vol.1, pp. 
373-4 (Everyman edition)).] (List, 1837a, p. 101, Hendersons‘s note) 
 
List furthermore argues that it will take qualified intervention to res-
cue the public interest from being hijacked by merchants, 
 
It will need the intervention of a statesman of high character to ensure 
that any clash of interests between the mercantile community on the one 
hand and a nation, society, or humanity on the other is resolved in favour 
of the latter. (List, 1837a, pp. 100-101)147 
 
In conclusion, List has a differentiated and realistic view of the mer-
chant interest, and the need to regulate it for the national good. 
 
 
3.28 Differentiate future from present  
 
List argues that regarding trade policy, the Orthodox school fails to dif-
ferentiate between the future and the present, between dreams and re-
ality.  
In his introduction to The National System, List explains how the 
great divergence between theory and practice developed in political 
economy as a conflict between national practical needs on the one side 
and on the other side philosophical ideas of brotherhood and peace: 
The philosophical demands of the future versus the political and practi-
cal demands of the present. Political economy is therefore torn between 
protectionism and free trade, between regulation/intervention and lais-
sez faire.  
 
… although the great questions of commercial policy have been discussed 
by the keenest brains of all nations in books and legislative assembles, yet 
the gulf between theory and practice which has existed since the time of 
Quesnay and Smith is not only not filled up, but gapes wider and wider 
each year. … Should we not rather suppose that practical men, even if they 
                                       
147 See a more extensive quotation in Appendix 3. 
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are as a rule too much inclined to keep to the beaten track, still could not 
oppose the theory so long and so stubbornly if the theory were not opposed 
to the nature of things?  
In fact, we believe that we can prove the responsibility for the divergence 
between the theory and practice of commercial policy to rest as much with 
the theorists as with the practical men. In questions of international trade, 
political economy must derive its teaching from experience, must adapt its 
measures to the needs of the present and to the particular circumstances of 
each nation, without neglecting the claims of the future and of mankind as 
a whole. Accordingly it founds itself upon philosophy, politics, and history.  
Philosophy demands, in the interests of the future and of mankind, an 
even closer friendship among nations, avoidance of war as far as possible, 
the establishment and development of international law, the change of what 
we call the law of nations into the law of federated states, freedom of inter-
national intercourse, both in intellectual tod material things; and, finally, 
the alliance of all nations under the rule of law that is, a universal union.  
But politics demands, in the interests of each separate nation, guaran-
tees for its independence and continued existence, special regulations to 
help its progress in culture, prosperity, and power, to build its society into a 
perfectly complete and harmoniously developed body politic, self-contained 
and independent. (List, 1841b, Introduction, in Hirst, 1909, pp.290-291) 
 
According to List, there is a balance to strike here between the needs 
of the present and the needs of the future: History is on the side of the 
future and tells us that we are approaching a universal federation of 
free trade, but history and politics also tells us that nations that ignore 
the immediate claims of the present will perish. Political economy today 
(the Orthodox School) only sides with the future, 
 
History, for its part, speaks unmistakably in favour of the claims of the 
future, since it teaches how the material and moral welfare of mankind has 
grown at all times with the growth of their political and commercial unity. 
But it also supports the claims of the present and of nationality when it 
teaches how nations which have not kept in view primarily the furtherance 
of their own culture and power have gone to ruin; how unrestricted trade 
with more advanced nations is certainly an advantage to every nation in the 
early stages of its development, but how each reaches a point when it can 
only attain to higher development and an equality with more advanced na-
tionalities through certain restrictions on its international trade. Thus his-
tory points out the middle course between the extreme claims of philosophy 
and politics.  
But the practice and theory of political economy in their present forms 
each takes sides with a faction, the one supporting the special claims of na-
tionality, the other the one-sided demands of cosmopolitanism. (List, 
1841b, Introduction, in Hirst, 1909, pp. 291-292) 
 
Whereas the mercantile system erred in making present protection-
ism absolute, the orthodox system of Smith based on Quesnay erred in 
making ―the most distant future‘s‖ free trade absolute. Smith therefore 
ignores the nation and pays attention to the teachings of history and 
politics when it fits its preconceived conclusions. Therefore, the Ortho-
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dox theory must claim that England became rich in spite of her own 
commercial policy, 
 
Practice, or, in other words, the so-called mercantile system, commits the 
great error of maintaining the absolute and universal advantage and neces-
sity of restriction, because it has been advantageous and beneficial to cer-
tain nations at certain periods of their development. It does not see that re-
striction is only the means, and freedom is the end. Looking only at the na-
tion, never at the individual, only at the present, never at the future, it is 
exclusively political and national in thought, and is devoid of philosophical 
outlook or cosmopolitan feeling. The ruling theory, on the contrary, founded 
by Adam Smith on the dreams of Quesnay, has in view only the cosmopoli-
tan claims of the future, indeed of the most distant future. Universal union 
and absolute freedom of international trade, which at the present time are a 
cosmopolitan dream only to be realized perhaps after the lapse of centuries, 
can (according to the theory) be realized at the present time. It does not un-
derstand the needs of the present and the meaning of nationality in fact, it 
ignores national existence, and with it the principle of national independ-
ence. In its exclusive cosmopolitanism, it considers mankind only as a 
whole, and the welfare of the whole race, not caring for the nation or na-
tional welfare, it shudders at (i)148 the teachings of politics, and condemns 
theory and practice as mere worthless routine. It only pays attention to his-
tory when the latter agrees with its own one-sided view, but ignores or dis-
torts its teaching when it conflicts with the system. Indeed, it is forced even 
to deny the influence of the English Navigation Acts, the Methuen Treaty, 
and English commercial policy in general, and to maintain a view entirely 
contrary to truth that England has reached wealth and power not by 
means, but in spite of, its commercial policy. (List, 1841b, Introduction, in 
Hirst, 1909, pp. 292-293)149 
 
List then claims that the only reason that this baseless, historically 
erroneous, and empirically void theory can continue to be taken seri-
ously is due to the philosophical mood of the times, in other worlds due 
to an unrealistic ideology, 
 
When we realize the one-sided nature of each system we can no longer 
wonder that the practice, in spite of serious errors, was unwilling and una-
ble to be reformed by the theory. We understand why the theory did not 
wish to learn anything from history or experience, from politics or nationali-
ty. If this baseless theory is preached in every alley and from every house-
top, and with the greatest fervour among those nations whose national ex-
istence it most endangers, the reason is to be found in the prevailing ten-
dency of the age towards philanthropic experiments and the solution of 
philosophical problems. (List, 1841b, Introduction, in Hirst, 1909, p. 293) 
 
                                       
148 Page 293. (i) Shudders at. List borrows his phrase from Latin and writes 
‖perhorrescirt." (Hirst‘s commentary note, in her translation of List‘ ‗Introduc-
tion‘ to his The National System, Cf. List, 1841b) 
149 A smaller excerpt of this quotation has also been used in Ch. 6, in the 
section; Contradiction between free trade theory and British practice. 
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List could have mentioned that another reason why the Orthodox 
School failed to differentiate between the future and the present was 
their ignorance of the immaterial factors, such as learning. Without 
learning there is no change (apart from ‗external‘ disruptions, such as 
natural disasters), and with no change the future and the present are 
the same. It is a static theory.  
 
 
3.29 Differentiate stages of development: Learning 
 
Since the Orthodox School, according to List, is unable to differentiate 
the future from the present, it would only be logical that they are una-
ble of differentiating different stages of development. And precisely so, 
List claims that the generalisation of the Orthodox School is unable to 
differentiate stages of national development,  
 
The school recognises no distinction between nations which have at-
tained a higher degree of economical development, and those which occupy 
a lower stage. (List, 1841a, p. 171) 
 
When we introduce learning in a system, we get a dynamic system 
that is able to change and adapt to changed ‗external‘ factors, whether 
human or natural. List refers to this collective learning process as an 
investment and as ―the industrial education of the nation‖,  
 
The loss which a nation incurs by protection is only one of values, but it 
gains powers by which it is enabled to go on producing permanently inesti-
mable amounts of value. 'This loss in value should be regarded merely as 
the price paid for the industrial education of the nation.‖ (List, 1841b, In-
troduction, in Hirst, 1909, p. 315) 
 
 
3.30 Differentiate actual from potential  
 
– increasing irrelevance of natural advantages 
 
List‘s criticises Smith‘s generalisations and the resulting inability to dif-
ferentiate present from future takes the shape of making future free 
trade absolute, even now. In contrast, J. Shield Nicholson writes about 
List that, 
 
The distinction between present and future advantage from the national 
standpoint is fundamental throughout the whole work. (Nicholson, 1904)150 
 
                                       
150 In the Introductory Essay to the 1885 translation of the National System into 
English (List, 1841a). 
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Smith has a tendency not to differentiate the actual from the poten-
tial with two opposite results: Smith first makes an imagined future ab-
solute, and then makes the present absolute. In more detail: 
In the first instance, List criticises Smith for imagining that the fu-
ture is with us now (regarding free trade), in the shape of a universal 
republic, and therefore allowing for free trade, 
In the second instance, List criticises Smith for making the present 
absolute (regarding the international division of labour), also for the fu-
ture. Smith‘s system lacks dynamism. 
Learning may dynamically change the table concerning production 
and trade advantages, and Smith does admit that artificial measures 
may channel a country‘s efforts into new manufacture. Nevertheless 
Smith argues that public regulation will diminish revenue and the ac-
cumulation of capital and, according to Smith‘s growth theory, therefore 
reduce growth, and apparently he holds that this loss cannot be com-
pensated by diligence in the new line of production, 
List refers to Adam Smith‘s argument that although protection will 
increase the industry of a country and render it efficient, the costs are 
so great that the end result is to lower growth in the long run. Smith‘s 
argument is based on his materialistic and Physiocratic conception of 
capital as stock and in shortage, and which must be saved and accu-
mulated to promote growth, 
 
Adam Smith (by means of the common expression, capital) urges the fol-
lowing argument against the protective commercial policy which is adopted 
to the present day by all his followers: 'A country can indeed by means of 
such (protective) regulations produce a special description of manufactures 
sooner than without them; and this special kind of manufactures will be 
able to yield after some time as cheap or still cheaper productions than the 
foreign country. But although in this manner we can succeed in directing 
national industry sooner into those channels into which it would later have 
flowed of its own accord, it does not in the least follow that the total amount 
of industry or of the incomes of the community can be increased by means 
of such measures.  
The industry of the community can only be augmented in proportion as 
its capital increases, and the capital of the community can only increase in 
accordance with the savings which it gradually makes from its income. 
Now, the immediate effect of these measures is to decrease the income of 
the community. But it is certain that that which decreases that income 
cannot increase the capital more quickly than it would have been increased 
by itself, if it, as well as industry, had been left free.' (Wealth of Nations, 
book IV, ch. ii) 
As a proof of this argument, the founder of the school adduces the well-
known example, refuted by us in the previous chapter, how foolish it would 
be to plant the vine in Scotland. (List, 1841a, p. 225)151 
                                       
151 List‘s quotation carries the correct meaning but may be incorrect due to 
translation into German and re-translation back into English, and also due to 
differences in the handful editions of Smith‘s Wealth of Nations. Here is 




List retorts that Smith forgets a whole row of points, such as the ex-
tensive influence of industry on other socio-economic phenomena, as 
opposed to the effects of remaining a purely agricultural nation, 
 
He has not considered the influence of manufactures on the internal and 
external commerce, on the civilisation and power of the nation, and on the 
maintenance of its independence, as well as on the capability arising from 
these of gaining material wealth. (List, 1841a, p. 227) 
 
Besides, List considers the extra costs to be an investment that pays 
off in the long run, which Smith disputes, 
 
… It is true some men will for the first year enrich themselves by political 
measures to the loss of individuals; but this is the expense incident to the 
completion of the productive power of the nation, and this first expense will 
after some years be ten times compensated by the benefit arising from a 
more perfect national economy. (List, 1827b, p. 69) 
 
List‘s argument here resembles A. Hamilton‘s point that it is of sec-
ondary importance whether some enrich themselves as long as the pri-
mary goal is approached; that the national economy grows. 
List continues by referring to the legal institution of intellectual prop-
erty, namely patents, which also is a temporary monopoly - quite paral-
lel both in function and legal status to the protection and monopoly 
that tariffs give, 
 
… On giving patents for new inventions you are directed by the same views. 
It will encourage new inventions by securing to the inventors the first ad-
vantages of them. The community pays for these advantages, but not more 
than the value of the new inventions and of securing them to the whole 
community. Without these privileges many of the most valuable inventions 
would die with the inventor, as in former times. (List, 1827b, p. 69) 
                                                                                                                
manufacture may sometimes be acquired sooner than it could have been 
otherwise, and after a certain time may be made at home as cheap or cheaper 
than in the foreign country. But though the industry of the society may be 
thus carried with advantage into a particular channel sooner than it could 
have been otherwise, it will by no means follow that the sum total, either of its 
industry, or of its revenue, can ever be augmented by any such regulation. 
The industry of the society can augment only in proportion as its capital 
augments, and its capital can augment only in proportion to what can be 
gradually saved out of its revenue. But the immediate effect of every such reg-
ulation is to diminish its revenue, and what diminishes its revenue is certainly 
not very likely to augment its capital faster than it would have augmented of 
its own accord had both capital and industry been left to find out their natural 
employments. 
Though for want of such regulations the society should never acquire the 
proposed manufacture, it would not, upon that account, necessarily be the 





Smith further argues that a country should stick to one‘s last and 
produce what it already has a natural advantage in producing, no mat-
ter whether these natural advantages are a gift from nature or a learnt 
advantage. In other words, there should neither be any change in the 
economic structure of a nation, nor any change in the international di-
vision of labour, 
 
… The natural advantages which one country has over another in produc-
ing particular commodities are sometimes so great that it is acknowledged 
by all the world to be in vain to struggle with them. By means of glasses, 
hotbeds, and hot walls, very good grapes can be raised in Scotland, and 
very good wine too can be made of them at about thirty times the expense 
for which at least equally good can be brought from foreign countries. … 
Whether the advantages which one country has over another be natural or 
acquired is in this respect of no consequence. (Smith, 1776, book IV, ch. II, 
p. 458) 
 
List says that theory of natural advantages to some degree is correct 
regarding agriculture, but not regarding manufacturing, 
 
The school maintains, as is well known, that every nation possesses spe-
cial advantages in various branches of production, which she has either de-
rived from nature, or which she has partly acquired in the course of her ca-
reer, and which under free trade compensate one another. We have in a 
previous chapter adduced proof that this argument is only true in reference 
to agriculture, in which production depends for the most part on climate 
and on the fertility of the soil, but that it is not true in respect to manufac-
turing industry, for which all nations inhabiting temperate climates have 
equal capability provided that they possess the necessary material, mental, 
social, and political qualifications. England at the present day offers the 
most striking proof of this. (List, 1841a, p. 385) 
 
List argues that man and his community must perfect themselves to 
be able to discover and utilise nature‘s abundance, 
 
The more that man and the community perfect themselves, the more are 
they enabled to make use of the natural powers which are within their 
reach for the accomplishment of their objects, and the more does the 
sphere of what is within their reach extend itself.. (List, 1841a, p. 210)152 
 
List describes how primitive societies are unable to use what is di-
rectly before their eyes, since they have not the required knowledge, 
 
The hunter does not employ the thousandth part, the shepherd not the 
hundredth part, of those natural advantages which surround him. The sea, 
foreign climates and countries, yield him either none, or at least only an in-
considerable amount of enjoyment, assistance, or stimulants to exertion. 
                                       




In the case of a people in a primitive agricultural condition, a large por-
tion of the existing natural resources lies yet unutilised, and man still con-
tinues limited to his nearest surroundings. The greater part of the water 
power and wind power which exists, or can be obtained, is unemployed; the 
various mineral products which the manufacturers so well understand how 
to utilise profitably, lie dead; various sorts of fuel are wasted or regarded 
(as, for instance, peat turf) as a mere hindrance to cultivation; stone, sand, 
and lime are used but little as building materials; the rivers, instead of be-
ing means of freight and transport for man, or of fertilising the neighbour-
ing fields, are allowed to devastate the country by floods; warmer climates 
and the sea yield to the agricultural country but few of their products. 
In fact, in the agricultural State, that power of nature on which produc-
tion especially depends, the natural fertility of the soil, can only be utilised 
to a smaller extent so long as agriculture is not supported by manufactur-
ing industry. (List, 1841a, pp. 210-211)153 
 
An agricultural nation, which inhabits a country of temperate climate, 
leaves therefore the richest part of its natural resources unutilised. List, 
1841a, p. 214)154 
 
By the establishment of industries and thereby transportation, value-
less raw materials are made valuable, and an increasingly differentiated 
demand for products is created. Therefore production is created, differ-
entiated and improved,  
 
… all minerals, all metals, which heretofore were lying idle in the earth are 
now rendered useful and valuable. Articles which could formerly only bear 
a freight of a few miles, such as salt, coals, stone, marble, slate, gypsum, 
lime, timber, bark, &c., can now be distributed over the surface of an entire 
kingdom. Hence such articles, formerly quite valueless, can now assume a 
degree of importance in the statistical returns of the national produce, 
which far surpasses the total of the entire agricultural production in previ-
ous times. Not a cubic foot of water-fall will then exist which is not made to 
perform some service; even in the most distant districts of a manufacturing 
country, timber and fuel will now become valuable, of which previously no 
one knew how to make any use. 
Through the introduction of manufactures, a demand for a quantity of 
articles of food and raw materials is created, to the production of which cer-
tain districts can be far more profitably devoted than to the growth of corn 
(the usual staple article of rude agricultural countries). The demand which 
now springs up for milk, butter, and meat adds a higher value to the exist-
ing pasture land, and leads to the breaking up of fallows and the erection of 
works of irrigation. The demand for fruit and garden produce converts the 
former bare agricultural land into vegetable gardens and orchards. (List, 
1841a, pp. 211-212) 
 
                                       
153 This quotation is also used in the section Efficiency and value of re-
sources. 




List does often point to the relevance of natural geographical ad-
vantages such as an abundance of raw materials and strategic location. 
Subcategories are climate, fertility of the soil, natural transport arteries 
etc.  
Nevertheless, List argues that nations that are worst fitted for agri-
culture, are best fitted for manufacture. A hilly country with a cold cli-
mate is therefore by nature best suited to be industrialised, and by im-
plication global leaders,  
 
The loss which the mere agricultural State sustains by not making use of 
these natural powers, is so much the greater the more it is fitted by nature 
for carrying on manufactures, and the more its territory is adapted for the 
production of raw materials and natural powers which manufacturers spe-
cially require; that loss will therefore be the greatest in mountainous and 
hilly countries less suitable for agriculture on the whole, but which offer to 
manufactures plenty of water power, of minerals, timber, and stone, and to 
the farmer the opportunity of cultivating the products which are specially 
required by the manufacturer. (List, 1841a, p. 213) 
 
List joins the argument that a harsh climate is not detrimental and a 
natural disadvantage, but quite in the opposite is disciplining and 
thereby creates habits valuable for industry and progress,  
 
Countries with a temperate climate are (almost without exception) 
adapted for factories and manufacturing industry. … the severe season of 
the year, which appears to the superficial observer as an unfavourable ef-
fect of nature, is the most powerful promoter of habits of energetic activity, 
of forethought, order, and economy…. Diligence, economy, order, and fore-
thought are at first produced by necessity afterwards by habit, and by the 
steady cultivation of those virtues. Morality goes hand in hand with the ex-
ertion of one's powers and economy, and immorality with idleness and ex-
travagance: each are reciprocally fertile sources, the one of power, the other 
of weakness.  (List, 1841a, pp. 213.214) 
 
The historical record tells us that some of the world‘s most favoured 
nations by nature have been able to squander its resources, Congo still 
being one. In addition, there is little use in blaming colonialism for mis-
eries, since an able nation would be able to organise and defend itself. 
Historically, a feeble nation invites attack. 
At the same time, some of the least favoured nations by nature have 
managed to develop best: Prussia had little else than poor soil, the 
Netherlands hardly had any soil and had to win it from the Sea, Japan 
had fish and Korea little more. What they did have was a disciplined 
commitment to learn and develop.  
It was not obvious from this point of view that North America as a 
whole would take the lead in industry, since she had an abundance of 
natural resources, but she was blessed,155 partially with a harsh cli-
mate. 
                                       
155 From an industrial point of view…. 
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More importantly, she was blessed with the first immigrants, who es-
tablished an industrial society, coming from countries with disciplined 




3.31 Differentiate raw materials from finished products 
 
Concerning Smith‘s unwillingness or inability to differentiate, between 
primitive and manufactured goods; between raw materials and finished 
products, List writes that ―goods are spoken of in general terms‖, 
 
Wherever international commerce is in question, the native individual is 
throughout simply pitted against the foreign individual; examples from the 
private dealings of separate merchants are throughout the only ones ad-
duced -- goods are spoken of in general terms (without considering whether 
the question is one of raw products or of manufactured articles) -- in order 
to prove that it is equally for the benefit of the nation whether its exports 
and imports consist of money, of raw materials, or of manufactured goods, 
and whether or not they balance one another. (List, 1841a, p. 171) 
 
And in chapter 27, The Customs System and the Popular School, List 
again writes that the school ―does not discriminate‖, and ―recognises no 
distinction‖ regarding goods,  
 
The popular school does not discriminate (in respect of the operation of 
protective duties) between natural or primitive products and manufactured 
products. It perverts the fact that such duties always operate injuriously on 
the production of primitive or natural products, into the false conclusion 
that they exercise an equally detrimental influence on the production of 
manufactured goods. (List, 1841a, p. 316) 
 
Disregarding the differences between raw materials and finished 
goods also opens up for disregarding the beneficial effects of industrial 
policy, intervention/regulation, and the need for the state as such.  
 
 
3.32 Differentiate nations’ suitability for industry  
 
List claims that the ―popular school‖ does not differentiate between na-
tions that are not well adapted and those that are, for the introduction 
of manufacturing industry. His differentiating features range from geog-
raphy to legal stability, 
 
The school recognises no distinction in reference to the establishment of 
manufacturing industry in a State between those nations which are not 
adapted for such industry and those which, owing to the nature of their ter-
ritory, to perfectly developed agriculture, to their civilisation, and to their 
just claims for guarantees for their future prosperity for their permanence, 
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and for their power, are clearly qualified, to establish such an industry for 
themselves. (List, 1841a, p. 316) 
 
List claims that only by the use of protection, can less developed na-
tions catch up with the more developed nations, 
 
 The school fails to perceive that under a system of perfectly free compe-
tition with more advanced manufacturing nations, a nation which is less 
advanced than those, although well fitted for manufacturing, can never at-
tain to a perfectly developed manufacturing power of its own, nor to perfect 
national independence, without protective duties. (List, 1841a, p. 316) 
 
List and his followers held that every nation has its particular cir-
cumstances, 
 
… Every nation must follow its own course in developing its productive 
powers; or, in other words, every nation has its particular Political Econo-
my. (List, 1827b, p. 75) 
 
Therefore, List warns that the protective system must be adjusted to 
the needs of the individual nation, 
 
In regard to the expediency of protecting measures, I observe that it de-
pends entirely on the condition of a nation whether they are efficacious or 
not. (List, 1827b, p. 33) 
 
List‘s criticism is an antecedent to the core arguments of the later 
German Historical School in economics against the orthodox school, as 
well as of the criticism of the past decades regarding international or-
ganisations like the IMF and IBRD (The International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development - The World Bank), who largely were devot-
ed to the same type of generalising economic policy as A. Smith, ―one 
size fits all‖ economics.   
 
 
3.33 Differentiate industries – effects of regulations 
 
List writes that the popular schools does not differentiate between agri-
culture and manufacture and therefore fails to see how regulations 
work in different ways on these two sections, since they have different 
characteristics, 
 
The school, inasmuch as, in judging the influences of climate on the pro-
duction of wealth, it has not distinguished between agriculture and manu-
facturing industry, has fallen into the gravest errors in respect to the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of protective regulations, … (List,1841a, p. 
213) 
 
Regarded in the light of day, however, it is fundamentally false, since re-
strictions on commercial intercourse operate quite differently on the pro-
149 
 
ductive power of agriculture than they do on the productive power of manu-
facturing industry. (List, 1841a, p. 214) 
 
With regard to the interchange of raw products, the school is perfectly 
correct in supposing that the most extensive liberty of commerce is, under 
all circumstances, most advantageous to the individual as well as to the en-
tire State….  
But the manufacturing productive power, on the contrary, is governed by 
other laws, which have, unfortunately, entirely escaped the observation of 
the school. (List, 1841a, p. 217) 
 
 
3.34 Differentiate industries – effects on culture  
 
Speaking of merchants, as opposed to the manufacturer, List claims 
that their contribution to the national culture and science is meagre, 
and accordingly that the popular school fails to see their different scien-
tific and cultural value for the nation, 
 
But in comparison with manufacturers, they cannot do very much to 
promote the development of freedom and progress of science. 
It is in the very nature of things that a manufacturer should sharpen his 
intellect by making a thorough study of the business in which he is en-
gaged. And he takes a real interest in the progress of science, technology 
and art. A merchant, on the other hand, concentrates upon arithmetic, 
double entry, and the state of the stock market and these are topics which 
are hardly likely to elevate the spirit or improve the intellect. (List, 1837a, p. 
102) 
 
List also claims that agricultural nations offer far smaller opportuni-
ties for individual self-fulfilment due to the very limited differentiation of 
the economy, where bodily strength is the most favoured individual re-
source. A developed industrial nation, however offers to the individual a 
wide range of economic opportunities, in technology based production, 
research, education, transport, communication and administration. In 
addition, due to the higher level of prosperity an industrial nation al-
lows for a far more intense and diversified cultural life. 
List claims that inventions, improvements and knowledge are higher 
valued in the manufacturing nations, and have stronger effects than in 
agricultural nations, 
 
New inventions and improvements in the mere agricultural State are of 
but little value. Those who occupy themselves with such things in such a 
State fall themselves, as a rule, a sacrifice to their investigations and en-
deavours, while in the manufacturing State there is no path which leads 
more rapidly to wealth and position than that of invention and discovery. 
Thus, in the manufacturing State genius is valued and rewarded more 
highly than skill, and skill more highly than mere physical force. In the ag-
ricultural State, however, excepting in the public service, the reverse is al-





3.35 Differentiate kinds of capital – and labour 
 
List states that the roots of national wealth, the productive power, are 
mental and physical, individual and social, and that the instruments of 
production (i.e. real capital) are results of former activity, 
 
The nation derives its productive power from the mental and physical 
powers of the individuals; from their social, municipal, and political condi-
tions and institutions; from the natural resources placed at its disposal, or 
from the instruments it possesses as the material products of former men-
tal and bodily exertions (material, agricultural, manufacturing, and com-
mercial capital). (List, 1841a, p. 224) 
 
He then looks at the cosmopolitan orthodox school‘s view concerning 
capital, and finds it to be too generalising, and lacking in concrete real-
world specificity. This leads to false reasoning he claims, 
 
That which we understand by the term 'instrumental powers' is called 
'capital' by the school. It matters but little by what word an object is signi-
fied, but it matters very much (especially with regard to scientific investiga-
tions) that the word selected should always indicate one and the same ob-
ject, and never more or less. As often, therefore, as different branches of a 
matter are discussed, the necessity for a distinction arises. The school now 
understands by the term 'capital' not merely the material, but also all men-
tal and social means of and aids to production. It clearly ought, therefore, 
to specify wherever it speaks of capital, whether the material capital, the 
material instruments of production, or the mental capital, the moral and 
physical powers which are inherent in individuals, or which individuals de-
rive from social, municipal, and political conditions, are meant. The omis-
sion of this distinction, where it ought to be drawn, must necessarily lead to 
false reasoning, or else serve to conceal false reasoning. (List, 1841a, p. 224 
ff) 
 
List again finds the cosmopolitan orthodox school‘s view concerning 
capital, too generalising. He then discusses transferral of ―capital‖ be-
tween different occupations in a way that supplies a strikingly acute 
argument of attack, undermining of also modern economics‘ similarly 
generalised notion of the term capital, which implies that capital can be 
moved from one industry to another instantly.  
Adam Smith describes a primitive economy with little specialisation 
of expertise, and accordingly easy transfers of labour and capital be-
tween branches. Smith employs a rather materialist concept of capital, 
with ‗stock‘ as a limiting factor. He writes, 
 
… though a great number of people should, by thus restoring the freedom 
of trade, be thrown all at once out of their ordinary employment and com-
mon method of subsistence, it would by no means follow that they would 
thereby be deprived either of employment or subsistence. … To the greater 
part of manufactures besides, it has already been observed, there are other 
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collateral manufactures of so similar a nature that a workman can easily 
transfer his industry from one of them to another. The greater part of such 
workmen too are occasionally employed in country labour. The stock which 
employed them in a particular manufacture before will still remain in the 
country to employ an equal number of people in some other way. The capi-
tal of the country remaining the same, the demand for labour will likewise 
be the same, or very nearly the same, though it may be exerted in different 
places and for different occupations. 
(Smith 1776, book IV, ch. II)  
 
List concludes that the generalisation deliberately serves to promote 
free trade, whereas a more realistic view would speak in favour of pro-
tectionism,  
 
The school distinguishes fixed capital from circulating capital, and clas-
ses under the former in a most remarkable manner a multitude of things 
which are in circulation without making any practical application whatever 
of this distinction. The only case in which such a distinction can be of val-
ue, it passes by without notice. … 
Vineyards have (as such) a value which, if used as arable fields, they 
would lose. Ships, if used for timber or for firewood, have a much lower 
value than when they serve as means of transport. What use can be made 
of manufacturing buildings, water-power, and machinery if the spinning 
industry is ruined? In like manner individuals lose, as a rule, the greatest 
part of their productive power, consisting in experience, habits, and skill, 
when they are displaced. The school gives to all these objects and properties 
the general name of capital, and would transplant them (by virtue of this 
terminology) at its pleasure from one field of employment to another. J. B. 
Say thus advises the English to divert their manufacturing capital to agri-
culture. How this wonder is to be accomplished he has not informed us, 
and it has probably remained a secret to English statesmen to the present 
day.  … The reason why the school so deliberately obscures things which 
are so clear is apparent enough. If things are called by their proper names, 
it is easily comprehended that the transfer of the productive powers of a na-
tion from one field of employment to another is subject to difficulties and 
hazards which do not always speak in favour of 'free trade,' but very often 
in favour of national protection.  (List, 1841a, p. 234) 
 
Mathew Carey held similar criticisms against Smith. He was one of 
List‘s close friends and hosts in America; an Irish-American; and an 
early and devoted proponent of the American System. Carey set out to 
establish a society for the propaganda of good economic doctrines: The 
American System.156 Mathew Carey tells us that his prime reason for 
                                       
156 In 1829 Mathew Carey writes, ―The plan was to form a general society, on 
a more purpose of dissemination of sound doctrines on the subject of political 
economy, and dispelling the delusion under which our southern fellow citizens 
labored.‖  (Carey, 1829, p. 144). He also lists the paragraphs of the constitution 
of THE SOCIETY OF POLITICAL ECONOMISTS, as being: ‖1. The object of this 
Society shall be to print and disseminate pamphlets on the subject of political 
economy, calculated to prove the soundness of what is styled the American Sys-
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starting to write about economics was that he was provoked by what 
Adam Smith wrote, concerning domestic manufactures being bankrupt-
ed by foreign competition. 
Mathew Carey mentions the dire consequences of the end of protec-
tion after the Anglo-American war. He argues that Smith‘ assertions 
that an easy transferral of stock and labour between branches is erro-
neous, since there are no collateral branches. Furthermore, if there 
were, a crisis would still hit collateral branches simultaneously, 
 
These positions, absurd, futile, and untenable as they are, form the basis 
of the Wealth of Nations. To a person wholly unbiased by prejudice, it must 
be a matter of astonishment, how a work, resting on such a sandy and mis-
erable foundation, could have obtained, and still more, have so long pre-
served its celebrity.   
I undertook to prove that there were no such collateral branches—that if 
there were, they would be in the same state of depression from excessive 
importations, … (Carey, 1829, p. 49) 
 
List‘s and Carey‘s point is that professions are so specialised that 
there is no easy transfer of labour between professions nor between 
their manufactories, and that the same argument goes for manufactur-
ing equipment, capital in production. Carey‘s additional point is that a 
crisis is general: Smith is only able to reason on the lofty level because 
he is generalising away the troublesome details of real life. 
There is also a methodological reason for this conflict of opinions. 
This is due to Carey‘s (and List‘s) Idealistic, empirical and practical ap-
proach, seeing that skills and capital are difficult to transfer from one 
branch of industry to another. The orthodox school, however, general-
ised all different categories into ‗money‘. Accordingly, this ―exchange 
value‖ school reasoned as if such transfers were just as uncomplicated 
in physical reality as when entities on an accounting sheet are moved 
from one account to another. 
 
 
3.36 Differentiate private versus community interests157 
 
List claims that the principle of Laissez faire et laissez passer, only 
would be true if there were no conflict between individual and national 
interests, which is not true,  
 
This principle would only be true if individual and national interest were 
never in opposition. But this is not the case. A country may possess many 
extremely rich men, but the country is poorer, because there is no equal 
distribution of property. Slavery may be a public calamity for the country, 
nevertheless some people may do very well in carrying on the slave trade 
and in holding slaves. Notwithstanding an absence of liberal institutions 
                                                                                                                
tem, and the fallacy of the ‗theories of Adam Smith.‖ (Carey, 1829, p. 148) 
157 See also the section above, Public regulation of the merchant interest, and 
the section Natural rights and ‗the selfish system‘, in chapter 5. 
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may be extremely injurious to a full development of the productive powers 
of the nations, some classes may find their reckoning in this bad state of 
things. The country may suffer from an absence of manufacturing industry, 
but some people may flourish in selling foreign manufactures. Canals and 
railroads may do great good to a nation, but all waggoners will complain of 
this improvement. Every new invention has some inconvenience for a num-
ber of individuals, and is nevertheless a public blessing. (List, 1827b, Letter 
VI, pp. 86-87) 
 
One important point of List‘s criticism against Adam Smith is that 
the materialist tradition either disregards the difference between private 
business economics and national economics, or focuses exclusively on 
private side to economics – behaving as if this was the only reality of 
economics. Adam Smith writes, 
 
The interest of a nation in its commercial relations to foreign nations is, 
like that of a merchant with regard to the different people with whom he 
deals, to buy as cheap and to sell as dear as possible. But it will be most 
likely to buy cheap, when by the most perfect freedom of trade… (Smith, 
1776, book IV, ch. II, p. 30, and p. 464) 
 
Smith here obviously sees no difference between private interests and 
public interests, meaning that he does not see any difference between 
values in exchange productive powers.  
List on the other hand claims in his preface to Das Nationale System, 
that Cosmopolitical Economy (theory of value in exchange) and Political 
Economy (theory of productive powers) have to be treated apart,  
 
There are consequently one cosmopolitical and one Political Economy, one 
theory of value in exchange and one theory of productive forces, doctrines 
which, very different from each other, must be developed independently. 
(List, 1841b, Introduction, in the German ed. p. 66, or in Hirst‘s translation)  
 
In addition, in 1827 List similarly writes, 
 
Conditions, events, etc. may be profitable in individual economy for some 
persons, and injurious to the community; or on the contrary, they may be 
injurious to individuals, and prove highly beneficial to the community: Indi-
vidual economy is not political economy. 
So - measures, principles can be beneficial to mankind, if followed by all 
nations, and yet prove injurious to some particular countries, and vice versa. 
Political economy is not cosmopolitical economy. …Every nation has its 
particular economy. (List, 1827b, Letter 5, p. 75) 
 
List‘s has a scorching characterisation of the conflicting interest of 
the nation as against that of the merchant. List argues that mer-
chants support Smith‘s theory of value, since it is in their natural in-
terest, and he claims that Smith‘s system is the true ―mercantile sys-




Once more we reject the criticism that we have drawn a caricature of the 
truth. It is our intention to stick to the truth. We have described the mer-
chant as he really is, as he can be, and as indeed he must necessarily be – 
unless a country deliberately sets limits to his lust for gain.  
Merchants are the most faithful disciples of the theory of value. They in-
vented the principles ―laissez faire et laissez passer‖ and ―buy where you 
can buy in the cheapest market‖. The cosmopolitan economists find that 
merchants are their most ardent followers and spread their doctrines with 
the greatest enthusiasm.  
And so the doctrines of Adam Smith and Say must be regarded as the 
true ―mercantile system‖ – an economic theory which places the interests of 
those merchants who import foreign manufactured goods above those of 
commerce in general. It is a theory which stresses only material wealth and 
ignores productive powers. It is a doctrine which sacrifices a country‘s fu-
ture economic power, political greatness, and cultural progress in order to 
deceive people into believing in the ―truth‖ of a principle which is in fact 
based upon the most despicable egotism.  
It is indeed strange that those who most passionately denounce what 
they choose to call the mercantile system have in fact invented a real mer-
cantile system all of their own – a system which exalts the hawker of foreign 
goods and actually includes the activities of the smuggler in the science of 
economics. (List, 1837a, p. 104) 
 
Concerning the possibility of different interests between the individu-
al and the nation, List writes that in times of war the merchant might 
be a natural fifth column from within, likely to ally with foreign inter-
ests. The merchant interest therefore must be tamed and regulated in 
the public interest, and also in the interest of commerce itself, 
 
In the time of war he provides the enemy with arms and ammunition. He 
would, if it were possible, sell fields and meadows to foreign countries, and 
when he had sold the last bit of land would place himself on board his ship 
and export himself. 
It is therefore evident that the interest of individual merchants and the 
interest of the commerce of a whole nation are widely different things. In 
this sense Montesquieu has well said, 'If the State imposes restrictions on 
the individual merchant, it does so in the interest of commerce, and his 
trade is nowhere more restricted than in free and rich nations, and nowhere 
less so than in nations governed by despots.'(1*) (List, 1841a, ch. 21) 
 
List argues that radical free trade economists have taken over the 
merchant‘s principle. He argues that sometimes the principle should be 
reversed, as in a slump when import duties should be reversed to sup-
port domestic production, 
 
It is by confusing the theory of productive powers with the theory of val-
ue that economists, who support free trade, have taken over the merchant‘s 
principle: Laissez faire et laissez passer. As we have seen in chapter 19 the 
principle should often be reversed. The more manufactured goods fall in 
price during a slump, the more dangerous – in the national interest – is it to 
buy them owing to the danger of ruining our own factories. In such circum-
155 
 
stances it is vitally important to levy high import duties on these products. 
Merchants on the whole demand ―freedom‖ in the very widest sense- illegal 
and harmful freedom as well as lawful and useful freedom. But in compari-
son with manufacturers, they cannot do very much to promote the devel-
opment of freedom and progress of science. (List, 1837a, p. 102) 
 
List claims that Smith and Cooper's158 conscious confusion of private 
and public interests is a reason for his downplaying of the role of public 
regulation and therefore the role of the nation. List explicitly criticises 
the Cosmopolitan School for assuming that market forces automatically 
will lead to the desired goal of industrial expansion, and that govern-
ment action is general harmful, 
 
CHAPTER THIRTEEN  
 
The Productive Powers of Industry (continued) 
 
THE COSMOPOLITAN THEORISTS do not question the importance of industrial 
expansion. They assume, however, that this can be achieved by adopting 
the policy of free trade and by leaving individuals to pursue their own pri-
vate interests. They believe that in such circumstances a country will au-
tomatically secure the development of those branches of manufacture 
which are best suited to its own particular situation. They consider that 
government action to stimulate the establishment of industries does more 
harm than good. (List, 1837a, p. 70) 
 
The assumption that an unregulated market will serve the common 
good best is not only tightly related to the lack of differentiation be-
tween private and public interests; it also has old roots, even in pre-
Socratic philosophy, related to the discussion of ‗private vices, public 
benefits‘.159 
In The National System chapter 15 (Nationality and the Economy of 
the Nation), we find an opening phrase, much like a compressed theo-
retical and political program and attack on the school of A. Smith. List 
claims that the Cosmopolitical School suffers from three main defects; 
boundless cosmopolitanism; dead materialism, and a disorganising par-
ticularism and individualism, 
 
The system of the school suffers, as we have already shown in the pre-
ceding chapters, from three main defects: firstly, from boundless cosmopoli-
tanism, which neither recognises the principle of nationality, nor takes into 
consideration the satisfaction of its interests; secondly, from a dead materi-
alism, which everywhere regards chiefly the mere exchangeable value of 
things without taking into consideration the mental and political, the pre-
                                       
158 Thomas Cooper, British born President of Columbia College. Declared 
materialist and nominalist philosopher, and the first of the North American 
advocates of free trade, according to Friedrich List. 
159 For an elaboration of these issues, see chapter 5, the section Natural 
Rights and ‗the selfish system‘. 
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sent and the future interests, and the productive powers of the nation; 
thirdly, from a disorganising particularism and individualism, which, ignor-
ing the nature and character of social labour and the operation of the union 
of powers in their higher consequences, considers private industry only as 
it would develop itself under a state of free interchange with society (i.e. 
with the whole human race) were that race not divided into separate na-
tional societies. (List, 1841, ch. 15, p. 174) 
 
List then claims that the individual Nation stands between the indi-
vidual and the global market (the human kind), and the individual is 
unconceivable without it, 
 
Between each individual and entire humanity, however, stands THE NA-
TION, with its special language and literature, with its peculiar origin and 
history, with its special manners and customs, laws and institutions, with 
the claims of all these for existence, independence, perfection, and continu-
ance for the future, and with its separate territory; a society which, united 
by a thousand ties of mind and of interests, combines itself into one inde-
pendent whole, which recognises the law of right for and within itself, and 
in its united character is still opposed to other societies of a similar kind in 
their national liberty, and consequently can only under the existing condi-
tions of the world maintain self-existence and independence by its own 
power and resources. As the individual chiefly obtains by means of the na-
tion and in the nation mental culture, power of production, security, and 
prosperity, so is the civilisation of the human race only conceivable and 
possible by means of the civilisation and development of the individual na-
tions. (List, 1841a, ch. 15, p. 174) 
 
List argues that a nation is much more than- and different from, the 
sum of the private interests,  
 
These interests of the community are, however, infinitely different from 
the private interests of all the separate individuals of the nation, if each in-
dividual is to be regarded as existing for himself alone and not in the char-
acter of a member of the national community, if we regard (as Smith and 
Say do) individuals as mere producers and consumers, not citizens of states 
or members of nations; for as such, mere individuals do not concern them-
selves for the prosperity of future generations -- they deem it foolish (as Mr 
Cooper really demonstrates to us) to make certain and present sacrifices in 
order to endeavour to obtain a benefit which is as yet uncertain and lying in 
the vast field of the future (if even it possess any value at all); they care but 
little for the continuance of the nation -- they would expose the ships of 
their merchants to become the prey of every bold pirate -- they trouble 
themselves but little about the power, the honour, or the glory of the na-
tion, at the most they can persuade themselves to make some material sac-
rifices for the education of their children, …(List, 1841a, p. 172) 
 
List claims that the nation is the necessary foundation and 
precondition for individual power and freedom. Since there often are 
contrasting interests between the interests of the individual and the 




…Individuals may become rich by hazardous bank schemes, but the public 
may lose by them.  
Without interference of national power there is no security, no faith in 
coined money, in measures and weights, no security for the health of sea-
ports, no security for the commerce at sea by the aid of a navy, no interfer-
ence for the citizens in foreign seaports and countries by Consuls and Min-
isters, no titles to land, no patents, no copyright, no canals and railroads, 
no national road. Industry entirely left to itself, would soon fall to ruin, and 
a nation letting everything alone would commit suicide. (List, 1827b, Letter 
VI, p. 87, Cf. 1841a, pp. 166) 
 
Nevertheless, Smith and his followers agree that law enforcement and 
defence are public goods160 that the state has to care for.  
List comments what Smith has to say on the Hansa, and on mer-
chants as citizens with no fatherland,    
 
Yet some passages in his work show clearly that he was not unacquaint-
ed with the causes of the fall of the League and its results. 'A merchant,' he 
says, 'is not necessarily the citizen of any particular country. It is in a great 
measure indifferent to him from what place he carries on his trade; and a 
very trifling disgust will make him remove his capital, and together with it 
all the industry which it supports, from one country to another.‘161 (List, 
1841a, p. 25) 
 
The tradition of confusing private- and community interests is old, 
and related to the Image of Man, as either irrational or rational. Fur-
thermore, it relates to the ancient question that Mandeville termed ‗pri-
vate vices, public benefits‘, meaning the question of whether private vic-
es can be used for the public benefit. This is an ancient pre-Socratic 
belief that was revived with the Enlightenment, and the theory of natu-
ral rights.162 
List often criticized the radical market school for their extreme and 
anti-social individualism, which he claimed would be destructive to 
communities – in opposition to his own idealistic- and socially oriented 
individualism. (Cf. List, 1841a, ch. 14, pp. 169-171)  
List‘s criticisms are almost endless regarding Smith‘s confusions of 
short-term private interests and -characteristics versus national eco-
nomic interests and –characteristics (Cf. e.g. List, 1827b, Letter 5, p. 
75, List, 1841a, pp. 169-172). List devoted a whole chapter in his Na-
tional System to this difference (Cf. List, 1841a, ch. 14, ‗Private and na-
tional economy‘, pp. 163-173). Hildegard Schwab-Felisch has edited a 
collection of List‘s writings on this issue, called A Selection of Writings 
on National Interests and Private Business (Cf. List, 1914).  
 
                                       
160 For a discussion on public goods, see chapter 5, the section Public Goods. 
161 Smith, Wealth of Nations, Book III, ch. iv. (List‘s note) 
162 For an elaboration of these issues, see chapter 5, the section Natural 
Rights and ‗the selfish system‘. 
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…Individuals may become rich by hazardous bank schemes, but the public 
may lose by them. (List, 1827b, Letter VI, p. 87, Cf. 1841a, pp. 166) 
 
List deals repeatedly and extensively with the difference between pri-
vate and public interests, such as in the chapter Private and National 
Economy in his National System (Cf. List, 1841a, pp. 163ff). 
One of List's very basic argument against Smith, was that his material-
ist, static, and superficial generalisations hid the crucial differences that 
made the state and different policies in different circumstances necessary 
- concerning types of goods, capital, markets, institutions, private vs. 
public interests, historical stage of development, the role of time in gen-
eral and of learning.  In particular, this concerned the difference be-
tween private versus public interest, between commodities and refined 
goods and the level of development of a nation in all respects.  
List claimed the short-term merchant interest and its accompanying 
monetarist outlook to be Smith‗s point of departure. Thereby Smith 
could overlook the necessity of installing an active government that would 
create a policy that differentiates, and therefore would defend the macro 
point of interest, by establishing regulations and legal arrangements, na-
tionally and internationally.  
With some irony, List comments that according to Smith, a ‗nation‘ of 
‗disorganised‘ individuals must constitute the highest state of bliss, 
 
… if every individual can provide best for himself, that nation must be the 
richest in which every individual is most left to himself.' The adherents of 
the American system of protection had opposed themselves to this argu-
ment, which had formerly been adduced by importing merchants in favour 
of free trade…  
Thus the popular school, which had begun by ignoring the principles of 
nationality and national interests, finally comes to the point of altogether 
denying their existence, and of leaving individuals to defend them as they 
may solely by their own individual powers. 
How? Is the wisdom of private economy, also wisdom in national econo-
my? Is it in the nature of individuals to take into consideration the wants of 
future centuries, as those concern the nature of the nation and the State? 
(List, 1841a, pp. 164-165) 
 
List here defends the Platonic-Aristotelian insight that different levels of 
existence are different realms, ruled by different laws under different cir-
cumstances, and they ought therefore to be judged and treated different-
ly, in theory and practice. 
 
 
3.37 Generalisations play down regulation and nation 
 
In his generalisations, Smith managed, largely, to exclude the non-
monetary and immaterial factors, in particular the role of institutions and 
regulation, List claimed. In addition, he argues that his own economic 
strategy would also promote these basic factors for economic development 
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that Smith mainly overlooked. In contrast, List saw the immaterial factors 
as the most important for the development of economics as well as civili-
sation in general.  
In more detail: List argues that the generalisations that Smith makes, 
largely based in his materialistic philosophy, play down the importance 
of institutions - except private companies. Apparently, Smith‘s deliber-
ate ―ignorance‖ concerns only public institutions. 
Thereby Smith plays down and disguises the role for regulation, and 
the nation. Smith‘s basic philosophy therefore has practical political 
consequences, just like the epistemology of Hobbes and Locke. A cho-
sen Image of Man therefore has political and economic consequences.  
More specifically, List claims that Adam Smith‘s and Thomas 
Cooper‘s (Smith 1776 and Cooper, 1825) conscious confusion of private 
and public interests is a major reason for their playing down of the role 
of public regulation, lawmaking, and therefore the role of the nation (Cf. 
List, 1827b, Letter VI, p. 87; cf. 1841a, p. 166).  
As a consequence of deliberately confusing the principles of private 
economy and national economy, and denying the sometimes existent 
fact of a conflict of interest between private and community interest, A. 
Smith, makes the logical mistake of playing down the necessity of or-
ganised action through the institution of the nation, claims List,  
 
We have proved historically that the unity of the nation forms the fun-
damental condition of lasting national prosperity… In the present chapter 
we have now to demonstrate how the popular school has concealed its mis-
understanding of the national interests and of the effects of national union 
of powers, by confounding the principles of private economy with those of 
national economy.  
'What is prudence in the conduct of every private family,' says Adam 
Smith, 163'can scarce be folly in that of a great kingdom.' Every individual in 
pursuing his own interests necessarily promotes thereby also the interests 
of the community. It is evident that every individual, inasmuch as he knows 
his own local circumstances best and pays most attention to his occupa-
tion, is far better able to judge than the statesman or legislator how his 
capital can most profitably be invested. … 
Adam Smith concludes from this: 'Restrictions on trade imposed on the 
behalf of the internal industry of a country, are mere folly … (Smith, 1776, 
book IV, ch. Ii) (List, 1841a, ch. 14: Private and National Economy, p. 163)  
 
Adam Smith here makes the classic ‗mental jump‘, known in the lit-
erature of philosophy of science as a ‗fallacy of the wrong level‘; or simp-
ly ‗level fallacy‘; or more specifically as ‗Fallacy of Composition‘ or the 
‗Reductionist Fallacy‘; He assumes that circumstances and conclusions 
on one level of argument (private economy) may automatically be trans-
ferred to another level (national economy).164  
                                       
163 1. Wealth of Nations, Book IV. chap. ii., (List‘s note) 
164 Regarding ‗Reductionism‘ see, the section, Reductionism, in chapter 2 and 




The reductionist point in this connection, meaning Adam Smith‘s ex-
ample, is that the private investor has a different setting than the na-
tion; e.g. different goals and different restrictions. Whereas the investor 
maximises individual profit on a relative short-term horizon, a modern 
nation, in principle, optimises the well-being of all citizens in a long-
term perspective (at least over decades) and is thus forced to make dif-
ferent evaluations than those of an individual investor. 
We may counter Smith‘s argument with one example where private 
prudence becomes public folly: Parsimony may in some circumstances 
be well for a family, but as a general policy it dooms a nation to idleness 
and poverty, as e.g. List pointed out (See the section above; Counterpro-
ductive saving). 
List sarcastically explains why the theory of self-interest and laissez 
faire recruited a large following, the former because people in general 
now could ―get rid of the hateful duties‖ of morality, and statesmen 
could follow a policy where ―all one had to do was to fold one's hands‖. 
Therefore, in essence, the theory‘s popularity was due to high vested 
private interests and low morality, 
 
It was also well known before, that work leads to wealth, and idleness to 
beggary; that private self-interest is the most powerful stimulus to active 
industry; and that he who desires to obtain young chickens, must not first 
eat the eggs. Certainly people had not known before that all this was politi-
cal economy; but they were delighted to be initiated with so little trouble in-
to the deepest mysteries of the science, and thus to get rid of the hateful 
duties which make our favourite luxuries so dear, and to get perpetual 
peace, universal brotherhood, and the millennium into the bargain.  
It is also no cause for surprise that so many learned men and State offi-
cials ranked themselves among the admirers of Smith and Say; for the 
principle of 'laissez faire et laissez aller' demands no sagacity from any save 
those who first introduced and expounded it; authors who succeeded them 
had nothing to do but to reiterate, embellish, and elucidate their argument; 
and who might not feel the wish and have the ability to be a great states-
man, if all one had to do was to fold one's hands in one's bosom? It is a 
strange peculiarity of these systems, that one need only adopt their first 
propositions, and let oneself be led credulously and confidingly by the hand 
by the author, through a few chapters, and one is lost. (List, 1841a, pp. 
356) 
 
There are often conflicts, List claims, between private and public in-
terests. Furthermore, if the nation does not protect the public interest, 
the nation will fall into decay. Therefore, the State must regulate indus-
try, in the public interest, 
 
In a thousand cases the power of the State is compelled to impose re-
strictions on private industry. It prevents the shipowner from taking on 
board slaves on the west coast of Africa, and taking them over to America. 
It imposes regulations as to the building of steamers and the rules of navi-
gation at sea, in order that passengers and sailors may not be sacrificed to 




… For similar reasons the State is not merely justified in imposing, but 
bound to impose, certain regulations and restrictions on commerce (which is 
in itself harmless) for the best interests of the nation. (List, 1841a, p. 167) 
 
In his The End of Laissez-Faire, John Maynard Keynes later followed 
List in his argument that there may well be reasons to regulate the pri-
vate interest, 
 
It is not a correct deduction from the principles of economics that en-
lightened self-interest always operates in the public interest. Nor is it true 
that self-interest generally is enlightened; more often individuals acting 
separately to promote their own ends are too ignorant or too weak to attain 
even these. Experience does not show that individuals, when they make up 
a social unit, are always less clear-sighted than when they act separately. 
We cannot therefore settle on abstract grounds, … (Keynes, 1926, Ch. 4) 
 
List warns against letting the interests of commerce dominate pro-
duction, manufacturing and agriculture. He lambasts the Cosmopolitan 
school of doing exactly that and says that this is a logical outcome of 
their point of departure, by looking at present values instead of the 
productive powers, 
 
… For similar reasons the State is not merely justified in imposing, but 
bound to impose, certain regulations and restrictions on commerce (which 
is in itself harmless) for the best interests of the nation. (List, 1841a, p. 
167) 
 
Commerce is also certainly productive (as the Laissez-Fare school main-
tains); but it is so in quite a different manner from agriculture and manu-
factures. These latter actually produce goods, commerce only brings about 
the exchange of goods … From this it follows that commerce must be regu-
lated, according to the interests and wants of agriculture and manufac-
tures, not vice-versâ.  
But the school has exactly reversed this last dictum by adopting as a fa-
vourite expression by adopting as a favourite expression the saying of old 
Gourney, ‗Laissez-faire, laissez-passez‘, an expression which sounds no less 
agreeable to cheats and thieves than to the merchant, and is on that ac-
count rather doubtful as a maxim. This perversity of surrendering the in-
terests of manufactures and agriculture to the demands of commerce with-
out reservation, is a natural consequence of that theory which everywhere 
merely takes into account present values, but nowhere the powers that 
produce them, and regards the whole world as but one indivisible republic of 
merchants. (List, 1841a, p. 259)165 
  
Nevertheless, List was no admirer of regulation for its own sake, but 
saw clear advantages of regulation for justice and prosperity in opposi-
tion to the principle of laissez faire et laissez passer.  
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… Individuals without the regulation of a society are savages. … Here too 
the truth lies in the middle. It is bad policy to regulate everything and to 
promote everything, by employing social powers, where things may better 
regulate themselves and can be better promoted by private exertions; but it 
is no less bad policy to let those things alone which can only be promoted 
by interfering social power.  
Look around, and you see everywhere the exertions and acts of individu-
als restricted, regulated, or promoted, on the principle of the common wel-
fare. The commonplace of laissez faire et laissez passer, invented by a mer-
chant [Footnote: ... Mr.de Gournay..] can therefore only be alleged sincerely 
by these merchants. (List, 1827b, Letter VI, p. 85) 
 
 
3.38 Critic of Malthus’ materialism 
 
The question of material consumption versus production is put on the 
edge in the discussion of sustainable population growth. This leads us 
to the question of the Image of Man, sufficiently creative or not?  
List writes that besides geographical factors, the crucial factors for 
progress are creativity, co-operation and collective willpower, 
 
… At best the "cosmopolitan system" lays far greater stress upon material 
objects than upon the creative power which makes possible the production 
of material goods. (List, 1837a, p. 180) 
 
… all that is required of the Governments can be expressed in one word, 
and that is – ENERGY. (List, 1841a, p. 435)166 
 
The view of immaterial production factors, wit and will, as paramount 
for progress or not, will reveal itself on a scale of issues from the indi-
vidual to the collective level. The general attitude to these problems is 
revealed by the attitude towards technology based on individual creativ-
ity, and by the attitude towards the potential for positive political inter-
vention in order to promote individual creativity. This has both techno-
logical and political aspects. 
List‘s specific answer to the question of whether population growth 
was sustainable was a clear confirmation of his belief in human creativ-
ity, and an attack upon the pessimists represented by Thomas Malthus. 
List writes, 
 
… the increase of capital of matter will outstrip even the increase of popula-
tion, if the community be wise enough to employ its capital of mind in order 
to develop and use the capital of nature with which it is blessed. (List, 
1827b, p. 67) 
                                       
166 This little quote has also been used elsewhere in the section; Realist and 
Idealist Methods, in chapter 2; and in the sections Capital of mind, and Immate-





In a lengthy attack on Malthus, List insists that one has to look at 
the problem in the long term and therefore employ a dynamic perspec-
tive as well as a wide cultural perspective that enables the whole scope 
of the problem to come into view,  
 
It is not true that population increases in a larger proportion than pro-
duction of the means of subsistence; it is at least foolish to assume such 
disproportion, or to attempt to prove it by artificial calculations or sophisti-
cal arguments, so long as on the globe a mass of natural forces still lies in-
ert by means of which ten times or perhaps a hundred times more people 
than are now living can be sustained. It is mere narrow-mindedness to con-
sider the present extent of the productive forces as the test of how many 
persons could be supported on a given area of land. The savage, the hunter, 
and the fisherman, according to his own calculation, would not find room 
enough for one million persons, the shepherd not for ten millions, the raw 
agriculturist not for one hundred millions on the whole globe; and yet two 
hundred millions are living at present in Europe alone. The culture of the 
potato and of food-yielding plants, and the more recent improvements made 
in agriculture generally, have increased tenfold the productive powers of the 
human race for the creation of the means of subsistence. In the Middle Ag-
es the yield of wheat of an acre of land in England was fourfold, to-day it is 
ten to twenty fold, and in addition to that five times more land is cultivated. 
In many European countries (the soil of which possesses the same natural 
fertility as that of England) the yield at present does not exceed fourfold. 
(List, 1841a, p. 128) 
 
List goes on by praising human inventiveness and then claiming that 
Malthus‘s doctrine is not only utterly immoral but also destructive of 
civilisation itself, 
 
Who will venture to set further limits to the discoveries, inventions, and 
improvements of the human race? Agricultural chemistry is still in its in-
fancy; who can tell that to-morrow, by means of a new invention or discov-
ery, the produce of the soil may not be increased five or ten fold? We al-
ready possess, in the artesian well, the means of converting unfertile wastes 
into rich corn fields; and what unknown forces may not yet be hidden in 
the interior of the earth? Let us merely suppose that through a new discov-
ery we were enabled to produce heat everywhere very cheaply and without 
the aid of the fuels at present known: what spaces of land could thus be 
utilised for cultivation, and in what an incalculable degree would the yield 
of a given area of land be increased? If Malthus' doctrine appears to us in 
its tendency narrow-minded, it is also in the methods by which it could act 
an unnatural one, which destroys morality and power, and is simply horri-
ble. It seeks to destroy a desire which nature uses as the most active means 
for inciting men to exert body and mind, and to awaken and support their 
nobler feelings -- a desire to which humanity for the greater part owes its 
progress. It would elevate the most heartless egotism to the position of a 
law; it requires us to close our hearts against the starving man, because if 
we hand him food and drink, another might starve in his place in thirty 
years' time. It substitutes cold calculation for sympathy. This doctrine 
tends to convert the hearts of men into stones. But what could be finally 
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expected of a nation whose citizens should carry stones instead of hearts in 
their bosoms? What else than the total destruction of all morality, and with 
it of all productive forces, and therefore of all the wealth, civilisation, and 
power of the nation? (List, 1841a, pp. 128-129) 
 
Now, J. S. Nicholson does not much agree with List, and is as usual 
fairly critical of List‘s abilities to understand British economists, 
 
Malthus, it may be observed incidentally, is another great writer whom 
List has utterly misrepresented through relying on popular dogma instead 
of going to the original source. The account given by List of the errors of 
Malthus (p. 103 et seq.) is curious and perversely wrong. (Nicholson, 1904) 
 
Wilhelm Roscher would surely have agreed with Nicholson, since 
Roscher dearly praises Malthus‘ high morals on the basis of his Princi-
ples of Political Economy (Cf. Malthus, 1836),  
 
… the representative of the science, who has been most attacked and who 
has been held up as a picture of impassible insensibility; on whom have 
been heaped the most bloody outrages, is Malthus. Let us hear him.  
… he goes on to say, that he knows nothing more detestable than the idea 
of knowingly condemning the laboring classes to cover themselves with 
rags, to lodge in wretched huts, to enable us to sell a few more stuffs and 
calicoes to foreign countries. ... 
Certain it is, that no defender, however determined, of the laboring clas-
ses, has said anything stronger or more deeply felt. The reason is, that 
nothing was more foreign to Malthus' ideas than the systematic rigidity of 
mathematical theories of wealth; that, a minister of the Gospel, he had 
meditated on its high precepts. His whole doctrine is based on the moral 
idea. (Roscher, 1877, p. 44) 
 
But, Malthus‘ has written more than one book, and having read Mal-
thus‘ Essay on the Principles of Population, as it affects the Future Im-
provement of Society with remarks on the Speculations of Mr. Godwin, M. 
Condorcet, and Other Writers, there is sufficient reason to state that Ni-
cholson is wrong in this case. This is especially so, since List aims not 
at Malthus‘ entire and later authorship, but rather at Malthus‘ ‗doc-
trine‘ of population, as it was explained in his Principles of Population. 
List thus hits the nail on its head;  
First by pointing to Malthus‘ disbelief in human inventiveness, and 
secondly by pointing to Malthus‘ concluding recommendation of not 
coming to the aid of the poor, and more so: in the name of humanism.  
Malthus was a cunning rhetorician, whose book was from the start a 
political argument, using dubious empirical ―facts‖ and disbelief in the 
human mind. Malthus wrote his book as a polemic against William 
Godwin (Godwin, 1793) and Marquis de Condorcet (Condorcet, 1795), 
who believed that the human spirit would tackle problems, including a 
growing population. Malthus fundamental view is, principally, that man 
is a sensuous beast without the creative powers to support himself. 
Malthus writes, in the style typical of the British Classical tradition, 
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best characterised as materialism with a spiritual facade. Malthus Es-
say has many expressions of sensualist, materialist thinking of which 
the following are illustrative of a train of thought that makes sensual-
ism the driver of progress, 
 
It is to the established administration of property and to the apparently 
narrow principle of self-love that we are indebted for all the noblest exer-
tions of human genius, all the finer and more delicate emotions of the soul, 
for everything, indeed, that distinguishes the civilized from the savage 
state,... (Malthus, 1798, p.176) 
 
Necessity has been with great truth called the mother of invention. ... 
Locke, if I recollect, says that the endeavour to avoid pain rather than the 
pursuit of pleasure is the great stimulus to action in life: ... If Locke's idea 
be just, and there is great reason to think that it is, evil seems to be neces-
sary to create exertion, and exertion seems evidently necessary to create 
mind. (Malthus, 1798, p.203) 
 
Had population and food increased in the same ratio, it is probable that 
man might never have emerged from the savage state. ... (Malthus, 1798, 
p.206) 
 
When the mind has been wakened into activity by the passions, and the 
wants of the body, intellectual wants arise, and the desire of knowledge,... 
(Malthus, 1798, p.211) 
 
Malthus‘ (dominant) disbelief in scientific and technical progress was 
and is empirically incorrect. List was right in his view that Malthus was 
empirically incorrect. He was also right in claiming that Malthus‘ theory 
had immoral consequences. Malthus did not express much faith in 
willed improvement of Man and Society, e.g. through governmental in-
terference, 
 
..., this argument seems to be conclusive, not only against the perfectibility 
of man, ... but against any very marked and striking reform for the better, 
in the form and structure of society, by which I mean any great and decided 
amelioration of the condition of the lower classes of mankind, ... the most 
important part of the human race.  (Malthus, 1798, p.172) 
 
Whether a government could with advantage to society interfere to repress 




3.39 Roscher, Schmoller and Schumpeter on Malthus  
 
It is interesting to note whether the leading German speaking econo-
mists followed List in this position. Gustav Schmoller clearly does, while 
Joseph Schumpeter does not. Wilhelm Roscher takes a somewhat inde-
cisive position, but generally follows List and the German tradition after 
the devastating Thirty Years War. 
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Wilhelm Roscher, the leading figure of the older German Historical 
School, exposes the same generally optimistic opinion throughout his 
Principles, but the chapter dealing with Malthus, has a more reserved 
taint to it. Roscher airs several reservations to optimism, but also criti-
cises Malthus‘ unsocial attitudes (Roscher, 1877, book V, ch. I, § 238-
243). Here is an example of Roscher‘s positive attitude where he writes 
that a dense population is by itself a productive force, 
 
The nation's economy attains its full development wherever the greatest 
number of human beings simultaneously find the fullest satisfaction of 
their wants. A dense population is not only a symptom of the existence of 
great productive forces carried to a high point of utilization; ... but is itself a 
productive force, ... and of the utmost importance as a spur and as auxilia-
ry to the utilization of all other forces. (Roscher, 1877, §253) 
 
Gustav Schmoller, the leading figure of the younger German Histori-
cal School was as clear as List had been, and states that a dense popu-
lation is ―the precondition for the higher culture‖, 
 
Checks and migrations intervene importantly in population growth and – 
movement. But the important question for a rapidly growing population still 
always remains, if and to what degree, under which preconditions, she may 
increase in her own territory. The densification of the population is the nat-
ural result of sound conditions, as it is the precondition for the higher cul-
ture. (Schmoller, 1900, vol. I, § 75, p. 184)167 
 
The arguments of Roscher and Schmoller agree very much with List‘s 
arguments for the positive effects of towns, regarding freedom, science, 
innovation and general elevation of culture and civilisation (Cf. e.g., the 
section Urbanisation furthers communication, innovation and freedom). 
 
On the other hand, Joseph Alois Schumpeter claims, much like Mal-
thus, that population growth is a result of development and not a 
cause,  
 
Already Marx exclaimed the lapidary sentence: "Capitalism has stamped 
populations out of the ground." This is true, indeed, and the causal rela-
tionship can clearly be seen. In general, development and partly its reper-
cussions facilitate the establishment of families and open up new possibili-
ties for single individuals. This is certainly true to a certain degree. Insofar, 
as it is true, the increase in population is a consequence and not a cause of 
development. (Schumpeter, 1911, ch. 7) 
 
As we shall see below, Schumpeter follows the English Classical 
School in several important areas, by preferring a formal ‗monetary‘ 
                                       
167 The last sentence in its German original: ― Die Verdichtung der 
Bevölkerung ist das natürliche Ergebnis gesunder Zustände, wie es die 
Voraussetzung der höheren Kultur ist."  
167 
 
method in economics, regarding population growth, and by holding a 
negative view of underconsumption theories. 
 
 
3.40 Malthus and the social question - Distribution 
 
Malthus population theory came about as a reply to ―the social ques-
tion‖ that arose in the late 18th Century. Following the immense Ice-
landic volcano eruptions in 1783-84, bad harvests in Europe fol-
lowed.168  This created a poverty problem and combined with a luxuri-
ous lifestyle among the rich, the French Revolution was one outcome. 
Similar social tendencies were seen in Great Britain, and the father of 
modern anarchism, William Godwin, spoke out for a better distribution 
of the wealth in his An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice (Godwin, 
1793). Malthus retaliated with his famous Essay on the Principle of Pop-
ulation, as it affects the Future Improvement of Society … (Malthus, 
1798).  
Malthus‘ book and theory was therefore political even before it ap-
peared. It was designed as an argument in a political fight. A debate 
ensued regarding the "perfectibility of society", where Malthus argued 
against social remedies to alleviate poverty, as they rather would in-
crease the problem.  
The essence of Malthus‘ system is first his lack of belief in the "per-
fectibility of society" or improvement as we might say today, and then 
his assumption of decreasing returns in agriculture. 
The originally Austrian economic historian, Karl Polanyi, argues that 
―the Speenhamland law‖169 is the vital historical background for the 
problem of pauperism and the Poor Law in Britain, and it was also the 
reason for a lacking free labour market in England, 
 
… the Poor Law discussion formed the minds of Bentham and Burke, God-
win and Malthus, Ricardo and Marx, Robert Owen and John Stuart Mill, 
                                       
168 The Icelandic Laki volcano system erupted over an 8 month period dur-
ing 1783-1784, killed 50% the livestock, and the resulting famine killed 25% 
of the population. The following years brought bad harvests in Europe, and it 
has been estimated that two million people were killed globally, by the deadli-
est volcanic eruption known in history. 
169The Speenhamland law was in practice between 1795 to 1834, providing 
every parish subject with a necessary minimum income, from which is 
subtracted any income they might acquire by themselves and also locking them 
to their particular parish. The law effectively blocked the creation of a free 
labour market in Great Britain in this period and thereby made it impossible to 
attract labour by offering higher wages as well as making it unnecessary for any 
employer to pay labourers a decent wage. Besides, the law, it is argued, blocked 
any interest by the worker for the result of his work. Nevertheless, Polanyi 
argues that the immediate effects after the abolishment of the law in 1834 were 
incomparably worse; "Never perhaps in all modern history has a more ruthless 
act of social reform been perpetrated; it crushed multitudes of lives ... (Polanyi, 
1944, pp. 82-83) 
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Darwin and Spencer, who shared with the French Revolution the spiritual 
parentage of nineteenth century civilization. It was in the decades following 
Speenhamland and the Poor Law Reform that the mind of man turned to-
wards his own community with a new anguish of concern: ... that of laws 
governing a complex society. Although the emergence of society in this new 
and distinctive sense happened in the economic field, its reference was uni-
versal.  
The form in which the nascent reality came to our consciousness was po-
litical economy. (Polanyi, 1944, p. 84) 
 
The effects of Speenhamland, is the original problem and necessary 
background for understanding the social circumstances under which 
the debate over the Poor Law emerged. Speenhamland is therefore also 
the background for the formation of the economics of Malthus and Ri-
cardo who therefore, Polanyi argues, completely misunderstood the way 
capitalism functions under more normal circumstances. Polanyi lays 
out the socio-historical background,  
 
… the degenerative process started by Speenhamland left its indefiable 
mark on the country [see footnote above]. ... It was this bond, we submit, 




3.41 Malthus’ assumptions 
 
Throughout his Principles of Population, Malthus uses the same rhetori-
cal structure. He first states his good intentions, then states the prem-
ises or ―facts‖ and finally draws a ―logical‖ conclusion. Malthus writes, 
 
Consequently, if the premises are just, the argument is conclusive 
against the perfectibility of the mass of mankind. (Malthus, 1798, p. 72) 
 
Malthus was of course well aware of technical improvements, but he 
argues that institutional social and technical change were ineffective in 
supplying sufficient foods and in achieving control over the size of a 
population.  
                                       
170An expanded quotation from Polanyi reads; "Malthus himself, like Burke 
and Bentham, was violently opposed to Speenhamland and advocated complete 
repeal of the Poor Law. Neither of them had foreseen that Speenhamland would 
force the wages of the laborer down to subsistence level and below; on the 
contrary they expected that it would force wages up, or at least maintain them 
artificially, which, but for the Anti-Combination Laws, might well have been the 
case. This false assumption helps to explain why the low level of rural wages 
was not traced by them to Speenhamland, which was its actual cause, but was 
regarded as incontrovertible proof of the working of the so-called iron law of 
wages. To this foundation of the new economic science we must now turn. ..." 
(Polanyi, 1944, p. 122) 
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The conclusion Malthus draws from his premises is that mankind is 
running out of arable land to feed its increasing population, and that 
technical improvements do not suffice to compensate for this increasing 
disparity. He furthermore draws the conclusion that mankind has to 
restrain its numbers by various means, primarily moral restraint and 




3.42 Malthus’ heirs in the English Classical School 
 
The essence of British Classical Economics is based in the Enlighten-
ment tradition of Natural Rights.171 It may, on a superficial level be said 
to be the (scholastic-Aristotelian) formalistic deductive methodology and 
these two "empirical" assumptions; of the greediness of man and of the 
elasticities of scale in production; less than one for agriculture and one 
for industry.172 This point of departure indicates how any question will 
be answered, since in a logical deductive system the conclusion depend 
singularly on the premise, as also Malthus argues.  
The first empirical assumption of the Classical School was popularly 
termed ‗economic man‘; that any agent will act according to his own in-
terests. The second assumption was popularly termed Malthus‘ ―law‖ of 
diminishing returns. It concerned production in agriculture and com-
bined with increasing growth of population, this would lead to stagna-
tion and eventually hunger. 
The idea of a stationary economy and economic collapse is not an in-
vention of the ecological movement of the 20th Century, but is the com-
mon trait among the British classical economists based on the Malthu-
sian assumptions, which were inherent also in Smith‘s system.  
Malthus‘s pessimistic assumptions lived on with the dominating Brit-
ish economist in the 19th Century, first Ricardo, then J.S. Mill and fi-
nally with Alfred Marshall. John Stuart Mill was the leading British 
economist in the second half of the 19th Century. In his Principles of Po-
litical Economy (1848), and repeated in all later editions, he states his 
belief in the Stationary State. Mill claims that technical improvements 
has not improved life for humanity,173 
 
                                       
171 See also the section Natural Rights and ‗the selfish system‘, in chapter 5. 
172 Polanyi argues that the British agricultural production system, with the 
classes of landlord, capitalist and labourer, was so historically unique, an 
isolated case, that it has little permanent interest and that therefore Marx is the 
first economist of the British school who deserve interest for studies of 
industrial societies. (Polanyi, 1944) It is interesting to see that Polanyi quite 
correctly, classifies Marx a part of the British School …. 
173 Indicating that he did not see any signs of improvement in the human lot, 
he did not change the wording of "hitherto" to "formerly" in any of the seven edi-
tions (1848, 1849, 1852, 1857, 1862, 1865, and 1871). 
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Hitherto it is questionable if all the mechanical inventions yet made have 
lightened the day's toil of any human being. They have enabled a greater 
population to live the same life of drudgery and imprisonment, and an in-
creased number of manufacturers and others to make fortunes. They have 
increased the comforts of the middle classes. But they have not yet begun 
to effect those great changes in human destiny, which it is in their nature 
and in their futurity to accomplish. Only when, in addition to just institu-
tions, the increase of mankind shall be under the deliberate guidance of ju-
dicious foresight, can the conquests made from the powers of nature by the 
intellect and energy of scientific discoverers, become the common property 
of the species, and the means of improving and elevating the universal lot. 
(Mill, 1848, book IV, ch. VI) 
 
 
3.43 Edwin Cannan’s criticism of Malthus 
 
In his, A Review of Economic Theory, Edwin Cannan launched a devas-
tating and deeply sarcastic critique of Malthus and his followers, in-
cluding J. S. Mill. Cannan charged that since scarcity is not peculiar to 
agriculture, neither are rents. This important point has not been much 
acknowledged. Describing Malthus‘ theory of ‗diminishing returns‘, 
Cannan writes, 
 
 ―… the value of land is dependent on diminishing returns.‖ But if this is 
true of land, it is equally true of any other materials or instruments. Coals, 
houses, horses, and automobiles may be divided into grades, and if we 
suppose such plenty of the highest grade that anyone can have as much as 
he likes, even that grade will have no value. (Cannan, 1929, ch. VIII, § 5, p. 
238) 
 
Cannan describes how this theory of diminishing returns remained a 
central part of the orthodox English doctrine, and was criticised by 
Hodgskin, Chalmers and more effectively by Henry Carey, without being 
noticed by the believers in the discredited religion, 
 
This grotesque theory became and remained what may be called the 
orthodox English doctrine for more than a generation. J.S.Mill made a 
pitiful attempt to restate and improve it, and long after his time it was 
taught to unfortunate youth, rather weakly in Fawcett's Manual and more 
uncompromisingly Mrs. Fawcett's Political Economy for Beginners. 
Hodgskin, in his Popular Political Economy, 1827 (pp. 226, 267), 
Chalmers, in his Political Economy in connection with the moral state and 
moral aspects of Society, 1832 (chap. i. §§ 2-7), and more effectively, H. Car-
ey, Principles of Political Economy, Pt. I, 1837 (p.58), all pointed out the very 
obvious fact that the returns to agricultural labour had actually not dimin-
ished but had greatly increased in the course of "the progress of civilisation." 
This, of course, knocked the bottom out of the theory that the historical fall 
of the rate of profit was due to diminution of agricultural returns. But the be-
lievers in that theory took no notice, and the public clings to a discredited 
economic theory, as it does to a discredited religion, until a better is provid-




Polanyi writes that Lauderdale, Longfield and von Thünen found a bet-
ter theory of interest, 
 
Eventually a better theory was found in the doctrine that interests 
depend on the quantity and the utility of accumulated material equipment. 
Lord Lauderdale in his Inquiry into the Nature and Origin of Public Wealth, 
1804, Mountiford Longfield in his Lectures, 1834, and von Thünen in Der 
Isolierte Staat, 1st ed., 1842, all conceived the return on capital as arising 
from the fact that suitable instruments enable labour to produce more ... 
(Cannan, 1929, ch. IX, § 4, p. 260) 
 
Cannan also gravely criticises, in particular Malthus‘ ‖followers‖, but 
also Malthus' popular theory, ripping apart his notion of geometrical 
and arithmetical growth ratios. Cannan states that, 
 
This is complete nonsense. ...Where he went wrong was in treating the 
increase of food production as it was some kind of natural phenomenon 
with which the amount of human industry had nothing to do, and in trying 
to get a general rule of growth from a speculation about the future rather 
than from past history. The most obvious factor in producing food is the 
number of persons ... and if the increase of production of food has always 
been in the arithmetical ratio in the past, the increase of population must 
have been so as well, which is entirely contrary to all historical evidence, 
sacred and profane, and is never claimed by Malthus. (Cannan, 1929, ch. 
IV, § 2, pp. 70-72) 
 
The law of diminishing returns had been stated by Turgot thirty years 
before Malthus wrote, and that too in a form much superior to that in 
which it became current in England after the Napoleonic war. ...  
To suppose, as many writers about Malthus have done, that his Essay 
enunciated the law of diminishing returns in opposition to the agricultural 
enthusiast's view and founded his main argument on that law is a mistake. 
... 
What Malthus always had in mind was not the idea that with increasing 
numbers there would be less and less land per head, but that as time goes 
on it will be more and more difficult to make the necessary changes of 
"improvements‖. (Cannan, 1929, § 3, p. 74)  
 
The "law of diminishing returns," on the other hand, in none of the 
numerous forms in which it has been framed, has never said anything of 
the annual or quarter-century additions to produce; it has always related to 
the additions which can be made by given quantities of labour, or of capital 
or some compound of "capital and labour. We are not entitled to say that 
Malthus founded the Essay on the law of diminishing returns merely 
because he used sometimes uses the word "diminishing" in speaking of 
something else than the subject of the law. ... But by the other economists 
it was immediately recognized as an excellent substitute for his geometrical 





3.44 Materialist reductionism - breeds ignorance 
 
The model used by Malthus, Townsend‘s tale of the island of Fernandez 
populated with goats, was taken from the animal realm and therefore 
excluded the intervention of both the human mind and Government. 
From these premises conclusions were drawn about human society. In 
philosophy of science, this is called ‗reductionism‘,174 deducing conclu-
sions on a higher level of existence from a lower level.  
The opposite is a method also Leibniz promoted, namely to conjecture 
from a higher level of existence such as a totality. Here it is argued, that 
to thoroughly understand a singular process, it is helpful to have an 
idea of the end result, the goal, or the connection to the whole.  
Polanyi comments Malthus‘ reductionism such, 
 
Here was a new starting point for political science. By approaching hu-
man community from the animal side, Townsend by-passed the supposedly 
unavoidable question as to the foundations of government, and in doing so 
introduced a new concept of law into human affairs, that of the law of Na-
ture. Hobbes' geometrical bias, as well as Hume's and Hartley's, Quesnay's 
and Helvetius hankering after Newtonian laws in society had been merely 
metaphorical. .... To Christian thought also the chasm between man and 
beast was constitutive, ... Hobbes had argued for the need for a despot be-
cause men were like beasts, Townsend argued instead that they were actu-
ally beasts and that, precisely for this reason, only a minimum of govern-
ment was required. From this novel point of view, a free society could be re-
garded as consisting of two races: property owners and laborers. The num-
ber of the latter was limited by the amount of food, and as long as property 
was safe, hunger would drive them to work. No magistrates were necessary, 
for hunger was a better disciplinarian than the magistrate.  
... The new foundations closely fitted the new society that was developing, 
... Economic society had emerged as distinct from the political state. (Po-
lanyi, 1944, pp. 112-115) 
 
Polanyi claims that the naturalist turn of Malthus and Ricardo was a 
result of a lacking ability to disentangle the working of a capitalist eco-
nomic system and of Speenhamland that together established a capital-
ist system without a labour market.175 
 
                                       
174 See also the section Reductionism, in chapter 2. 
175Polanyi writes; "If ever the overwhelming evidence of the facts seemed to 
point in one direction, it was, therefore in the case of the iron law of wages, ... 
This semblance was, of course, not only misleading but indeed implied an 
absurdity from the point of view of any consistent theory of prices and incomes 
under capitalism. Yet, in the last analysis, it was on account of this false 
appearance that the law of wages could not be based on any rational rule of 
human behavior, but had to be deduced from the naturalistic facts of the 
fertility of man and soil, as they were presented to the world by Malthus' law of 
population combined with the law of diminishing returns. The naturalistic 
element in the foundations of orthodox economics was the outcome of the 
conditions primarily created by Speenhamland." (Polanyi, 1944, p. 124 ) 
173 
 
It follows that neither Ricardo nor Malthus understood the working of the 
capitalist system. Not until a century after the publication of the Wealth of 
Nations was it clearly realized that under a market system the factors of 
production shared in the product, and as produce increased, their absolute 
share was bound to rise.176 ... (Polanyi, 1944, p. 124) 
 
Polanyi argues that the reductionism of Malthus and Ricardo put 
human laws under the dictates of ‗nature‘ and the law of the jungle, 
and had far reaching consequences for economic theory, 
 
… the deus ex machina of animal and plant propagation had to be invoked 
in a scientific system the authors of which claimed to deduce the laws of 
production and distribution from the behavior not of plants or of animals 
but of men. 177 ...  
… the solution hit upon by the classical economists had the most far-
reaching consequences for the understanding of the nature of economic 
theory. As gradually the laws governing a market economy were apprehend-
ed, these laws were put under the authority of Nature herself. The law of 
diminishing returns was a law of plant physiology. The Malthusian law of 
population reflected the relationship between the fertility of man and that of 
the soil. In both cases the forces at play were the forces of Nature, ... The 
laws of a competitive society were put under the sanction of the jungle. (Po-
lanyi, 1944, pp. 123-125) 
 
The naturalism that Malthus and Ricardo thereby established came 
to dominate human sciences in the 19th Century,  
 
The true significance of the tormenting problem of poverty now stood re-
vealed: economic society was subjected to laws which were not human laws. 
The rift between Adam Smith and Townsend had broadened into a chasm, a 
dichotomy appeared which marked the birth of nineteenth century con-
sciousness. From this time onward naturalism haunted the science of man, 
and the reintegration of society into the human world became the persis-
                                       
176Cannan, E., A Review of Economic Theory, 1930. Polanyi goes on such; 
"Although Adam Smith had followed Locke's false start on the labor origins of 
value, his sense of realism saved him from being consistent. Hence he had 
confused views.... ... Smith's own view was that universal plenty could not help 
percolate down to the people, ... Unfortunately, the facts did not seem to bear 
him out for a long time to come; and as theorists had to account for the facts, 
Ricardo proceeded to argue that the more society advanced the greater would be 
the difficulties of procuring food and the richer would landlords grow, exploiting 
both capitalist and worker... " (Polanyi's note) 
177Polanyi continues: "Let us briefly survey the consequences of the fact that 
the foundations of economic theory were laid down during the Speenhamland 
period, which made appear as a competitive market economy what actually was 
capitalism without a labor market. First, the economic theory of the classical 
economists was essentially confused. ... Secondly, given the conditions under 
which the problem represented itself, no other solution was possible. ... Third,... 
" (Polanyi, 1944, p. 125) 
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tently sought aim of the evolution of social thought.178 (Polanyi, 1944, p. 
127) 
 
According to Polanyi, Malthus‘ theories reinforced Smith‘s arguments 
against commercial regulations. The naturalism of Malthus and Ricardo 
which implied that there ought to be no artificial regulation of competi-
tion united theoreticians, who on other matters stood far apart, into a 
forceful movement for radical liberalism in economic matters,  
 
Since economics established as a natural science the expansion of the 
self-regulating market that was believed to be an ineluctable necessity, the 
Poor Law also had to disappear. 
It was on this point that Townsend, Malthus, Ricardo, Bentham and 
Burke were at one. Fiercely as they differed in method and outlook, they 
agreed on opposition to the principles of political economy and to Speen-
hamland. What made economic liberalism an irresistible force was this 
congruence of opinion.... (Polanyi, 1944, p. 127) 
 
 
3.45 Reductionism and consequences – a contrast 
 
For the sake of gaining a wider perspective of the consequences of List‘s 
Idealist (and Realist) system, one is well served by investigating the 
opposed British ‗materialist‘ and ‗biological‘ schools and their 
consequences. Referring to the consequences of a materialistic view of 
Man, life and society, as opposed to List‘s view, serves a contrasting and 
illuminating purpose. 
These ―materialist‖ and ―biological‖ schools had the same philosophi-
cal origins as the English Classical School, a Materialist worldview with 
a reductionist Image of Man as eudemonic and egotistical. They in prin-
ciple came to be the originators of a ―science‖ of white racial superiority 
and the ―science‖ of Eugenics, in the service of Imperial Expansion. This 
                                       
178 Polanyi continues; "Marxian economics - in this line of argument - was an 
essentially unsuccessful attempt to achieve that aim, a failure due to Marx' too 
close adherence to Ricardo and the traditions of liberal economics. The classical 
economists themselves were far from unconscious of such a need. Malthus and 
Ricardo were in no way indifferent to the fate of the poor but their human 
concern merely forced a false theory into even more tortuous paths. ...  
Within Ricardo's system itself the naturalistic and the humanistic forces 
coexisted which were contending for supremacy in economic society. The 
dynamics of this situation was of overwhelming power. As its result the drive for 
a competitive market acquired the irresistible impetus of a process of Nature. 
For the self-regulating market was now believed to follow from the inexorable 
laws of Nature, and the unshackling of the market to be an ineluctable 
necessity. ... What made economic liberalism an irresistible force was this 
congruence of opinion between diametrically opposed outlooks; for what the 
ultrareformer Bentham and the ultratraditionalist Burke equally approved of 




was a consequence of a materialistic point of departure, and opposed to 
List‘s Idealist outlook and his strategy of the Harmony of Interests.  
The background was established historically by Materialist and Nom-
inalist thinkers like Hobbes and Locke, but the immediate originators 
were Charles Darwin and his book The Origin of Species, with the less 
known subtitle Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life 
(Darwin, 1859), and his cousin Francis Galton, who founded British Eu-
genics Society.  
It was the Liberal philosopher Herbert Spencer who coined the mod-
ern term Survival of the Fittest, (although the concept is as old as Em-
pedocles, Cf. Windelband, 1893, p. 53), and also wrote a classificatory 
book on races, hierarchically organised (Spencer, 1864). Galton argued 
for a ―Jihad‖ for Eugenics as a new religion, but believed in Lamarckian 
biology (the ability to inherit experience) (Galton, 1869).  
 Subsequent political events fuelled these ideas and Social 
Darwinism, in a way that illustrates how the development of 
philosophy, science and politics are intertwined.179 
 
 
3.46 Empirical evidence 
 
The combination of population growth and the wealth created the past 
centuries shows that Malthus' expectations have not been confirmed. In 
the post-WWII era, Malthus' warnings have been repeated in various 
shapes and versions of which the last is the argument of pollution.180 
In his The History of the World Population, Carlo M. Cipolla looks to-
wards the future as Malthus did, and writes in the same pessimistic 
spirit,  
  
As world population grows, difficulties seem to grow more than propor-
tionately. ... Even if one resists the distressing thought that it is already too 
late, one can hardly avoid the unpleasant feeling that all we can foresee in 
the near future is a worsening of the general situation. In order to improve 
their miserable standards of living, the underdeveloped and developing 
countries must undergo the Industrial Revolution. If they fail, they are con-
demned to abject misery. If they succeed, they will add greatly to the prob-
lems of pollution and depletion plaguing our planet today. (Cipolla, 1978, 
pp. 121-29)  
 
Nevertheless, the trend in population growth is falling. Population 
growth has been halved from 1962 to 2009 (from 2.20 to 1.13 %) and 
the population of major developed countries is shrinking, such as Ger-
                                       
179 See e.g. the section, British policy after List, in chapter 7. 
180 For example, the "climate-crisis" argument is more than 100 years old but 
has for some reason been picked up again. See e.g. Ecological Economics: 
Energy, Environment, and Society by Juan Alier-Martinez and Klaus 
Schlupmann, 1987, in the chapter on Frederick Soddy. 
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many, Italy, Russia, and Japan. With increased industrialisation, this 
gives reason to expect population growth to keep falling. 
Furthermore, Cipolla‘s argument has a hidden underlying premise: In 
the future, there will be no technological development that discovers 
new resources, or new ways to use old resources more efficiently. This 
was precisely the premise that List repeatedly attacked as an illusion 
and contrary to empirical facts.181  
Admittedly, there are many serious problems that support Cipolla‘s 
argument, but there is no turning back, since without scientific and 
technical improvement a country and the world are certain to run out of 
resources. The trick is to channel development into more advanced sci-
ence, technology and culture and not into ‗mindless consumerism‘. 
Many empirical facts speak in favour of List‘s optimism. Many kinds 
of pollution have decreased, new resources are constantly developed, 
and new technologies increase output of known resources such as in 
agricultural biotechnology – using combinations of e.g. bio-chemistry, 
bacteriology, genetics, stem cell technology, and nanotechnology. Re-
searchers speak of coming ―green revolutions‖ in food production. And 
interestingly, newly developed- and developing countries like Taiwan, 
South Korea and Brazil are at the forefront of this research,  
 
… Some of the most successful food producers over the past 20 years have 
been the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China). … 
The BRICs' influence on food markets will rise as Europe's declines.  (‗A 
prospect of plenty‘, The Economist, 2011) 
 
Also concerning the main input in farming, energy, new technologies 
are opening immense opportunities, such as nuclear Thorium,182 where 
developing nations like India and China are leading the research.  
The lacking development of Thorium power is but one illustration of a 
more general international problem with new technologies: What seems 
to be a major problem, is not lacking realistic technical possibilities, but 
rather a lack of co-ordinated efforts in policies of research- and econom-
ics, struggling against vested interests in the old technologies, like ura-




                                       
181 Cf. the quotation above, in the section Critic of Malthus‘ materialism; 
List, 1841a, pp. 128-129. 
182 Cf. e.g. the article in Forbes, ‗Is Thorium the Biggest Energy Breakthrough 
Since Fire? – Possibly‘ (Pentland, 2011) and BBC World‘s ‗Cleaner Energy‘, on 
Horizons - a weekly program on innovative technology (BBC World, 2012), this 
time discussing solar- and Thorium power only. 
 183 Cf. e.g.  Forbes‘ article, ‗The Thing About Thorium: Why The Better Nu-
clear Fuel May Not Get A Chance‘ (Katusa, 2012); and the article, High Speed 
Rail is Old-Fashioned, promoting automated transport (Daastøl, 2007). 
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3.47 Science, technology, – and politics, define resources  
 
Although Malthus‘ theories have been refuted empirically, they resur-
face in ways that are easily discovered. The UNESCO researcher Henry 
Teune comments the 1972 Club of Rome report by stating that it re-
peated the empirically void theories of Malthus,  and argues that ―Tech-
nology ... always defines resources‖, 
 
The conclusion was Malthus again, whose ideas about growth limiting 
growth -a clear dialectical principle- had been for so long devoid of empiri-
cal confirmation. ...  
The main question addressed by these models of growth is as much 
feared by modern political leaders as the one about life after death by theo-
logians. Can the economic growth of the past two centuries be continued 
indefinitely? There are two major unknowns in "theories" of economic 
growth: What will be the new technology and what will people do? ...  
All growth is potentially destabilising ... Any compound growth in a niche 
will eventually destabilize it. And that is the insight of Malthus and others 
... but it is not a general one because relationships within nearly all social 
systems change. ... If one interpretation of the "law" of entropy is accepted, 
that is, it is merely a function of time, all systems will disintegrate or wear 
down and eventually collapse ... then there must be some kind of growth in 
the strength of structures to compensate for this tendency. With no growth 
all systems will eventually disappear. ... Thus for social systems there must 
be qualitative structural growth, or a necessary for survival, continuous "in-
tegrative" function. ... All systems are subject to entropy, ... Growth is one 
way of compensating for entropy. ... The most obvious entropy-decay func-
tion is the physical ecology of modern societies. The infrastructure needs to 
be rebuilt on a continuing basis just to stay even, ... All growth, whether bi-
ological or social requires know-how: ... A characteristic of human societies 
is that they can innovate. ... Technological advances also change the nature 
of resources. Technology ... always defines resources. (Teune, 1988, pp. 64-
78) 
 
To counter entropy a society needs so-called ―negentropy of the hu-
man mind‖ materialised in new and more efficient technology - both 
material and immaterial.  
Growth of the population and the living standard may be required if 
mankind is to survive: Let us shortly reflect upon some simple natural 
and socio-economic characteristics. If a society stagnates at one techno-
logical level, the resources, upon which this society is built, are bound 
to peter out and end this society. The obvious solution -if one holds that 
human survival is positively valued- is, as Teune pointed out, to make 
technology more able to define and utilise new resources through inno-
vation.  
Innovation, however, requires in this perspective four things, educa-
tion focused on innovation; increased living age; increased proportion of 
the population engaged in innovation, and investment: 
First, innovation must be advanced by a general education system 
geared at creating scientific discoveries. This first and most important 
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relation requires a general uprising in the rational culture of societies 
including morality and art. 
Secondly, the working force must in an increasingly degree be able to 
work at a higher age level since the technological complexity requires 
longer education. This requires that the quality of the living standard be 
raised.  
Thirdly, an increasing part of the population must be directly en-
gaged in innovation, as it gets increasingly complex. This requires that 
the population becomes more efficient which again requires a higher 
population density, eventually substituted by more efficient infrastruc-
ture.  
Fourthly, innovation also requires investment, which requires profit-
able investment opportunities - a complex requirement by itself. The 
alternative to growth therefore cannot be a zero-growth society, as this 
will collapse since resources will eventually run out. A zero-growth soci-
ety will not be willing or able to make the ever-increasing investments 
necessary to continue the needed innovation. On the other hand, the 
character of ‗growth‘ is an open issue. 
To summarise, a sustainable society requires investments and 
‗growth‘, continuous innovation and therefore qualitatively better infra-
structure, -higher living standards and -culture. And as Friedrich List 
so succinctly ended his major opus in 1841, ―… all that is required of the 
Governments … is – ENERGY.‖ (List, 1841a, p. 435), meaning that political 
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There is a moral foundation and a moral commitment to progress, spir-
itually and materially in List‘s writing and system. He considered indi-
vidual spiritual freedom to be both the ultimate good, and at the same 
time the great mover of economic progress. List emphasised education 
as the bedrock of an industrial society, and emphasised how an industri-
al nation was able to utilise science in an immensely higher degree than 
agricultural nation. 
List‘s concept of ‗mental capital‘ is even broader and deeper in that he 
includes many cultural and historical factors that the ‗human capital‘ 
tradition omits. List points to collective phenomena such as communica-
tion and the collaborating network of companies etc. – the confederation 
of labour, what later has been termed the National System of Innovation - 
and as List pointed out, it included both consumption- and production 
related activities. 
In Western academia, formal studies in the 1950s and 1960s showed 
that almost 90 % of growth per capita resulted from ‗rest‘ factors other 
than an increased capital to labour ratio, or capital accumulation. The 
‗rest‘ factors, often known as the Solow residual, was denominated as 
‗technical progress‘.  The search for the source and content of ‗technical 
improvement‘ gradually led to the broadly accepted view that human cap-
ital is responsible for most of the ‗technical improvement.  
List argues that ‗mental capital‘ also had ‗collective‘ and historical di-
mensions – ‗materialised‘ in the formal and informal behaviour and -
institutions that together constitute a nation‘s culture. This was also ar-
gued by the Conservative- and Romantic traditions, as well as by the con-
temporary Historical School of Jurisprudence and by the later Ethical-
Historical School of Economics, who sometimes termed themselves ‗Real-
ists‘. 
According to List, the primary role of transport was immaterial and to 
spread information and culture, and thereby contribute to innovation and 
elevate civilisation. List argues that only an industrial nation was able to 
release the huge potential of agriculture and natural resources. Industry 
also made possible the use of innovative new methods of communication, 
which allowed for larger markets and economy of scale in production.  
Furthermore, industry allowed a higher degree of urbanisation, both 
real and virtual (through better communication), which through a symbi-
osis increased innovation. This led to further differentiation of production 
and consumption that released more creativity, in a virtuous circle.  
Thereby, industry was the centre of a new type of economic system that 
increased the pace of production tremendously. 
Crucially, he claimed that there were also important cultural effects of 
industry, since it demanded disciplined, skilled and educated labour and 
therefore led to general elevation of popular knowledge. Improved com-
munications and larger markets led to equalisation of institutionalised 
standards across former boundaries, such as physical measurements like 
weight, distance, time, etc., but also in institutions like money, credit, law 




Development should be balanced between all sectors and thereby con-
tribute to multifaceted inspiration for innovation, consumption and pro-
duction.  
List argues for the State‘s duty to promote pivotal branches and insti-
tutions, such as the normally assumed tasks of administration, jurispru-
dence, security but also education, science, infrastructure and the ma-
chine tool industry. List suggested the use of many practical tools that 
had been used traditionally in the State Mercantilist and Cameralist tra-
ditions, such as temporary monopolies such as patents, preferential in-
terest rates, and State purchase of stocks in new establishments, thereby 
financing their start up. The tools were direct and administrative but in 
particular indirect through the legal apparatus, which had a particular 
role in removing obstacles to an efficient economy. 
 
 
4.02 Religion, science and education  
 
a) List on religion 
 
List often mentions the positive social- and economic effects of reli-
gion184 and morality.185 Being a German, the religion he had in mind 
obviously was the Christian religion. List repeatedly mentions how ―en-
lightened‖ and tolerant religion has contributed to general advance and 
progress, regarding numerous nations and in particular Switzerland 
(Cf. List, 1837a, p. 106), England (Cf. List, 1837a, p. 136; List, 1841a, 
p. 49, 56) and the USA, 
 
The Christian religion, … are rich sources of productive power. (List, 1841a, 
p. 49) 
 
Simultaneously, List is very explicit on the need for toleration and re-
ligious freedom.186  
 
The spirit of enterprise, industry, and commerce can only strike root in the 
soil of religious and political liberty; gold and silver will only abide where 
industry knows how to attract and employ them. (List, 1841a, p. 59) 
 
He argues that despotism, whether religious or political, is no asset 
economically speaking, and will prevent industrialisation,  
 
With the best intentions in the world one may try to introduce industry and 
attract - and keep - bullion but all the efforts in this direction will be of no 
                                       
184 See e.g. List, 1837a, p. 44; and List, 1841a, p. 49, 56, 81, 137, 139, 143, 
159, 175,   . 
185 See e.g. List, 1837a, p. 44; and List, 1841a, pp.  137, 143, 159, 175, and 
259-260. 
186 See e.g. List, 1837a, p. 106, 136, 164; and List, 1841a, p. 11, 59, 139, 
159, 208, 322, 414, 416. 
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avail and will have no permanent success in a country oppressed by politi-
cal and religious despotism. (List, 1837a, p. 164) 
 
List argues that religious fanaticism and bigotry was a disaster for 
e.g. Spain and France who by their governments‘ intolerance therefore 
lost many of their most talented citizens to forced emigration. In addi-
tion, since the refugees immigrated into competitive nations, mainly the 
Netherlands and England, Spain and France lost doubly so in the in-
ternational power race. In the case of Spain, List mentions the expul-
sion of Jews and Arabs, and the lack of a Reformation, 
 
The expulsion of the jews and the arabs cost Spain many useful citizens 
and a great deal of capital. (List, 1837a, p. 164) 
 
… if, in a word, Spain had politically developed herself in consequence of a 
Reformation, as England did … (List, 1841a, p. 322) 
 
In the case of France, List mentions the expulsion of Protestants 
 
The religious persecutions began in Colbert‘s lifetime. They put an end to 
any hope of attracting foreign capital and skilled artisans to France. They put 
an end to any confidence in the permanence of Colbert‘s reforms. (List, 
1837a, p. 136) 
 
In the case of Austria, List mentions the expulsion of Protestants,  
 
Austria had formerly suffered enormously from the banishment of the 
Protestants, her most industrious citizens; … (List, 1841a, p.82) 
 
A more specific argument regarding the reasons for the positive eco-
nomic effects of religion and morality is lacking with List. His most ex-
plicit arguments are not well founded, 
 
There is no better proof for the Divine origin of the Christian religion than 
that its doctrines and promises are in perfect agreement with the demands 
of both the material and spiritual well-being of the human race. (List, 




To be convinced of this, we need only compare the condition of the 
European states with that of the Asiatic ones. (List, 1841a, p. 139) 
 
The truth of this was seemingly seen as self-evident and an argument 
for this was seemingly seen as superfluous. His whole argument may 
therefore be understood as somewhat doctrinaire but also as implicit; 
that morality and religion contributes to diligence, perfection, and hon-
esty: Respect for quality work (work ethic), -its fruits (property), and -
business contracts.  
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Nor did List, explain why e.g. Protestantism was more beneficial eco-
nomically speaking. In any case, these themes were elaborated upon by 
Max Weber in particular (Cf. Weber, 1920). 
 
b) Religion and education: The Reformation 
 
… England alone has been able, over the centuries, to use to her own ad-
vantage nearly all the fruits of the Reformation, … (List, 1837a, p. 136) 
 
During the Renaissance, the view gained force that promotion of gen-
eral education is essential; adding force to the argument that an in-
creased population adds to national wealth. The religious Reformation 
and the increasing influence of Protestantism that took place during the 
Renaissance from the sixteenth century dramatically increased the lit-
eracy of the population.187 R. A. Houston supports this view in his Lit-
eracy in Early Modern Europe: Culture and Education, 1500-1800, 
 
One of the great themes which runs through historical writing on educa-
tion is that Protestantism and schooling are connected. Luther, Calvin and 
the other revolutionaries who broke the mould of medieval Christendom af-
ter 1517 shared the belief that the Bible was the sole source of truth and 
that each individual Christian should have access to the Word of God 
through the Scriptures. Luther changed his views on education during the 
1520s.  … However, for many reformers the way to a godly life and indeed 
salvation itself was by reading. Protestant communities would therefore be 
more likely to wish to educate their children than traditional Catholic ones, 
and would create schools to do so. A correlation would therefore exist be-
tween the confessional leanings of a region, country or community and the 
availability of schooling.  
There is a considerable measure of truth in this argument. The advent of 
the Reformed faith had a direct (if delayed) impact on the expansion of edu-
cation in Protestant countries such as Scotland and Sweden; the influence 
of the Pietists coupled with state action catapulted Prussian society into 
mass literacy during the eighteenth century; and in regions where Catholics 
and Protestants were in competition for the hearts and minds of the people, 
the dynamism of Protestant educational provision enervated Catholic 
schooling. (Houston, 1988, p. 35) 
 
By increasing literacy, education and freedom of thought, Protestant-
ism may thus be said to have ―dramatically‖ contributed to democratise 
society in the longer term.188 Increased literacy, education and freedom 
of thought, naturally also contributed to scientific progress.189 
                                       
187 Not forgetting, of course, the technical advances that facilitated this; Gu-
tenberg‘s ‗Chinese‘ printing press. For more discussions regarding the role of 
Protestantism, see also the section, Perfecting the State, in chapter 5. 
188 The Russian Atheist and Anarchist Mikhail Aleksandrovich Bakunin 
thus argues that Protestantism liberated large parts of Europe but not France, 
―It is a thousand times right to say that Protestantism, not as a Calvinist the-
ology but as an energetic and armed protest, represented revolt, liberty, hu-




c) Religion and science: The Renaissance 
 
At the core of the ‗European Miracle‘ of progress in science, culture and 
economics is religious reform. This began with a philosophical and spir-
itual change of attitude during the late Medieval Age and early Renais-
sance. It was a re-orientation from rather doctrinaire Aristotelian Scho-
lasticism, towards an empirically oriented Aristotelianism, and even 
more so towards an empirically oriented and pantheistic Neo-
Platonism.190 More specifically, what took place was a reform of religion 
in a liberating direction, enabling a questioning of old doctrines and 
promoting empirical explorations of the real world, e.g. by telescope, 
microscope and ship. The Reformation was only one side of this funda-
mental and revolutionary movement.191  
 
 
4.03 Science as elevator of civilisation  
 
Friedrich List explains how industry and science mutually promote 
each other and how they give opportunities for social and spiritual ele-
vation for the working population, and with a fair material reward, 
which did not exist in the agrarian society, 
 
                                                                                                                
thority, divine law, the mutual salvation of the Church and the State, the con-
demnation of human society to protracted slavery.  …  the victory of Catholi-
cism in France in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was a great misfor-
tune for the entire human race. …  Once a people loses the inclination for lib-
erty, it necessarily becomes, not only in its external conditions but in the very 
essence of its own being, a people of slaves. It was because Protestantism was 
defeated in France that the French people lost, or perhaps never acquired, the 
habit of liberty. It is because this habit is wanting …  that all the revolutions it 
has made up till now have failed to achieve its political liberty‖ (Bakunin,  
1872, p. 313)     
189 Mikhail Bakunin in his God and the State, thus expresses a true 
Protestant sentiment when he argues, ―If I bow before the authority of the spe-
cialists … I bow before the authority of special men because it is imposed on me 
by my own reason.‖ (Bakunin, 1871, p. 229)  
The difference to Protestantism is of course that Bakunin rejected the Bible 
as an authority, and thus was a more consistent ―Protestant‖. 
190 Interestingly, the differences between doctrinaire Scholasticism and Re-
naissance empiricism is paralleled around the time of the Methodenstreit in 
economics, the opposition between the rationalist English Classical School and 
the empiricist Historical School (in an Idealistic fashion, as during the Renais-
sance).  
191 Reinert and Daastol elaborate along these lines in their artcle Exploring 
the Genesis of Economic Innovations: The religious gestalt-switch and the duty to 




The greater the advance in scientific knowledge, the more numerous will 
be the new inventions which save labour and raw materials and lead to the 
discovery of new products and processes. As those engaged in industry be-
come more familiar with the advances made in scientific knowledge the 
more quickly - and the more successfully - will new discoveries and inven-
tions be applied to industry in a practical way. (List, 1837a, p. 67)192 
 
In addition to literary studies, List advices rule of law, travel and free 
and direct communication especially with those of other trades, and 
thereby gives us a reason why the closeness in towns is productive, 
 
Anyone engaged in industrial pursuits should appreciate that success 
will depend upon his knowledge of science and upon the new discoveries 
that are the result of scientific progress. If he does not already possess cer-
tain qualities he should develop the art of independent thought and the 
ability to make decisions. A man acquires intellectual qualities and imagi-
nation not only from schoolmasters and books but by travelling and by as-
sociating with those who have ambitions similar to his own. He should be 
in touch not only with men who are in the same line of business as himself 
but he should also associate with those engaged in various other aspects of 
the world of business and also with men who devote their talents to public 
affairs. A man with this sort of training and experience will soon realise that 
if he is to succeed in business and gain a fair reward for his work he will 
need as firm guarantees as possible for his personal safety and for the se-
curity of his property. His experiences of life - and an appreciation of the 
nature of his own interests - should lead him to support the abolition of an-
ything that restricts his freedom and the prosperity of his enterprises. He 
should support the establishment of national institutions that will ensure 
his freedom and increase his prosperity. (List, 1837a, pp. 67-68, see also p. 
64, 69, and 79) 
 
List argues that industry gives greater opportunities for scientific 
progress. He praises the cultural effects of industrialisation, as opposed 
to effects from agriculture, and how industrialisation promotes freedom, 
enterprise, innovation, and more efficient use of resources, 
 
… the productive powers of industry awaken in industry and agriculture 
the spirit of enterprise and innovation. 
... industry  … stimulates the improvement of communications, … 
 
Agriculture gives little scope for the abilities of skilled and useful, work-
ers. Factories, on the other hand, do give them the opportunity to use their 
skill so that their productive powers are multiplied by 10 or even by 100. 
Consequently an industrialised society will gain immeasurably more from 
new inventions and from scientific progress than is possible for an agrarian 
society. (List, 1837a, p. 68)193 
 
                                       
192 This quotation is also used elsewhere in this chapter, under Efficiency 
and value of resources … 




Today, we may argue that agriculture has changed a lot and that it 
often embodies so much knowledge and combined skills that it often 
may offer the individual a more varied life if not as specialised as the 
industry based life might do. However, even in his days, List argues for 
the introduction of science in agriculture, as for instance in breeding. 
List claims that a manufacturing industry is the precondition for a 
modernisation of agriculture and that science and arts will blossom in a 
manufacturing state,  
 
Manufactures are at once the offspring, and at the same time the sup-
porters and the nurses, of science and the arts. We may observe how little 
the condition of raw agriculture puts sciences and arts into requisition, how 
little of either is necessary to prepare the rude implements which it em-
ploys. It is true that agriculture at first had, by yielding rents of land, made 
it possible for men to devote themselves to science and art; but without 
manufactures they have always remained private treasures, and have only 
extended their beneficial effects in a very slight degree to the masses. In the 
manufacturing State the industry of the masses is enlightened by science, 
and the sciences and arts are supported by the industry of the masses. 
There scarcely exists a manufacturing business which has not relations to 
physics, mechanics, chemistry, mathematics, or to the art of design, etc. No 
progress, no new discoveries and inventions, can be made in these sciences 
by which a hundred industries and processes could not be improved or al-
tered. In the manufacturing State, therefore, sciences and arts must neces-
sarily become popular. (List, 1841a, ch. 17, p. 200) 
 
Science and industry has produced machinery, which tenfold out-
weighs the use of slavery, and the manufacturing nation has a 
hundredfold more opportunities of applying machinery than the agri-
cultural nation, 
  
The sciences and industry in combination have produced that great ma-
terial power which in the new state of society has replaced with tenfold 
benefits the slave labour of ancient times, and which is destined to exercise 
on the condition of the masses, on the civilisation of barbarous countries, 
on the peopling of uninhabited lands, and on the power of the nations of 
primitive culture, such an immeasurable influence-namely, the power of 
machinery.  
A manufacturing nation has a hundred times more opportunities of ap-
plying the power of machinery than an agricultural nation. A cripple can 
accomplish by directing a steam engine a hundred times more than the 
strongest man can with his mere hand. (List, 1841a, ch. 17, p. 200) 
 
List often uses England as a model, also regarding science and the arts, 
 
It is true that for this increase in her power, and in her productive capac-
ity, England is not indebted solely to her commercial restrictions, her Navi-
gation Laws, or her commercial treaties, but in a large measure also to her 




List regarded education and research, as crucial parts of the produc-
tive forces. List writes that historically, the huge sacrifices of ―exchange 
value‖ to improve knowledge ―have ultimately been rewarded by an im-
mense increase in their prosperity and productive power‖, 
 
The owner of a large estate will sacrifice significant "exchange value" if he 
decides that his son should not work on his farms to increase their output 
but should travel abroad to study new farming methods and to bring home 
new plants, seeds and improved livestock. Here the immediate loss is bal-
anced by an improvement in the productive power achieved by later genera-
tions rather than by the landowner himself. 
While Watt and Arkwright were inventing new machines and improving 
them there was a loss of "exchange value" but eventually these pioneers 
enormously increased the productive power not only of England but of the 
whole world. Most inventors and those who advance technical knowledge 
sacrifice their savings but the national economy is immensely strengthened. 
Countries, such as the United States of America, have suffered huge eco-
nomic losses to achieve political independence but their sacrifices have ul-
timately been rewarded by an immense increase in their prosperity and 
productive power. (List, 1837a, p. 35) 
 
In the National System List delivers a hard blow against technology 
pessimists like Malthus, claiming that their narrow-mindedness neglect 
the possibilities in inventions, promote egotism, and a destruction of 
wealth and civilisation,  
 
It is not true that population increases in a larger proportion than pro-
duction of the means of subsistence … It is mere narrow-mindedness to 
consider the present extent of the productive forces as the test of how many 
persons could be supported on a given area of land. … Who will venture to 
set further limits to the discoveries, inventions, and improvements of the 
human race? … ? If Malthus' doctrine appears to us in its tendency narrow-
minded, it is also in the methods by which it could act an unnatural one, 
which destroys morality and power, and is simply horrible. (List, 1841a, pp. 
128-129)194 
 
History has proven List right on his technology optimism and we may 
only mention a few achievements such as agricultural genetics, biotech, 
the Green Revolution, with examples like the miraculous transfor-
mation of the vast savannah-like Cerrado steps in Brazil into a food 
producing giant. (Cf. e.g. ―The miracle of the cerrado‖, The Economist, 
2010 and The Economist, 2010) 
From the above, it is clear that List was a fond believer in the possi-
bilities of science. If we now combine this with what List said about the 
interconnectedness of all trades and occupations in a national confed-
eration of Labour, then we have the core of a theory of national innova-
                                       




tion systems as Chris Freeman et al pointed out (Freeman, 1982-2003, 
and 1987).  
List's fascination with railways, internet (the telegraph), steam loco-
motives, and then electromagnetic propulsion was not alone due to the 
importance of communications and their market forging capabilities.  
An equally important factor was the innovative aspect - that this rep-
resented a revolutionary new technology that would promote economic 
efficiency throughout the economy, as with the machine tool industry, 
and in fact also decades of accomplishments by NASA (Cf. The Railroad 




4.04 Education and power  
 
After the end of the Thirty Years War in 1648, and the establishment of 
the Western European competitive state system, the national elites 
gradually became aware that an educated population had significant 
advantages, technologically, economically and militarily. Prussia was to 
lead the way in the eighteenth Century. John C Caldwell writes,  
 
In Prussia, Frederick the Great instituted compulsory schooling in 1763. 
While the schooling was not good, it had sufficient impact to stir the rest of 
Europe, especially after the Franco-Prussian War and was a much-quoted 
precedent in the struggle for universal schooling (Caldwell, 1980, p. 233). 
 
Thereafter, compulsory education became a raison d‘état for nations 
that aspired to a place in the Sun. The following is a profound explana-
tion of why education is important, written in the spirit of Friedrich 
List, by Professor Louis Wolowski, in his introductory Preliminary Essay 
to the American translation of Wilhelm Roscher‘s Principles of Political 
Economy (Roscher, 1878). Wolowski translated Roscher‘s work to 
French in 1856, 
 
Man is an intelligent being, …  Man was created in the image of God, … 
Labor is nothing but the action of spirit on itself and on matter.195 … 
Wealth, then, is treated only as one of the forces of civilization. Other in-
terests than purely material ones occupy the first place. …  the most fruit-
ful source of material development lies in intellectual development. … From 
the moment that it is the mind which -produces and which governs the 
world, intellectual and moral perfection become the cause and effect of ma-
terial progress. … 
The increase of production, then, appears an instrument of elevation in 
the moral order.196 It is energy of soul, intelligence and manly virtue which 
constitute the chief source of the wealth of nations; … 
Labor is the child of thought. … 
                                       
195 2 M. Cousin has brought this out in an admirable manner in his lectures 
on Adam Smith. Cours de Philosophie Moderne. (Wolowski‘s note) 
196 1 Channing. (Wolowski‘s note) 
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Production is, therefore, not a material, but a spiritual, work. How, then, 
can acts and their morality be separated? How not understand that the 
market of labor has its own distinct laws, and that education, even from a 
material stand-point, becomes the highest interest and the most important 
duty of society, since on it depends the efficiency of labor? (Wolowski, 1877) 
 
 
4.05 Education as immaterial bedrock of economics 
 
In his emphasis on education and liberty, List had many German pre-
decessors, such as Johann Gottlieb Fichte. Although Fichte may be one 
of the most individualistic philosophers, he nevertheless regards Man‘s 
true destiny as an unselfish political being. The reason why this seem-
ing contradiction was no contradiction to Fichte was his idealistic point 
of departure, individualism develops in the spiritual creative process, 
not in material consumption. This is an idea that later was developed 
by Rudolf Steiner,197 who also practiced as a teacher for working class 
youth and developed a theory of education. In The Problem of Education 
in Fichte's Philosophy, Zoran Dimić explains the core role of education 
within Fichte‘s social framework, as a result of Fichte‘s ‗Image of Man‘ 
as a being social and political. Therefore, Fichte insisted that scholars 
had a public duty, as in his The Vocation of Man (Cf. Fichte, 1799). 
Dimić writes, 
 
Fichte's comprehension of Education depends directly upon the way he 
understands philosophy and philosophising. The Primacy of Practical Rea-
son is quite noticeable in his philosophy. First of all, Fichte is an orator, a 
teacher, a rhetorician and an educator. The idea of Man stands at the foun-
dations of his entire philosophy and philosophising. The precise definition 
of Man enables a clear and fundamental definition of Education. According 
to Fichte, Man is a community being. If he strives to be Man, he must not 
be selfish and egoistic. The role of Scholar and Educator is of particular im-
portance in this. The essence of each individual indeed lies outside himself, 
yet not in some kind of abstract metaphysics of ethics. It lies in other peo-
ple and in the general spirit of the community to which Man is directed if he 
wants to fulfil himself as a being. Man's destiny is not metaphysics but poli-
tics. (Dimic, 2003, p. 777) 
 
List honours liberty and universal education for the success of the 
Swiss, 
 
Civil and religious liberty and universal education have evoked in the 
Swiss, activity and a spirit of enterprise … (List, 1841a, p. 321) 
 
List argues that the necessity of education induces devotion for in-
struction and writing, and competition in such activities; thereby per-
fecting science, arts, industries, and agriculture, 
                                       
197 For a thorough discussion of this issue see Hjalmar Hegge‘s published 




The necessity for education and instruction, through writings and lec-
tures by a number of persons who have to bring into practice the results of 
scientific investigations, induces men of special talents to devote themselves 
to instruction and authorship. The competition of such talents, owing to the 
large demand for their efforts, creates both a division and co-operation of 
scientific activity, which has a most beneficial influence not merely on the 
further progress of science itself, but also on the further perfection of the 
arts and of industries. (List, 1841a, ch. 17, p. 200)198 
 
John Heskett argues that List found the deeper causes for long term 
economic success to lie in ‗capital of mind‘, and that skill and compe-
tence was the precondition also for a better society, specifically includ-
ing the instructors, 
 
… In addition to the arguments for temporarily protecting domestic indus-
try, he also began to consider how more long-term objectives could be pro-
moted. He emphasised that it was necessary to understand the ‗deeper ly-
ing causes‘ that explained how a nation produces economic wealth, in par-
ticular the concept of ‗productive powers‘, which were essentially constitut-
ed by ‗the intellectual and social conditions of individuals, which I call capi-
tal of mind‘. 5199 
This prefigured the recent emphasis on human or intellectual capital as 
the constant factor in explaining innovative competitiveness, rather than 
the division of labour, which List believed led to divisiveness and a debase-
ment of work. Instead, he advocated skill and competence as the founda-
tion not just of lasting economic achievement, but of a better society. The 
mental capital of a nation, he also stressed, is generated not only by those 
who create value in exchange, but also ‗the instructors of youths and of 
adults, virtuosos, musicians, physicians, judges, and administrators‘. 6 200  
(Heskett, 2010, p. 5) 
 
It is evident throughout List works that he considers that education 
has a very considerable- and fundamental role to play in the develop-
ment of a nation.  
In his Philadelphia speech in 1827, List praises French intellect and 
the French system of education, and the establishment of a higher 
technical school, a policy that later was to be emulated by Germany 
and many other nations, 
 
France erected in the time of her revolution, a  n a t i o n a l  p o l y t e c 
h  s c h o o l, by which a number of individuals, and according to Mr. 
                                       
198 The first part of this quotation has also been used in then section on edu-
cation. 
199 [4] List, F., Ingersoll, C. J., Liebig, M. & Larouche, L. H. (1996), Outlines 
of American Political Economy in Twelve Letters to Charles J. Ingersoll, Bottiger, 
Wiesbaden, p. 63 (Heskett‘s note) 
200 [5] List, F. (1966), The National System of Political Economy, Augustus M. 
Kelley, New York, p. 140 (Heskett‘s note) 
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Dupin, not less that  f o u r   t h o u s a n d  public officers, acquired the 
necessary knowledge, and ardent sprit of promoting internal industry.  
... so France may improve her political institutions by imitating ours, so 
we may advance our public prosperity, by taking her economical insti-
tutions for a model. The great example of France respecting her national 
polytechnic school, has long ago been imitated by all European govern-
ments, … 
If a national literary institute may be an ornament of a nation, highly ad-
vanced in literature, arts and sciences, a national polytechnic institute is 
an urgent necessity of the present stage of our social condition. (List, 
1827d) 
 
John Heskett argues that French success in luxury goods was the 
result of a deliberate policy to promote and educate quality labour,  
 
The promotion of quality work to strengthen French competitive power, a 
vital element of Colbert‘s policy during the reign of Louis XIV, was without 
doubt extremely successful in laying long-term foundations for success.  … 
The role of France as a leader of taste in Europe was not an accident, and 
had nothing to do with any innate quality of taste in French culture. In-
stead, it was the outcome of long-term consistency in political policies, and 
support for design practice and education in quality manufacturing. 
(Heskett, 2010, p. 5) 
 
In his 1837 treatise, List calls for education, for the good of develop-
ing individual abilities and supplying industry with skilled people. He 
therefore argues for more books and teachers, in particular within 
mathematics and the natural sciences, 
 
INDUSTRY is the mother and father of science, literature, the arts, en-
lightenment, freedom, useful institutions, and national power and inde-
pendence.  
Anyone who wishes to devote himself to industrial activity – to the pro-
duction of manufactured goods - should learn and understand something of 
mathematics and the natural sciences. Schoolmasters and books are need-
ed to enable those engaged in industrial pursuits to make progress in these 
subjects. They are needed to give young people possessing the appropriate 
natural ability and previous education the opportunity to specialise in 
mathematics and the natural sciences. (List, 1837a, pp. 66-67) 
 
And in 1841, in his Natural System, List advices public fostering of 
country-wide technical education and competition between the schools, 
 
The government should foster the extension of technical education to the 
best of its ability. Technical and agricultural schools and colleges should be 
established not only in the capital of a country but throughout the provinc-
es. The cost of building these schools should be defrayed by the provincial 
authorities. They should be run under the supervision of provincial cham-
bers of commerce and agriculture and competition between them should be 
encouraged. The Ministry of Education should exercise only a general over-




List advices education, as a prerequisite for acquiring skill, and are to 
be considered as investment into the future, 
 
All expenditure in the instruction of youth, the promotion of justice, de-
fence of nations, &c. is a consumption of present values for the behoof of 
the productive powers. The greatest portion of the consumption of a nation 
is used for the education of the future generation, for promotion and nour-
ishment of the future national productive powers. (List, 1841a, p. 139) 
 
List argues that England excelled because their government promot-
ed education, 
 
Before the time of Edward III, the English were the greatest bullies and 
good-for-nothing characters in Europe; certainly it never occurred to them 
to compare themselves with the Italians and Belgians or with the Germans 
in respect to mechanical talent or industrial skill; but since then, their Gov-
ernment has taken their education in hand, and thus they have by degrees 
made such progress that they can dispute the palm of industrial skill with 
their instructors. (List, 1841a, pp. 386–387) 
 
List describes how England invited skilled workers from abroad, let 
them educate England‘s workers, and carefully nurtured the new skill, 
 
The island kingdom borrowed from every country of the Continent its 
skill in special branches of industry, and planted them on English soil, un-
der the protection of her customs system. Venice had to yield (amongst oth-
er trades in articles of luxury) the art of glass manufacture, while Persia 
had to give up the art of carpet weaving and dyeing. 
Once possessed of any one branch of industry, England bestowed upon it 
sedulous care and attention, for centuries treating it as a young tree which 
requires support and care. (List, 1841a, p. 39) 
 
The crucial point in order to understand List's trade policies is that 
the mental foundations of economics make learning necessary and pos-
sible. However, knowledge is a fragile commodity. This necessitates sta-
bility-, security- and protection of production.  
List explains how a nation‘s productive power, its immaterial and 
material force, is the result of a union of generations -of continuous 
work for generations,  
 
One can see at a glance that, as in all human institutions so also in in-
dustry, a law of nature lies at the root of important achievements which has 
much in common with the natural law of the division of labour and of the 
confederation of the productive forces, whose principle, namely, consists in 
the circumstance that several generations following one another have 
equally united their forces towards the attainment of one and the same ob-
ject, and have participated in like manner in the exertions needed to attain 




A nation‘s productive power is possible only due to the education of 
younger generations by the older generations, through religious institu-
tions, professional caste systems and guilds, and later by schools and 
books. List often refers to this collective learning process as ―the indus-
trial education of the nation‖ (Cf. List, 1841b, Introduction, in Hirst, 
1909, p. 315). 
The necessity of education induces devotion for and a competition in 
such activity, thereby perfecting science, arts, industries, and agricul-
ture, 
 
The necessity for education and instruction,   through writings and lec-
tures by a number of persons who have to bring into practice the results of 
scientific investigations, induces men of special talents to devote themselves 
to instruction and authorship. The competition of such talents, owing to the 
large demand for their efforts, creates both a division and co-operation of 
scientific activity, which has a most beneficial influence not merely on the 
further progress of science itself, but also on the further perfection of the 
arts and of industries. The effects of these improvements are soon after-
wards extended even to agriculture. Nowhere can more perfect agricultural 
machines and implements be found, nowhere is agriculture carried on with 
so much intelligence, as in countries where industry flourishes. Under the 
influence of manufactures, agriculture itself is raised to a skilled industry, 
an art, a science. (List, 1841a, ch. 17, p. 200)201 
 
List claims that educators, artists, physicians, judges, and administrators ―are productive 
in a much higher degree‖ indirectly than those who are producing directly, despite the 
fact their products often cannot be sold for money, 
 
The errors and contradictions of the prevailing school to which we have 
drawn attention, can be easily corrected from the standpoint of the theory of 
the productive powers. Certainly those who fatten pigs or prepare pills are 
productive, but the instructors of youths and of adults, virtuosos, musi-
cians, physicians, judges, and administrators, are productive in a much 
higher degree. The former produce values of exchange, and the latter pro-
ductive powers, some by enabling the future generation to become produc-
ers, others by furthering the morality and religious character of the present 
generation, a third by ennobling and raising the powers of the human wind, 
a fourth by preserving the productive powers of his patients, a fifth by ren-
dering human rights and justice secure, a sixth by constituting and pro-
tecting public security, a seventh by his art and by the enjoyment which it 
occasions fitting men the better to produce values of exchange. (List, 1841a, 
pp. 143-144) 
 
The following is a modern confirmation from practical business life, of 
the importance of education. In the summary of Stefan Bergheim‘s 
2005 report for Deutsche Bank Research, Human capital is the key to 
growth, Success Stories and Policies for 2020, he writes that,  
 
                                       




• Our empirical investigation supports the view that human capital is the 
most important factor of production in today‘s economies. Increases in hu-
man capital are crucial to achieving increases in GDP. The best available 
proxy for human capital is the average years of education of the population 
aged 25 to 64. (Bergheim, 2005) 
 
 
4.06 High productivity has many sources  
 
In List‘s general discussion of the causes of wealth, he asks why the 
English have ―hundreds‖ of times higher productivity than other na-
tions, 
 
It is true that for this increase in her power, and in her productive capac-
ity, England is not indebted solely to her commercial restrictions, her Navi-
gation Laws, or her commercial treaties, but in a large measure also to her 
conquests in science and in the arts. 
    But how comes it, that in these days one million of English operatives 
can perform the work of hundreds of millions? It comes from the great de-
mand for manufactured goods which by her wise and energetic policy she 
has known how to create in foreign lands, and especially in her colonies; 
from the wise and powerful protection extended to her home industries; 
from the great rewards which by means of her patent laws she has offered 
to every new discovery; and from the extraordinary facilities for her inland 
transport afforded by public roads, canals, and railways. (List, 1841a, pp. 
48-49) 
 
Only culturally mature nations like England are able to carry out im-
portant transport projects and have them repay their costs. List‘s de-
scription of England‘s rapid success reminds us of the more recent and 
rapid successes by South-Korea, Taiwan and China, 
 
England has shown the world how powerful is the effect of facilities of 
transport in increasing the powers of production, and thereby increasing 
the wealth, the population, and the political power of a nation. She has 
shown us what a free, industrious, and well-governed community can do in 
this respect within the brief space of half a century, even in the midst of 
foreign wars. That which the Italian republics had previously accomplished 
in these respects was mere child's play. It is estimated that as much as a 
hundred and eighteen millions sterling have been expended in England up-
on these mighty instruments of the nation's productive power. 
 England, however, only commenced and carried out these works when 
her manufacturing power began to grow strong. Since then, it has become 
evident to all observers that that nation only whose manufacturing power 
begins to develop itself upon an extensive scale is able to accomplish such 
works; that only in a nation which develops concurrently its internal manu-
facturing and agricultural resources will such costly engines of trade repay 
their cost; and that in such a nation only will they properly fulfil their pur-





4.07 The primary sources of productivity are immaterial  
 
To the question of why the English have ―hundreds‖ of times higher 
productivity than other nations, he replies by pointing first to her wise 
policy, -laws, and high morality,  
 
It must be admitted, too, that the enormous producing capacity and the 
great wealth of England are not the effect solely of national power and indi-
vidual love of gain. The people's innate love of liberty and of justice, the en-
ergy, the religious and moral character of the people, have a share in it. The 
constitution of the country, its institutions, the wisdom and power of the 
Government and of the aristocracy, have a share in it. The geographical po-
sition, the fortunes of the country, nay, even good luck, have a share in it. 
(List, 1841a, p. 49) 
 
List argues that workers in an advanced country have much greater 
output, but only if they are well educated and achieve good knowledge 
of science and technical skills. Nevertheless, many other conditions 
must be met regarding morality, security, legal system and the fostering 
and protection of science and arts. All contributing to harmonious bal-
ance between all branches of production, 
 
Nature supplements and increases men's productive powers and output 
by the power of water, wind, animals, and steam. But men can use these 
natural powers to establish advanced types of workshops and factories only 
after they have made the requisite intellectual progress. They must be en-
lightened and well educated and they should have a good knowledge of sci-
ence as well as high standards of technical skill. Consequently the workers 
in an advanced country have a much greater output than workers in a 
backward country. 
It follows that certain conditions must be fulfilled before men's produc-
tive powers, and their intellectual and physical labours, can be successfully 
applied to the production of material goods that have an exchange value. 
There must be good laws, effectively enforced. Persons and property must 
enjoy the maximum security. The people must have high moral and reli-
gious standards so that superstition, prejudice and vice can be rooted out. 
There must be a good system of education. Science and the arts must be 
zealously fostered. Workshops and factories must receive adequate protec-
tion. There should be a harmonious balance between all branches of pro-
duction. In general the whole national economy should be stimulated. The 
government should safeguard economic prosperity at home and should pro-
tect the country from foreign aggressors. Moreover the labours of those who 
promote the expansion of productive powers are just as productive as those 
who actually make goods that have an exchange value. (List, 1837a, p. 185) 
 
List denies that prosperity is directly related to the quantitative num-
ber of scholars – and indirectly points to the quality of scholars, 
 
Our opponents might argue that the principle we have advanced could be 
interpreted as meaning that economic prosperity is related to the number of 
lawyers, parsons, soldiers, teachers, and scholars who are working in a 
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country. It is easy to refute this sophism. Intellectual production and 
brainwork - like manual labour and the production of material goods - can-
not be measured by counting the numbers of individuals concerned. … 
(List, 1837a, p. 185) 
 
List also claimed that Christianity, and even some versions of it, is 
better suited for development,202  
 
Christianity, monogamy, and freedom are more likely to foster the devel-
opment of productive powers than Mohammedanism, polygamy, and servi-
tude or a very limited amount of freedom. And there are even significant dif-
ferences between the productive powers of the adherents of various Chris-
tian churches. (List, 1837a, p. 184) 
 
Kaevan Gazdar, in his Germany's Balanced Development: The Real 
Wealth of a Nation, points to the influence of List on later German econ-
omists such as Weber and Sombart, regarding the deeper cultural 
foundations of economic progress; ―emphasis on the foundations rather 
than the manifestations of wealth‖; ―emphasis on insights rather than 
merely on facts and figures‖. Moreover, we may we add, emphasis on 
inner and immaterial relations rather than external and material rela-
tions, in other words the contrast between epistemological nominalism 
versus –realism. Gazdar writes, 
 
Friedrich List, a publicist whose fame derives from his promotion of a 
customs union that preceded the unification of Germany in the nineteenth 
century, founded a school of thought that concentrated on the national 
specificity of wealth creation rather than on universal economic laws. List 
attacked the materialistic orientation of the classical school, criticizing Ad-
am Smith for his cosmopolitan individualism. "Those who breed pigs are, 
according to this doctrine, more productive than those who teach human 
beings," he mockingly commented. By contrast, he recognized that stable 
wealth depended on education, transport, and other elements of infrastruc-
ture, influencing German state policies in this direction.203 
List's emphasis on the foundations rather than the manifestations of 
wealth was deepened and refined by social scientists like Max Weber in the 
early twentieth century. Weber perceived the importance of cultural context 
and relativized the significance of economic laws. In his famous study The 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Weber demonstrated how re-
ligious traditions influenced the rise of capitalism in different western coun-
tries.204 
                                       
202 As e.g. Wilhelm Roscher, Max Weber. Werner Sombart and Richard Taw-
ney later elaborated upon (Roscher 1877, Weber 1929, Sombart 1911, Tawney 
1926) and Adam Müller etc. before List. 
203 4: Friedrich List, Das nationale System der politischen Ökonomie ( 
Stuttgart: Cotta, 1883), especially pp. 46-49, 136-141; for an Anglo-Saxon 
assessment of List, see James Fallows, "How the World Works," in Atlantic 
Monthly, December 1993, pp. 61ff. (Gazdar‘s note) 
204 5: Ludwig M. Lachmann, Drei Essays über Max Webers geistiges Ver-
mächtnis (Tübingen: Mohr, 1973), pp. 2-9, 16-21 (Gazdar‘s note) 
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Similarly, Weber's colleague Werner Sombart perceived in his master-
piece, Modern Capitalism, that the epoch of high capitalism had ended with 
the outbreak of the First World War. He recognized the normative nature of 
what he called "late capitalism": the dislodging of the profit motive as the 
prime term of reference, the replacement of pure competition through ele-
ments of cooperation, and the diminuation of employer-employee antago-
nism through a complex system of rules and regulations. 205 
Attentive readers of Sombart's works are privy to insights into the true 
nature of the German economy, insights still relevant to a deeper under-
standing of the country's wealth. This book aims at the same depth of un-
derstanding, the same emphasis on insights rather than merely on facts 
and figures. (Gazdar, 1998, p. 5) 
 
 
4.08 Immaterial forces as basis for entrepreneurship  
 
Although e.g. Malthus mentioned the role of distress and gloom as im-
portant economic drivers, many other immaterial factors have been ig-
nored; e.g. in standard economic textbooks. Many immaterial drivers 
are of a subjective and indeed of a positive nature, and highly essential 
for economic progress, e.g. optimism; lust for exploration; curiosity and 
playfulness, perfectionism and personal improvement; communal re-
sponsibility and morality; as well as popular engagement.  
These are all positive motivating factors and therefore closely related 
to willpower. In fact, it is not easy to say which is the premise for the 
other, but all are strongly needed in order to succeed. Therefore, these 
highly subjective but indeed also collective factors can be said to be 
part of the productive powers of a nation. These immaterial factors are 
commonly acknowledged as such in scientific endeavours, in explora-
tion in general, and in business management.   
The US based magazine Business Week devoted a whole issue to the 
theme of ‗Optimism‘ after the financial crisis in 2008, and James Gul-
liver Hancock began the feature article such,  
 
Most human resources managers base their motivational policies on a 
simple psychological premise: that optimistic, engaged employees are more 
productive and hence can help their employers grow and make more mon-
ey. Put simply, workplace optimism, if nurtured properly, can be a competi-
tive advantage. (Hancock, 2009) 
 
And indeed, after the financial crisis in 2008, the difference in the 
will to make bold initiatives in Asia and the West is startling, as indi-
cated in the headline of this article in The Economist: ―Asian optimism, 
European gloom‖ (Economist, 2008).  
List argues that the prime mover in economics is will power,  
 
                                       
205 6: Werner Sombart, Das Wirtschaftsleben im Zeitalter des Hochkapitalis-
mus, Book 1 ( Munich: Duncker & Humblot, 1927), pp. XIIff. (Gazdar‘s note) 
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If work produces wealth, what produces work? … We always find that 
there is some inner urge which sets the human body in motion. … (List, 
1837a, p. 184)206 
 
… all that is required of the Governments can be expressed in one word, 
and that is – ENERGY. (List, 1841a, p. 435)207 
 
Path breakers in history have later emphasized the relevance of will-
power needed to succeed. President Kennedy in 1962 pointed to the 
core of the problem, when arguing that one should choose the harder 
tasks in order to improve oneself. Donald Gibson, in his Battling Wall 
Street. The Kennedy Presidency, quotes President Kennedy as saying 
that, 
 
We choose to go to the moon. We choose to go to the moon in this dec-
ade, and do the other things, not because they are easy but because they 
are hard; because that goal will serve to organise and measure the best of 
our energies and skills; because that challenge is one that we are willing to 
accept, one that we are unwilling to postpone, and one which we intend to 
win - and the others too. (Gibson, 1994, p.150) 
 
Similarly, Colbert chose to use a ‗frog-leaping strategy‘ to lift the 
skills of France; by deliberately planning long-term, he promoted pro-
duction of luxury goods.208 - And French luxury goods sell extremely 
well even today, with Asia‘s new prospering classes, and even after the 
crisis of 2008,  
 
China's appetite for high-end Western branded goods is fast becoming insa-
tiable … China—relatively untouched and still optimistic—remains the 
most important market for luxury retailers. …  
But there‘s another China reality. About half of China's potential shoppers 
aren't really consumers in this sense at all….  The trickle down of wealth is 
still waiting to take place. (Chan (2011), China‘s Luxury Goods Boom) 
 
Such ‗frog-leaping‘ strategies; of deliberately choosing the harder 
tasks in  industrial development, are not limited to the space race or 
production of luxury goods, since the production of jet-planes and 
helicopters in Indonesia in the 1990s also was a conscious effort in this 
direction, as is the Taiwan Ministry of Economic Affairs‘ recent machine 
tool strategy of developing ‗model firms‘. MOEA's Industrial Develop-
ment Bureau (IDB) will,  
 
                                       
206 For an extended quotation see the section, Differentiate cause from effect: 
Mental powers, in chapter 3. 
207 This little quote has also been used elsewhere in the chapters and sec-
tions; (2) Realist and Idealist Methods; and (4) Capital of mind. 
208 Cf. Heskett, 2010, p. 5; see quotation in the section above; Education as 
immaterial bedrock of economics. 
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… help developing Taiwan as one of the world's top-three producing and 
export nation for the products, in 2015. …[and] develop Taiwan as an Asia-
Pacific R&D and design hub for key components for emerging industrial 
production equipment, … (Cf. Taiwan Economic News, 2007). 
 
 
4.09 Immaterial forces as basis for entrepreneurship  
 
Reading and making a summary of Dornbusch and Fischer‘s textbook 
Macroeconomics, I noticed that the basic argument was that culture, or 
more specifically human institutions, were often described as an obsta-
cle to growth - so to speak standing in the way of the well-oiled and effi-
cient economic machinery (Dornbusch and Fischer, 1978). But who, 
indeed, can imagine an economy as external to and independent of cul-
ture and institutions? 
In contrast, List explains wealth as a result of culture. In his Phila-
delphia speech in 1827, List explains how France established her 
wealth through her intellectual powers - and with the aid of institu-
tions, for example the establishment of a polytechnic school, 
 
It was not only the protecting system by which France was enabled to in-
crease so wonderfully her productive power. It was moral riches, which in-
creased her material riches, it was her  i n t e l le c t u a l power, which, 
with the aid of her protecting measures, raised her  i n s t r u m e n t a l  
powers.  
… industry and knowledge are the causes of individual wealth and public 
prosperity. (List, 1827d)209 
 
List‘s emphasis on cultural and intangible factors differed from the 
focus on material matters of English classical economists. The focus on 
material matters was later subsumed within a pecuniary or monetary 
framework that could be formalised – as opposed to the intangible fac-
tors. The focus on intangible matters also belonged to the Renaissance 
statecraft and its heir in the Cameralist science, and was very pro-
nounced with a forerunner of List, the German born Adam Müller. List 
wrote,  
 
Adam Smith regarded the physical labour which produces goods having 
exchange value as the sole source of goods and he failed to examine the ori-
gins that enable this work to be done. From this failure came his serious 
mistake of ignoring the intellectual resources that lie behind the creation of 
productive powers. (List, 1837a, 186) 
 
List writes that the Americans understood that civilisation and power 
is more important than material wealth, and that this translates into a 
need for industry, 
                                       
209 See the rest of the quote below, in the section; Education as immaterial 




At length the Americans came to realise the truth that it behoves a great 
nation not exclusively to set its heart upon the enjoyment of proximate ma-
terial advantages; that civilisation and power -- more important and desira-
ble possessions than mere material wealth, as Adam Smith himself allows -
- can only be secured and retained by the creation of a manufacturing pow-
er of its own … (List, 1841a, p. 102) 
 
On the other hand, List also emphasized the interdependence be-
tween mind and matter,  
 
It is not easy to say whether the material forces exert a greater influence 
over the moral forces, or whether the moral outweigh the material in their 
operation; whether the social forces act upon the individual forces the more 
powerfully, or whether the latter upon the former. This much is certain, 
however, namely, that between the two there subsists an interchanging se-
quence of action and reaction, with the result that the increase of one set of 
forces promotes the increase of the other, and that the enfeeblement of the 
one ever involves the enfeeblement of the other. (List, 1841a, p. 49) 
 
Nevertheless, List points to the crucial importance of mental work,  
 
The more the mental producers succeed … so much greater will be the 
production of material Wealth. On the other hand, the more goods that the 
material producers produce, the more will mental production be capable of 
being promoted. (List, 1841a, p. 159)210 
 
                                       
210 Here is an extended quotation: ―The whole social state of a nation will be 
chiefly determined by the principle of the variety and division of occupations 
and the cooperation of its productive powers. What the pin is in the pin manu-
factory, that the national well-being is to the large society which we term 'the 
nation.' The most important division of occupations in the nation is that be-
tween the mental and material ones. Both are mutually dependent on one an-
other. The more the mental producers succeed in promoting morality, religion, 
enlightenment, increase of knowledge, extension of liberty and of perfection of 
political institutions -- security of persons and property within the State, and 
the independence  and power of the nation externally -- so much greater will 
be the production of material Wealth. On the other hand, the more goods that 
the material producers produce, the more will mental production be capable of 
being promoted.  
The most important division of occupations, and the most important co-
operation of productive powers in material production, is that of agriculture 
and manufacture. Both depend mutually upon one another, as we have 
shown. 
As in the pin manufactory, so also in the nation does the productiveness of 
every individual -- of every separate branch of production -- and finally of the 
whole nation depend on the exertions of all individuals standing in proper re-
lation to one another. We call this relation the balance or the harmony of the 




List gives an example of how an invention may increase production 
tenfold by improving the capital of mind, and concludes that these so-
cial and intellectual conditions are more important than mere accumu-
lation of material capital, 
 
Suppose ten single woollen weavers in the country possess a thousand 
dollars capital each; …  each produces not more than a thousand dollars of 
cloth a year. Suppose now, they invent a spinning machine, … The same 
capital of matter …  produces now by the improved social and intellectual 
conditions, or by the acquired capital of mind, $100,000 worth of broad 
cloth. So can a nation with the same existing matter improve its productive 
power tenfold in improving its social and intellectual conditions.   (List, 
1827b, p. 63) 
 
 
4.10 Capital of mind  
 
Adam Smith, and thereby Jean-Baptiste Say, David Ricardo and Karl 
Marx, focused on matter and therefore on the manual side of labour. 
Thereby they came to diminish and even exclude the role of mind-
related factors, concerning wealth promotion.  
List, however, mocked those who do not distinguish between the po-
tential productivity of a Kepler and that of a donkey (Cf. List, 1841a, pp. 
142ff; cf. p. 159). List maintained that Adam Smith and Jean Baptiste 
Say overdid their focus on exchange (monetary) value.  
List claimed that they ignored the intellectual, moral and religious 
activity behind the only apparent productive forces and thence behind 
exchange value.  
The following quotation gives us a condensed expression of List‘s crit-
icism, where he says they the focus on gaining matter instead of the 
ability to produce, they generalise and materialise the concept of capital 
and overdo its importance. List writes,  
 
… Smith and Say …  
As these theorists confounded cosmopolitical principles with political 
principles, so they entirely misapprehend the object of political economy. 
The object is not to gain matter, in exchanging matter for matter, as it is in 
the individual and cosmopolitical economy, and particularly in the trade of 
a merchant. But it is to gain productive and political power by means of ex-
change with other nations; or to prevent the depression of productive and 
political power, by restricting that exchange. They treat, therefore, princi-
pally of the effects of exchange of matter, instead of treating of productive 
power.  And as they made not the productive power, and the causes of its 
rise and fall in a nation, the principal object of their inquiry, they neither 
appreciated the true effect of the different component parts of productive 
power, nor the true effect of the exchange of matter, nor of the consumption 
of it. They called the existing stock of matter, produced by human industry, 
by the general name of capital, and ascribed to the different component 
parts of this stock not only a common and equal, but an omnipotent effect. 




List continues by arguing against Smith and Say‘s claim that growth 
is limited foremost by the amount of material capital. Instead, he claims 
that capital of nature and capital of mind is more important, probably 
having in mind that clever a mind can find a way to transform nature, 
 
The industry of a people is, according to them, restricted to the amount 
of capital, or stock of produced matter; they did not consider that the pro-
ductiveness of this capital depends upon the means afforded by nature, and 
upon the intellectual and social conditions of a nation. It will be shown 
hereafter that if the science requires for the existing stock of produced mat-
ter the general term of capital, it is equally necessary to create for the exist-
ing stock of natural means, as well as for the existing state of social and in-
tellectual conditions, a general term: in other words, there is a capital of na-
ture, a capital of mind, and a capital of productive matter, and the produc-
tive powers of a nation depend not only upon the latter, but also and prin-
cipally upon the former. (List, 1827b, Letter IV, pp. 57-59)  
 
We here see that List has a clear focus on the nature and role of capi-
tal and its implications, which since has been lost to most econo-
mists.211 List begins his On the Nature and Value of a Nation's Forces of 
Production by arguing that that the statesman and legislator should not 
care so much about tangible goods, but rather focus on those (immate-
rial) forces and institutions that produce and assure national welfare, 
 
… if we are to learn how entire nations achieve prosperity and affluence, we 
must not confine ourselves to an enquiry as to the way in which individuals 
produce material goods, distribute them amongst themselves and consume 
them.  Such would be a teaching which might satisfy the individual mer-
chant, manufacturer or farmer, but to the statesman and legislator it must 
appear as not adequate for his greater efficacy.  For him it is not so much a 
matter of amassing valuable objects in the hands of individuals, but rather 
of assembling those forces and those institutions by which the welfare of 
                                       
211 One example of how the material aspect has been allowed to dominate 
may be found in economic history, not least among historians influenced by 
Marxism. The development of European capitalism may here be explained as a 
result of plundering amassment of monetary riches from colonies, and interna-
tional trade and war seen as efforts to rob competing nations of their surplus 
(Cf. e.g. Wallerstein, 1974, p. 222). Although important, expansion of the mone-
tary base offers a poor and insipid explanation of contemporary scientific and 
technical advance in Europe. European history may with advantage be com-
pared to the lack of such advance in expansionist robber states in history, such 
as the Mongolian Empire – but only to some extent so, since Mongolia also had 
her qualities. A different and complementing angle on history may be found in 
the argument that the cultural revolution of the Renaissance and Reformation 
charged the European continent with a spirit of individual freedom and explor-
ing endeavour (Cf. e.g. Reinert and Daastol, 1996: Exploring the Genesis of Eco-
nomic Innovations: The religious gestalt-switch and the duty to invent as precon-
ditions for economic growth). 
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the whole nation is produced and assured. (List, 1839c, p. 101, my transla-
tion) 
 
List claimed that (mentally based) inventions increase human power,  
 
Mental work is in the social economy what the soul is to the body. By 
means of new inventions, it continuously increases the power of the human 
being. Let us here recall only the achievements of the few to whose work we 
owe the invention and perfection of the steam engine … They have provided 
a small number of people with the power which had required millions of 
hands earlier. (List, 1927-36, vol.5, 1930, p. 42)  
 
List argues that the ‗popular school‘ of Adam Smith and his admirers 
(and we might add, including Marx on this point) have made a serious 
mistake in focusing on money and physical labour alone,  
 
We now see into what extraordinary mistakes and contradictions the 
popular school has fallen in making material wealth or value of exchange 
the sole object of its investigations, and by regarding mere bodily labour as 
the sole productive power. (List, 1841a, p. 142) 
 
Moreover, List ironically comments that,  
 
The man who breeds pigs is, according to this school, a productive mem-
ber of the community, but he who educates men is a mere non-productive. 
…. A Newton, a Watt, or a Kepler is not so productive as a donkey (List, 
1841a, p. 142) 
 
List‘s rather hilarious point here is obvious; that the popular school 
with this practice hampers and even prevents herself from realising the 
obvious; that much even of the material progress over the past Millen-
nium is due to scientific progress. 
List details some elements that constitute the productive powers, and 
practically all of these are institutions and inventions resulting from 
mental exertions, and consequently therefore part of the mental capital. 
To illustrate the importance of spiritual liberty, he suggests comparing 
England with Spain, 
 
The Christian religion, monogamy, abolition of slavery and of vassalage, 
hereditability of the throne, invention of printing, of the press, of the postal 
system, of money weights and measures, of the calendar, of watches, of po-
lice, 'the introduction of the principle of freehold property, of means of 
transport, are rich sources of productive power. To be convinced of this, we 
need only compare the condition of the European states with that of the 
Asiatic ones. In order duly to estimate the influence which liberty of 
thought and conscience has on the productive forces of nations, we need 
only read the history of England and then that of Spain. (List, 1841a, p. 
139) 
 
In his discussion over the causes of England‘s success, List in par-
ticular points to the ―the moral forces‖ and the geographical position 
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(Cf. List, 1841a, pp. 48-52). The production factor and value that List 
cherished most of all was freedom and sound institutions, and he be-
lieved that other nations are capable of raising themselves to the same 
degree of liberty, 
 
It is especially owing to her civil, mental, and religious liberty, to the na-
ture and excellence of her political institutions, that the commercial policy 
of England has been enabled to make the most of the natural riches of the 
country, and fully to develop the productive powers of the nation. But who 
would deny that other nations are capable of raising themselves to the 
same degree of liberty? (List, 1841a, p. 322)212  
 
A crucial element in ‗Capital of Mind‘, is not only - the heart and wit 
part of it - moral and intellectual development, but also political will-
power. List writes, 
 
…, those nations which feel themselves to be capable, owing to their moral, 
intellectual, social, and political circumstances, of developing a manufac-
turing power of their own must adopt the system of protection as the most 
effectual means for this purpose. (List, 1841a, pp. 131-132) 
 
And List ends his National System … with a call for action, 
 
… all that is required of the Governments can be expressed in one word, 
and that is – ENERGY. (List, 1841a, p. 435)213 
 
The Austrian philosopher Rudolf Steiner is a clear thinker regarding 
the fundamental relations between economics and the human mind. In 
his lectures held in 1922, Steiner argues that Spirit gives Labour a cer-
tain direction, which transforms Nature, and thus produces Goods and 
Capital, and eventually value. Therefore, the origin of value in econom-
ics is the Spirit (human intelligence). In a rather complex and unusual 
discussion, put simple, he writes, 
 
We must always go back to the real origins whence the economic process is 
nourished, on the one hand, and by which, on the other hand, it is regulat-
ed — Nature on the one hand, Spirit on the other.  
Now if you take the ordinary economic doctrines, you will generally find 
three factors mentioned … Nature, human Labour and Capital. … But if we 
take Nature, Labour and Capital simply side by side in this way, we shall 
not grasp the economic process in a living way…. there is the underlying 
idea of taking hold of something static and giving it a definition, whereas in 
the real economic process things are in perpetual movement.  
In the study of Economics it is quite impossible to stop short at defini-
tions of Value and Price. We must always go back to the real origins whence 
                                       
212 This quotation has also been used in the section Colonies, the internation-
al division of labour and free trade. 
213 This little quote has also been used elsewhere, in the section  




the economic process is nourished, on the one hand, and by which, on the 
other hand, it is regulated — Nature on the one hand, Spirit on the other. 
… 
Nature is the basis of economy. … labour as such has no purpose at all 
in Economics…. labour, economically speaking, is some-thing neutral and 
irrelevant. But it becomes an economic value-creating factor the moment 
we let it be directed by the intelligence of man. … the essential point is this: 
Through the Spirit — by intelligence, reflection, perhaps even speculation 
— Labour is given a certain direction: the various units of Labour are 
brought into certain mutual relations, and so on. (Steiner, 1922, Lecture 
II)214 
 
4.11 Accumulated capital of mind  
 
Terms such ‗innovation‘ and ‗progress‘ point to how the future will shape 
‗mental capital‘, but List repeatedly emphasized that ‗mental capital‘ had 
a social and an historical background - in the thousand years of accumu-
                                       
214 Steiner also criticises the static character of economic theory which does 
not grasp the dynamic character of the real world of economics;  
 
―In all economic theories of modern time, this has been the difficulty: 
they have always tried to hold fast at the outset that which is really fluctuat-
ing. … the point is that even men of considerable insight, in developing their 
theory of Economics, have stumbled again and again over this obstacle: 
They have tried to observe at rest things that are always in a state of flux. 
…  as though it were composed of a multitude of tiny states of rest and 
jump from one to the other. For when we integrate, we regard even move-
ment as if it were composed of states of rest.  
On the model of such a science we cannot study the economic process.‖ 
(Steiner, 1922, Lecture II) 
 
Furthermore, Steiner argues that not price formation, but exchange of val-
ues, is the essential activity in economics, and to understand this field we 
must search for the source of this value, 
 
―Again and again one is astonished to find Price discussed in the ordi-
nary works on Economics, as though it were possible to define it. …  
The economic process takes its course in the activities of buying and sell-
ing. Buying and selling are essentially an exchange of values … In Econom-
ics we must not speak of ―goods ‖ but of ―values‖ as the elementary thing. It 
is wrong to try to consider Price in any other way than by envisaging the in-
terplay of values. Value set against value gives you Price. … there is, in fact, 
no other exchange than that of values. Properly speaking, it is wrong to 
speak of an exchange of goods. The ―goods ‖ that play a part in the econom-
ic process — whether they appear as modified products of Nature or modi-
fied Labour — are always values. … Wherever Price emerges, it is always 
through the impact of value on value in the economic process.  
… We must go back to that which creates the value: … The value that is 
thus produced through human Labour is a modified object of Nature.‖ 
(Steiner, 1922, Lecture II) 
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lated societal experience, ‗materialised‘ in formal and informal behaviour 
and –institutions; habits; customs; morality; legal and organisational 
framework etc.; all constituting a nation‘s traditional culture. The con-
nects List to the insights of the Conservative- and Romantic traditions, 
which influenced his contemporary Historical School of Jurisprudence215 
and were to influence the later Historical School of Economics, following 
List. 
There is far more to List‘s concepts of ‗Capital of Mind‘ or ‗Mental 
Capital‘ than an individualistic perspective could reveal, since with List 
the term ‗mental capital‘ includes knowledge historically created, and 
stored in institutions and indirectly also in physical capital, 
 
The present state of the nations is the result of the accumulation of all 
discoveries, inventions, improvements, perfections, and exertions of all gen-
erations which have lived before us; they form the mental capital of the pre-
sent human race, and every separate nation is productive only in the pro-
portion in which it has known how to appropriate these attainments of for-
mer generations and to increase them by its own acquirements, in which 
the natural capabilities of its territory, its extent and geographical position, 
its population and political power, have been able to develop as completely 
and symmetrically as possible all sources of wealth within its boundaries, 
and to extend its moral, intellectual, commercial, and political influence 
over less advanced nations and especially over the affairs of the world. (List, 
1841a, p. 140) 
 
In this, List follows Adam Müller who dealt extensively with this issue 
of ―intergenerational‖ creation of capital (Cf. Müller, 1808-09, Lecture 
24: About national capital and national credit). List claims that we can 
only explain the present elevated standing in material wealth as a result 
of a historical progress during a thousand years with accumulation of 
mental capital over many generations,  and a nation can only progress 
to the degree that it is able to take possession of and utilise this imma-
terial and historical fund, 
 
If we consider merely bodily labour as the cause of wealth, how can we 
then explain why modern nations are incomparably richer, more populous, 
more powerful, and prosperous than the nations of ancient times? The an-
cient nations employed (in proportion to the whole population) infinitely 
more hands, the work was much harder, each individual possessed much 
more land, and yet the masses were much worse fed and clothed than is 
the case in modern nations. In order to explain these phenomena, we must 
refer to the progress which has been made in the course of the last thou-
sand years in sciences and arts, domestic and public regulations, cultiva-
tion of the mind and capabilities of production. (List, 1841a, ch. 12, p. 139)216  
                                       
215 For instance; Friedrich Carl von Savigny (1779-1861) and Karl Friedrich 
von Eichhorn (1781-1854). 
216 Here is the quotation in the German original: „Der jetzige Zustand der Na-
tionen ist eine Folge der Anhäufung aller Entdeckungen, Erfindungen, Verbes-




Since co-operation of labour necessitates ―mentally based‖ activity, it 
is only natural that ‗Mental capital‘ in List's opinion was the core of the 
productive powers. This value of networking has increasingly been re-
ferred to as ‗social capital‘217 
Among those who have noticed this point in List‘s argument, ‗mental 
capital‘ is often regarded as synonymous to ‗human capital‘, which in 
the modern literature is understood as being an individualistic phe-
nomenon.  
Know-how is established by learning, which is accumulated into Cap-
ital of Mind, as List put it, or as we would say today, Human Capital.  
However, there is a slight difference in emphasis here. Whereas Hu-
man Capital tends to be seen as individual, Capital of Mind is a more 
collective and historical concept, referring to its character of being ac-
cumulated over the years. Institutions are a good example of this, as 
they are built over time and they are collective.218 Yet, they are not ac-
counted for as human capital. ‗Governance‘ is one modern concept for a 
tiny part of what List is referring to as ‗Capital of Mind‘. 
 
 
4.12 Human Capital 
 
The spirit of times change, and sometimes not to the better. The 
Norwegian Professor of Law, Statistics and State Economics, Anton 
Martin Schweigaard,219 was characterised as the high priest of 
materialism by his contemporary national poetic heroes such as 
Bjørnson (the Nobel laureate), Wergeland and Vinje. Nevertheless, and 
much like List, he argues against the English conception of an egotistic 
‗economic man‘ and in 1847 Schweigaard wrote that the most 
important factors of production are immaterial, 
 
The result of human labour is not only dependent upon its strength and 
perseverance, but is to a considerable degree also dependent on the 
leadership of labour. … 
                                                                                                                
uns gelebt haben, sie bilden das geistige Kapital der lebendigen Menschheit, 
und jede Nation ist nur produktiv in dem Verhältnis, in dem sie diese Errun-
genschaften früherer Generationen in sich aufzunehmen und durch eigene Er-
werbungen zu vermehren gewußt hat.― 
217 The issue of ‗social capital‘ has been discussed in a section below; Net-
working and Social Capital. 
218 See also the sections below, such as Networking and Social Capital.  
219 The Norwegian Professor of Law, Statistics and State Economics, Anton 
Martin Schweigaard, was also a practical man and the most important states-
man in Norway in the 19th Century. He promoted a national market e.g. by 




… inner religious, moral and political social relations, have not priority 
after but priority before the external preconditions of production. 
(Schweigaard, 1847)220 
  
Following Schweigaard, a number of Norwegian economists followed 
in his footsteps, but - as in other European countries - the English 
classical school gradually came to dominate and the emphasis on im-
material factors was lost. 
Nevertheless, research along the lines of Moses Abramowitz and Rob-
ert Solow (Cf. Abramowitz, 1956 and Solow, 1957, p. 320)221 was also 
done elsewhere, as in Norway. Heretic opinions along the lines of List‘s 
argument were not well received, however: ―Already‖ in 1952, a group of 
economists at the Ministry of Finance wrote a report, The Economic Poli-
cy Instruments, arguing that the rate of investment should receive less 
emphasis. Instead, more attention should be directed to ―organisational 
and administrative means‖. And in this way it would, 
 
 ―… doubtlessly be possible to increase productivity without or with relative-
ly moderate investments‖. (―Group‖, 1952, quoted in Bergh and Hanisch, 
1984, p. 234).222 
 
In 1958, and based on careful econometric research, Odd Aukrust 
(the director of Norway‘s SSB – the national Statistical Central Bureau) 
published an article called Investments and economic growth. He argues 
that 
 
We have tried to increase the rate of progress by keeping a high rate of 
investment. We should carefully consider whether there might not be more to 
gain by increased efforts in research and education. (Aukrust and Bjerke, 
1958, p. 66, quoted in Bergh and Hanisch, 1984, p. 234)223 
 
These arguments did not win the day. Erik Brofoss was Norway‘s Fi-
nance Minister and the main architect of the investment policy after 
WW II. Brofoss‘ exposed his reaction directed specifically to Aukrust‘s 
                                       
 220 The original text in Norwegian reads:  "Udbyttet av det menneskelige 
Arbeid er ikke alene afhængigt af dets Styrke og Udholdenhed, men i Væsentlig 
Grad ogsaa af den Indsigt hvoraf det ledes" . He furthermore wrote that "indre 
religiøse, moralske og politiske Samfundsforhold, som i Vigtighed ikke staar 
tilbage for, men have Overvægten over de mere udvortes betingelser for 
Produktionens Gang." Quoted in Bergh & Hanisch, 1984, p. 34 
221 Cf. the section below, Growth theory – thought as the lacking source. 
222 The original text in Norwegian reads: ―utvilsomt være mulig å øke 
produktiviteten uten eller med forholdsvis beskjedne investeringer." 
223 The original text in Norwegian reads: "Vi har prøvd å presse framstegstak-
ten i været ved å holde investeringsnivået høyt. Vi bør tenke alvorlig over om det 
ikke er mer å hente ved økt innsats innenfor forskning og undervisning.‖ The 
article was based on the research by Odd Aukrust and Juul Bjerke  published 
as Real kapital og økonomisk vekst 1900-1956  (‗Real capital and economic 
growth 1900-1956‘) (Aukrust and Bjerke,1958) 
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argument of re-orientation, in a letter to (the Nobel laureate) Ragnar 
Frisch in 1960. Brofoss‘ wrote that,  
 
I consider this pure nonsense. (Brofoss, 1960, quoted in Bergh and 
Hanisch, 1984, p. 234)224 
 
Starting in the 1960s, there has been extensive work done around 
the concept of ‗Human Capital‘, following the pioneering works of Theo-
dore Schultz (Cf. The Economic Value of Education, Schultz, 1963) and 
the Nobel Laureate Gary Becker (Cf. Human Capital … with Special Ref-
erence to Education, Becker, 1964). They both focused on education as 
an investment, as List did more than one century earlier.  
These rather belated efforts to include immaterial- or non-manual 
work, have in economics increasingly resulted in growth models that 
have broaden the term ‗capital‘ to include knowledge- and  human capi-
tal. Nevertheless, as in common in economics, these growth models 
have only sluggishly found their way into standard textbooks, indicat-
ing their rather ad-hoc nature to the core of economic theory. 
For instance, the standard textbook by Dornbusch and Fischer does 
not mention this at all in the 1978 edition, whereas Mankiw‘s later edi-
tion from 2002, does mention human capital but briefly and superficial-
ly.  
In more detail: C. E. Ferguson and J. P. Gould‘s Microeconomic Theo-
ry from 1975 does not mention human capital at all (Cf. Ferguson and 
Gould, 1975). Hugh Gravelle and Ray Rees‘s Microeconomics, from 1981 
spend one page of over 600 pages, on the difference between human 
capital and physical capital. But they do not at all evaluate the im-
portance of human capital or how to promote it (Cf. Gravelle and Rees, 
1981). Macroeconomics, by Rudiger Dornbusch and Stanley Fisher in 
1978, does not mention human capital at all (Cf. Dornbusch and Fish-
er, 1978).  
N. Gregory Mankiw‘s textbook Microeconomics, discusses human cap-
ital on four pages, but solely from an individualistic angle and he focus-
es singularly on the effect on wages, not on the national effects. He 
spends just as much text on the role of education as a signal of 
achievement for the individual person, as he spends on the role of gen-
eral education for society (Cf. Mankiw, 2002, p. 407).  
Reinert and Daastol comment the failure of human capital theory to 
see the larger picture; knowledge also must be set to practical use 
through e.g. government intervention creating incentives and invest-
ments. In other words, individualistic human capital theory alone, 
would not be a satisfactory strategy guide for investments, and needs to 
be complemented to secure a more holistic investment approach, 
 
By seeing the learning process only as a process of accumulation of ‗hu-
man capital‘, mainstream theory loses an important point: Human capital 
                                       
224 The original text in Norwegian reads, «Det anser jeg for det rene sludder.» 
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is only of measurable value where a technological ‗window-of-opportunity‘ - 
a new idea - creates a demand for this knowledge. Where human capital is 
accumulated without the demand for knowledge, which is essentially creat-
ed by new ideas, the result is unemployment and/or a ‗brain drain‘. 
(Reinert and Daastol, 1997, p. 263) 
 
In other words, it is not enough that the State creates a supply of 
knowledge. It also has to create a demand for it. List‘s ready reply was 
to promote incentives for the construction of e.g. infrastructure like 
railroads, and this later became a prime driver for development for one 
Century, like electricity grids, and networks for telegraph, telephone, 
the internet, and highways. 
 
 
4.13 Knowledge and information economics 
 
In the 1960s, various theories appeared in the Western academic world 
in order to explain the residual factor, which according to Solow is re-
sponsible for the 87.5 % ‗residual‘ of growth that conventional theories 
of capital accumulation could not explain, in the Physiocratic and 
‗Smithian‘ tradition. Knowledge production was then included into the 
production function, but the source of knowledge and therefore how to 
promote it, was still to be hidden in the black box.  
The Austrian born economist Fritz Machlup was a student of Ludvig 
von Mises. Machlup writes that Adam Smith and especially Friedrich 
List was among those forerunners of the approach of internalising 
knowledge as a factor of production, as opposed to the exogenous role it 
normally has played in economics, 
 
The "promotion" of knowledge from the rank of an exogenous independ-
ent variable to that of an endogenous variable dependent on input, on the 
allocation of resources, is an important step. Not that this ideas is a novel 
one. Adam Smith in 1776 wrote that "man educated at the expense of much 
labor and time ... may be compared to one of those expensive machines,"225 
and the notion of the "capital concept applied to man"226 has never com-
pletely disappeared from the economic treatises. It was especially empha-
sised by writers, such as Friedrich List, who gave much prominence to the 
development of the productive forces of man. (Machlup, 1962, p. 5) 
 
Machlup founded the subject of knowledge economics and infor-
mation economics. His research on the patent system made him realise 
that it was only a part of the much larger ‗knowledge economy‘. Incorpo-
rating everything related to communication, he found that already in 
1959, some 29 % of the GDP in the USA had been produced by this sec-
                                       
225 1 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of 
Nations (Everymans's Library, 1910), Vol. I, pp. 88-89. (Machlup‘s note) 
226 2 R.J. Walsh, "Capital Concept Applied to Man," Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. XLIX (1935), p. 255ff. (Machlup‘s note) 
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tor. Furthermore, of the total civilian labour force 43 % were employed as 
knowledge transmitters or - receivers. The growth was also staggering: 
Between 1900 and 1959, the sector‘s proportion of the labour force in-
creased from 11 to 32 percent. The growth towards a knowledge econ-
omy can be described as a greater reliance on immaterial input than on 
material input, or in more economic terms, a greater reliance on intel-
lectual input than on input of real capital and raw materials. Infor-
mation and media are typical examples of this, and have become key 
drivers in modern economies, replacing traditional industrial goods. 
One example is computer games; and although at first sight not the 
most productive one, the possible implementations are vast, as in air 
pilot simulations, training in steering container ships etc. 
 
 
4.14 List’s predecessors - Conservatism and Romanticism 
 
Not many known economists precede List in his immaterial approach, 
but he possibly learned from Adam Müller, who also considered the 
state as the most important type of capital of a nation, as in his lecture 
on ‗On Division of Labour and Spiritual Capital‘ (Von der Teilung der 
Arbeit und vom geistigen Kapital, Müller, 1808-1809, book V, Lecture 
26).  
There are different opinions regarding Müller‘s influence on List. 
Charles Rist denies outright that List was inspired by Müller (Cf. Rist 
and Gide, 1909, pp. 286n), while John Kells Ingram claims exactly the 
opposite (Cf. Ingram, 1888, ch. 5). Without further inquiry, I would side 
with Ingram and accept Müller as predecessor to List on this issue, 
since Ingram is an insider to the tradition following List. Furthermore, 
although List never refers to Müller (which is customary when one 
agrees), List met with Müller in Vienna in 1820. 
In any case, the similarities in analysis are startling, and so are the 
differences in their conclusions: Müller preferred the old stable society 
whereas List eagerly looked towards the new mobile society, much like 
Hegel.  
Adam Müller happened to be one of Edmund Burke's greatest admir-
ers in the German-speaking world.227 Burke is generally viewed as both 
the founder of modern Conservatism, and simultaneously a representa-
tive of classical liberalism. He was a decisive inspiration for the Histori-
cal School of Jurisprudence both in Germany and in Great Britain, and 
along with J.G. Fichte; he was the major inspiration for the Romantic 
School in economics, such as Adam Müller. In the Encyclopedia Britan-
nica 1902, John Kells Ingram writes that Müller precedes the German 
Historical School in in his criticism of the materialist doctrines of Smith 
                                       
227 Edmund Burke, of Norman-Irish stock, is also known for his support of 
the American Revolutionaries, opposition to the French Revolution, and served 
as a representative in Great Britain‘s House of Commons.  
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and his own emphasis on the importance of immaterial factors, such as 
co-operation and spiritual capital,  
 
Adam Müller (1779-1829) was undoubtedly a man of real genius. … 
He protests against the doctrine of Smith and against modern political 
economy in general on the ground that it presents a mechanical, atomistic, 
and purely material conception of society, that it reduces to nullity all mor-
al forces and ignores the necessity of a moral order, that it is at bottom no 
more than a theory of private property and private interests, and takes no 
account of the life of the people as a whole in its national solidarity and his-
torical continuity. Exclusive attention, he complains, is devoted to the im-
mediate production of objects possessing exchange value and to the transi-
tory existence of individuals; whilst to the maintenance of the collective 
production for future generations, to intellectual products, powers, posses-
sions and enjoyments, and to the State with its higher tasks and aims, 
scarcely a thought is given. … For the continent of Europe a quite different 
system is necessary, in which, in place of the sum of the private wealth of 
individuals being viewed as the primary object, the real wealth of the nation 
and the production of national power shall be made to predominate, and 
along with the division of labour its national union and concentration along 
with the physical, no less the intellectual and moral, capital shall be em-
braced. In these leading traits of Müller's thought there is much which fore-
shadows the more recent forms of German economic and sociological 
speculation, especially those characteristic of the "Historical" school. (In-
gram, 1888, ch.5) 
 
According to Roll, Müller‘s theory of capital and production is that 
spiritual capital is a core part of the factors of production, but econo-
mists have ignored this, 
 
The factors of production are not land, labour and capital, but nature, 
man and the past. The last includes all capital, physical and spiritual, 
which has been built up in the course of time and is now available to help 
man in production. Economists, says Müller, have tended to ignore 
spiritual capital. The fund of experience which past exertion has made 
available is put in motion by language, speech and writing; and it is the 
duty of scholarship to preserve and increase it. All these elements 
collaborate in production; though in different spheres the emphasis will 
differ. In agriculture the stress is on landed property; in industry it is on 
labour; in commerce on capital, particularly in its monetary form; and in 
science the accent is on the capital of ideas. But in all of them the other 
elements are also preserved. Feudalism is praised because its social 
structure reflected the existence of these factors of production. Land leads 
to nobility, labour to the estate of the burgher, spiritual capital to the 
clergy. As for physical capital, it was at first also attached to the clergy; but 
the disintegration of feudalism brought a separation between physical and 
spiritual capital. The concept of physical capital began to invade every other 
factor and gain supremacy over the whole of civic life. Physical capital 
acquired the strongest influence in all spheres of production and 





Roscher criticises Müller for just being descriptive and not making 
clear the essence of immaterial capital, 
 
The concept of capital should not be limited to real products, but Müller 
fails to make clear the essence of immaterial capital. It presents itself in 
various ways in the language, as the physical presents itself mainly in 
money.228 The most important part of every merchant capital is trade expe-
rience,229 Taxes are not seen as insurance premium by Müller, but rather 
as interest on the invisible and yet completely necessary immaterial capital, 
which lies in the State. Even the armies, fortresses, laws of a people, are in 
their own peculiarities integrated parts of the national wealth.230 Some-
times, however, he expresses himself as if the immaterial capital of the peo-
ple coincides with the religion or the spiritual power. (Roscher, 1874, p. 
768, my translation)231 
 
 
4.15 Comments on List’s approach to Capital of Mind 
 
List‘s insights into the importance of immaterial production factors or 
‗intangible capital‘ have of course been noted on earlier occasions in 
history. 
The accumulation theory of growth was claimed by Adam Smith in 
1776 (Smith, 1776, Introduction and book, IV, ch. II). In 1904, J. Shield 
Nicholson writes an ‗Introductory Essay‘, to the English translation of 
The National System. Nicholson applauds List‘s criticism of the limited 
view of capital as material only: ―List did good service in showing that 
mere accumulation is of minor importance‖, thereby supporting List‘s 
criticism of Adam Smith, who had claimed that accumulation depended 
on the amount of material saving, as opposed to for instance 
investment in human resources, 
 
… List‘s system is emphatically and explicitly the national system of politi-
cal economy.  
Next in importance to his doctrine of nationality must be placed his posi-
tion on immaterial capital and productive powers. Adam Smith had includ-
ed under the fixed capital of a nation the natural and acquired abilities of 
its inhabitants, but for a long time both in theory and practice the term 
‗capital‘ was narrowed down to purely material forms. If this change of defi-
nition had been made merely in deference to popular usage, in order to 
avoid confusion, no harm might have ensued; but, unfortunately, with their 
exclusion from capital the immaterial productive forces and powers were 
dropped from the popular arguments altogether. Apparently the wealth of 
nations was supposed to depend principally on the accumulation of materi-
al capital, which was necessary to provide both the auxiliary aids to labour 
and its subsistence. List did good service in showing that mere accumula-
                                       
228 2: E, III, 40 ff. (Roscher‘s note) 
229 3: Briefw. Mit Gentz, 214 (Roscher‘s note) 
230 Verm. Schr. I,  65 (Roscher‘s note) 
231 ‗Geistiges Kapital‘ is here literally translated, not as ‗immaterial capital‘ 
but rather as ‗spiritual capital‘. 
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tion is of minor importance compared with the organisation of the produc-
tive forces of society. ‗   (Nicholson, 1904, in the English translation in 1884 
of The National System, List, 1841a, 1884)  
 
Nicholson errs, however, in placing the concept of ‗mental capital‘ be-
low that of the ‗nation‘ in importance. Mental capital constitutes the 
nation through the confederation of labour and is therefore primary, not 
secondary. 
In his lecture, Friedrich List: The National Political Economy Revisited, 
David Calleo232 describes the idealist and immaterial essence of List‘s 
message, and therefore ―List defended spending for education, the arts, 
justice, or defense .,. also for the sake of the economy's efficiency‖ 
 
Friedrich List (1789–1846) was a German liberal nationalist, deeply im-
bued with the Idealist view of reality that returned to fashion with Romanti-
cism. … 2 List is famous, above all, for his nationalist critique of Adam 
Smith's celebrated concept of the ―division of labor.‖ It is not merely the di-
vision of labor that makes the modern economy possible, List taught, but 
the ―union of labor‖—the ―confederation or union of various energies, intel-
ligences, and powers on behalf of a common production.‖233 An efficient un-
ion of labor depends on being situated in a cultural community conducive 
to it, in other words, in a nation with broadly shared cultural and moral 
values that foster cooperation. Linked to these values are many of a socie-
ty's nonmaterial elements: culture, morality, communication, and fellow-
ship, together with human rights, laws, politics, and national security. To 
grasp the influence of such immaterial elements as liberty of thought and 
conscience on the productive force of nations, List suggested reading ―the 
history of England and then that of Spain.‖234 A rich civic culture had made 
England durably prosperous, while the lack of such a culture had left Spain 
poor, despite the huge wealth that had passed through Spanish hands. List 
sharply criticized Smith and his followers for their ―materialism‖—for de-
picting mental forces as mere by-products of material circumstances. Ac-
cordingly, List defended spending for education, the arts, justice, or defense 
not only for aesthetic, moral, or military reasons but also for the sake of the 
economy's efficiency. Such expenditures were ―consumption of present val-
ues‖ to nourish ―future productive powers.‖ He ridiculed the view of eco-
nomic development that led Smith to count such expenditures as subtrac-
tions from economic values. The causes of idleness and wealth among men 
could not be explained merely by a study of their limbs and other body 
parts, while one ignored ―the spirit which animates the individuals, the so-
cial order which renders their energy fruitful, and the powers of nature 
which they are in a position to make use of.‖235 (Calleo, 2001, pp. 70-71) 
 
                                       
232 Professor and Director of the European Studies Department at the Johns 
Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies since 1968. 
233 3: Friedrich List, The National System of Political Economy (New York: Au-
gustus M. Kelley, 1966; originally published 1841), pp. 149–150. (Calleo‘s note) 
234 4: Ibid., p. 139. (Calleo‘s note) 
235 5: Ibid., p. 136. (Calleo‘s note) 
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In their Doctrines of Development, Cowen and Shenton have noticed 
the mechanic understanding of the productive powers in Smith and 
Hamilton, and concluded that List extended Hamilton‘s concept. That is 
perhaps stretching Hamilton a bit too much and too gently, since there 
is hardly any notice of this factor in Hamilton - actually less than with 
Smith. Furthermore, they fail to see List‘s connection to older German 
and European literature, apart from correctly identifying Adam Müller 
as a possible source, 
 
List arrived at this doctrine of national development primarily through a 
reworking of Adam Smith's concept of 'productive powers', the concept 
which was central to Hamilton's Report. In particular, List repeated Hamil-
ton's argument that it was manufacturing which conveyed the greatest po-
tential for realising the improvements of productive powers. Through re-
working the concept of productive powers, List extended the concept be-
yond Hamilton's mainly restricted technical sense of 'powers' by furnishing 
the power of productive force with moral or 'spiritual' meaning. While there 
has been debate over the immediate source of List's spiritual morality, one 
plausible candidate might be Adam Muller, … Whatever his source, List's 
moral dimension of productive force is crucial for making sense of the vari-
ous ways in which he uses the concept in his National System, for an un-
derstanding of the basis of the system and, not least, for why productive 
force has entered into the expanded domain of development. (Cowen and 
Shenton, 1996, p. 159)  
 
In 1963, Robert Eckert wrote his PhD dissertation called Friedrich 
List‘s Stay in America and its Importance for the Listian System (Eckert, 
1963).236 Eckert spends the second chapter on The Theory of the Pro-
ductive Forces, on the concept itself and the American influence on the 
concept. He points out the core of the theory as the immaterial factors 
and finds support in Egon Koeppel‘s dissertation (Koeppel, 1936).  Eck-
ert also quotes from a lecture by Clausing in 1961, where Clausing says 
about List that, 
 
When he speaks of productive forces, he simply means the dynamic Ele-
ment. (Eckert, 1963, p. 25) 
 
Eckert comments on List that, 
 
The Listian theory is a theory of possibilities. (Eckert, 1963, p. 26) 
 
Eckert agrees with Weippert who calls List a … 
 
Thinker of possibilities. (Weippert, 1956, p. 83) 
 
                                       
236 In the German original: Der Amerikaaufenhalt Friedrich Lists in seiner Be-
deutung für das Listische System. 
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David Levi-Faur‘s work on List is noteworthy for his depth of under-
standing the core of List. He notes that with List the role of protection 
was to promote capital of mind,  
 
Protection, in certain cases, is therefore recommended and justified as an 
education tax that would enable the Americans to engage in equal exchange 
with the British, i.e. exchange not only matter for matter but also mental 
capital for mental capital . . . According to List, the role of the state in such 
a case was to create adequate conditions for the development of American 
mental capital. These conditions, however, could not be provided unless a 
managed trade policy was implemented. (Levi-Faur 1997a, p. 166)  
 
David Levi-Faur notes that List sets capital of mind before other kind 
of capital. He writes that with List ―the various types of capital have a 
hierarchical order, and that mental capital is the most important‖, 
 
According to List, these three types of capital are distinguishable accord-
ing to their relative importance to the creation of wealth: natural and mate-
rial capital are inferior to mental capital. Economic policy making that is 
aimed at the development of mental capital, all other things being equal, 
will result in better performances than economic policy that aims to enlarge 
the development of natural and material capital. (Levi-Faur 1997a, p. 
158)237  
 
This may well be what List intends, and it does indeed seem so, but 
List does not write it. Instead, List writes, 
 
…, there are a capital of nature, a capital of mind, and a capital of produc-
tive matter, and the productive powers of a nation depend not only upon 
the latter, but also and principally upon the two former. (List, 1827b, p. 
188) 
 
Levi-Faur criticises Smith and the Classical school for failing to 
―identify properly the causes of wealth‖, and correctly states that 
Smith‘s materialist outlook led Smith to focus on the division of labour 
as the source of wealth, and that this again was dependent upon accu-
                                       
237 David Levi-Faur continues; ―In order to clarify this point, List offered the 
example of two families, each with a farm and ﬁve sons. The father of the ﬁrst 
family deposits his savings in the bank and maintains his sons in manual la-
bour. In contrast, the father of the second family exploits his savings for the 
sake of his sons‘ education and grants them both time and encouragement for 
their own personal cultivation. … The ﬁrst father identiﬁed wealth with material 
capital and hence neglected the cultivation of his sons‘ mental abilities. The se-
cond identiﬁed wealth with mental capital and therefore invested in his sons‘ 
education. This story exempliﬁes List‘s strong conviction that the various types 
of capital have a hierarchical order, and that mental capital is the most im-
portant. This distinction further enabled him to argue that the ﬁrst father acted 
according to the materialist conceptions of Adam Smith‘s followers, whereas the 
second father acted according to a human capital-oriented theory of policy mak-
ing. (Levi-Faur 1997a, p. 159) 
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mulation of physical capital, 
 
The example gives us the opportunity to examine critically the notion of 
human capital in classical economics and its distinction between wealth 
and the causes of wealth. I contend that following Adam Smith classical 
economic theory failed to identify properly the causes of wealth. 
Indeed, Adam Smith made the distinction between wealth and causes of 
wealth a central point in his criticism of the mercantilists‘ perceptions of 
the role of silver and gold as sources of wealth. As alternatives to gold and 
silver, Smith offered the division of labour and the accumulation of capital 
as primary causes of development. This, however, led neoclassical economic 
theory to adopt a materialist notion of social change and economic devel-
opment. Indeed, it is the division of labour that received most of Adam 
Smith‘s attention. … Yet, a division of labour is conceived by him as de-
pendent on the accumulation of capital, and so ‗the accumulation of stock 
must, in the nature of things, be previous to the division of labour‘ (Smith, 
1776: 260). Thus, it is the accumulation of capital that enhances the divi-
sion of labour and it is the division of labour which in turn makes possible 
the further increase in the accumulation of capital. In Smith‘s own words, 
‗As the  accumulation of stock is previously necessary for carrying on this 
great improvement in the productive powers of labour, so that accumula-
tion naturally leads to this improvement‘ (Smith, 1776: 260). The process of 
accumulation, which contiguously furthers the division of labour, is hence 
the process of economic development.11 (Levi-Faur 1997a, pp. 158-159) 
 
Ten pages further down, Levi-Faur continues by discussing the Clas-
sic Schools neglect of human capital, and again correctly states that 
when it eventually was paid respect in the 1960s, it was interpreted in 
an individualistic fashion that omitted the role of institutions and the 
State, 
 
Smith‘s concept of economic development was criticized by List. It is not 
that List rejected the importance of Smith‘s notion of the division of labour, 
nor did he reject the importance of trade and savings as instruments of 
economic development, but in his view they are inferior to the augmenta-
tion of mental capital. In modern terminology we may say that List empha-
sized the importance of human capital in economic development.12 The im-
portance of human capital had been neglected in mainstream economic 
theory. This much has already been argued by Mark Blaug: ‗[the classical 
economists] simply failed to explore the implication of a human capital view 
of labour supply. Adam Smith made a start; John Stuart Mill carried it a lit-
tle further‘ (Blaug, 1975: 574).13 The same point was made by List more 
than one hundred years ago when he emphasized the importance of human 
capital to economic development. List should be considered one of the 
founders of human capital theory and deserves more appreciation in this 
regard than he has received (see, for example, Kiker, 1966). 
It was only in the 1960s, through the works of Gary S. Becker, that the 
concept of human capital was introduced into mainstream economic theo-
ry. Yet, even when it was ﬁnally introduced, it received an individualistic in-
terpretation that hardly did justice to the important role of the state and 
nationalist movements in building a mass system of education – not as a 
response to individuals, or to a market-driven demand for education, but as 
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an elite effort to educate (and mobilize) the masses. (Levi-Faur 1997a, pp. 
167-168) 
 
Levi-Faur has also noted List‘s emphasis on the education system, 
and that it is integral to List‘s system rather than external as in Smith‘s 
system, 
 
The source of the British trade superiority, argued List, was the British 
educational system: ... 
Education is indigenous rather than exogenous to List‘s political econo-
my. In the notion of productive powers, education is an important factor in 
national economic performance. A nation has to develop its educational 
system in accordance with its economic progress: … (Levi-Faur 1997a, pp. 
158-159) 
 
List writes that more industrialised nations need better trained and 
more specialised people, who will command higher wages, 
 
As a nation becomes more industrialised, it becomes more necessary to 
secure the service of suitable, trained people in the factories and work-
shops. Such people are now able to command higher salaries and wages 
than was formerly possible. It will be easier for them to devote themselves 
entirely to a particular branch of knowledge, provided that they have the 
necessary natural aptitude and the good preliminary training. Knowledge is 
becoming more specialised. (List, 1837a, p. 67) 
 
 
4.16 The Historical School on Capital of Mind 
 
In addition, other and later German economists within the Historical 
School stressed the importance of immaterial factors of production, 
such as the most prominent economist of the ‗Older Historical School‘, 
Wilhelm Roscher. Roscher writes that historically progress towards 
freedom has been bought with great efforts, but ―we are on the right 
road‖. Moral greatness is the foundation for material power, and indus-
trial progress is but an instrument towards moral perfection, Roscher 
writes,238 
                                       
238 This is the beginning of the quotation; ―The unvarying testimony of ages 
affirms the continued and gradual amelioration of man by individual energy 
and moral thought. … Want and suffering have urged him forward. Foresight, 
labor, sacrifice and virtue have in part redeemed him. No right has been less-
ened or usurped, and every step in civilization has been a step in the way of 
freedom. Instead of making the latter responsible for a material and moral 
wretchedness which it is called upon to cure, we may prove, that, in propor-
tion as real liberty and legal guaranties increase, evil diminishes.  
We do not desire to yield to a convenient optimism, and deny the sufferings 
which weigh only too heavily on the world. We are far from having reached the 
end assigned to our efforts; but let not the hope we entertain of further pro-
gress blind us to that which has already been accomplished. This latter shows 




On our moral greatness depends our material power. The elevation or de-
basement of character, the energy or debility of the will — such is the first 
source of good or evil. The world, a Chalmers rightly says, is so constituted 
that we should be materially happy if we were morally good.  
Industrial progress helps, we have said, towards moral perfection. It is 
not the source of that perfection, but its instrument; for ignorance and mis-
ery, its habitual attendants, are poor advisers. Political Economy shows 
how the goods of this world are multiplied. (Roscher, 1877, § 14) 
 
Roscher writes that intellect is the most important factor of political 
economy, and shows in the footnote that the classical philosophers 
warned against materialism, 
 
Political economy treats chiefly of the material wants of nations. ... even 
in a material sense, the intellect of a people is their most important ele-
ment, ... 239 (Roscher, 1877, § 21) 
 
Apart from capital such as soil-improvements and physical capital 
Roscher mentions incorporeal capital that is not exhausted by use, 
thereby grasping a core meaning of public goods. He has interesting 
references in his footnote, mentioning Charles Ganilh (1815) and 
Justus Möser (1774–76) as predecessors regarding the importance and 
focus on ‗Mental Capital‘, and later on Hermann Lotze (1856–1864), 
   
There is also what may be called incorporeal capital (quasi-capital accord-
ing to Schmittthenner), which is as much the result of production as any 
other capital, and is used in production, but which, for the most part, is not 
exhausted by use. There are species of this kind of capital which may be 
transferred, as for instance, the good will of a well-established form. Others 
are as inseparably connected with human capacity for labor as soil-
improvements with a piece of land; e.g., the greater dexterity acquired by a 
workman through scientific study, or the greater confidence he has ac-
quired by long trial.240 (Roscher, 1877, § 42)241 
                                                                                                                
free rein to the human faculties. Sudden changes are made only in theaters. 
In the real world, the march of progress is slow and laborious. It may be accel-
erated by a happy hit; but it would be vain to try to hurry it.  
Man still suffers. No one desires to deny the evil, but only to estimate its extent. 
Yet it cannot be gainsaid that its fatal empire is narrowing instead of enlarging. 
Especially is it the progress accomplished in the higher regions of intellect and 
of the feelings which here exerts its beneficent influence.‖ (Roscher, 1877, § 14) 
 239Demosthenes ... shows the over-estimation of material things to be the 
principal cause of the decline of Athens ... Also Phil., IV, 144, cautions us 
against the Manchester criterion of national prosperity. See Plato, De Rep., VIII. 
... (Roscher's note)  
240Thus, Ganilh, Théorie de l'Economie politique I, 133, calls the knowledge, 
talents and probity of merchants, as well as their reputation, valuable parts of 
their capital in trade. See, also, Möser, Patriot. Ph.II, 26, See some happy 
observations on the intellectual capital of nations, as consisting of "known and 




Another prominent economist of the older German Historical School, 
Bruno Hildebrand, also criticises Smith‘s materialism and writes,  
 
Finally, Smith knows only one type of capital, the physical and external 
capital. Besides this, there is another which is at least as important or even 
more important; spiritual capital. … (Hildebrand, 1842, p. 33, my transla-
tion)242 
 
Hildebrand also writes that it is the moral powers that made Britain 
great, and as science and intelligences, they constitute an invisible 
power that cannot be measured. Furthermore, he writes that next to 
intelligence, the sense of duty and the willpower of the individual are 
the most important moral powers (Cf. Hildebrand, 1842, p. 301 ff).243  
This spiritual power and -capital cannot be created from ‗above‘; it 
can only ripen slowly with the hard-won experience of a people, 
 
                                                                                                                
353 seq. (Roscher's note) 
241 What Roscher describes here is what we today term ‗public goods‘ (Cf. 
chapter 6, and the section, Public goods. 
242 The original text in German: „Endlich kennt Smith nur eine Kapitalart, 
das physische, äußerliche Kapital. Neben diesem gibt es aber noch ein wenigs-
tens ebenso wichtiges oder noch wichtigeres geistiges (42) Kapital.― I owe this 
reference to Hildebrand, to Prof. Bertram Schefold, Frankfurt a.M. 
243 Hildebrand‗s text in German is this: „Diese sittliche Kraft, welche dem 
alten Rom fehlte und welche im heutigen Britannien die Nation groß gemacht 
hat, ist freilich keine sinnlich wahrnehmbare Größe. Ihr Umfang und ihre In-
tensität können weder durch Beobachtungen ermittelt, noch durch Experi-
mente gemessen werden. Sie ist wie die Wissenschaft und die Intelligenz eine 
unsichtbare Macht, die in den Herzen und in den Gesinnungen der Menschen 
lebt und nur in ihren Wirkungen auf das Pflichtgefühl und die persönliche 
Willenskraft der "einzelnen Individuen erkennbar wird, aber sie muß deshalb 
nicht minder als der wichtigste Faktor neben (141) der Intelligenz im ökono-
mischen Völkerleben anerkannt werden. Sie, die durch den Grundsatz des 
„laissez faire― und durch die Hypothese der Naturgesetze beseitigt werden soll-
te, ist gerade die Seele jedes gesunden nationalökonomischen Volksorganis-
mus. 
Wie die Intelligenz die Fähigkeit und die Macht des Menschen vergrößert, 
durch geringeren Aufwand von Kräften größere nationalökonomische Resulta-
te zu erreichen, ebenso steigert die öffentliche Moral nicht nur den Fleiß, den 
Unternehmungsgeist und die Ausdauer in der Arbeit, sondern auch die Ge-
wissenhaftigkeit in der Pflichterfüllung, das gegenseitige Vertrauen, den Kredit 
und die Opferbereitwilligkeit für das gemeinsame Beste. Sie hebt den einzel-
nen Menschen aus seiner beschränkten egoistischen Welt auf den höheren 
Standpunkt des öffentlichen Gemeinwohls, gibt ihm ein Bewußtsein über den 
Zusammenhang seines speziellen Berufs mit der nationalen Arbeit und ver-
leiht dadurch seiner ganzen Tätigkeit höhere Zielpunkte und eine höhere Wei-
he, durch die wiederum seine Berufsfreude und seine Leistungsfähigkeit 
wächst. ― (Hildebrand, 1842, p. 300) 
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But of course, this moral power will be created neither by governmental 
measures nor by economic institutions. It is a spiritual capital of peoples, 
which is laboriously acquired only through hard work. It is the slow-
ripening fruit of a large experience-rich history; of an intense national cul-
tural and political life of an ordered and free State life. (Hildebrand, 1842, 
pp. 300-301, my translation) 244  
 
In Olli Turunen‘s Immaterial capital: ideas of human and social capital 
in the Older Historical School of German Political Economy, he briefly 
mentions Friedrich List as one starting point for his graduation thesis, 
and claims that List saw skills and acquired abilities as the most im-
portant components of a nation‘s stock of capital, 
 
Did Wilhelm  Roscher  (1817–1894),  Bruno  Hildebrand (1812–1878),  and 
Karl  Knies (1821–1898) develop Smith‘s  thoughts  further  or  is  there  to be  
found original contributions to modern thought?  
More to this, since already Friedrich List (1789–1846), an important fore-
runner of the Historical School seen sometimes as its founder, placed com-
munity over individual, though only insofar as it advanced the success of indi-
vidual, it is interesting to see what aspects of the contemporary and at the 
moment very trendy social capital theory are included in the works of Roscher, 
Knies, and Hildebrand.  In addition, for List human skills and acquired abili-
ties of human beings were the most important components of a nation‘s stock 
of capital.4 Thereby, the List‘s statement: ―the power to create riches is indefi-
nitely more important than the riches themselves,‖ will serve as a second 
starting point  for  this  study. (Turunen, 2007) 
 
The most prominent economist of the younger German Historical 
School, Gustav von Schmoller, seems to intensify the focus on immate-
rial productive forces. In his major work, Grundriss der Allgemeinen 
Volkswirtschaftslehre (‗Foundations of General Economics‘), he starts off 
the almost 1400 pages with a 75 page discussion of the immaterial 
foundations of economics, regarding issues such as language, writing, 
morality, customs, and law.  He also focuses very explicitly on the im-
material aspects of capital. In a later chapter on Fortune, capital and 
credit, he discusses the historical- and conceptual details of ‘Capital‘ at 
great length. Schmoller begins in this way, 
 
So we ask first, how did capital come into being ... 
On the one hand, people had to think ... on the other hand, they had to 
make technical advances ... This was first of all of a question of creating 
certain abilities, a slow process of education; .... The ablest, brightest, and 
                                       
244The original text in German: „Aber freilich kann diese sittliche Macht we-
der durch Regierungsmaßregeln noch durch ökonomische Institutionen ge-
schaffen werden. Sie ist ein geistiges Kapital der Völker, das nur durch lange 
harte Arbeit mühsam erworben wird, sie ist die langsam reifende Frucht einer 
großen erfahrungsreichen Geschichte, einer intensiven nationalen Kultur und 




strongest accumulated large inventories, created better means of produc-
tion.  
They advanced most rapidly to the fore, if they simultaneously could or-
ganise better than others both martially and politically, to protect them-
selves against enemies of all kinds. They achieved much more if they earlier 
than others learned working together ... and developed the forms and insti-
tutions in which this happened. With ascending culture, organisation be-
came a principal means of increasing supplies, and making more effective 
means of production.  
The economic and technical as well as the organizational excellence of 
families and tribes mainly became the inheritance of their descendants, for 
centuries and millennia; ...  (Schmoller, 1923, pp. 187-188, my transla-
tion)245 
 
It is clear, from this quotation alone, that Schmoller in his analysis of 
‗Capital‗ not only focuses on the ability to think as such, but also on its 
derivatives such as; co-operation, organisation and institutionalisation 
– all of which were issues close to the heart of Friedrich List in his con-
siderations of the same issue. Furthermore, like Adam Müller, List, and 
Hildebrand, Schmoller also brings up the historical aspect of accumu-
lated knowledge. They seem to form links in a common chain.  
Also Max Weber and Werner Sombart chose to focus on the immate-
rial aspects of capitalism, e.g. with Weber‘s The Protestant Ethic and the 
Spirit of Capitalism (Cf. Weber, 1904) and Sombart‘s ‗The Citizen – the 
Spiritual History of the Modern Businessman‘ (Cf. Sombart, 1913). The 
motivational factors here exposed, was a field where List excelled. 
 
 
4.17 Marx’s orthodoxy – algebra of exchange value  
 
The German born Karl Marx early on showed attempts at a more dy-
namic and Idealist view of economic development. In his Foundations 
(Grundrisse), Marx writes, 
                                       
245 The original text in German is: „Wir fragen also zuerst, wie entstand das 
Kapital … 
Die Menschen mußten einerseits denken,  … sie mußten anderseits  tech-
nische Fortschritte machen, … Es handelte sich zunächst bei all dem um die 
Ausbildung bestimmter Eigenschaften, um eine langsamen Erziehungsprozeß; 
…. Die fähigsten, klügsten, kräftigsten sammelten größere Vorräte, schufen 
bessere Produktionsmittel. Sie kamen am raschesten voran wenn sie zugleich 
kriegerisch und politisch organisiert, sich gegen Feinde aller Art besser als 
andere schützen konnten. Sie erzielten viel mehr, wenn sie früher als andere 
das Zusammenarbeiten mehrerer … erlernten und die Formen und Institutio-
nen, in welchen das geschah, ausbildeten. Diese Organisation wurde mit stei-
gender Kultur ein Hauptmittel, die Vorräte zu häusen, die Produktionsmitteln 
ergiebiger zu machen. 
Die wirtschaftlichen und technischen wie die organisatorischen Vorzüge der 
Familien und Stämmen blieben meist jahrhunderte- und jahrtausendelang 
das Erbe des Nachkommen; … ― (Schmoller, 1923, Vol. II; Book 3, chapter 5, § 




But to the degree that large industry develops, the creation of real wealth … 
depends rather on the general state of science and on the progress of tech-
nology, or the application of this science to production. (Marx, 1858, p. 704) 
 
In his classic The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory, Richard 
Bernstein accordingly comments that, 
 
If we take this suggestion seriously – and grasp the extent to which Marx‘ 
prediction had been realized in contemporary technological societies – then, 
at the very least, the original Marxist critique of political economy needs 
radical revision. (Bernstein, 1976 p.183)246 
 
Marx left this venue, and in general deals with the concept of Capital 
and growth in quite orthodox ways. Concerning the value of goods, 
Marx follows the Smithian tradition of focusing on exchange value only, 
 
The progress of our investigation will show that exchange-value is the only 
form in which the value of commodities can manifest itself or be expressed. 
(Marx, 1867, Vol. 1, Ch. 1) 
 
Likewise, Marx‘ contemporary Wilhelm Roscher writes that Marx‘ lim-
its his study of Capital to monetary expressions, 
 
Marx makes a very arbitrary assertion when he says that only the capital 
operating in trade, and even only that operating in trade where money is 
used as the instrument of exchange, can properly be called capital; and 
that therefore, the modern biography of capital dates back only from the 
16th century, (Das Kapital I, 106 ff.) (Roscher, 1877, § 42, p. 152) 
 
Roscher argues that an evaluation of productiveness must be based 
on a notion of imbedded value, 
 
It is clear that every political economist must construct his exposition of 
productiveness on his prior notions of goods and value. (Roscher, 1877, 
§48) 
                                       
246 Richard Bernstein discusses the ‗neo-Marxist‘ ‗Frankfurter School‘ and 
Max Horkheimer in particular, and adds, ―For this change affects all those 
concepts which Horkheimer claims form a ―conceptual whole,‖ especially the 
absolutely central one of surplus value. But we do not find in Horkheimer any 
attempt to begin the type of detailed revision that such as changed historical 
situation requires.‖ 
Bernstein indicates that when these Marxists were confronted with the in-
adequacies of Marxist economics, they took refuge in discussions over culture; 
―It is not surprising that Horkheimer and other central Frankfurt thinkers be-
came less and less interested in a systematic development of an historical rel-
evant critique of political economy, and more interested with the critique of 
ideology in its variety of expressions.‖ (Bernstein, 1976 p.183) This so-called 
‗Critical Theory‘ has been labelled ‗Cultural Marxism‘ by US Conservatives, 




Roscher furthermore argues that exchange value only has an interest 
for private agents and not for the nation, since it would leave out many 
―important elements‖ which a nation must consider ―because locomo-
tive of the economy of the nation‖, 
 
It has often been made a question, whether the valuation of resources 
should be based on the value in use, or the value in exchange of their con-
stituent parts. ... The latter has of course no interest, except in so far as we 
are concerned with ...  estimating the value of private resources, ... A valua-
tion, therefore, based on value in exchange, however interesting it might 
seem to be to enable us to determine how property is shared by the differ-
ent classes and persons that compose the nation, would afford but little in-
formation concerning the absolute amount of national wealth. This of 
course, applies in a much higher degree to the resources of the whole 
world. 
If now, we were to estimate the resources of an entire people or even the 
world, by summing up the value in exchange of their several component 
parts, many very important elements would be left out of the account en-
tirely; as for instance, harbors, navigable streams, numberless relations 
which have, indeed, no relation in exchange whatever, but which are of the 
highest importance, because locomotive of the economy of the nation. 
(Roscher, 1877, § 8)  
 
Since Marx insists on dealing primarily with exchange value, he may 
thereby be classified as an economist within the ‗mercantile‘ Smithian 
tradition, as opposed to ‗political economy‘ dealing with the needs of a 
nation.  
It is interesting but perhaps not very surprising to note that Marx 
seems to have followed the ―orthodox‖ road and its materialist stance 
also in his discussions of ‗capital‘: In the whole of the three volumes of 
The Capital, Marx does not once mention the concepts ‗human capital‘, 
‗intellectual capital‘, ‗mental capital‘, or ‗spiritual capital‘. When he does 
mention ‗social capital‘, the meaning is purely material and equivalent 
with the total capital of a society. For Marx, Capital accumulation tends 
to be an exercise in algebra, in the ‗mercantile‘ exchange-value tradi-
tion. 
Roscher claims that other socialists followed in Marx‘ footstep by also 
regarding Labour only from the materialist point of view, 
 
Many of the socialists take a retrograde step in this respect, inasmuch as 








List criticised Smith for his abstract way of dealing with economics,247 
as when he argues that Smith dealt with ‗capital‘ only from an ex-
change-value point of view. In other words, Smith dealt with capital as 
would a shopkeeper and accountant, and not as a national political 
economist should. List claims that Smith‘s generalisations would lead 
to gross misunderstandings of how an economy works, and with disas-
trous results.248 
List is in his reasoning also indirectly supported by two Liberal Aus-
trian-Americans. Ludwig von Mises in 1940 published his major work 
Human Action. A Treatise on Economics.249 Mises‘ book is written very 
much in the tradition of List, Hildebrand, Schmoller and Steiner in his, 
relatively speaking - regarding economists, focus and emphasis on 
methodology and on the realm and importance of ideas. For instance, 
Mises argues that only the human mind is the source of creativity and 
production, 
 
Only the human mind that directs action and production is creative. The 
mind too appertains to the universe and to nature; it is a part of the given 
and existing world. To call the mind creative is not to indulge in any meta-
physical speculations. We call it creative because we are at a loss to trace 
the changes brought about by human action farther back than to the point 
at which we are faced with the intervention of reason directing human ac-
tivities. Production is not something physical, material, and external; it is a 
spiritual and intellectual phenomenon. Its essential requisites are not hu-
man labor and external natural forces and things, but the decision of the 
mind to use these factors as means for the attainment of ends. What pro-
duces the product are not toil and trouble in themselves, but the fact that 
the toiling is guided by reason. The human mind alone has the power to 
remove uneasiness. 
 
As noted above, the Austrian-American Joseph Alois Schumpeter ar-
gues that Smith‘s analysis only looks less abstract, but in reality 
Smith‘s ―reasoning is not less abstract than ... Ricardo‘s‖ (Schumpeter, 
1954, p. 538n).250 
Ludwig von Mises argues that the (general) concept of ‗capital‘, as 
used among economists, is an immaterial fiction, which only serves as a 
tool for calculations. Furthermore, it is only effective to the degree that 
men allow themselves to be guided by accounting, alone - we might 
add. 
                                       
247 Cf, e.g. chapter 3, in the section, Generalisation and abstraction. 
248 Cf, e.g. chapter 3, in the section, Differentiate kinds of capital – and la-
bour. 
249 Or as the original was called in German; ‚Nationalökonomie. Theorie Des 
Handelns und Wirthschaftens (meaning; National Economics. Theory of Trade 
and Business). 
250 For a more extensive quotation, see chapter 3, in the section, Generalisa-
tion and abstraction. 
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More specifically, Mises argues that action is guided by ideas and 
hence by leaders who are empowered by ideologies. Power is therefore a 
spiritual phenomenon,  
 
… Action is always directed by ideas; it realizes what previous thinking has 
designed.   
If we hypostatize or anthropomorphize the notion of ideology, we may say 
that ideologies have might over men. Might is the faculty or power of direct-
ing actions. … . Only ideologies can convey to a man the power to influence 
other people‘s choices and conduct. One can become a leader only if one is 
supported by an ideology which makes other people tractable and accom-
modating. Might is thus not a physical and tangible thing, but a moral and 
spiritual phenomenon. (Mises, 1940, p. 176) 
 
Following this line of thought, in the chapter Accumulation, Mainte-
nance and Consumption of Capital, Mises starts by arguing that ‗Capital‘ 
is nothing but a conceptual tool to guide action, 
 
Capital goods are intermediary products which in the further course of 
production activities are transformed into consumers‘ goods. All capital 
goods, including those not called perishable, perish either in wearing out 
their serviceableness in the performance of production processes or in los-
ing their serviceableness, even before this happens, through a change in 
the market data. There is no question of keeping a stock of capital goods in-
tact. They are transient. 
The notion of wealth constancy is an outgrowth of deliberate planning 
and acting. It refers to the concept of capital as applied in capital account-
ing, not to the capital goods as such. The idea of capital has no counterpart 
in the physical universe of tangible things. It is nowhere but in the minds of 
planning men. It is an element in economic calculation. Capital accounting 
serves one purpose only. It is designed to make us know how our arrange-
ment of production and consumption acts upon our power to satisfy future 
wants. 
The intention of preserving the available supply of capital goods in full 
power or of increasing it could also direct the actions of men who did not 
have the mental tool of economic calculation. … (Mises, 1940, p. 476) 
 
The general concept of ‗capital‘ is only effective to the degree that men 
allow themselves to be guided by accounting, 
 
Conceptual realism has muddled the comprehension of the concept of 
capital. It has brought about a mythology of capital. …  
An existence has been attributed to ―capital,‖ independent of the capital 
goods in which it is embodied. Capital, it is said, reproduces itself and thus 
provides for its own maintenance. Capital, says the Marxian, hatches out 
profit. All this is nonsense. 
Capital is a praxeological concept. It is a product of reasoning, and its 
place is in the human mind. It is a mode of looking at the problems of act-
ing, a method of appraising them from the point of view of a definite plan. It 
determines the course of human action and is, in this sense only, a real 
factor. It is inescapably linked with capitalism, the market economy. 
227 
 
The capital concept is operative as far as men in their actions let them-
selves be guided by capital accounting. … (Mises, 1940, p. 477)  
 
Fritz Machlup was an Austrian student of Ludvig von Mises, and con-




4.19 Growth theory – thought as the lacking source 
 
In their article, Exploring the genesis of economic innovations, Erik S. 
Reinert and Arno M. Daastøl describe how the understanding of growth 
and development gradually has improved, 
 
Starting from a capital-centered view of growth, the economics profession 
has moved through various layers of explanations - unknowingly approach-
ing the understanding of economic growth much in the same way one 
would peel an onion, ever finding a new issue once the previous issue had 
been brought into view. Very early theories of development tended to focus 
on geography and climate. In the neo-classical tradition capital, of course, 
is the main factor which virtually alone was supposed to account for the 
growth process. Schumpeter once referred to this as ‗the pedestrian view 
that it is the accumulation of capital per se that propels the capitalist en-
gine‘252. Outside the mainstream human creativity, in the form of entrepre-
neurship, was studied. Also here, in the atomistic tradition of modern eco-
nomics, focus was mostly on individuals, not on society or its institutions.  
In the late 1960‘s focus shifted to technology. An early and important 
book in this tradition was David Landes‘ The Unbound Prometheus 253. 
Technology is normally seen as consisting of two parts, a ‗hard‘ part - the 
tool or machine - and a ‗soft‘ part - human knowledge. For a long time, the 
study of technology concentrated on the ‗hardware‘, the machine. Implicitly, 
knowledge was seen in the light of neo-classical ‗perfect information‘, and 
therefore not important to technological change. Consequently ‗technology 
transfer‘ came to be seen as a transfer of hardware, of machinery, while lit-
tle attention was paid to human knowledge. Knowledge was seen to be ‗cod-
ified‘ - as in instruction booklets - and easily transferred. This is the formal 
and static interpretation of knowledge, as opposed to an alternative view 
which is more tacit, intuitive, and creative.  
As a next step the entrepreneur and the machine came to be seen as part 
of a system which continuously created innovations - a ‗National Innovation 
System‘254. This brand of evolutionary or Schumpeterian approach got its 
‗seal-of-approval‘ by the establishment through a large OECD programme, 
                                       
251 See the section above, Knowledge and information economics. 
252 Schumpeter, Joseph A. History of Economic Analysis, New York, Oxford 
University Press, 1954, p. 468. (Reinert and Daastol‘s note) 
253 Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1969. (Reinert and Daastol‘s 
note) 
254 Lundvall, Bengt-Åke (ed.), National Systems of Innovation, London, Pinter, 
1992, and Nelson, Richard (ed.), National Innovation Systems, New York, Oxford 
University Press, 1993. (Reinert and Daastol‘s note) 
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‗Technology and Economy‘, which was finished in 1992.255 The layer which 
required understanding after ‗the machine‘ - the hardware of technology - 
was ‗knowledge‘. Slowly the concept of knowledge itself was brought into fo-
cus - and the importance of ‗tacit‘ or uncodified knowledge was acknowl-
edged. (Reinert and Daastol, 1997) 
 
Reinert and Daastol are a bit off the mark here, since even in the ear-
ly 1960s and including the USA, several economists pointed to the in-
tangible factors of knowledge and education as the main driving force of 
growth (Schultz, 1963, Becker, 1963, and Machlup, 1964). There was 
also discussion along these lines in the early 1950s, such as in Nor-
way‘s Ministry of Finance (Cf. ―Group‖, 1952).  
Moreover, economic scholars in the German Language area were of 
course no strangers to such ideas, which had been debated without in-
terruption since before the time of Müller and List (Cf. e.g. Hildebrand, 
1848; Roscher, 1877; Schmoller, 1900; Mises, 1940; Eckert, 1963).  
We will now look briefly at the development of such ideas of intangi-
ble factors in the USA, since this is what most of academia today re-
members, 
In the tradition of Mercantilism and also the English Classical 
School, as well as the post WW II period, generally speaking, the fun-
damental task of the economic science has been to promote material 
growth.256 Distribution and other issues have been seen as secondary 
to this task, although of course related. Growth has been defined as in-
creased production, and therefore determined by what is productive. 
It has been common practice to consider economic growth as a result 
of in particular two factors: Labour and capital, but often with nature/ 
land added as a third factor. This makes it possible to quantify a theory 
if one also assumes that each factor is homogenous, which of course is 
the opposed to Malthus and Ricardo‘s basic argument concerning land. 
This is of course in general not true either, but it is a convenient simpli-
fying tool in order to bring forward and highlight some points of argu-
ment.  
A problem it is, however, that this insistence on measurement as the 
prime tool blurs other important points, and in particular the role of 
thinking, which only to a small degree is quantifiable.  
Increasingly economists have realised that technological progress is a 
key factor in promoting and explaining economic growth. Human 
thought is the main factor behind technological progress, but textbooks 
                                       
255 OECD, Technology and Productivity. The Challenge for Economic Policy, 
Paris, OECD, 1991, and Technology and the Economy. The Key Relationships, 
Paris, OECD, 1992. (Reinert and Daastol‘s note) 
256 That the fundamental task was seen differently in other countries is a 
matter we shall leave alone here, and restrict ourselves to note that Friedrich 
List was part of a tradition, where material growth only was one tool to a greater 
goal, namely the progress of civilisation. List view here corresponds e.g. with 




have indeed dealt poorly with it. Robert Heilbroner writes in 1989 about 
human capital in individualistic terms, 
 
… our human capital of skills and knowledge. In the long run this is proba-
bly the ultimate source of a country`s productivity and inventiveness -... 
(Heilbroner, 1989, p. 217)  
 
As an indication of the difference between academic textbook eco-
nomics and business in practice, the following document may be of in-
terest. In the summary of Stefan Bergheim‘s 2005 report for Deutsche 
Bank Research, Human capital is the key to growth, Success Stories and 
Policies for 2020, he writes that,  
 
• Many of the growth stars identified in our introductory study ―Global 
Growth Centres 2020‖ owe their success to solid gains in human capital – 
especially India, China, Thailand and Spain. 
• Our empirical investigation supports the view that human capital is the 
most important factor of production in today‘s economies. Increases in hu-
man capital are crucial to achieving increases in GDP. The best available 
proxy for human capital is the average years of education of the population 
aged 25 to 64. (Bergheim, 2005)257 
 
Wealth and its growth have normally been seen as related to con-
sumption, of food, houses, cars, etc. Such measurements say nothing 
of the reasons behind wealth and growth, or of whether they are sus-
tainable. This was indeed one of List‘s main criticisms of the Smithians, 
that they mistook nominal wealth (‗exchange values‘) for the ability to 
produce them (‗productive force‘). List pointed to the role of what we 
may term technology, read large – encompassing also ‗cultural technol-
ogy‘, such as discipline, law, administration, language, grammar. 
Relating economic growth to technological progress gives us an op-
portunity for a better definition of growth. Growth can be seen as the 
increased power to manipulate nature to satisfy the needs of mankind 
for physical survival. The result could be measured in the potential 
human density per area of land.  
I will use standard and classic textbooks to visualise the academic 
treatment of the growth issue and more specifically the human capital 
issue and the issue of technological improvement. Newer textbooks do 
offer more details and insight into these issues, but only slightly so.  
Dornbusch and Fisher make no effort to define the concept of growth 
other than as output in a monetary unit, in US dollars (Dornbusch and 
Fischer, 1978, ch. 17: Long term Growth, pp. 548 ff). They write, 
 
Growth theory asks what factors account for the increase in output over 
time, and what behavior an economic system will show along the growth 
path of full-employment output. (Dornbusch and Fischer, 1978, p. 549) 
 
                                       
257 The second half of this quotation is repeated in the section on education. 
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They explain the causes of growth in this way in the section Sources 
of Growth in Real Income: Theory, 
 
What are the sources of growth in real output over time? The simple an-
swer is: First, growth in the availability of factors of production and, se-
cond, improvements in technology. (Dornbusch and Fischer, 1978, p. 551) 
 
In the subsequent section, Sources of Growth, they write about ac-
cumulation of material capital, 
 
We have seen that growth in the amount of capital per head increases 
the output per head. One of the sources of long-term growth in output per 
head is that capital has grown faster than labor and therefore has caused 
the capital-labor ratio to rise. ….  
An improvement in technology would mean that we can produce with the 
same amount of capital per head a larger quantity of output per head. Our 
second source of growth is therefore improvement in technology, or techno-
logical progress.  … Growth in capital per head and technology are the only 
sources of growth in output per head.  (Dornbusch and Fischer, 1978, pp. 
553-555) 
 
In essence, ‗improvement in technology‘ or ‗technological progress‘ is 
synonymous with ‗capital improvement‘ - that a given ―amount‖ of capi-
tal has been qualitatively improved and / or replaced by qualitatively 
better capital. In other words, a quantitative approach does not tell the 
whole story. However, by how much are we off the mark if we stick to 
the quantitative approach alone?  
In his Resource and Output Trends in the US since 1870, Moses 
Abramowitz showed in 1956 that capital accumulation accounted for 
some 10-15 % of US economic growth (Abramowitz, 1956). 
‗Nobel‘ Laureate Robert Solow published in 1957 the MIT study Tech-
nical Change and the Aggregate Production Function. Solow does not de-
fine technological progress, but in the conclusion, Solow writes that 
technical progress accounts for 87.5 % of economic growth, and that 
there is a slight degree of diminishing returns, 
 
Among the conclusions which emerge from a crude application to Ameri-
can data, 1909-49, are the following: 
1. Technical change during that period was neutral on average. 
2. The upward shift in the production function was, apart from fluctua-
tions, at a rate of about one per cent per year for the first half of the 
period and 2 per cent per year for the last half. 
3. Gross output per man hour doubled over the interval, with 87,5 per 
cent of the increase attributable to technical change and the remain-
ing 12 ½ per cent to increased use of capital. 
4. The aggregate production function, corrected for technical change, 
gives a distinct impression of diminishing returns, but the curvature 




What Solow referred to as technical progress was often referred to as 
‗the Solow residual‘ of 87.5 %, or simply the ‗residual‘. This phenome-
non was duly noticed also in the textbook literature. Dornbusch and 
Fischer write in 1978,  
 
An early and famous study by Robert Solow of MIT dealt with the period 
1909-1949 in the United States.258 Solow‘s surprising conclusion was that 
over 80 percent of the growth in output per man hour over that period was 
due to technical progress, that is, to factors other than growth in the input 
of capital per man hour. (Dornbusch and Fischer, 1978, p. 556) 
 
A more recent view from 2002 elaborates the issue somewhat. Dis-
cussing the Solow model N. Gregory Mankiw259  writes, in the fifth edi-
tion of his textbook Macroeconomics, 
 
With the addition of technological progress, our model can finally explain 
the sustained increases in standards of living that we observe. That is, we 
have shown that technological progress can lead to sustained growth in 
output per worker. By contrast, a high rate of saving leads to a high rate of 
growth only until the steady state is reached. Once the economy is in 
steady state, the rate of growth of output per worker depends only on the 
rate of technological progress. According to the Solow model, only techno-
logical progress can explain persistently rising living standards.  
The introduction of technological progress also modifies the criterion for 
the Golden Rule. The Golden Rule level of capital is now defined as the 
steady state that maximizes consumption per effective worker. (Mankiw, 
2002, p. 214) 
 
Solow and Mankiw thereby claim that technological progress is the 
only long-term factor that can promote growth. In spite of this, Mankiw 
then only uses seven sentences (out of a book of 462 pages) on the 
chapter Encouraging Technological Progress, to explain how technologi-
cal progress can be promoted. Mankiw writes, 
 
The Solow model shows that sustained growth in income per worker 
must come from technological progress. The Solow model, however, takes 
technological progress as exogenous; it does not explain it. Unfortunately, 
the determinants of technological progress are not well understood.  
Despite this limited understanding, many public policies are designed to 
stimulate technological progress. Most of these policies encourage the pri-
vate sector to devote resources to technological innovation. For example, 
the patent system gives a temporary monopoly to inventors of new prod-
                                       
258 4: Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function,‖ Review of 
Economics and Statistics, August 1957. (Dornbusch and Fischer‘s note) 
259 N. Gregory Mankiw is one of the world‘s most influential economists (ac-
tually ranked 22nd, above US Federal Reserve President Ben Bernanke, Cf. 
RePEc, 2011). He has written one of the most used text books in economics, 
«Principles of Economics», sold in over one million copies (Mankiw, 1998). From 
2003 til 2005 he was the Chairman of US President‘s G.W. Bush‘s Council of 
Economic Advisors.  
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ucts; the tax code offers tax breaks for firms engaging in research and de-
velopment; and government agencies such as the National Science Founda-
tion directly subsidize basic research in universities. In addition, as dis-
cussed above, proponents of industrial policy argue that the government 
should take a more active role in promoting specific industries that are key 
for rapid technological progress. (Mankiw, 2002, p. 189) 
 
Moreover, in spite of human thought and science being the obvious 
forces behind technological progress, not a word is written on the issue 
by e.g. Mankiw. What motivates thought (including innovation of 
course) ought to be the core theme of economic growth theory, and eco-
nomics as such, but today this core theme is totally absent in econom-
ics. Some space is given to an offspring of thought, namely technologi-
cal progress, but in the core literature even this is treated rather hap-
hazard, as in Makiew‘s seven sentences out of 462 pages. Dornbusch 
and Fischer‘s textbook is not any better, and indeed symptomatically 
the authors are more interested in the model than in the real world: 
They spend one page discussing the effects of technological progress on 
the model as opposed to discussing technology in the real world. The 
reasons for technological progress, is obviously of no interest. 
 
In his classic Phases of Capitalist Development, the OECD-expert An-
gus Maddison writes,  
 
Technological progress is the most essential characteristic of modern 
growth and the one that is most difficult to quantify or explain. (Maddison, 
1982, p. 56) 
 
The difficulty in quantifying technological growth may explain the ig-
norance in standard economic textbooks about technological growth. 
By looking at thought as a production factor, we would achieve a 
closer connection to other sciences and to philosophy, and achieve wid-
er perspective and more closeness to goal and meaning in economic pol-
icy. Looking at the above quotation from Mankiw, and even more so the 
work of Dornbusch and Fischer, it seems that a lot is to be learned 
about growth, by reading Friedrich List‘s 170-180 year old works who 
focuses precisely on these ignored issues. That List has been ignored 
for so long in this field, in spite of his main work having been translated 
also into English in Britain (1884, 1904, and 1928) and the USA (1856), 
certainly leaves something to be explained. 
List addresses the issue of technological progress directly and indi-
rectly when discussing the confederation of labour (‗national teamwork‘) 
and by discussing what he calls ‗Capital of Mind‘.  
 
 
4.20 National innovation systems - based on mental capital  
 
Starting around 1990, a group of researchers in the industrialised 
countries called for ‗national innovation systems‘ to be developed more 
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consciously in order to promote technological and thereby economic 
growth (Freeman, 1982, 1987 and 1995; Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993; 
Edquist, 1997, Mietttinen, 2002) 
This reached perhaps its peak with the OECD report in 1997: Na-
tional Innovation Systems (OECD, 1997). This was much inspired by 
similar attempts in Japan and other Asian countries. However, we shall 
see below, the inspiration was far older than this and closer to home. 
In essence, a ‗national innovation system‘ means an active network 
that promotes technical innovation through a flow of technologically 
related information among people, enterprises and institutions like uni-
versities and government research institutes. Bengt-Åge Lundvall, one 
of the originators of the theory, writes that Freeman by referring to List 
established a connection between innovation theory and development 
theory,  
 
1.1. The Origin of the Concept  
 
The innovation system concept was developed in parallel at different places 
in Europe and in the USA in the 1980s. There is no doubt that the collabo-
ration between Christopher Freeman and the IKE group in Aalborg at the 
beginning of the 1980s was important in coining and shaping the earliest 
versions of the concept (Freeman, 1982; Lundvall, 1985) but the basic in-
gredients and the inspiration may be found in the work of many other inno-
vation scholars at the same time and even earlier.  
Freeman brought deep understanding of innovation processes, historical 
insight and wisdom to the collaboration. His reference to Friedrich List in 
his 1982 paper was crucial since it linked the concept to catching-up pro-
cesses.  (Lundvall, 2007) 
 
Freeman introduces his 1982 paper such,  
 
The paper is probably the first written paper using the concept of 'the na-
tional innovation system'.  … The analysis is rooted in historical context 
through references to Friedrich List and his criticism of Adam Smith and 
laissez-faire. (Cf. Freeman, 1982, preface, p. 2) 
 
Lundvall also points to List as an early predecessor of ‗national inno-
vation systems‘ due to his emphasis on ‗national production systems‘ 
wherein ‗mental capital‘ played the key role. He furthermore points out 
that the originator of the concept of ‗national innovation systems‘, 
Freeman, wrote about it while inspired by List. Lundvall points out that 
important elements of modern theory came from research on develop-
ment issues. Lundvall writes, 
 
5.2. Common Roots  
The history and development of the concept of "national system of inno-
vation" indicates that it can be useful for analysing less developed econo-
mies. Some of the basic ideas behind it go back to Friedrich List (List, 
1841a) and they were developed as the basis for a German "catching-up" 
strategy. His concept of "national systems of production" took into account 
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a wide set of national institutions including those engaged in education and 
training as well as infrastructures such as networks for transportation of 
people and commodities (Freeman, 1995b).  
List's analysis focused on the development of productive forces rather 
than on allocation issues. He was critical and polemic to the "cosmopolitan" 
approach of Adam Smith, where free trade was assumed always to be to the 
advantage of the weak as well as the strong national economies. Referring 
to the "national production system", List pointed to the need to build na-
tional infrastructure and institutions in order to promote the accumulation 
of "mental capital" and use it to spur economic development rather than 
just to sit back and trust "the invisible hand" to solve all problems. It was a 
perspective and a strategy for the "catching-up" economy of early 19th-
century Germany.  
The first written contribution that used the concept "national system of 
innovation" (Freeman, 1982), "Technological Infrastructure and Interna-
tional Competitiveness", was written very much in the spirit of Friedrich 
List, pointing out the importance of an active role for government in pro-
moting technological infrastructure. It also discusses in critical terms under 
what circumstances free trade will promote economic development.  
It is also interesting to note that while the modern version of the concept 
of national systems of innovation was developed mainly in rich countries 
(Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993; Edquist, 1997) some of the most important 
elements in the concept actually came from the literature on development 
issues in the Third World. (Lundvall, 2007) 
 
However, List, as could be expected, was not the first person who 
thought along these lines. Although neither he was the first, but never-
theless already Leibniz called for a national program for the elevation of 
arts and handicrafts, meaning knowledge and industry, modelled on 
Richelieu‘s Académie française for the promotion of the French lan-
guage (formally from 1635) and then Colbert‘s Académie des sciences, 
established 1666 (Leibniz, 1671a). Leibniz was later instrumental in 
founding the Academies of Berlin and St. Petersburg.  
In the republishing of Freeman‘s 1982 article in 2003, Lundvall 
writes in the preface that Freeman saw List‘s main contribution to be 
his emphasis on infrastructure and ‗mental capital‘, 
 
To the best of my knowledge it is the first written contribution that uses 
the concept national system of innovation (see below on p. 9). It is interest-
ing to note that he put national in italics in the original text and if anything 
that indicates that the innovation system had already become an everyday 
concept for him.  
But more remarkable than the fact that this is the richness of the con-
text in which the concept appears. Many of the points that current research 
on innovation systems are focusing on are already raised and the contours 
of the full-blown concept are already to be seen in this paper. … 
Also in terms of policy conclusions the paper is very rich. It starts from 
List‘s criticism of Adam Smith and it shows that the most important contri-
bution by List was not his protectionist proposals but rather the emphasis 
put on governmental initiatives to build ‗infrastructure‘ and invest in ‗men-
tal capital‘. It opens up what is certainly a very controversial possibility in 
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the OECD-context that free trade might not be to the advantage of weak 
players. Finally it points to the need for policy co-ordination across policy 
fields, including technology and industrial policy. (Freeman, 1982, preface, 
p. 2) 
 
Lundvall is, however, slightly wrong. Freeman did not write that List‘s 
most important contribution was the emphasis on ‗infrastructure‘ and 
‗mental capital. Rather Freeman writes that ―the central feature‖ was 
―‗the mental capital‘ and productive powers of the nation‖.  
 
… the central feature of List's doctrine was his belief that economic pro-
gress depended on building up the ‗mental capital‘ and productive powers 
of the nation. This depended in turn on the capacity to assimilate and use 
all the discoveries, inventions and improvements which had been made in 
any part of the world and to improve upon them. … (Freeman, 1982, ch. 6, 
p. 16) 
 
But neither is this strictly speaking correct, but it would have been if 
we exchange the word ‗and‘ with the word ‗as‘: The point being that List 
saw ‗mental capital‘ as the central feature of the productive powers of 
the nation. Freeman is more precise when he lists the ―fundamental 
points‖ in List‘s strategy, and begins with ―(1) The importance of ‗mental 
capital‘‖. Freeman then suggests that,  
 
… ‗intellectual capital‘ might be a better rendering today than the English 
translation of that time. (Freeman, 1982, ch. 5, p. 14) 
 
List‘s original expression was Geistige Kapital, and the direct transla-
tion would be ‗spiritual capital‘. This would include all kinds of immate-
rial infrastructure such as language, grammar, morality, work disci-
pline, contract morality, measurement standards, organisational struc-
ture, institutions etc. ‗Intellectual capital‘ has a far narrower ring to it 
and Freeman‘s suggestion is therefore neither adequate nor good.  
List himself lists the following as capital of mind, 
 
Greater part of the productive power consists in the intellectual and so-
cial conditions of the individuals, which I call capital of mind. (List, 1827b, 
p. 192) 
 
164 years after the passing of Friedrich List, and 28 years after 
Freeman‘s article, the concept ‗Geistiges Kapital‘ or ‗Mental Capital‘ has 
still not received a general acceptance. A Google search in May 2010 for 
the combination of the two "Friedrich List" "Geistige Kapital" produced 
only 22 hits, and only 13 hits when we changed the grammar slightly to 
"Geistiges Kapital". The combination of "Friedrich List" and "Mental 
Capital‖ produced 77 hits, while "Friedrich List" and "Spiritual Capital‖ 
produced 29 hits. Many of these hits referred to the same sources. 
In his fifth chapter, Friedrich List, Laissez-Faire and Mental Capital, 
Freeman writes that List ―anticipated by more than a century the ‗hu-




In particular, the most important and influential economic theorist in 
Germany, Friedrich List, discussed the British economy in terms highly 
reminiscent of much contemporary discussion on Japan. He was a powerful 
critic of Adam Smith on a number of key issues, which are relevant to our 
analysis: … 
This perversity of surrendering the interests of manufactures and agri-
culture to the demands of commerce without reservation, is a natural con-
sequence of that theory which everywhere merely takes into account pre-
sent values, but nowhere the powers that produce them, and regards the 
whole world as but one indivisible republic of merchants.260 … 
He accompanied this onslaught on the ‗school‘ by another line of attack 
in which he anticipated by more than a century the ‗human capital‘ theo-
ries of the neo-classical school. … (Freeman, 1982, ch. 5, pp. 12-13) 
 
Freeman argues that to understand international competition, ―We 
must go to the original source of the national competitivity school.‖; 
read List in the original, and notice that ―The fundamental points‖ are 
―1. The importance of ‗mental capital‘― …,  
 
These arguments of List have been quoted at considerable length for sev-
eral reasons. First, to convey the flavour and the vehemence of List's on-
slaught. Secondly, because List is seldom read in the original in these days. 
Thirdly, and most important, because in these passages are contained the 
seeds of most of the policies later adopted in Germany (and in other coun-
tries trying to overtake established technology and trade leaders. If we are 
really to understand international competitively, then it is of no use to go 
back to Adam Smith and still less to Ricardo and the ‗school‘ of neo-
classical comparative advantage theory, and Michalet has rightly warned 
against this.261 We must go to the original source of the national competitiv-
ity school. No doubt, if Adam Smith had been writing two hundred years 
later he would have been able to find many much better examples of the fol-
ly of ‗artificial‘ investment in non-competitive industries than the hypothet-
ical and improbable one of vine-growing in Scotland. No doubt either, as 
many have observed, that List exaggerated somewhat the extent to which 
Adam Smith might be criticised for the dogmatism of his followers (the 
‗school‘).  
Nevertheless, the debate still has a contemporary ring and is echoed to-
day around the whole world, and not only in the industrialising countries of 
the Third World with their infant and teenage industries.  
The fundamental points in List's spirited defence of national competitive 
strategies were the following:  
(1) The importance of ‗mental capital‘ … (Freeman, 1982, ch. 5) 
 
In 1987, Christopher Freeman published the book, Technology and 
Economic Performance: Lessons from Japan and the chapter, Technologi-
cal leadership and trade performance. In this chapter, he writes that 
                                       
260 28: (Freeman‘s note) 
261 2. Michalet, C. A. (1981), 'Competitiveness and internationalisation', 
DSTI/ SPR/ 81.63, OECD, Paris. (Freeman‘s note) 
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long-term shift in export shares were not ―primarily explicable in tradi-
tional price competition theory, but must be explained in other terms.‖ 
He then refers to the role of ‗technology‘, which had been referred to as 
the culprit in several sector-by-sector studies, as well as cross-sector 
studies, but not regarding the success of whole countries, which was a 
matter of fact. Freeman argues that traditional theory is unable to ex-
plain the process, so we have to look elsewhere for help, 
 
Catching up and overtaking established technological leaders could pose 
formidable problems for imitators and aspirants for leadership, since they 
must aim at a moving target. … We must start, not from such unrealistic 
assumptions deriving from general equilibrium theory, but from the evi-
dence of empirical research on the dynamics of technological competition. 
The findings of such research are virtually unanimous, … in pointing to 
several characteristics of the innovation process, which relate to externali-
ties, to the availability of skills, of external sources of research and devel-
opment support, to infrastructural investment and other features of the na-
tional system of innovation. (Freeman, 1987, pp. 96-97) 
 
Freeman argues that the factors involved have to be treated different-
ly in each country case, and that superior culture established Britain as 
a leader while having the highest wages, contrary to traditional price 
theory, 
 
What changes … is the mode of dealing with these basic characteristics, 
that is those social changes which permit and stimulate a particular society 
… 
This point should be understood above all in Britain … Economic histo-
rians are largely agreed that it was superior organisation, technology and 
machinery which enabled Britain to establish this lead, rather than lower 
labour costs or the relative prices of labour and capital. In fact British wag-
es were higher … (Freeman, 1987, pp. 97-98) 
 
Freeman thereby repeats the insights of List,262 namely that higher 
productivity based on superior mental capital allows for higher wages, 
and not only allows it but demands it, since a higher productivity of la-
bour presupposes a higher living standard. Moreover, as Freeman re-
peats, this is contrary to standard price oriented theories of competi-
tion. 
Freeman argues that Friedrich List early on understood the problems 
related to technology gaps and the caching up process, 
 
The explanation of economic development in terms of the opening up of 
technology 'gaps' and subsequent efforts by other countries to overtake 
(and surpass) the technological leaders is, of course, not new. It was al-
ready made quite explicit by Friedrich List … (who) had much of interest to 
say about uneven development. (Freeman, 1987, p. 98) 
                                       
262 Cf. e.g. List, 1837a, pp. 120-121, and List, 1841a, pp. 202-203, and au-




Freeman writes that, 
 
The fundamental points in List's advocacy of national technology strate-
gies were the following:  
 
1. The central importance of 'mental capital' … 
2. The necessity of importing the most advanced foreign … 
3.  … the importance of new investment … and … learning by doing … 
4. The importance of skills in the labour force... 
5.   The importance of the manufacturing sector … 
7.   Finally, List stressed very strongly the importance of an active national 
policy in order to promote long-term development, … (Freeman, 1987, pp. 
98-99) 
 
Freeman discusses the differences between German and British 
management, and claims that by following List‘s ideas, Germany devel-
oped a national education and training system, ―a national system of 
innovation‖, which made German industry more fitted to modern tech-
nical requirements than Britain‘s. 
 
The ideas advocated by List and his followers were important in the evo-
lution of German economic policies and German approaches to technology. 
Their first and most important consequence was the early development of 
an education and training system capable of putting the whole process of 
acquiring and disseminating world technology on a regular and systematic 
basis. By the late nineteenth century Germany had developed a 'national 
system of innovation‘  which proved superior to the British in terms of the 
education and training system, as well as the organisation of in-house re-
search and development in the new chemical and electrical industries. 
(Freeman, 1987, p. 100) 
 
Freeman finishes the chapter by discussing management traditions 
in several social sectors, and claims that practical focus on quality; de-
sign; and longer term strategic thinking was more typical of German 
society, and even more so of Japanese society, 
 
The German system, on the other hand, was based on thorough and de-
liberate professional development and on the recognition of Technik -design 
and engineering - as a 'third culture' equal in status to the arts and scienc-
es. This was of the greatest importance for the general 'management cul-
ture' in German industry. … 
The type of long-term strategic thinking necessary for long-term success 
with new technologies was therefore more characteristic of German than of 
British industry, as well as an insistence on high quality and good design 
on the technical side. This is even more true of Japanese firms in the most 
recent period.  
The importance of this long-term way of thinking was by no means con-
fined to German industry. It was also extremely important in government 
(for example, in the finance of research and education, as well as in 
measures to promote strategic industries) and in financial institutions. 
239 
 
Again, as we have seen in Chapters 2 and 3, this was and is even more im-
portant in Japan. . (Freeman, 1987, p. 101) 
 
Freeman‘s understanding of Germany and Japan as cultures that are 
particularly oriented towards long term quality is supported and de-
scribed in greater detail by other authors, such as Managers and Man-
agement in West Germany (by Peter Lawrence, 1980) and Confronting 
Managerialism (by Robert R. Locke and J.-C. Spender, 2012)  
In his Aspects of Design Policy in History, Professor John Heskett at 
School of Design, Hong Kong Polytechnic University, argues that List‘s 
specific emphasis on skill and competence was ignored in the US and 
England and for a long time also in Germany, but around the turn of 
the 20th Century Friedrich Naumann renewed List‘s emphasis on quali-
ty,  
 
List‘s work has tended to be ignored in Britain and the US, which instead 
have followed the economic doctrines derived from Adam Smith, emphasis-
ing individualism and the market as the defining forces of an economy. In 
Europe and Asia, however, a different emphasis is evident. In Germany, for 
example, industrialisation in the late nineteenth century resulted again in 
much copying and earned for German products a reputation for being 
cheap and nasty knock-offs. Reacting against this trend, politician Frie-
drich Naumann published a book in 1906, Neudeutsche Wirtschaftspolitik 
(New German Economic Policy), in which he wrote in terms similar to List: 
 
―One can only trade successfully with good products. The masses must 
therefore manufacture good products, if they are not to give up on physical 
and spiritual quality ... The content of this competition is the question: 
which nation has the best technology, the best forms and the best organiza-
tion of work and commerce. In other words, where is the highest human 
achievement becoming a mass phenomenon? ... But higher quality of prod-
ucts is not possible without higher quality of productive power, indeed, of 
all productive powers.‖6 (Heskett, 2010, p. 6)263 264 
 
Therefore, like List, Naumann claimed that quality production was 
only possible with a higher quality of Labour itself. 
 
 
4.21 Confederation of Labour  
 
Civil Society is part of what List and others termed the Confederation of 
Labour – which includes both the co-operative aspect of society – as 
well as the competitive aspect. 
Anyone who has taken part in practical production in a company of 
some kind knows that it demands a co-operative effort, and the quality 
                                       
263 [6] Naumann, F. (1906), Neudeutsche Wirtschaftspolitik, Buchverlag der 
‗Hilfe‘, Berlin, p. 20  (Heskett‘s note) 
264 Quotation marks has been inserted by me to make clear that the last par-
agraph is a quotation from Friedrich Naumann.  
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of co-operation determines the quality of the product. An economist in-
terested in production and growth ought therefore to study how to im-
prove co-operation. This is done in modern Management theory and in 
Sociology of labour and organisation.  
It was, however, ignored by the Cosmopolitan School, claims List. It 
may be fair to regard List as a pioneer in Management theory, preceding 
e.g. Henri Fayol (1841–1925) by decades, but of course himself being in 
debt to the Cameralist-Renaissance tradition of Statecraft and man-
agement. 
List agrees with Smith and Hamilton that division of labour was an 
important reason for productivity of labour,265 and he equally agreed 
that the union of labour - the confederation of labour - was important.  
Nevertheless, List also severely criticised Smith for dealing too shortly 
with the latter side to the coin, namely the confederation of labour, 
which to List was more important.  
 
The cause of the productiveness of these operations is not merely that 
division, but essentially this union. (List, 1841a, p. 150) 
 
In 1837 List argues for ―the principle of co-operation‖ of labour of all 
branches of industry of a nation, and prefers economic growth to be 
slow and steady, in order to avoid disruptive setbacks, 
 
The fullest development of manufacturing industry, however, will take 
place only when various branches of industry are so intimately linked that 
one process can follow another as closely as possible. The principle of co-
operation is as indispensable to steady regular industrial growth as the 
principle of the division of labour. 
Experience teaches us that a high degree of civilisation, and the labours 
of successive generations, are necessary to bring the industrial capacity of a 
country to a high degree of perfection. To achieve this object a regular - 
though perhaps a slow - rate of growth both of output and of sales must 
have first priority. Any step backwards must be avoided at all costs. (List, 
1837a, p. 28) 
 
A crucial point of List‘s criticism against Smith - related to Smith‘s 
generalisations - was Smith‘s one-eyed focus on the role of the division of 
labour. List applauded Smith‘s contribution in this area, but claimed that 
Smith had forgotten the other side to this phenomenon, namely the un-
ion- or confederation of labour, i.e. the co-operation of individuals and 
institutions (firms, regions and nations) in order to produce a result. This 
concerns several sub-issues. One issue is the immaterial side: The skill, 
morality, and insight required to co-operate.  
                                       
265 Before Adam Smith, the principle of the division of labour and its benefi-
cial effects was discussed for instance by Xenophon, Plato, Sir William Petty, 
Bernard de Mandeville, David Hume and Henri-Louis Duhamel du Monceau (Cf. 
e.g. Roscher, 1877). 
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List only starts to use this expression of the ‗confederation of labour‘ in 
his National System, but the concept behind it had been under way for 
some time. In the Natural System, he speaks of the principle co-operation, 
 
The principle of co-operation is as indispensable to steady regular indus-
trial growth as the principle of the division of labour. (List. 1837a, Letter I, 
p. 28) 
 
List also repeatedly mentions co-operation between agriculture and 
manufacture and co-operation between consumers and producers, as 
well as between different branches and different nations. The idea of an 
organic pulsating whole that constitutes the ‗confederation of labour‘ and 
innovation, seems to arrive later.266 
The method of the Cosmopolitical School is to promote international 
trade through national specialisation and cultivation of comparative ad-
vantages, and thereby promote national dependence on the internation-
al market – which England dominated both regarding finance, trade, 
transport, and not to forget, the navy. Whereas England promoted na-
tional dependence (for other nations), List promoted independence. The 
purpose of List‘s strategy was to establish a multifarious variety of 
competitive national industries in order to promote national sovereignty 
and productive synergy between economic sectors, as well as the men-
tioned stability mentioned above,  
 
The whole social state of a nation will be chiefly determined by the prin-
ciple of the variety and division of occupations and the cooperation of its 
productive powers.  (List, 1841a, p. 159)  
 
However, to achieve this, small nations had to unite into larger viable 
units that formed an aggregate within itself, 
 
The arguments of the school in favour of free competition are thus only 
applicable to the exchange between those who belong to one and the same 
nation. Every great nation, therefore, must endeavour to form an aggregate 
within itself, … (List, 1841a, p. 159)   
 
 Grand material achievements are only possible by the intergenera-
tional confederation of labour, List writes,  
 
The importance of this principle becomes still more evident in respect to 
material achievements. 
Individual cities, monasteries, and corporations have erected works the 
total cost of which perhaps surpassed the value of their whole property at 
                                       
266 The expression ‗confederation of labour‘ is often used in French and in 
Spanish to denote a the general or national union of workers, such as the old 
Anarchist union CNT in Spain (Confederation National del Trabajo) and the So-
cialist union CGT (Confederation General de Travail) in France, both meaning, 




the time. They could only obtain the means for this by successive genera-
tions devoting their savings to one and the same great purpose. 
Let us consider the canal and dyke system of Holland; it comprises the 
labours and savings of many generations. Only to a series of generations is 
it possible to complete systems of national transport or a complete system 
of fortifications and defensive works. (List, 1841a, p. 296) 
 
The concept of a Confederation of Labour has implications for 
transport and tariff policies. A higher union or confederation of labour 
requires better communication and co-operation. Geographical proximity 
between actors furthers better co-operation, and thereby improves syner-
gy between skills, trades and branches. Besides, it may be economical in 
the sense that it requires less transport and therefore use of resources 
like time and energy. However, such local confederation of labour may not 
develop ―naturally‖ and spontaneously, e.g. due to the lack of costly infra-
structure, but may require ―artificial measures‖ as macro planning and 
therefore governmental intervention and restriction of sorts, as with the 
customs union, the Zollverein. In his On the Use of the Railway (Cf. List, 
1841c), List describes how the tariff policy and infrastructure mutually 
support each other in the effort to construct a national confederation of 
labour,  
 
The railway system and the customs union are Siamese twins; born at 
the same time, physically attached to one another, of one mind and pur-
pose. They mutually support one another, strive for one and the same great 
goal, for the unification of the German peoples into one great and cultured, 
one wealthy, powerful and inviolable nation. Without the customs union a 
German railway system would never have come up for discussion, let alone 
have been completed. Only with the help of the German railway system is 
the cooperative economy of the Germans able to soar to national greatness, 
and only as a result of this prosperity can the railway system attain its full 
importance. (List, 1841c, see also the English translation in 1981, p. 183) 
 
In 1841, List similarly argues that the principle of co-operation of in-
dividuals in a factory was replicated on a national scale, 
 
The popular school … has not perceived that the same law extends its 
action especially over the whole … economy of the nation. (List, 1841a, 
p.151)267  
 
The principle of division of labour has not been fully grasped up to the 
present. Productivity depends not only on the division of various manufac-
turing operations among many individuals, but still more on  the moral and 
physical co-operation of these individuals for a common end.  
Thus the principle is applicable not merely to single factories or estates, 
but to the whole agricultural, manufacturing, and commercial forces of a 
nation. Division of labour and co-operation of productive powers exist 
                                       
267 The full quotation of the List‘s attack on the ―Popular school‖ and 
Smith‘s shallowness may be found in appendix 1a.  
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where the intellectual activity of a nation bears a proper ratio to its material 
production, where agriculture, industry, and trade are equally and harmo-
niously developed. (List, 1841b, Introduction, in Hirst, 1909, pp. 306-307)268 
 
In this section, List points out the benefits of proximity for stable 
production, and thereby the dangers of international dependency, 
which the world manufacturing system experienced after the earth-
quake and flood-wave in Japan early 2011, 
 
In like manner the entire manufacturing industry … will prosper the 
more the nearer they are placed to one another, and the less they are inter-
rupted in their mutual exchanges with one another. (List, 1841a, p. 151) 
 
List also claims that Smith neglects the fact that this co-operation is 
most successful where whole districts are devoted to their specialities. 
List thereby precedes Michael Porter‘s cluster theory by some 149 
years. (Porter, 1990)  
 
Smith had in view only the separate manufactory and the separate farm. 
He has, however, neglected to extend his principle over whole districts and 
provinces. Nowhere has the division of commercial operations and the con-
federation of the productive powers greater influence than where every dis-
trict and every province is in a position to devote itself exclusively, or at 
least chiefly, ... (List, 1841a, p. 151) 
 
The different emphasis (of Adam Smith and Friedrich List) regarding 
division versus co-operation of Labour has important implications. A 
one-eyed focus on the division of labour may lead the way to ―beastly‖ 
competition, and may be open to relatively mechanically analysis and 
biological metaphors - like that of Darwinistic competition drawn from 
Malthus‘ model.  
Confederation of labour on the other hand, more readily points to 
human compassionate activity by way of mental activity in the sense of 
moral reason: The unification of morality and intelligence. This aspect 
is less open to a mechanical analysis and to biological metaphors.  
The focus on the aspect of division and not on union was another 
factor that made formalisation of economics easier; and more lacking in 
relevance to real life. In the extreme, formalisation implies a mechanism 
that runs ―frictionless‖ without the transaction costs and externalities 
that human beings and institutions involve. 
For instance, the French co-founding father of Sociology, Émile 
Durkheim, argues that the division of labor serves to create social soli-
darity and that,  
 
                                       
268 List thereby precedes the OECD report National Innovations Systems by 
some 160 years (Cf. OECD, 1997).  
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...the economic services that it can render are insignificant compared with 
the moral effect that it produces, and its true function is to create between 
two or more people a feeling of solidarity. (Durkheim, 1893, p.17) 
 
When Durkheim argues that this integrative function is more im-
portant that the ―narrow‖ productive aspect, he is also right economi-
cally speaking - in a wider understanding of economics. This integrative 
function is of course of immense value, however immeasurable.269  
The Russian Anarchist Prince and Geographer Piotr Kropotkin ar-
gued in his Mutual Aid against Darwin, or perhaps more correctly so 
against Herbert Spencer and the Social Darwinists (Cf. Kropotkin, 
1904). Kropotkin argued that not competition but rather co-operation 
was the driving force of progress in history between races and species – 
of animals as well as human beings – in primitive societies as well as in 
modern societies. True to the main stream of his time, however, Kro-
potkin attributed this co-operative force to biology. As opposed to a bio-
logical understanding of altruism270 and 80 years before Kropotkin, List 
instead attributed this force of co-operation, in the idealistic fashion, to 
the human spirit.  
A recent illustration, of the principles of an organic confederation of 
labour versus a mechanical division of labour, is found in Robert R. 
Locke‘s article, Managerialism and the Demise of the Big Three. The big 
tree US automakers demise is explained as a failure to implement JMS 
(Japanese Management Systems). Success is here traced to successful 
Japanese confederation of labour (co-operation systematically geared 
towards quality and innovation), rather than American mechanical divi-
sion of labour (specialisation) and conflict-provoking authoritarian 
command lines. Locke writes,  
 
So it is the collective motivation and organizational learning capacity of 




4.22 Mental side of transportation 
 
The transportation system was a vital part of List‘s national confedera-
tion of Labour, being its physical foundation. Without this network glu-
ing together the individual parts, there would be no collaboration, no 
market, no confederation, and no nation.  
For some time, economists have understood the importance of physi-
cal transport, but it may surprise that List held that transport‘s prima-
ry function was cultural, or ideal. The most important role of transport 
was to convey ideas, spark new ideas and promote innovation. 
                                       
269 Paradoxically, Durkheim who was influenced by e.g., August Comte, en-
deavoured to use the methods of the physical and empirically sciences on social 
issues. 
270 Being perhaps a forerunner of ―the altruistic gene‖? 
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 List argues that transport was more important for its cultural (im-
material) impact than for its physical impact; more important for educa-
tion and production than for consumption;  
 
… railroad transport functions more spiritually than materially, more 
through people than through matter, more on the productive forces than on 
the distribution of goods, and finally more on education, the well-being and 
the enjoyment of the producing classes, than on the consuming. (List, 
1838, p. 7, my translation)271 
 
Furthermore, science, tourism, intercultural understanding and peace 
would increase due to cheaper transport, … 
… intercultural understanding and peace would increase due to cheaper 
transport. Transport was more important for its cultural (immaterial) im-
pact than for its physical impact (List, 1838, p. 7, my translation) 
 
The emphasis on the cultural role of transport has remained a strong 
tendency in German economic thought. Karl Bücher especially points to 
the crucial role of communication for economic activity and, in particu-
lar, for a community‘s cultural life, the liberation of the individual and 
the capacities of each individual, in the same spirit as List. Bücher calls 
attention to the cultural impact of transportation, 
 
… one would be wrong if one thinks that the effects of transport on economic 
system are limited. As we have shown it is in essence not at all an economic 
phenomenon, and treating transport as a part of economics has only served 
to limit the scope of view. This is already clear since every development 
begins with transport of intelligence, not with transport of goods and people, 
and since the early instances serve State purposes. (Bücher, 1893, pp. 212, 
my translation) 
 
The present transport system consists of a multifarious large number of 
private undertakings and public institutions. With its increasing independ-
ence and with universal access it has first of all become an enormous cul-
ture shaping power, which so often is praised.  Not only has it reshaped 
company structures of industry, agriculture, handicraft, mining, trade, 
banking and insurance, it has permeated the whole of human society and 
let it grow tightly together. (Bücher, 1893, p. 216, my translation) 
 
 
                                       
271 This is the original German version: „.. der Eisenbahntransport mehr 
geistig als materiell, mehr durch die Menschen als durch die Sachen, mehr 
auf die productiven Kräfte als auf die Verbreitung der Producte, endlich mehr 
auf die Bildung, das Wohlsein und die Genüsse der producirenden Classen, 
als der consumirenden zu wirken bestimmt ist.― (List, 1838, p. 7) 
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4.23 Urbanisation furthers communication, innovation and free-
dom272 
 
Early economists like Antonio Serra (Cf. Serra, 1613) and later Frie-
drich List argues that the crammed communication of towns made 
them the forging blacksmiths of progress.  
Theodore Laue describes List as the strongest adherent of an urban-
industrial society ever, and who anticipated Marx‘ disdain for "the idio-
cy of rural life". In contrast, according to List, the urban man is always 
on the alert and continuously sharpens his mind. Laue writes, 
 
There never was a more inspired paean to urban-industrial civilization 
than Chapter Seven, Book II, of the National System: "Of Manufacturing In-
dustry and of the Personal, Social, and Political Productive Forces or Pow-
ers of a Country." A rural society shows, one reads there, "slowness of ap-
prehension, bodily inactivity, adherence to old ideas, old processes, old us-
ages, old habits, a defective education, with lack of comfort and personal 
liberty." Trade and industry, on the other hand, stimulate "the desire for a 
continual increase of moral and material wealth, emulation, and a love of 
liberty." Here indeed was first spelled out what Marx a few years later in the 
Communist Manifesto called "the idiocy of rural life." Urban man, on the 
other hand, "is incessantly buying and selling, exchanging and negotiating. 
He is everywhere in collision with men, with laws and institutions; and he 
is kept at all times on the alert by changing circumstances; he has a hun-
dred-fold more occasion to exert his mind than the peasant." Further on 
one reads: "The well-known fact, that among manufacturers time has an 
incomparably greater value than among farmers, testifies to a higher esti-
mation of labor. The degree of civilization of a people and the estimate they 
fix upon labor cannot be better measured than by the value they set upon 
time." (Laue, 1963, p. 58) 
 
Individual freedom, diversification, democracy, and rule of law are 
according to List, vital result of urbanisation. List claims that industri-
alisation promotes urbanisation since it concentrates the productive 
factors,  
 
The productive powers of agriculture are scattered over a wide area. But 
the productive powers of industry are brought together and are centralised 
at one place. This process of concentration eventually creates an expansion 
of productive powers which grow in geometric rather than in arithmetic 
proportion. (List, 1837a, p. 69) 
 
When this concentration forges a geometric expansion, it might be 
read as if List envisions ‗increased returns‘ to scale, but this would not 
be precise. ‗Increased returns‘ is a strictly technical term, which means 
that the production elasticity for one input is higher than one, ceteris 
                                       
272 Cf. also the sections; Transportation and urbanisation promotes competi-




paribus, i.e. all other factors hold constant. In other words, ‗you gain 
more than you spend‘.  
In this case, the input is ―concentration‖ of productive factors, as List 
explains and List‘s reason for why concentration is productive is not 
technical, it is sociological,  
 
Mental friction, … , only exists where people live together closely, … 
Therefore liberty and civilisation have everywhere and at all times emanated 
from towns. (List, 1841a, pp. 203-204, see an extended quotation below) 
 
List explains that towns (and better communications) establish con-
centration. This concentration causes social and intellectual ―friction‖ 
and co-operation; which makes better ideas flourish; allows the indi-
vidual more opportunities; and develops better institutions. Towns are 
therefore the hotbed of individual liberty, innovation and the elevation 
of civilisation. List writes, 
 
Under the powerful influence of habit, everywhere among merely agricul-
tural nations has the yoke which brute force or superstition and priestcraft 
imposed upon them so grown into their very flesh, that they come to regard 
it as a necessary constituent of their own body, as a condition of their very 
existence. 
On the other hand, the separation and variety of the operations of busi-
ness, and the confederation of the productive powers, press with irresistible 
force the various manufacturers towards one another. Friction produces 
sparks of the mind, as well as those of natural fire. Mental friction, howev-
er, only exists where people live together closely, where frequent contact in 
commercial, scientific, social, civil, and political matters exists, where there 
is large interchange both of goods and ideas. The more men live together in 
one and the same place, the more every one of these men depends in his 
business on the co-operation of all others, the more the business of every 
one of these individuals requires knowledge, circumspection, education, 
and the less that obstinacy, lawlessness, oppression and arrogant opposi-
tion to justice interfere with the exertions of all these individuals and with 
the objects at which they aim, so much the more perfect will the civil insti-
tutions be found, so much larger will be the degree of liberty enjoyed, so 
much more opportunity will be given for self-improvement and for co-
operation in the improvement of others. Therefore liberty and civilisation 
have everywhere and at all times emanated from towns… (List, 1841a, pp. 
203-204) 
 
For these reasons List argues against a geographical extension of 
population and capital in the US, since this would dilute the nation and 
create inefficient sprawl, 
 
Whilst the United States by protecting duties would attract foreign capi-
tal and skill, they would prevent in the interior a very disadvantageous ex-
tension of population and capital over an immense continent.  …  As the 
Roman military power was weakened by the extension of their territory, so, 
I fear, the power, the progress of civilization, the national strength of this 
union would be checked by an additional accession of states. Fifty millions 
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of Americans in one hundred states scattered over the whole continent, 
what would they do? — clear land — raise wheat — and eat it. The whole 
American history of the next hundred years shall be contained in these 
three words, if you do not what Jefferson said  - place the manufacturer by 
the side of the farmer. This is the only means of preventing population and 
capital from withdrawing to the west. (List, 1827b, p. 71) 
 
In the typical German idealist and rationalist Renaissance tradition, 
List argues that the industrially based urban lifestyle rewards the indi-
vidual with humane and liberating benefits, (Cf. List, 1837a, p. 69).  
List also explains how urbanisation and industrialisation depend on 
each other, 
 
Urbanisation depends on industrialisation, like industrialisation depends 
on urbanisation and its potential for communication, trade, justice and lib-
erty. List points out the quickly information travels in towns, how easily its 
population may come to an agreement, concentrate its resources and unite 
with other towns. (List, 1841a, p. 207) 
 
The town populations will secure to themselves their most sturdy de-
fenders (against the absolutist rulers, probably) by giving the country 
peoples a share in the cultural riches of the towns, 
 
The country derives energy, civilisation, liberty, and good institutions 
from the towns, but the towns insure to themselves the possession of liber-
ty and good institutions by raising the country people to be partakers of 
these acquisitions. Agriculture, which hitherto merely supported landown-
ers and their servants, now furnishes the commonwealth with the most in-
dependent and sturdy defenders of its liberty. (List, 1841a, p. 208)  
 
Throughout German history, there is strong tradition in regarding 
urbanisation, communication, and industry as positive for individual 
freedom and, accordingly, innovation. Karl Bücher describes the bless-
ings of transport in this way,273 
 
This has increased the capacity of every individual, increased his per-
spective, revolutionised the thought and opinions of people and even their 
daily living habits, as well as changed the state and the family. Its existence 
is today the precondition for every individual, it so to say pushes the blood 
faster through the social body; It is no more isolated. Whether we want to or 
not, its influence is the foundation of even the smallest utterance of our life.  
This gives an infinite enrichment of all human existence, and an increase 
of every individual‘s power, which in sum lifts modern society above every 
former. We find precisely the disruption of transport one of the most painful 
effects of the last war, and one of the foremost blessings of the new peace 
must be a free working transport system. (Bücher, 1893, pp. 216-217, my 
translation)274 
                                       
273 This quotation is a continuation from the section above; Mental side of 
transportation. 




Georg Simmel, the German economist (nowadays ―redefined‖ as ―so-
ciologist‖), also describes how freedom, individualism, urbanism are 
linked. In the last sentences below, he points to the crucial role of 
communication, connecting the city beyond itself and thus staging the 
scene for cosmopolitanism, 
 
Cities are, first of all, seats of the highest economic division of labor. …  
All this forms the transition to the individualization of mental and psy-
chic traits which the city occasions in proportion to its size. … 
It is not only the immediate size of the area and the number of persons 
which, because of the universal historical correlation between the enlarge-
ment of the circle and the personal inner and outer freedom, has made the 
metropolis the locale of freedom. It is rather in transcending this visible ex-
panse that any given city becomes the seat of cosmopolitanism.  
…. The most significant characteristic of the metropolis is this functional 





4.24 Networking and Social Capital 
 
The economic role of social ‗networking‘ and ‗nearness‘ (whether actual 
or ―virtual‖‘ through efficient transport/communication), was as we 
have seen highly regarded by Friedrich List (Cf. e.g. List, 1841a, pp. 
203-204).  
The beneficial effects from urbanisation and communication; and fur-
thermore from related phenomena like ‗social networks‘, ‗networking‘ 
and ‗clusters‘, this all may all be described as different effects of a prin-
ciple of geographical ‗proximity‗ or -‗nearness‘.  
All of these effects contribute to establishing efficient home mar-
kets275 and improving the national ‗co-operation of Labour‘. The socio-
geographical and logistical ‗nearness principle‘ translates in short to an 
efficient maximisation in time and space of; utility of places, connec-
tions; and closeness of related activities - And quite simply; it boils 
down to efficient ‗networking‘, except for one complication: Since we are 
dealing with human beings, the nearness issue also concerns social re-
lations. In other words, it concerns the social stability, which is neces-
sary for development of social trust, which again is essential for efficient 
trade credit and norms- and law enforcement.276 
Furthermore, with the advent of industrialism, traditional society be-
gan to dissolve, and along with this development, the tight established 
social networks of traditional society dissolved - and new relations more 
                                                                                                                
Daastøl, 2000, especially pp. 397-398). 
275 See also the section, Creation of a home market & feed-back mechanisms, 
in chapter 6. 
276 See also the section, Stability furthered by closeness, in chapter 6. 
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based on market relations and on bureaucratic routines evolved. As 
Durkheim somewhat ―counter-intuitively‖ put it, the ‗mechanical soli-
darity‘ of traditional societies was replaced with an ‗organic solidarity‘ in 
complex societies (Cf. Durkheim, 1893, p. 126ff). This schism between 
tradition and modernisation was thoroughly debated by e.g. Hegel and 
Müller, and by List‘s ―successors‖ in Germany.277  
Social networking is the basis for the modern concept of ‗Social Capi-
tal‘. There are innumerable definitions of ‗social capital‘, but the com-
mon denominator is ‗social relations‘.278 The phenomenon was paid 
scant interest in mainstream economics and even not in social theory in 
general, until the 1960s. However, the interest in the economic effect of 
‗social relations‘ took off in 1990s with a flood of studies, e.g. Pierre 
Bourdieu‘s Ökonomisches Kapital, kulturelles Kapital, soziales Kapital 
(Cf. Bourdieu, The Forms of Capital, 1986).279 
 
 
4.25 Perfecting the balanced harmony of productive powers 
 
List argues that symbiosis increases output above the aggregate of indi-
vidual productions. In the national organism, each part benefits from 
the perfection of other parts (and therefore has an interest in their per-
fection), 
 
We may notice how the augmentation of the powers of production in con-
sequence of the separation of occupations and the co-operation of the pow-
ers of individuals begins in the separate manufactory and extends to the 
united nation. The manufactory prospers so much the more in proportion 
as the commercial operations are divided, the more closely the workmen are 
united, and the more the co-operation of each person is insured for the 
whole. The productive powers of every separate manufactory are also in-
creased in proportion as the whole manufacturing power of the country is 
developed in all its branches, and the more intimately it is united with all 
other branches of industry. The agricultural power of production is so 
much greater the more intimately a manufacturing power developed in all 
its branches is united locally, commercially, and politically with agriculture. 
In proportion as the manufacturing power is thus developed will the divi-
sion of the commercial operations and the co-operation of the productive 
powers in agriculture also develop themselves and be raised to the highest 
stage of perfection. That nation will therefore possess most productive pow-
er, and will consequently be the richest, which has cultivated manufactur-
ing industry in all branches within its territory to the highest perfection, 
and whose territory and agricultural production is large enough to supply 
                                       
277 See a discussion of this in the sections, Hegel‘s liking for Civil Society, 
Conservative liking for Civil Society, and Marx‘s disliking for Civil Society, in 
chapter 5. 
278 See also the end of the section, Public goods, in chapter 5. 
279 For a good and fairly recent overview of the relevance for business strate-
gy, see Burt, 2005. 
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its manufacturing population with the largest part of the necessaries of life 
and raw materials which they require. (List, 1841a, pp.152-153) 
 
One side of the synergy effect of this division and co-operation of la-
bour is that it is greater the more variety there is among branches and 
occupations. Among these, List ranked higher those activities that de-
manded more skill, since they would increase this same variety more - 
as would for instance manufacturing as compared with agriculture. 
Apart from this, he did not attach any higher moral rank to mental than 
to material occupations. The variety of branches and occupations is po-
tentially larger the more populated, connected and ―infrastructured‖, 
and therefore urbanised, that a society is.280 
List‘s emphasis on the harmony of the productive powers and on the 
confederation of Labour has implications for organisation and remuner-
ation, both inside companies and on a national scale. When collabora-
tion is essential for productivity, then organisation type, remuneration 
differences will be essential for the legitimacy of leadership, and the co-
operative will of the employees and population. 
List was keenly interested in the systemic side of economics. He 
therefore was an interested observer of the interrelationships between 
different markets; how the way 'some‘ markets functioned; was crucially 
shaping, connected to; and reliant upon how ‗other‘ markets func-
tioned. Most branches are mutually interdependent as List points out.  
 
... the success of one particular branch of industry depends on that of sev-
eral other branches ... (List, 1841a, p. 39) 
 
Moreover, he claims that the historical case of England confirms this, 
 
The English have thus given a striking confirmation … that all individual 
branches of industry have the closest reciprocal effect on one another; that 
the perfecting of one branch prepares and promotes the perfecting of all 
others; that no one of them can be neglected without the effects of that ne-
glect being felt by all; that, in short, the whole manufacturing power of a 
nation constitutes an inseparable whole. Of these opinions they have by 
their latest achievements in the linen industry offered a striking confirma-
tion. (List, 1841a, p. 387) 
 
List argues that in a nation all branches of production depend on 
each other, and when in proper relation to each other they together 
constitute the harmony of the productive powers, 
 
As in the pin manufactory, so also in the nation does the productiveness 
of every individual -- of every separate branch of production -- and finally of 
the whole nation depend on the exertions of all individuals standing in 
proper relation to one another. We call this relation the balance or the har-
mony of the productive powers. (List, 1841a, p. 160) 
                                       
280 Further discussed below in the sections, Mental side of transportation … ; 




List argues that to reach a balanced development, therefore all 
branches need to be stimulated, 
 
There should be a harmonious balance between all branches of produc-
tion. In general the whole national economy should be stimulated. (List, 
1837a, p. 185) 
 
Professor Theodore von Laue at Harvard University, points out that 
List elaborated on Hamilton‘s strategy of ‗balanced development‘ regard-
ing different economic activities, which became a main theme of all var-
iants of historical economics, British-, German-, etc. Nevertheless, Laue 
adds, it was industry that was to lead considerations and set the pace, 
 
It is only fair to add that in List's ideal the economy remained balanced 
between agriculture, trade, and industry. Yet it was industry that set the 
pace. (Laue, 1963, p. 58) 
 
 
4.26 Communication furthers urbanisation; wealth and culture 
 
List points out the benefits of democracy and the benefits of improved 
communication for democracy (Cf. List, 1837b, p. 131). Democracy is 
another way of saying ‗universalism‘ i.e. equal rights, and this too was a 
strong tendency in the tradition of German economic thought. Bücher 
pointed more descriptively to the same phenomenon in transportation 
and health service (Cf. Bücher, 1893 p. 195 ff). 
List argues that nation building was generally a continuation of the 
principles of city building, 
 
The agricultural-manufacturing-commercial State is like a city which 
spreads over a whole kingdom, or a country district raised up to be a city. 
In the same proportion in which material production was promoted by this 
union, the mental powers must necessarily have been developed, the politi-
cal institutions perfected, the State revenues, the national military power, 
and the population, increased. Hence we see at this day, that nation which 
first of all perfectly developed the agricultural, manufacturing, and com-
mercial State, standing in these respects at the head of all other nations. 
(List, 1841a, p. 339) 
 
List claims regarding coal and iron production that a better policy 
than tariff protection is to promote transport, 
 
The best policy would be for the state to foster these industries by im-
proving internal communications - canals and railways - as much as possi-
ble. (List, 1837a, p. 116) 
 
In this experts on ‗The Asian Miracle‘ support him. During fall 1996, 




The West speaks about the Asian miracle but there is no miracle. It is all 
a matter of governments directing matters so as to suit the industry, 
concerning infrastructure in particular. (NRK-1 TV, Aug. 1996) 
 
And describing Japanese policies, Prof. Shigeto Tsuru is quoted by 
Vassilij Leontieff such, 
 
Co-ordinating planning was successfully used in making what the author 
describes as "anticipatory" public investment that involved the creation of 
factory sites, by reclamation along with providing such infrastructure as 
ports and feeder roads. (Leontieff, 1994) 
 
And List‘s focus on transport is as vitally important as ever. The Eu-
ropean Commission‘s White Paper for Transport 2011, is not as pro-
found in its understanding of the role of transport as List, by focusing 
mainly on the physical side of transport. Nevertheless, it still starts by 
stating its importance for individual liberty,  
 
Transport is fundamental to our economy and society. Mobility is vital for 
the internal market and for the quality of life of citizens as they enjoy their 
freedom to travel. … The future prosperity of our continent will depend on 
the ability of all of its regions to remain fully and competitively integrated in 
the world economy. Efficient transport is vital in making this happen. (Eu-
ropean Commission, 2011) 
 
List writes, that the more populated and urbanised a society is, the 
variety of branches and occupations is potentially larger. This increases 
reciprocal influences, exchange of ideas and the elevation of science 
and culture. This effect can also be achieved by ―artificial urbanisation‖ 
through the construction of efficient transport infrastructure. List em-
phasises the role of transport for a nation, 
 
... the wealth and culture of a people in large depends upon the circum-
stances of the means of transportation. (List, 1838, p. 2) 
 
Practically no British theoretical Mercantilists, as opposed to the Men 
of Practice, paid attention to construction of infrastructure.281 This was 
natural since infrastructure was a small problem. British government 
had long paid unusual good attention to this instrument of prosperity. 
Also, since Britain is an insular nation with a humid climate, nature 
supplied infrastructure for free in the way of natural waterways, inland 
and offshore. Even today, British Waterways, maintains a staggering 
3 000 kms of canals In England and Wales. 
But above all, Britain could use her extensive coast as a conveyer. 
The Mercantilists of the Continental nations were provoked into devel-
oping a quite different attitude. 
 
                                       
281 Although Steuart is an exception, he pays so little attention to the matter 
that this exception is insignificant (Steuart, 1767, book I, ch. IX). 
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England is greatly favoured by nature; but against this it may be stated 
that even in respect of these natural products, nature has not treated other 
countries merely like a stepmother; for the most part the want of good 
transport facilities is the chief obstacle to the full utilisation of these prod-
ucts by other nations …. (List, 1841a, p. 323) 
 
Nevertheless, England showed the way List claims, 
 
England gave the civilised world the first complete national network of 
highways and canals and so showed how truly remarkable are the results 
of constructing an efficient transport system. Such a system of communica-
tions vigorously stimulates all the productive powers of the nation. … Eng-
land has produced new sources of energy, new machines, and new manu-
facturing processes which have greatly increased the efficiency of transport 
facilities and the output of labour. (List, 1837a, pp. 136-137) 
 
England has shown the world how powerful is the effect of facilities of 
transport in increasing the powers of production, and thereby increasing 
the wealth, the population, and the political power of a nation. (List, 1841a, 
p. 49)282  
 
The power of machinery, combined with the perfection of transport facili-
ties in modern times, affords to the manufacturing State an immense supe-
riority over the mere agricultural State. (List, 1841a, ch. 17, p. 200) 
 
In the Introduction (in the main unfortunately missing in the English 
edition) to the National System he writes, concerning the lessons he 
learned about infrastructure in Little Schuylkill, in Pennsylvania, 
 
Only now did I recognise the reciprocal relationship which exists between 
manufacturing power and the national system of transportation, and that 
the one can never develop to its fullest without the other. (List, 1827b, § 22) 
 
So, List brought with him to American the Cameralist pragmatism 
regarding trade and regulation as well as a focus on immaterial factors. 
And although Cameralism did indeed pay attention to transport, List 
admits that only in America did he learn about the depth of its 
transport‘s reciprocal importance for industry. 
Like Leibniz (Leibniz, 1671b), List underlined the importance of 
cheap energy - and cheap, regular transport, and claims that industri-
alists promote and make transport projects profitable, 
 
Nothing is more important for industrialists than the availability of cheap 
fuel and also easy, speedy, and regular transport at a low cost for all the 
products and raw materials which they need to build factories and to pro-
duce manufactured goods. Consequently industrialists hasten to promote 
the expansion of communications within a country. They foster the con-
struction of highways, canals, and railways and the improvement of navi-
                                       
282 This quotation has also been used in the section: The balanced harmony 
of the productive powers 
255 
 
gable rivers. Moreover they turn these improvements into lucrative indus-
trial undertakings. (List, 1837a, ch. 11, p. 62) 
 
List argues that tolls to finance infrastructure must be set so low that 
industry is stimulated,  
 
1. The national transport system should be expanded to the fullest ex-
tent. This includes canals, railways, roads, steam shipping, and river ship-
ping. Tolls should be fixed at a level that will stimulate industrial expansion 
in the hope that the costs of construction will eventually be covered. They 
should not be fixed at such a level as to raise immediately the funds neces-
sary to pay investors interest on the capital invested in these public works. 
(List, 1837a, ch. 24, p. 119) 
 
In his treatise The World Moves (Cf. List, 1837b), and in the book The 
German National Transport-System (Cf. List, 1838), he elaborated fur-
ther on the importance of transport for progress, 
 
By a comparison between the circumstances of ocean coasts and shores 
of navigable streams and the circumstances of the countries who were de-
prived of navigation, one would already in ancient times have acquired the 
knowledge that the wealth and culture of a people in large depends upon 
the circumstances of the means of transportation. (List, 1838, p. 2, my 
translation)283 
 
Wilhelm Roscher supports List‘s view of the crucial importance of 
transport, for the extension of markets and division of labour, 
 
Whoever, therefore, would increase the division of labor among the peo-
ple, must, first of all, extend their market; and this is done most efficiently 
by improving the means of communication. (Roscher, 1877, Vol. I, § 61) 
 
List argues against Adam Smith who follows the Physiocratic School 
in claiming that only agriculture is productive and manufacture is ster-
ile. List claims that experience shows that investing in manufacture and 
transport both increase the value of land tenfold, since they both in-
crease division of labour, the national confederation of labour and 
thereby the power of production. It therefore only appears (sic!) as if ag-
riculture is most the important activity, also in a manufacturing nation, 
 
… all capital which is devoted by the agricultural nation in a profitable 
manner to manufactures, increases in the course of time the value of the 
land tenfold. Experience and statistics everywhere confirm this statement. 
…  
                                       
283 The original text in German; „Durch eine Vergleichung des Zustandes der 
Meeresküsten und der Ufer schiffbarer Ströme mit dem Zustande der Länder, 
welche der Vortheile der Schifffahrt beraubt waren, hätte man schon im Al-
terthume zur Einsicht gelangen können, daß der Wohlstand und die Cultur der 
Völker großentheils durch den Zustand ihrer Transportmittel bedingt sei.― (List, 
1838, p. 2) 
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The reason for this appearance lies in the increased power of production 
in the nation, which emanates from the regular division of labour and from 
the strengthened confederation of the national powers, also from a better 
use of the mental and natural powers placed at the disposal of the nation, 
and from foreign commerce. 
These are the very same causes and effects which we may perceive in re-
spect to improved means of transport; which not merely yield in themselves 
a revenue, and through it a return for the capital spent upon them, but also 
powerfully promote the development of manufactures and agriculture, 
whereby they increase in the course of time the value of the landed property 
within their districts to tenfold the value of the actual material capital 
which has been employed in creating them. (List, 1841a, p. 240) 
 
 
4.27 Competition promotes innovation 
 
List argues that in an industrial society, market pressure or competi-
tion, was an important factor for innovation and as well for general im-
provement of the manufacturer‘s abilities, in pursuit of survival, profit 
and respect. List says that the manufacturer ‖must endeavour to be-
come rich in order not to be reduced to poverty‖ and that,  
 
The nature of manufactures is fundamentally different from that of agricul-
ture. …  
[The manufacturer]… must strive to gain more than enough in order to be 
certain of having enough of what is absolutely necessary; he must endeav-
our to become rich in order not to be reduced to poverty … The desire to 
gain the respect of his fellow-citizens … are to him a sharp stimulus to un-
interrupted activity, to ceaseless progress. … These circumstances produce 
in the manufacturer an energy which is not observable in the mere agricul-
turist. (List, 1841a, pp. 1998-199)284 
                                       
284 Here is an extended quotation, which deserves to be read due to its soci-
ological insight into entrepreneurial manufacturing,  
―The nature of manufactures is fundamentally different from that of agricul-
ture. Drawn towards one another by their business, manufacturers live only 
in society, and consequently only in commercial intercourse and by means of 
that intercourse. …  
While the agriculturist simply has to do with his own neighbourhood, the 
trade of the manufacturer extends itself over all countries and parts of the 
world….  
[The manufacturer]… must strive to gain more than enough in order to be 
certain of having enough of what is absolutely necessary; he must endeavour 
to become rich in order not to be reduced to poverty. If he goes on somewhat 
faster than others, he thrives; if he goes slower, he is certain of ruin. He must 
always buy and sell, exchange and make bargains. Everywhere he has to deal 
with men, with changing circumstances, with laws and regulations; he has a 
hundred times more opportunity for developing his mind than the agricultur-
ist. In order to qualify himself for conducting his business, he must become 
acquainted with foreign men and foreign countries; in order to establish that 
business, he must make unusual efforts. While the agriculturist simply has to 




Transport has the effect of enlarging the effective size of any related 
market and thereby increasing the competition in these markets. In 
this way, improved transport also increases innovation. 
 
 
4.28 Communication furthers innovation - and vice versa 
 
List therefore saw improved infrastructure, material and immaterial – 
especially in the shape of innovative transport (steam and telegraph) - 
and the legal and constitutional system - as a lever for cultural devel-
opment, continuous modernisation, international friendship and peace, 
as in his The German National Transport System' (Cf. List, 1838, pp. 10-
14).  
In List‘s treatise The World Moves, he argues in ways that are just as 
topical and of current interest as they were in 1837. The reason is the 
World Wide Web, Internet. List begins the first chapter, called Time and 
Space (―Zeit und Raum‖), in this way, 
 
The more the human spirit has the ability to communicate with other 
people and to act, the faster humanity will progress, because each individ-
ual thus receives more opportunities to educate themselves and to partici-
pate in the general progress and to contribute to this. (List, 1837b, p.65, 
my translation)285 
 
List argues that smart individuals with the same interests are sepa-
rated and this must be overcome in the interests of human progress, 
 
Intelligent people are separated by the gap of time and space from one 
another. Now, if the spaces and distances are reduced to get closer together 
                                                                                                                
over all countries and parts of the world. The desire to gain the respect of his 
fellow-citizens or to retain it, and the continual competition of his rivals, 
which perpetually threaten his existence and prosperity, are to him a sharp 
stimulus to uninterrupted activity, to ceaseless progress. Thousands of exam-
ples prove to him, that by extraordinary performances and exertions it is pos-
sible for a man to raise himself from the lowest degree of well-being and posi-
tion to the highest social rank, but that, on the other hand, by mental inactivi-
ty and negligence, he can sink from the most respectable to the meanest posi-
tion. These circumstances produce in the manufacturer an energy which is 
not observable in the mere agriculturist.‖ (List, 1841a, pp. 198-199) 
285 The German translation from the French original: „Je mehr der menschli-
che Geist die Möglichkeit besitzt, mit anderen Menschen zu kommunizieren 
und sich Handlungen auszuführen, um so mehr beschleunigt sich der Fort-
schritt der Menschheit, weil jedes Individuum damit mehr Möglichkeiten erhält, 
sich selbst zu bilden, am allgemeinen Fortschritt zu partizipieren und zu die-
sem beizutragen.― (List, 1837b, p.65) 
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to each other, this must contribute significantly to the progress of humani-
ty. (List, 1837b, p. 67, my translation)286 
 
List continues by pointing out e.g. that through improved means of 
communication, each individual increases the possibility of communi-
cating with other individuals with similar interests, such as mathemat-
ics, music, technology, poetry, painting, chemistry etc.  
Thus, improved communications enables each individual to improve 
his talents for the benefit of humanity. List‘s points and arguments are 
just as relevant today, concerning discussion groups via email, twitter 
or other social media, in particular. List writes, 
 
The more resources which mankind puts at the disposal, allows an indi-
vidual to develop the gifts that he has received from nature, and optimise 
his performance in an assigned a particular destination. The more mutual 
contact and mutual action is available to the talented of the same kind, the 
greater the progress in all areas of knowledge and skills, and the faster and 
easier progress of all mankind. (List, 1837b, p. 67, my translation)287 
 
The worldwide transformation that the steam engine and the wired 
telegraph brought in the 19th Century, relatively speaking, easily com-
petes in importance with all later innovations in transport technology 
including the automobile, the aeroplane and the internet. List pointed 
out already in 1838 that e.g. ―electro-magnetic force‖ would be a far 
cheaper, less dangerous and more general means of propulsion than 
steam (Cf. List, 1838, p. 7).288  
List repeatedly points out how improved communications transform 
the whole of society. Innovative transport technology, as with the 
steam-powered locomotive at List's time, combines communication and 
innovation and thereby plays an immense productivity-increasing role.  
One type of modern technology that fills this role is transport based 
on magnetic propulsion, for instance so-called maglev trains of both 
                                       
286 The German translation from the French original: „Die intelligenten 
Menschen sind durch die Diskrepanz von Zeit und Raum voneinander ge-
trennt. Wenn nun die Zwischenräume und Entfernungen verringert und ei-
nander angenähert werden, so muß dies in starkem Maße zum Fortschritt der 
Menschheit beitragen.― (List, 1837b, p.67) 
287 The German translation from the French original: „Je mehr Mittel, über 
welche die Menschheit verfügen kann, es einem Individuum erlauben, jene 
Gaben zu entfalten, die es von der Natur empfangen hat und durch seine Ar-
beitsleistung die ihm zugedachte Bestimmung zu erfüllen und je mehr Talente 
der gleichen Art zu wechselseitigem Kontakt und gemeinsamer Aktion vorhan-
den sind, um so größer sind die Fortschritte in allen Bereichen des Wissens 
und der Fertigkeiten und um so schneller und leichter schreitet die gesamte 
Menschheit voran.― (List, 1837b, p.67) 
288 It took 41 more years before a rotating electromotor was first used for 
propulsion - on rail guided transport, by Werner von Siemens in 1879. - Sie-
mens & Halske constructed an ―electric railroad‖ (street car) system in Lichter-
feld outside Berlin in 1881. 
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inter-city and urban (intra-city) types. Another type of modern transport 
that may be combined with the above technology is PRT (Personal Rapid 
Transit, or ―taxi-rails‖), where automated individual transport on elevat-
ed tracks gives personal service on a new flexible and user-friendly lev-
el. Arno Mong Daastøl in 1997 wrote, concerning the transformation 
and development of the former Socialist regimes that, 
 
The railroad approach was especially important when this technology 
was relatively new. There are today new technologies in this field which may 
again establish railroads as an interesting field of investments; …  
The 19th century experience with railroads as an expansion of the tech-
nological frontier, has been shown to be a parallel to 20th century space-
projects like Apollo (Hughes, 1965). The technological spin-offs to the rest of 
industry and society concerning knowledge of materials and in productivity 
have been immense, and for the Apollo-project calculated at around 14 
times the investment-input. (Daastøl, 1996) 
 
Whereas railroads and later technologies decreased the effective dis-
tance in transport and communication, modern ICT (Information and 
Communication Technology) with video-conferencing, instant messag-
ing and chatting, etc. make the world into one global village with in-
stant universal knowledge. This obviously has enormous consequences 
for spiritual freedom - the web has therefore become a powerhouse of 
invention and development. 
Already in 1970, and in the same spirit, the still active and long serv-
ing security advisor in the US, Zbigniew Brzezinski, foresaw the devel-
opment and importance of the Internet. In his Between Two Ages: Amer-
ican‘s Role in the Technotronic Era, Brzezinski pointed out how improved 
communications would create a revolutionary new kind of ―technotronic 
societies― where knowledge becomes omnipresent instantly, 
 
… a society that is shaped culturally, psychologically, socially, and econom-
ically by the impact of technology and electronics – particularly in the area 
of computers and communications….   
In the technotronic society scientific and technical knowledge, in addition 
to enhancing production capabilities, quickly spills over to affect almost all 
aspects of life directly. (Brzezinski, 1970, pp. 9-10)289 
 
Communication and innovation have in common that they are per-
haps the most important types of public goods that distribute their 
benefits widely throughout the economies, both nationally and interna-
tionally. They also mutually reinforce each other, and this is true for for 
                                       
289 Brezinski also warned against elite surveillance of every citizen of the 
population; ―Another threat, less overt but no less basic, confronts liberal de-
mocracy. More directly linked to the impact of technology, it involves the 
gradual appearance of a more controlled and directed society. Such a society 
would be dominated by an elite whose claim to political power would rest on 




the machine tool industry. As with ICT, the machine tool industry dis-
tributes innovations throughout the economies.  
ICT combines communication and innovation, but additionally is a 
machine tool industry and thereby the queen mother of technologies 
today. The ICT-sector not only combines the sectors that formerly were 
separated, it also erases the delineation between the secondary and ter-
tiary industries, i.e. manufacturing and service. It is both. It also inte-
grates education. 
Modern ICT fulfils to an unparalleled degree what List argues was 
primary function of transport, namely communication of ideas, thereby 




4.29 Freedom promotes innovation, communication and efficiency 
 
A central and crucial part of his world of ideas and List‘s agitation was 
freedom, ―civil, mental, and religious‖, the lack of which had persecuted 
him more than once, 
 
The spirit of enterprise, economic progress, technical knowledge, and ar-
tistic skill develops only in countries enriched by political and religious 
freedom. (List, 1837a, p. 164) 
 
To what causes England owes her manufacturing and commercial su-
premacy, we have shown in our fifth chapter.  
 It is especially owing to her civil, mental, and religious liberty, to the na-
ture and excellence of her political institutions, that the commercial policy 
of England has been enabled to make the most of the natural riches of the 
country, and fully to develop the productive powers of the nation. But who 
would deny that other nations are capable of raising themselves to the 
same degree of liberty? (List, 1841a, p. 322)290  
 
List argues that freedom is a productive power also in the sense that 
it attracts bearers of knowledge, and had it not been for the follies if the 
Continental powers, England would have had a hard time in attracting 
the refugees that built English supremacy, 
 
History teaches that arts and trades migrated from city to city, from one 
country to another. Persecuted and oppressed at home, they took refuge in 
cities and in countries where freedom, protection, and support were 
assured to them. In this way they migrated from Greece and Asia to Italy; 
from Italy to Germany, Flanders, and Brabant; and from thence to Holland 
and England. Everywhere it was want of sense and despotism that drove 
them away, and the spirit of freedom that attracted them. But for the folly 
of the Continental governments, England would have had difficulty in 
attaining supremacy in industry. But does it appear more consistent with 
wisdom for us in Germany to wait patiently until other nations are impolitic 
                                       
290Also quoted above, in the section Capital of Mind. 
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enough to drive out their industries and thus compel them to seek a refuge 
with us, or that we should, without waiting for such contingencies, invite 
them by proffered advantages to settle down amongst us? (List, 1841a, p. 
109-110) 
 
Chaos seldom fosters freedom for the average person. As with lan-
guage and games, a culture needs collective rules in order to make it 
possible for the individual to play with these, in order to benefit for 
himself and perhaps for society at large. The following quotation gives 
an idea of the important role List gave to freedom guaranteed by the 
legal order, 
 
Everywhere and at all times has the well-being of the nation been in 
equal proportion to the intelligence, morality, and industry of its citizens; 
according to these, wealth has accrued or been diminished; but industry 
and thrift, invention and enterprise, on the part of individuals, have never 
as yet accomplished aught of importance where they were not sustained by 
municipal liberty, by suitable public institutions and laws, by the State 
administration and foreign policy, but above all by the unity and power, of 
the nation. 
History everywhere shows us a powerful process of reciprocal action be-




4.30 Industrialisation fosters freedom and a humane civilisation 
 
List claims that history tells us that in purely agricultural nations, the 
population was kept in ignorance and oppression, 
 
Everywhere merely agricultural nations have lived in slavery, or 
oppressed by despotism, feudalism, or priestcraft. The mere exclusive 
possession of the soil gave the despot, the oligarchy, or the priestly caste a 
power over the mass of the agricultural population, of which the latter 
could not rid themselves of their own accord.  
Under the powerful influence of habit, everywhere among merely 
agricultural nations has the yoke which brute force or superstition and 
priestcraft imposed upon them so grown into their very flesh, that they 
come to regard it as a necessary constituent of their own body, as a 
condition of their very existence. (List, 1841a, ch. 17, p. 203) 
 
Economic progress was in List's mind inseparable from progress in 
civilisation, which in List's opinion meant a liberal world modelled after 
the British experience, as the above quotation indicates. (See also: List, 
1841a, pp. 48-52, 56, 130) List's insistent and repeated criticism of 
cynical British power policies toward its emerging competitor states 
should not make us forget that Britain was his model country, regard-
ing both a civilised liberal political regime at home and its imperial and 
civilising strength abroad.  
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It was List‘s firm belief that religious and political freedom could only 
be attained through urbanisation, industrialization and refinement of 
infrastructure and vice versa (Cf. List, 1841a, p. 142). This had to be 
enacted through the legal system, establishing a rule of law of just and 
egalitarian law.291 This spirit runs throughout his writings regarding 
the judicial system,  
 
It has been the experience of all ages and of all countries that freedom 
and industrial progress are like siamese twins. (List, 1837a, p. 153) 
 
List claims that industry will transform the morality of habit into a 
conscious morality and tolerance, 
 
The more industry and agriculture flourish, the less can the human 
mind be held in chains, and the more are we compelled to give way to the 
spirit of toleration, and to put real morality and religious influence in the 
place of compulsion of conscience. Everywhere has industry given birth to 
tolerance; everywhere has it converted the priests into teachers of the peo-
ple and into learned men. (List, 1841a, pp. 208) 
 
List pointed out how manufacturing, as opposed to agriculture, cre-
ates a higher potential for individual freedom, diversification of social 
activity and enhanced possibilities for utilization of individual abilities, 
meaning especially mental abilities, thereby enhancing and harmoniz-
ing equal rights to develop one‘s abilities and happiness with social wel-
fare and prosperity.  
 
It is evident that by agriculture merely personal qualities of the same 
kind are put into requisition, and merely those which combine bodily power 
and perseverance in executing raw and manual labour with the simple idea 
of order; while manufactures require a thousand fold variety of mental abil-
ity, skill, and experience. The demand for such a variety of talents makes it 
easy for every individual in a manufacturing State to find an occupation 
and vocation corresponding with his individual abilities and taste, while in 
an agricultural State but little choice exists. In the former mental gifts are 
infinitely more prized than in the latter, where as a rule the usefulness of a 
man is determined according to his bodily strength. The labour of the weak 
and the cripple in the former is not infrequently valued at a much higher 
rate than that of the strongest man is in the latter. Every power, even the 
smallest, that of children and women, of cripples and old men, finds in 
manufactures employment and remuneration. (List, 1841a, ch. 17, p. 200) 
 
The prime reason List gives for industrialisation and trade, in essence 
is that it promotes ‗progress‘ most efficiently,  
 
As an uncivilised nation, having a barbarous system of agriculture, can 
make progress only by commerce with civilised manufacturing nations, so 
                                       
291 This is a Liberal concept of law as opposed to a Conservative approach 
with its differentiation of rights according to social standing. 
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after it has attained to a certain degree of culture, in no other way can it 
reach the highest grade of prosperity, civilisation, and power, than by pos-
sessing a manufacturing industry of its own. (List, 1841a, ch. 15, p. 183) 
 
… Everywhere have the cultivation of national language and literature, have 
the civilising arts, and the perfection of municipal institutions kept equal 
pace with the development of manufactures and commerce. (List, 1841a, p. 
209) 
 
List argues that industry promotes intellectual and moral forces, 
innovation, enterprise, productivity and can better utilise science. In-
dustry raises the value of land, of raw materials and improves agri-
culture, 
 
A country devoted entirely to agriculture esteems really sturdy physical 
strength most highly and accords it the greatest financial rewards. In such 
a society the whole range of intellectual and moral powers is virtually non-
existent. But industry calls forth and promotes the growth of intellectual 
and moral forces of every kind.292 
In the previous chapter we have shown how the productive powers of in-
dustry awaken in industry and agriculture the spirit of enterprise and inno-
vation. We have seen how a great many natural resources - formerly of little 
or no value - have become increasingly valuable as industry expands. We 
have explained that industry promotes the division of labour in agriculture, 
increases the demand for new farm products, stimulates the improvement 
of communications, and checks the harmful subdivision of land into tiny 
smallholdings, while fostering a sensible division of landed property. We 
have shown how industry gives scope for the expansion of all kinds of skills 
and abilities as well as increasing the revenues and value of land. We have 
made it clear that normally agriculture can prosper only insofar as industry 
also prospers and becomes more efficient.  
Agriculture gives little scope for the abilities of skilled and useful, work-
ers. Factories, on the other hand, do give them the opportunity to use their 
skill so that their productive powers are multiplied by 10 or even by 100. 
Consequently an industrialised society will gain immeasurably more from 
new inventions and from scientific progress than is possible for an agrarian 
society. (List, 1837a, p. 68)293 
 
The old argument that a higher division of labour caused growth, also 
spoke in favour of industrialisation,  
 
A division of labour can be usefully developed in agriculture only insofar 
as it is brought about and stimulated by differences of soil and climate. On 
the other hand the various branches of industry can give unlimited scope 
for the division of labour. (List, 1837a, pp. 68-69) 
                                       
292 1. Charles Dupin, Forces prod., p. 92. [List‘s note] The full reference is 
Charles Dupin, Forces productives et commerciales de la France (two volumes, Par-
is, 1827), Vol.1, pp. 89-92.  
293 Parts of this quotation is also used elsewhere in this , under Science as el-




Harvard University‘ scholar in Russian history, Theodore von Laue, 
comments List‘s insistence on urbanisation and industrialisation, as 
being ahead of his time, 
 
According to List, liberty, civilization, national power, in short, the high-
est goals of contemporary mankind, flowed from urban-industrial life as ex-
emplified by England. In other words, through industrialization the back-
ward could catch up with England. Thus List fused nationalism and indus-
trialization in an ironbound combination more fitting to the twentieth than 
to the nineteenth century. (Laue, 1963, p. 62) 
 
For many, it may today seem somewhat odd that List favoured ur-
banisation and industrialisation, since today both are often seen as 
prime reasons for immoralities, such as crime, poor living conditions, 
and social exploitation on the one hand, and pollution and natural ex-
ploitation on the other hand.  
However, appearance is not the same as the essence of the matter. 
And manifested matters are not the same as potential matters. List ar-
rived at his conclusions by focusing on the principal matters of these 
phenomena. Although there certainly were many sad effects and inci-
dents of urbanisation and industry, overall he found them to be poten-
tially very advantageous. 
List argues that industrialisation is necessary to construct a truly 
humane society, establish freedom of mind as well as democracy and a 
say for small people, preserve nature and its resources, thereby improv-
ing the efficiency of the economic system and adding to wealth creation. 
In the following quotation from 1841, List suggests reciprocity between 
freedom and its impact, 
 
Let us compare Poland with England: both nations at one time were in 
the same stage of culture; and now what a difference. Manufactories and 
manufactures are the mothers and children of municipal liberty, of intelli-
gence, of the arts and sciences, of internal and external commerce, of navi-
gation and improvements in transport, of civilisation and of political power. 
They are the chief way of liberating agriculture from its chains. (List, 1841a, 
pp. 141-142) 
 
List also suggests that a reciprocal relation exists between art, sci-
ence and the diligence of the masses,  
 
In the manufacturing State the industry of the masses is enlightened by 
science, and the sciences and arts are supported by the industry of the 
masses.  (List, 1841a, p. 200) 
 
List argues that through a sound industry, rent will constitute a fund 
for the improvement of mental culture. The point is that the multiplica-
tion of investment opportunities and the elevated culture of an indus-
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trial nation, as opposed to the situation in an agricultural country, may 
make financial funds act as drivers of progress, 
 
Inasmuch as a sound manufacturing industry especially tends to pro-
duce liberty and civilisation, it may also be said that through it rent itself is 
redeemed from forming a fund for idleness, debauchery, and immorality, 
and is converted into a fund for promoting mental culture, and consequent-
ly that through it the merely consuming towns are changed into productive 
towns. (List, 1841a, p. 205)  
 
Lists claims that the mental- and political power of a nation ―are in-
creased in equal proportion by establishing in it a manufacturing pow-
er‖, that industry must be considered as a political, defensive and fi-
nancial tool. In other words, also the martial power of a nation depends 
on its mental power, a lesson e.g. the major British strategist Halford 
Mackinder took to heart (Cf. Mackinder, 1962 (1919), p.13). List writes,  
 
… At a time where technical and mechanical science exercise such im-
mense influence on the methods of warfare, where all warlike operations 
depend so much on the condition of the national revenue, … more than ev-
er before, must the value of manufactures be estimated from a political 
point of view. (List, 1841a, p. 209) 
 
 
4.31 Social well-being improves economic efficiency 
 
List was not a socialist, but it is obvious from his writings that he cared 
for ordinary people. List came from a practical background, and was 
therefore well aware of the sad situation of the working population in an 
agrarian economy. Industrialisation, however, offered them opportuni-
ties for moral, spiritual, social and material elevation, 
 
In countries where arable farming has been practised for centuries it is 
rare to find men who rise from poverty to enjoy first a modest competence 
and then wealth and complete financial independence. Industry, on the 
other hand, offers men who start at the bottom the chance of rising to the 
very top by using their abilities and by working hard. The possibility of 
such an achievement provides a stimulus for the whole working population. 
A country devoted entirely to agriculture esteems really sturdy physical 
strength most highly and accords it the greatest financial rewards. In such 
a society the whole range of intellectual and moral powers is virtually non-
existent. But industry calls forth and promotes the growth of intellectual 
and moral forces of every kind. (List, 1837a, pp. 68) 
 
In the typical German rationalistic Renaissance tradition, as opposed 
to the later irrational Romantic tradition, List continues by arguing for 
the humanistic and individualistic benefits of urban life-style. List ar-
gues that only in towns does the population, by force of tits concentra-
tion, achieve enough momentum to oppose brute force; maintain free-




This is why the population of an industrialised society is brought togeth-
er in a few conurbations in which are concentrated a great variety of skills, 
productive powers, applied science, art and literature. Here are to be found 
great public and private institutions and associations in which theoretical 
knowledge is applied to the practical affairs of industry and commerce. On-
ly in such conurbations can a public opinion develop which is strong 
enough to vanquish the brute force, to maintain freedom for all, and to in-
sist that the public authorities should adopt administrative policies that 
will promote and safeguard national prosperity. ... (List, 1837a, p. 69) 
 
List argues that workers must be well paid and well fed, and there-
fore the unjust indirect taxes on necessities must be removed, and re-
placed by income tax in order to avoid any deficit in public budgets. He 
finds that in a democratic and constitutional state, it will not be diffi-
cult to collect an income tax. The removal of such consumption taxes 
will benefit the workers and reduce the cost of manufactured goods,  
 
It is essential that the workers of a country which is becoming industrial-
ised should be well paid and well fed. It is therefore necessary that the abso-
lute necessities of life should be taxed either very lightly or not at all. The 
worst imposts - taxes which are contrary to natural law - are octrois (con-
sumption duties) levied upon the commonest foodstuffs, fuel, soap, meat, and 
ordinary wine and beer.‘ No worker can be expected to increase his output if 
he is not getting sufficient nourishment. Roast beef and porter have done 
more for the greatness of England than one might suppose. All English par-
liamentary enquiries prove that the output of the English worker is two or 
three times as great as that of workers in other countries. The influence of 
the earnings of workers upon the prices of manufactured goods should not 
be judged by the existence of a high or a low level of wages. It should be 
judged by the relation between wages and output. If workers are poorly 
nourished their children will be stunted and weakly and so the productive 
powers of future generations will be destroyed. Moreover it is unjust to 
place the same heavy indirect taxes upon those who can afford only the 
barest necessities of life and those who are able to live in the lap of luxury. 
The worst tax of all is that upon salt because it directly threatens a nation‘s 
productive powers. 
It would be injudicious to make these proposals without also suggesting 
how to meet the deficit in the national budget which would follow the aboli-
tion of all taxes on the necessities of life. An income tax would bridge the 
gap. No one has yet put forward a reasonable and sensible objection to the 
introduction of income tax. Its opponents have been content to argue that 
there are insuperable practical difficulties in assessing and collecting such 
a tax. This is true enough in a despotic state but it is not true in a constitu-
tional state. In a democratic society the administration operates with the 
support of sound institutions and patriotic sentiments. If each citizen made 
a declaration of his income - and if this was checked by three different ju-
ries - a satisfactory assessment could be made and nobody would have 
cause to complain about it. 
It is particularly important that octrois should be abolished and that the 
lost revenue should be made good by imposing an income tax. The removal 
of these consumption duties would help to reduce the cost of manufactured 
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goods and would be most beneficial to the workers. (List, 1837a, pp. 120-
121) 
 
List argues that improving the comfort of the workman increases the 
productive powers immensely, and increases the efficiency of the work-
man by a factor of two to three, 
 
… if we compare the result of the labour of the workman in countries where 
he is clad and nourished like the well-to-do man with the result of his 
labour where he has to be satisfied with the coarsest food and clothing, we 
shall find that the increase of his comfort in the former case has been 
attained not at the expense of the general welfare, but to the advantage of 
the productive powers of the community. The day's work of the workman is 
double or three times greater in the former case than in the latter. (List, 
1841a, p. 305-306) 
 
List repeatedly emphasises that in manufacturing states the work-
man is far more efficient, and that the time of the workman accordingly 
is much higher valued (i.e. commanding higher wages).294 Furthermore, 
―The workman begins to feel that he possesses … the means of improv-
ing his condition‖, List writes,  
 
As, however, manufactures operate beneficially on the development of 
the mental powers of the nation, so also do they act on the development of 
the physical power of labour, by affording to the labourers means of enjoy-
ment, inducements to exert their powers, and opportunities for making use 
of them. It is an undisputed observation, that in flourishing manufacturing 
States the workman, irrespective of the aid which he obtains from better 
machinery and tools, accomplishes a far larger day's work than in mere ag-
ricultural countries. 
 Moreover, the circumstance that in manufacturing States the value of 
time is recognised much more than in agricultural States, affords proof of 
the higher standing in the former of the power of labour. The degree of civi-
lisation of a nation and the value of its labour power cannot be estimated 
more accurately than according to the degree of the value which it attrib-
utes to time. The savage lies for days idle in his hut. How can the shepherd 
learn to estimate the value of time, to whom time is simply a burden which 
his pastoral pipe or sleep alone makes tolerable to him? How can a slave, a 
serf, a peasant, subject to tributes of forced labour, learn to value time, he 
to whom labour is penalty, and idleness gain? Nations only arrive at the 
recognition of the value of time through industry. At present time gained 
brings gain of profit; loss of time, loss of profit. The zeal of the manufactur-
er to utilise his time in the highest possible degree imparts itself to the agri-
culturist. Through the increased demand for agricultural products caused 
by manufactures, the rent and therefore the value of land is raised, larger 
capital is employed in cultivating it, profits are increased, a larger produce 
must be obtained from the soil in order to be able to provide for the in-
creased rent and interest of capital, and for the increased consumption. 
                                       




One is in a position to offer higher wages, but one also requires more work 
to be done. The workman begins to feel that he possesses in his bodily pow-
ers, and in the skill with which he uses them, the means of improving his 
condition. He begins to comprehend why the Englishman says, 'Time is 
money.' (List, 1841a, pp. 202-203) 
 
List wrote under the impressions of a mainly rural continental Eu-
rope and an idealised impression of the industrial and urbanised Eng-
land. He therefore held few of the positive opinions of Smith 60 years 
before him regarding rural life, or the negative opinions of factory life. 
Smith‘s objections came later with List, such as in List‘s Factory Bill 
manuscript of 1846 discussing the awful situation in British industry. 
Naturally, List as opposed to Smith of course saw matters from the 
German situation and -point of view (Cf. List‘s Factory Bill manuscript, 
List, 1846a). But there is more to the divergence between Smith and 
List than this (too) obvious point of material living conditions in indus-
trial towns. List has deep and immaterially based reasons for his pro-
motion of an urban-industrial lifestyle, as we will see in the sections on 
these two phenomena. 
List also had proof and experience in the USA for his assertions that 
industry may benefit the ordinary working man and woman. List writes, 
 
Recently published official statistics295 of Massachusetts give a tolerable 
idea of the start taken by the manufactures of the United States, especially 
in the central and northern states of the Union, in consequence of the pro-
tective system, and in spite of the subsequent modification of the tariff of 
1828. … 
Misery, brutality, and crime are unknown among the manufacturing 
population here. On the contrary, among the numerous male and female 
factory workers the strictest morality, cleanliness, and neatness in dress, 
exist; libraries are established to furnish them with useful and instructive 
books; the work is not exhausting, the food nourishing and good. Most of 
the women save a dowry for themselves.  
This last is evidently the effect of the cheap prices of the common neces-
saries of life, light taxation, and an equitable customs tariff. (List, 1841a, p. 
99) 
 
List refers to statistics to prove that industry allows maintaining far 
larger populations on a given territory and at a far higher level of pros-
perity, 
 
Comparative statistics show that by the complete and relatively equal culti-
vation of manufactures and agriculture in a nation endowed with a sufficiently 
large and fertile territory, a population twice or three times as large can be 
                                       
295 1. Statistical Table of Massachusetts for the Year ending April 1, 1837, by 
J. P. Bigelow, Secretary of the Commonwealth (Boston, 1838). No American 
state but Massachusetts possesses similar statistical abstracts. We owe those 
here referred to, to Governor Everett, distinguished alike as a scholar, an au-
thor, and a statesman. (List‘s note) 
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maintained, and maintained, moreover, in a far higher degree of well-being 
than in a country devoted exclusively to agriculture. From this it follows that 
all the mental powers of a nation, its State revenues, its material and mental 
means of defence, and its security for national independence, are increased in 
equal proportion by establishing in it a manufacturing power.  (List, 1841a, p. 
209) 
 
List writes that more industrialised nations need better trained and 
more specialised people, who will command higher wages, establishing 
yet another reason for industrialisation, 
 
As a nation becomes more industrialised, it becomes more necessary to 
secure the service of suitable, trained people in the factories and work-
shops. Such people are now able to command higher salaries and wages 
than was formerly possible. It will be easier for them to devote themselves 
entirely to a particular branch of knowledge, provided that they have the 
necessary natural aptitude and the good preliminary training. Knowledge is 
becoming more specialised. (List, 1837a, p. 67) 
 
List continues by saying that as industrialisation progresses, better 
trained people command higher salaries, as they specialise themselves, 
and knowledge is becoming more specialised, 
  
As a nation becomes more industrialised it becomes more necessary to 
secure the services of suitable trained people in the factories and work-
shops. Such people are now able to command higher salaries and wages 
than was formerly possible. It will be easier for them to devote themselves 
entirely to a particular branch of knowledge, provided that they have the 
necessary natural aptitude and a good preliminary training. Knowledge is 
becoming more specialised. It is clear that all branches of knowledge – par-
ticularly those which can be applied to industrial pursuits - are making 
rapid progress. (List, 1837a, pp. 66-67) 
 
List also had something to say about the domestic- and distributional 
side of the debt issue that may have relevance in many countries today 
regarding national debt, perhaps especially so in the developing world 
(where corruption has allowed the elite to impose debt on the nation in 
order to pay for their own pleasures), 
 
10. England's national debt would not be so great an evil as it now ap-
pears to us, if England's aristocracy would concede that this burden should 
be borne by the class who were benefited by the cost of wars, namely, by 
the rich. McQueen estimates the capitalised value of property in the three 
kingdoms at 4,000 million pounds sterling, and Martin estimates the capi-
tal invested in the colonies at about 2,600 millions sterling. Hence we see 
that one-ninth part of Englishmen's private property would suffice to cover 
the entire national debt. Nothing could be more just than such an appro-
priation, or at least than the payment of the interest on the national debt 
out of the proceeds of an income tax. The English aristocracy, however, 
deem it more convenient to provide for this charge by the imposition of tax-
es upon articles of consumption, by which the existence of the working 
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classes is embittered beyond the point of endurance. (List, 1841a, ch. 4, 
endnote 10, and footnote p. 55) 
 
 
4.32 Efficiency and value of resources 
 
List argues that industry and science extends human potential to uti-
lise resources that formerly had no value, and furthermore utilise the 
ones already in use more efficiently. In other words, progress and ad-
vance in science and industry sets off resource depletion, contrary to 
many later theories,  
 
The more that man and the community perfect themselves, the more are 
they enabled to make use of the natural powers which are within their 
reach for the accomplishment of their objects, and the more does the 
sphere of what is within their reach extend itself. (List, 1841a, p. 210)296 
 
... industrialisation will greatly increase the value of a country's natural re-
sources. (List, 1837a, p. 79) 
 
We have seen how a great many natural resources - formerly of little or 
no value - have become increasingly valuable as industry expands. (List, 
1837a, p. 68)297 
 
Thereby industrialisation and science will save labour and resources 
- and give birth to new products and processes,  
 
The greater the advance in scientific knowledge, the more numerous will 
be the new inventions which save labour and raw materials and lead to new 
products and processes. (List, 1837a, pp. 66-67, see also pp. 64, 67-69, 79) 
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In fact, in the agricultural State, that power of nature on which produc-
tion especially depends, the natural fertility of the soil, can only be utilised 
to a smaller extent so long as agriculture is not supported by manufactur-
ing industry. (List, 1841a, pp. 210-211)299 
 
An agricultural nation, which inhabits a country of temperate climate, 
leaves therefore the richest part of its natural resources unutilised. List, 
1841a, p. 214) 300 
                                       
296 This quotation is also used in the section Differentiate actual from poten-
tial – increasing irrelevance of natural advantages. 
297 This quotation has also been used elsewhere in this , in the section Indus-
trialisation fosters … 
298 This quotation has also been used elsewhere in this , in the section Sci-
ence as elevator … 
299 This quotation is also used in the section Differentiate actual from poten-
tial – increasing irrelevance of natural advantages. 
300 This quotation is also used in the section Differentiate actual from poten-




And industrialisation will save costs of transport, by increasing the 
value/weight ratio, 
 
In addition the manufacturers are the focus of a large, lucrative, and 
worldwide trade with peoples of varied standards of culture who live in 
many distant countries. Industry turns cheap bulk raw materials, which 
cannot be sent long distances, into goods of low weight and high value 
which are in universal demand. (List, 1837a, p. 69)  
 
List‘s technology optimistic view seems to correspond with the view 
that human kind is doomed to continue with economic growth, since 
this creates demand, which creates investment, technological progress, 
and development of new resources. Without growth and new resources, 
an economy will deplete the old resources it is based upon. Fortunately 
- and thanks to growth -, we never ran out of flint stone, would proba-
bly be one conclusion of this view. 
 
 
4.33 Production of energy and machines  
 
List pointed to the strategic role and position of the machine tool indus-
try for national productive power. He therefore recommended it for spe-
cial attention and support from the State, 
 
… Nations which have not yet made considerable advances in technical art 
and in the manufacture of machinery should allow all complicated machin-
ery to be imported free of duty, or at least only levy a small duty upon 
them, until they themselves are in a Position to produce them as readily as 
the most advanced nation. Machine manufactories are in a certain sense 
the manufacturers of manufactories, and every tax on the importation of 
foreign machinery is a restriction on the internal manufacturing power. 
Since it is, however, of the greatest importance, because of its great influ-
ence on the whole manufacturing power, that the nation should not be de-
pendent on the chances and changes of war in respect of its machinery, 
this particular branch of manufacture has very special claims for the direct 
support of the State in case it should not be able under moderate import 
duties to meet competition. The State should at least encourage and direct-
ly support its home manufactories of machinery, so far as their mainte-
nance and development may be necessary to provide at the commencement 
of a time of war the most necessary requirements, and under a longer inter-
ruption by war to serve as patterns for the erection of new machine facto-
ries. (List, 1841a, p. 314) 
 
List argues that the machine tool industry is strategically important, 
and like transport a foundation for all other branches of industry, 
 
Without machine manufactories, a nation would in time of war be ex-
posed to the danger of losing the greater portion of its manufacturing pow-




When in short supply, machine tools should be exempted from im-
port duties on manufactured goods, and this especially applies to inno-
vative machines, 
 
An exception to this rule should be made in favour of plants making ma-
chines. If a country has industries sufficiently advanced to require large 
numbers of modern machines of various kinds but does not have the engi-
neering workshops which make them, it would be foolish to impose high im-
port duties on machinery. Such a policy would gravely endanger the future 
productive powers of the country. This argument is valid for a country which 
has just begun to establish import duties to protect its new industries. Here 
too, as with mining, the state would be well advised to foster the establish-
ment of joint stock companies to set up model engineering workshops for the 
construction of machinery. If a war were to break out these workshops could 
be expanded and their output would meet all the country‘s requirements as 
far as machines were concerned. All newly invented machines should be al-
lowed to enter the country for a certain period without payment of any im-
port duty. (List, 1837a, p. 117) 
 
Energy is another instance of a good that is crucially necessary for 
many other branches. List argues that,  
 
Nothing is more important for industrialists than the availability of cheap 
fuel and also easy, speedy, and regular transport at a low cost … (List, 
1837a, p. 62) 
 
Special care must therefore be taken to secure, nurture, and protect 
these industries, since to a considerable degree they have the character 
of being public goods - along with infrastructure and the credit system. 
 
 
4.34 Productive public credit in a sound credit system  
 
A crucial and core part of a modern market economy‘s infrastructure is 
the financial system – in particular the credit system, which includes 
both customer credit and trade credit. This ―virtual‖ institutional sys-
tem is indispensable for a fluid working of an industrial economy. 
Accordingly, List argues that the State must arrange for a proper na-
tional credit system, by providing sufficient currency in circulation, 
promote the establishment of credit institutions and provincial banks, 
and provide public inspections of all companies to ensure that proper 
financial routines are followed. 
 
10. A government should do everything in its power to increase the cur-
rency in circulation to keep pace with the growth of industry. It should also 
promote the establishment of public credit institutions. It should encourage 
the establishment of provincial banks all over the country and these banks 
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should be authorised to issue their own notes.301 But great care should be 
taken to ensure that these banks were run on sound financial principles. 
National banks in the capital of a country, which have no branches in 
the provinces and issue notes only in large denominations, cannot ade-
quately carry out the functions of country banks or cannot carry them out 
at all. 
11. The government should try to foster the founding of new companies 
but should endeavour to prevent any misuse of this form of business organ-
isation. It should forbid the issue of bearer bonds302 and should make pro-
vision for the public inspection of the working of all companies. (List, 
1837a, pp. 121) 
 
List also argues that the national credit system must be protected 
from disturbances from abroad, which we will investigate in a later 
chapter. List did not devote much time into discussing public procure-
ment, which arguably was relatively much smaller in his days than at 
present. 
Closely related to public procurement, as well as to loans and subsi-
dies to private industry, is the instrument of public credit. List hails the 
use of credit for productive purposes, but calls it a curse if it is used for 
non-productive consumption and especially if the working class should 
pay the interest on this debt,  
 
The system of State credit is one of the finest creations of more recent 
statesmanship, and a blessing for nations, inasmuch as it serves as the 
means of dividing among several generations the costs of those achieve-
ments and exertions of the present generation which are calculated to bene-
fit the nationality for all future times, and which guarantee to it continued 
existence, growth, greatness, power, and increase of the powers of produc-
tion; it becomes a curse only if it serves for useless national expenditure, 
and thus not merely does not further the progress of future generations, 
but deprives them beforehand of the means of undertaking great national 
works, or also if the burden of the payment of interest of the national debt 
is thrown on the consumptions of the working classes instead of on capital. 
(List, 1841a, p. 296) 
 
List sees state debt as a loan from future generation to the present 
generation, and finds this to be sound as long as the investment is pro-
ductive, 
 
State debts are bills which the present generation draws on future ones. 
This can take place either to the special advantage of the present generation 
or the special advantage of the future one, or to the common advantage of 
both. In the first case only is this system an objectionable one. But all cases 
                                       
301 1. [In the same year that he wrote The Natural System of Political Econo-
my List submitted a memorandum to Louis Philippe recommending the estab-
lishment of joint stock banks to finance the construction of railways (List, 
Werke, Vol. V, pp. 95-8).] (Henderson‘s note) 
302 Bearer bonds are bonds that are made out to the bearer and not to a 
named person. (My note) 
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in which the object in view is the maintenance and promotion of the great-
ness and welfare of the nationality, so far as the means required for the 
purpose surpass the powers of the present generation, belong to the last 
category. (List, 1841a, p. 297) 
 
However, he here explains State credit as a loan, where the State is a 
debtor. He thereby ignores an important alternative way of creating 
public credit; utilising the State‘s legal monopoly of national money is-
suing, ‗the printing press‘ or in our days creating ‗electronic money‘ by 
the ‗computer keyboard‘, and directing it to productivity enhancing ―de-
flationary‖ purposes, such as infrastructure. This is a bit strange since 
he was well aware of paper money as an institutional tool … There 
seems to be a missing link somewhere in List‘s publications. The im-
pression one gets from his numerous references to ‗paper money in cir-
culation‘ is that they ought to be backed by precious metals.  
A few days after delivery of the second draft on this dissertation, I 
suddenly realised that my criticism of List here was somewhat wrong:  
List favoured species (gold, silver) backing of circulating money for 
most countries, but added that England did not need this, since her 
productive power gave her the necessary trust in the financial markets. 
Therefore according to List, essentially, productive power, and eventual-
ly mental power which is the core of productive power, is the true back-
ing of (trust in) money, 
 
The prevailing theory has evidently not sufficiently discriminated be-
tween the mere possession of the precious metals and the power of disposi-
tion of the precious metals in international interchange. Even in private ex-
change, the necessity of this distinction is clearly evident. No one wishes to 
keep money by him, everyone tries to remove it from the house as soon as 
possible; but everybody at the same time seeks to be able to dispose at any 
time of the sums which he requires. The indifference in regard to the actual 
possession of ready money is manifested everywhere in proportion to 
wealth. The richer the individual is, the less he cares about the actual pos-
session of ready money if only he is able at any hour to dispose of the ready 
cash lying in the safes of other individuals; the poorer, however, the indi-
vidual is, and the smaller his power of disposing of the ready money lying in 
other people's hands, the more anxiously must he take care to have in 
readiness what is required. The same is the case with nations which are 
rich in industry or poor in industry. If England cares but little as a rule 
about how great or how small a quantity of gold or silver bars are exported 
out of the country, she is perfectly well aware that an extraordinary export 
of precious metals occasions on the one hand a rise in the value of money 
and in discount rates, on the other hand a fall in the prices of fabrics, and 
that she can regain through larger exportation of fabrics or through realisa-
tion of foreign stocks and State paper speedy possession of the ready money 
required for her trade. England resembles the rich banker who, without 
having a thaler in his pocket, can draw for any sum he pleases on neigh-
bouring or more distant business connections. If, however, in the case of 
merely agricultural nations extraordinary exports of coin take place, they 
are not in the same favourable position, because their means of procuring 
the ready money they require are very limited, not merely on account of the 
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small value in exchange of their products and agricultural values, but also 
on account of the hindrances which foreign laws put in the way of their ex-
portation. They resemble the poor man who can draw no bills on his busi-
ness friends, but who is drawn upon if the rich man gets into any difficulty; 
who can, therefore, not even call what is actually in his hands, his own. 
A nation obtains the power of disposition of the amount of ready money 
which is always required for its internal trade, mainly through the posses-
sion or the production of those goods and values whose facility of exchange 
approaches most nearly to that of the precious metals. 
The diversity of this property of the facility of exchange in respect to the 
various articles of commerce and of property, has been as little taken into 
consideration by the popular school of economists in judging of interna-
tional commerce, as the power of disposition of the precious metals. (List, 
1841a, pp. 281-284)  
 
Thus, List has grasped the concept of paper- and fiduciary money.  
List also argues that the expansion of industry and the supply of money 
must proceed at same pace,  
 
10. A government should do everything in its power to increase the curren-
cy in circulation to keep pace with the growth of industry. (List, 1837a, pp. 
121)303 
 
List here indirectly suggests that the state supplies directed produc-
tive credit itself, by using its legal monopoly of issuing money. Never-
theless, he does not take the final step by expressing this openly. If he 
had done so, he would have been ahead of today‘s governments.  
This was, however, to some degree suggested by various economists 
in Germany ending with cross-political consensus in 1931, such as at 
the Friedrich List conference in 1931. Hansjörg Klausinger‘s following 
comment is relevant for the situation of Greece today, 
 
… the Lautenbach-Plan was developed in the aftermath of the crisis when 
there was no chance anymore - if there ever was one - of raising a foreign 
loan.  (Klausinger, 1985, p. 379, also cf. Backhaus, 1985) 
 
And as Backhaus wrote in 2002, 
 
… self-financing forms of public works are preferable such as those de-
signed by Wilhelm Lautenbach and implemented between 1932 and 1935. 
In relying on the Keynesian multiplier and accelerator effects, the funds 
spent wisely yield a return that constitutes the original fund. (Backhaus, 
2002) 
 
In the 1930s, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt used the RDF (Re-
construction Finance Corporation) for similar purposes and this also 
became the role of the ‗KfW‘ in post-WW II Germany (Kreditanstalt für 
Wiederaufbau - the post-war Reconstruction Credit Bank). 
                                       
303 Quoted more extensively above, in this same section. 
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Investments must be financed with claims in future production. It is 
especially so the case if investments are highly productive and lead to a 
fast capacity expansion. Therefore, the orthodox argument of ‗first save 
and then invest‘ is turned upside down: ‗First invest‘.   
List omits mentioning the non-inflationary character of productive 
investment, which is another important argument for its construction. 
Nevertheless, according to List, the use of state debt and investments 
into transportation is by far the most profitable project for future gener-
ations, 
 
No expenditure of the present generation is so decidedly and specially 
profitable to future generations as that for the improvement of the means of 
transport, especially because such undertakings as a rule, besides increas-
ing the powers of production of future generations, do also in a constantly 
increasing ratio not merely pay interest on the cost in the course of time, 
but also yield dividends. (List, 1841a, p. 297) 
 
In fact, List argues that the present generation has a duty to invest in 
transportation projects, 
 
The present generation is, therefore, not merely entitled to throw on to 
future generations the capital outlay of these works and fair interest on it 
(as long as they do not yield sufficient income), but further acts unjustly 
towards itself and to the true fundamental principles of national economy, 
if it takes the burden or even any considerable part of it on its own shoul-
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Markets do not always function optimally, and may need a benevolent 
‗guiding hand‘ in addition to the ‗hidden hand‘. Some examples are 
‗transaction costs‘ and ‗public goods‘. 
‗Transaction costs‘ are the costs of making economic exchanges. One 
version of transaction costs is the extra cost incurred by the interrela-
tionships between markets. Individual actors in one market may de-
pend on other markets, but have little influence on them, or insufficient 
                                       
304 See also the sections, Public regulation of the merchant interest, and Gen-
eralisations play down regulation and nation, in chapter 3. 
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incentives to engage in them. This often results in market failures and 
imperfections, which may be corrected by a collective agent. 
A public good is normally described as a good that is non-rivalrous 
and non-excludable, and therefore display concentrated costs and dis-
persed benefits. This makes them unattractive to private investors, 
leading to structural underinvestment. Public goods also give rise to the 
‗free-rider‘ phenomenon, and to the ‗tragedy of the commons‘, all 
entailing economic inefficiency. In short, the existence of a public good 
may lead to societal loss, if not regulated. 
Some public goods may even be global, such as knowledge. Global 
public goods can be used by everyone without reducing the benefits for 
anyone else. 
Since trade policy and in particular infant industry protection is an 
instrument in furthering know-how, trade policy may be considered as 
a way to promote public goods, and paradoxically this also goes for pa-
tent policies.  
Furthermore, strategic state procurement and investment may be 
used strategically to promote public goods and reduce transactions 
costs. 
When one assumes that unregulated markets will benefit the com-
mon good, this assumption has roots in the pre-Socratic philosophy. It 
is tightly related to the lack of differentiation between private and public 
interests and to the question that Bernard de Mandeville termed ‗pri-
vate vices, public benefits‘, meaning the question of whether private vic-
es can be used for the public benefit. This ancient pre-Socratic theory, 
including the theory of natural rights, was revived during the Enlight-
enment, often referred to as ‗the selfish system‘.  
The tradition of confusing private- and community interests is also 
related to the Image of Man as basically either irrational or rational: The 
tradition opposing the ‗the selfish system‘ also appealed to Natural 
Rights, but considered that Man‘s prime duty to God was not simply 
biological survival but rather intellectual and moral perfection. This 
philosophy was continued with the Renaissance, the Reformation and 
with German Idealism. The task became to erect Heaven on Earth, .i.e. 
perfecting the State. This may be seen e.g. with Hegel‘s view of the na-
tion – as a quest for liberty. In this quest, Hegel emphasised the ex-
treme importance of civil society, as an instrument for individual liber-
ty, as tools for individual development. J.J Rosseau on the other hand, 
saw the institutions of Civil Society as impediments to such liberty, and 
English classical economists and K. Marx followed him in this ap-
proach. 
The Romantic and Conservative respect for Civil Society as intermedi-
ating organisations between the individual and the state is seen also in 
List‘s view of the nation; as an intermediating organisation between the 
individual and the global market. Just as the Conservative Edmund 
Burke argued for the intermediates‘ role in nurturing and securing the 
individual‘s freedom and opportunities, so List argues for the exact paral-
lel role for the nation.  
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Both economics and law promote general welfare as their ultimate 
goal, and the goal of analysis is nowadays perceived as promoting eco-
nomic ‗efficiency‘. In both, there is no reason to interfere politically as 
long as there are no negative ‗externalities‘.  
A core part of List‘s criticism against Smith concerns a lack of differ-
entiation between private interests and public interests. List repeatedly 
argues that private interests differ from national interests, and that un-
fettered markets cannot properly take care of the national interests: The 
national interest therefore requires an active state.  
List devoted his life to arranging the legal system to serve economic 
efficiency, for the common good. Like the Cameralists, List defined his 
profession as a duty to direct and regulate in search of perfection. 
Through libertarian ideas, he promoted more efficient markets, -for ide-
as, -for innovation, and for entrepreneurial activity. He argues that in-
justice was a major reason for existing economic problems, and that 
more justice would serve efficiency, and vice versa. Regarding List's 
agenda, at first he might be mistaken for a modern Liberal, but his em-
phasis on the need for regulation makes a difference. 
What separates List from modern law and economics would be his 
emphasis on the immaterial production factors; factors that cannot be 
measured and accordingly cannot be priced.  
However, List‘s close attention to the role of immaterial factors also 
made him aware of the role of incentives in economic development; and 
how these could be propelled by regulative and legal arrangements. He 
discussed the incentive structure thoroughly, and regarded it as crucial 
for entrepreneurship and the promotion of the mental powers of pro-
duction, for instance regarding tax incentives. 
Law and economics today, also deals with the incentives structure, 
but mainly within the standard economic image of Man, as purely self-
interested. List‘s approach is wider, but more difficult to formalise. 
Like Leibniz, List saw legal action as a tool to restrict the randomness 
and excesses of the bureaucracy. Furthermore, he argues for agricul-
tural reform to promote democratisation and industrialisation, and for 
political reforms to promote a representative parliamentary system. The 
civil liberties of this system were supposed to promote an urbanised 
and industrial society.  
Nevertheless, List was pragmatist and argues that the government of 
a people must correspond to the maturity of the people. In some in-
stances therefore, absolutism might promote progress better than more 
democratic systems. What mattered most he argues, was stability, indi-
vidual liberty and security of property. 
On this background, List may be considered as a pragmatic Social-
Conservative, and not really in the Liberalist camp where he normally is 
placed. 
In Russia and China, Sergei Witte and Sun Yat-sen promoted policies 
similar to List, concerning economic development and civil liberties, but 





5.02 Transaction costs of interrelated branches  
 
List claimed that markets have different characteristics, and to work 
properly, they need to be treated in different ways through public legis-
lature (Cf. List, 1841, p. 333, referring to Serra, 1613). As with nations 
and individuals, there is no such ‗one size fits all‘. 
Some branches more than others, are more ‗dependence creating‘ for 
other branches. This means that it matters especially much to an eco-
nomic system whether these markets function or not. They have a key 
role.  
List knew the basic and key function these constituted, as carpets 
and productivity-enhancing locomotives for other economic activities in 
…, practically speaking any society. He was therefore especially eager to 
make these basic markets fulfil their functions better by shaping the 
constitutional, legislative and regulative system with this in mind.305 
‗Transaction costs‘ are cost incurred in making an economic ex-
change. One version of transaction costs is the extra cost incurred by 
the interrelationships between markets.306 This occurs when individual 
actors in one market are dependent upon other markets, but alone have 
limited influence on them - or they have insufficient incentives to en-
gage in them, when benefits are compared with related costs - even 
though this malaise might affect all the actors.  
This illustrates a case of market failures and market imperfections, 
which may be corrected by a collective ―macro‖ agent. Lack of joint ac-
tion to rectify such failures, however, results in unnecessary costs that 
may be far distributed. Sergei Witte, the Russian PM and translator of 
List, illustrates that  this principle was well understood: He writes in 
his Memoirs that the state has to take initiative when private enterprise 
fails in providing important services for the national economy, 
 
                                       
305 List pointed this out in e.g. these instances, regarding;  
- education (Cf. List, 1827d; List, 1837a, pp. 119 and 66-67; List, 1841a, 
pp. 139, p. 200, 203-204 and 386–387; List, 1841b, p. 315);  
- science (Cf. List, 1837a, pp. 64-69, and 79; List, 1841a, pp. 48, 128-129,  
and 200);  
- transport (Cf. List, 1837a, pp. 136-137; List, 1837b, in general but e.g. p. 
67; List, 1838 in general but e.g. pp. 2 and 7; List, 1841a, pp. 49, 200 and 
323);  
- energy, (Cf. List, 1837a, pp. 62 and 136-137; List, 1837b, in general; List, 
1838, in general); and  
- machine tools (Cf. List, 1837a, p. 117; List, 1841a, pp. 151 and p. 314). 
306 Transaction costs, in the sense of Steven N. S. Cheung, however, are re-
lated to costs that arise due to the existence of institutions, and therefore ac-
cording to Cheung should be called "institutional costs‖. The question immedi-
ately arises whether Cheung ever saw an economy without institutions … (Cf. 
Cheung, 1987)  
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The new policy was and is based on the belief that railroads have a major 
importance for the state and that private enterprise, which is basically 
concerned with private interests, cannot adequately serve the interest of the 
state in this field. (Witte, 1990, p.192) 
 
List advices special care taken to secure, nurture, and protect such 
key branches, which are of particular interest for other branches and 
the common good of a nation. List here includes resources like ener-
gy,307  and strategic raw materials. For centuries iron has been serving 
as a vital input to other sectors, and List argues that,  
 
… Iron is a raw material that influences all the productive powers of a coun-
try. (List, 1837a, p. 117)308 
 
In particular, when a resource is hard to come by, and needed by 
many agents who by themselves alone cannot influence the supply, we 
may speak of incurred transaction costs. Increased knowledge of alter-
natives can amend this; increased knowledge of how to access and ex-
tract the resource; or by mutual action through e.g. the government. 
In general, however, List singles out regulation of the branches that 
are related to infrastructure – read large – as especially important. He 
considers these branches to be the ―foundation‖ or precondition for oth-
er branches. 
For List, these activities are normally related to knowledge, new 
knowledge, and transport of knowledge.  
Infrastructure, in a larger means functions that hold society together 
- like a social glue - includes knowledge (e.g. productive competence, 
grammar, measurement standards, education, media, research); 
transport (primarily communication of knowledge, also by moving new 
machines); security (of property; of resources; and of know-how), and 
machine tools (new know-how), markets (e.g. a fair, and the credit sys-
tem) and administration.309 
Also new technology has a strong element of knowledge embedded, 
and have this quality the more easily this knowledge is distributed to 
other sectors. This concerns in particular machine production, and in 
our time especially ‗computing‘; information and communications tech-
nology (ICT): such characteristics are displayed by e.g. fiber optics, 
transistors and derived products like ICs, CPUs, and RAM (i.e. ‗Inte-
grated Circuits‘, ‗Central Processing Unit‘, and ‗Random Access 
Memory‘).  
We may argue that the more ‗key‘ branches are, and the more they 
are related to knowledge – and the more they have the character of be-
ing public goods.  
                                       
307 (Cf. List, 1837a, pp. 62 and 136-137; List, 1837b, in general; List, 1838, 
in general) 
308 A more extensive quotation may be found in the section Pragmatism - fo-
cus on potential and value added, in chapter 6. 





5.03 Public goods 
 
Differential treatment of (different) markets in particular concerns mar-
kets for public goods. As ‗transaction costs‘, they must be treated differ-
ently, receive preferential treatment, not only in order to function them-
selves, but also in order to make other and perhaps many other mar-
kets function better. For instance, the well-being of the machine tools 
markets, the energy markets and the communication markets are cru-
cial for practically every other market in society, and therefore must all 
be treated with particular care.  
Modern theory of public goods goes back to Paul Samuelson‘s article 
The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure (Samuelson, 1954) where he dealt 
with the issue on two pages. Samuelson wrote in 1954, and the 1959 
edition of Richard A. Musgrave‘s classic textbook Public Finance still 
had a very rudimentary approach to public goods as ―goods the inher-
ent quality of which requires public production‖,310 and spent no more 
than one page on this issue out of more than 600 pages (Musgrave, 
1959, pp.43-44). In the 1960‘s, interest in the issue grew, clearly 
marked by Mancur Olson‘s classic The Logic of Collective Action: Public 
Goods and the Theory of Groups. Indicative of the economic profession‘s 
ignorance regarding organisations before him, Olson writes that,  
 
Economists have for the most part neglected to develop theories of organ-
izations, but there are a few works from an economic point of view on the 
subject. … (Olson, 1965; 1971, p. 5) 
 
Olson then gives a list of eleven books and articles written between 
1951 and 1961. This ignorance of the ―Liberalist‖ tradition contrasts 
strongly with the ―obsession‖ with ‗the Confederation of Labour‘ and 
Civil Society that List showed, along with his successors.311 Concerning 
this long tradition of attention to organisations in German economics, 
Olson mentions e.g. Max Weber, Robert Michels, and George Simmel, 
but as is usual within the contemporary economics profession, Olson 
classifies them as Sociologists – as he does with the Norwegian-
American economist, Thorstein Bunde Veblen. 
The character of some goods and markets, approach the characteris-
tics of public goods more than other and therefore deserve special at-
tention. This is not an either or question, but a matter of degrees.312 
                                       
310 Musgrave writes that ―Our concept of public wants may thus be supple-
mented by a concept of public goods - that is, goods the inherent quality of 
which requires public production. While public goods are characteristically 
goods that satisfy public wants, not all goods that satisfy public wants may be 
public goods in this sense.‖ (Musgrave, 1959, p.44) 
311 See e.g. the section, Confederation of Labour, in chapter 4. 
312 When a good is rivalrous and non-excludable we have what is often 
called a ‗common pool resource‘. When a good is non-rivalrous and excludable 
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The benefits of public goods concern two distributional aspects: 
timewise and so-called ‗external effects‘.  
Time-distribution concerns the fact that pay-back time for many 
investments in public goods is long, such as for infrastructure, 
education and research. 
External effects – ‗externalities‘ or ‗spin-offs‘ - concerns on the 
positive side for example; productivity improving effects of new 
technology, or efficiency-synergy from organisational co-operation; and 
on the negative side increased distrust, or environmental pollution.  
A ‗pure public good‘ is normally described as a good that is both non-
rivalrous and non-excludable, in the sense that the use by one individ-
ual does not reduce availability to others, and in the sense that individ-
uals cannot be effectively excluded from using the good (Cf. e.g. Olson, 
1965; 1971, p.36ff; Gravelle and Rees, 1981, pp. 504-507; 517-518; 
and Stiglitz, 1999, p. 309). 
Public goods are also related to ‗social capital‘. It is characteristic of 
‗social capital‘ that its value grows with more use, in diametrical oppo-
site of private goods, and more so than ‗public goods‘.313 
The costs of public goods tend to be concentrated to the investor but 
their benefits are distributed to a far larger community of users.  
These characteristics result in private investors lacking sufficient 
incentives for individual action; they make public goods less attractive 
to individual agents. For these reasons there is likely to be an 
under-investment in public goods: These areas tend to have structural 
underinvestment, if markets are not regulated, directly or indirectly, so 
as to correct this imperfection. Market ‗self-regulation‘ is therefore ‗per 
definition‘ often inadequate or inefficient in the case of public goods. 
(Cf. e.g. Olson, 1965; 1971, p.11-36; and Gravelle and Rees, 1981, pp. 
517-518) 
The existence of pure public goods is therefore also related to the so-
called ‗free-rider‘ phenomenon (Cf. Olson, 1965; 1971, p.29), and to the 
related ‗tragedy of the commons‘: A ‗free rider‘ takes advantage of the 
investments made by others but contributes nothing or little to 
investment or maintenance (Cf. Hardin, 1968).  
As a result of structural underinvestment and under-maintenance, 
we get a tragedy of the commons. This concers ‗natural‘ issues like un-
spoilt nature, e.g. clean air and water (Cf. e.g. Fischer, 1981, p.167ff), - 
but also concern ‗cultural‘ issues like knowledge and media 
broadcasting. The problem is that whereas no-one has enough interest 
to invest in construction of maitainence, access is so easy that the good 
may be overused and spoilt. 
                                                                                                                
we have what is often called ‗club goods‘.  A public good can change its 
characteristics when it becomes subject to legal or technical restrictions, 
regarding access and use: They may become quasi-public goods, club goods or 
even private goods. Some exclusion mechanisms are copyrights, patents, 
congestion pricing, data encryption, and pay television (Cf. e.g Buchanan, 
1965; and Gravelle and Rees, 1981, p. 505).  
313 See also the section, Networking and ‗Social Capital‘, in chapter 4. 
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Public goods, of various degrees, are therefore a prime target of gov-
ernmental regulation and lawmaking. This are therefore reasons for 
governmental intervention into development of many kinds of 
infrastructure like for instance; human (education, science); 
institutional (measurements and legal system); organisational (law 
enforcement and defence); and material (energy and transportation).  
 
Some arguments for public action in the face of public goods are, 
 
 Concentrated costs and widely distributed benefits  
 Implies natural monopoly and economics of scale 
 Major investment costs above the reach of most micro agents 
 The system may benefit, but not the individual small micro agent 
 Cost-benefit bottom line of a micro agent promotes no action 
 Implies sub-optimal investment level  
 - for micro agents and for economic system at large  
 A macro agent must take responsibility for the system at large - 
for its benefit 
 Macro action should rely on a general understanding of wealth 
creation  
 Infrastructure – read large - is a public good  
 
The cost of investment for public goods is often high and therefore 
results in strong economics of scale and high barriers to entry. This is 
beneficial for the establishment of a natural monopoly, if the investor 
can manage to collect payments; fees, dues, or taxes. As with 
monopolies in general, this may lead to potentially damaging monopoly 




5.04 Global public goods 
 
List argues that just as private interests may differ from public interests, national interests may differ from 
global interests,  
 
Conditions, events, etc., may be profitable in individual economy for 
some persons, and injurious to the community; or, on the contrary, they 
may be injurious to individuals, and prove highly beneficial to the commu-
nity: Individual economy is not political economy. 
So — measures, principles can be beneficial to mankind, if followed by 
all nations, and yet prove injurious to some particular countries, and vice 
versa. Political economy is not cosmopolitical economy. (List, 1827b, Letter 5, 
p. 75)  
 
List thereby indicates an area of research; ‗Global Public Goods‘, which is receiving increased attention 
(Cf. e.g. Kaul, Grunberg and Stern, 1999). Many public goods are related to knowledge 
and the communication of knowledge. As former leader for the World 
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Bank,314 Joseph Stiglitz, argues in his article, Knowledge as a Global 
Public Good, 
 
Today we recognize that knowledge is not only a public good but also a 
global or international public good. We have also come to recognize that 
knowledge is central to successful development. The international commu-
nity, through institutions like the World Bank, has a collective responsibil-
ity for the creation and dissemination of one global public good - knowledge 
for development. … In particular, I emphasize the role of knowledge for de-
velopment, articulated forcefully in the World Development Report 1998/99 
(World Bank 1998b), and the consequences thereof. (Stiglitz, 1999, p. 308) 
 
 
a) Tariffs and international trade agreements 
 
Knowledge as a global public good, is also related to the difference be-
tween raw materials and finished goods; knowledge-based (manufac-
tured and refined) goods distributed by ideal and material communica-
tion. In this perspective, also trade policy is an instrument in furthering 
public goods, generally understood as the creation of know-how. The 
infant industry argument is one argument of this type, regarding 
learning and new know-how in production as an instance of a potential 
and future public good. And as noticed above, List was in particular ob-
servant of such basic functions of infrastructure, including education; 
administration; security and communication.315  
Concerning security, List knew, from mercantilist experience and lit-
erature, how monopoly power in "intelligence market", as well as in "the 
military and naval market" spilled over into other markets, i.e. by dip-
lomatic cunning and brute force.  
List repeatedly discussed in detail and at length the strong historical 
experiences in this regard, especially concerning the Sea powers, the 
Venetians, Portuguese, and Dutch. He also paid much attention to e.g. 
the English ‗Act of Navigation‘ (Cf. List, 1841a, ch. 4, p. 46), but List 
conveniently all forgot the strong use of power by the Hanse.316  
                                       
314 I.e. the IBRD - The International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment. 
315 See e.g. the section, Mental side of transportation, in chapter 4. 
316 The Hanse used power against e.g. the Wends, Danes and Norwegians - 
where trade and use of weapons went hand in hand. The Wends did not fare 
well. The Hanse League was initiated as a defence league against centuries of 
northern raiders (e.g. Goths, Vikings, etc.). The founders were disciplined Teu-
tonic monk knights at the North Sea, and related merchants from Westphalia 
and Saxony. On invitation by Poland and blessed by the Pope, the Teutons went 
on a crusade in the East and ―settled‖ in the land of Prussia, populated by the 
heathen Wends (Slavs / Latvians) hostile to Poland. These lands were incorpo-
rated into the League. The League was initiated and headed by Lübeck, the 
once frontier settlement against the east, and finally established in 1356.  
A prominent example of use of military power by the Hanse is their thorough 





b) Strategic state procurement 
  
After List, public procurement (purchase) for various purposes has been 
an increasingly important instrument in the industrialisation process. 
This is related to both Socialist and standard Liberal and Conservative 
conceptions of public duties, such as the up keeping of infrastructure 
in the widest sense: Health, education, transport, law, security, defence 
etc.  
List does not seem to have missed this point, but he does not spend 
much time on it. One reason is possibly the small scale of public pro-
curement of his time. Nevertheless, he mentions state investments in 
infant industry (Cf. List, 1841a, p. 315) and transport (Cf. List, 1841a, 
p. 297). Furthermore, he repeatedly advices investment into strategic 
branches.317  
His pupils, saw this clearly and extended his general principles into 
this field; utilising public procurement to promote domestic know-how, 
production, jobs and a wider tax base.  
In particular England, but e.g. also Sweden, used public procure-
ment in particular the navy, to raise a row of private manufacturing es-
tablishments.318 Nevertheless, investment into civilian activities, e.g. 
education, innovative infrastructure, and -energy production, is a more 
                                                                                                                
in 1368 and 1369 (along the coast from Bergen in the west to the Swedish bor-
der in the east, by today‘s Gothenburg). Norway was the former dominating Sea 
Power outside the Mediterranean, in the North Sea and the Baltic. Norway had 
herself used her powers against client states and competing regions, such as 
the major retaliation mission against Danish and North-German trading towns 
in 1284.  
Norway‘s power had been utterly broken by the Black Plagues in 1349 and 
1363, removing more than half the population, and up to 80 % in some regions. 
The Hanse League then deliberately made an easy killing of a former competi-
tor, and secured her power in northern Europe for centuries to come (Cf. 
Gierløff, 1945, pp. 11-19). 
317 See e.g. the sections, Production of energy and machines, and Communi-
cation furthers urbanisation; wealth and culture, in chapter 4. 
318 In the middle of the 19th Century Sweden was a non-industrial and poor 
country. Constructing Göta kanal was seen as a way to kick-start Sweden‘s 
economy, this is a huge canal system intended to link the two major towns 
Stockholm and Gothenburg - cutting the country in two. But when the canals 
finally opened in 1832, they were fast becoming outdated. Railroads were soon 
far more efficient.  
However, the most lasting impression of the canals was not the canals 
themselves, although a great tourist attraction today. They made a huge im-
pression on the Swedish industry, by importing British expertise and technol-
ogy and establishing a row of mechanical industries throughout the interior of 
Sweden. This began Sweden‘s impressive journey into becoming one of the 
world‘s most advanced industrial nations (Cf. e.g. Magnusson, 2000, p. 115ff) 
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efficient way of transforming an economy than investments into martial 
activities. 
More recently, the procurements of Pentagon and NASA in the USA 
have been famous for their ability to develop new technologies and in-
dustries, like the precursors of the Internet, ARPANET (Advanced Re-
search Projects Agency).  
The often-ignored trick with public procurement is to make them per-
formance specific and technology-open, thereby promoting to innova-
tion and increased productivity, quantitatively and qualitatively. This 
option of making public procurement promote innovation has increas-
ingly been acknowledged internationally, e.g. in the so-called ‗Wilkinson 




5.05 Natural Rights and ‘the selfish system’319 
 
 
a) Natural Rights  
 
The leading Physiocrat and finance minister in France, Turgot, was the 
hero of A. Smith. Smith was also, as Marx, an admirer of Aristotle who 
in his Politics (Aristotle, 350 BC) used the dichotomy ‗natural‘ vs. ‗un-
natural‘ in his analysis.  
The Physiocrats defined their system as the natural system and the 
core of classical economics has the structure of natural law. This was 
an axiomatic-deductive system, deducing statements from established 
axioms based on introspection of ‗clear and  og distinct‘ facts (Cf. Des-
cartes, 1637, e.g. pp. 65, and 163). The historical school was an explicit 
rebellion against this unempirical scholastic attitude. The ultimate axi-
om concerned the duties of man towards God.  
The materialist faction of the philosophical tradition of Natural Rights 
claimed that Man's ultimate duty was biological survival. Hobbes was 
one of the Enlightenment pathbreakers for this originally hedonist tra-
dition (‗hēdonē‘ is Greek for ‗pleasure‘), however Christian in words he 
claimed to be. Although Hobbes wanted to moderate egotism with his 
(un-controlled) Leviathan dictator, he still believed egotism to be the 
principal founding stone of the social order. Egotism thus became the 
principle of all practical philosophy, and even Spinoza made it the 
foundation of his philosophical system, whereas Descartes elaborated a 
mechanical system of emotions (Cf. Windelband, 1893, p. 412) 
The Idealists in England, primarily the Neo-Platonists Ralph Cud-
worth and Henry More at Cambridge, undertook the warfare against 
Hobbes (Cf. Windelband, 1893, p. 382; and Cassirer, 1932: The Platonic 
Renaissance in England). Leibniz and the English Idealists were at-
                                       
319 For a brief discussion of the relation to the Enlightenment and the analyti-
cal method, see the section The rational and analytical method, in chapter 2. 
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tacked by Locke and Newton, and these attacks on the Neo-Platonic 
School at Cambridge by Locke and Newton had more than epistemolog-
ical importance, since it was connected to a political struggle between 
(national) monarchy versus (feudal and local) aristocracy. The former 
argued for State intervention and the latter for Laissez nous faire (leave 
us alone). The latter represented major socio-economic interests and 
held strategical positions.320 
The Neo-Platonists referred to Thomas Aquinas who had declared be-
nevolence to be the ultimate axiom of natural law. More‘s friend, Gott-
fried Wilhelm Leibniz and his younger collaborator Christian Wolff con-
tinued this attack on the Hobbesian school by developing a system 
where the Platonic and Renaissance idea of perfection became the 
founding stone instead of conservation (i.e. biological survival). This 
conflict reflects two different images of man, this time as the ultimate 
foundation for the system of Natural Law. This psychological question 
signalled the dawn of Enlightenment. One image was of Man as a spir-
itual and moral being, and the other of Man as a biological being – ‗a 
cunning animal‘.  
Both the idealist and the materialist traditions connect to the system 
of natural law. Both traditions can be said to pursue the duty towards 
God and the ‗happiness of Man‘ but the sources of happiness are quite 
different, and one would believe that their understanding of God should 
be different as well.  
The duty of Man within the Materialist tradition of was biological sur-
vival, whereas the duty in the idealist tradition was moral perfection. In 
the source of happiness within the materialist tradition, happiness re-
sults more from satisfaction of more mundane needs. The Idealist tradi-
tion understands happiness as resulting from spiritual sources where 
Man enjoys the unfolding of his potential to understand and do good 
(i.e. perfection of rational morality).  
 
 
b) ‘the selfish system’ of irrational man 
 
Wilhelm Windelband, Schumpeter‘s favourite historian of philosophy,321 
describes the tradition as ‗hedonism‘, ‗the selfish system‘ and ‗utilitari-
                                       
320 This struggle coincided with The Glorious Revolution of 1688, when the 
Protestant Dutch Stadtholder, Prince Willem III of Orange-Nassau, was invited 
by aristocrats who rebelled against the Catholic King James II, and became 
King William I of England. Along with Willem III from the Netherlands, came 
also Bernard de Mandeville and several British exiles, such as John Locke and 
his prominent pupil, the 3rd Earl of Shaftsbury, Anthony Ashley Cooper, Lord 
Ashley, one of Britain‘s richest men. John Locke became the secretary of the 
Board of Trade, and argued against public regulation of coinage. Locke‘s friend 
Isaac Newton was simultaneously ‗Chancellor of the Exchequer‘ in Great Brit-
ain. Together they were a formidable pair and quite an opponent to be reck-
oned with for Leibniz and the Cambridge Neo-Platonists. 
321 ‗..I shall name but one name, that of the man whose work seems to me 
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anism‘ as a dominant trait of the Enlightenment period, as opposed to 
the Idealism of the former Renaissance period. Besides Lamettrie, 
Holbach, and Helvetius, Bernard de Mandeville developed this view in 
his Fable of the Bees, or Private Vices, Publick Benefits (Mandeville, 
1714, with an early version in 1705). Wilhelm Windelband writes that 
Hobbes‘ selfish system also lent itself to a separation between morality 
and motives, in other words to the possibility of ‗private vices and pub-
lic benefits‘ – that individual sin could be good for society, 
 
The close connexion in which this utilitarianism stood historically after 
Hobbes with the selfish system that is with the assumption of the essential-
ly egoistic character of human nature led necessarily to the separation of 
the question as to the criterion of morality and the kind of knowledge by 
which it is apprehended, from that as to the sanction of the moral com-
mands and the motives for obeying them. (Windelband, 1893, pp. 513-514) 
  
The tradition of regarding private vices as public benefits is, however, 
much older than this, probably as old as philosophy itself, probably 
starting with the ancient philosophies of Aristippus and Epicurus (Cf. 
Windelband, 1893, pp.70, 85ff and 165, 170). This concerns the 
legitimation of egotism, and this contrasts with the duty-oriented 
tradition of among others Stoicism. The ethics of this materialist 
tradition is utilitarian, hedonistic and ―outcome‖- and ―result‖ oriented.  
Wilhelm Windelband and ‗therefore‘ Joseph A. Schumpeter, point to 
pain and pleasure as the motive force in the hedonistic tradition of Brit-
ish Classical Economics, and to social atomism as its sociology.322 
Therefore, the Epicurean background, rooted in former Greek hedonism 
and atomism, of English classical economics deserves to be mentioned 
in some detail, 
 
The great difference in apprehension of the ethical life which exists be-
tween the Epicureans and the Stoics, in spite of a number of deep and far-
reaching common qualities, becomes most clearly manifest in their respec-
tive theories of society and of the state. …. Epicureanism carried through 
systematically the ideas already developed in Sophistic teaching concerning 
the origin of the political community from the well-weighed interest of the 
individuals who formed it. … And as is the case for their origin and content, 
so also for their validity and acknowledgment, the amount of pain which 
they are adapted to hinder and pleasure which they are adapted to pro-
duce, is the only standard. All the main outlines of the utilitarian theory of 
society are logically developed by Epicurus from the atomistic assumption 
that individuals first exist by and for themselves, and enter voluntarily and 
with design into the relations of society, only for the sake of the goods 
                                                                                                                
to have been the peak achievement of the ‗historical philosophy‘ of that or any 
other age: Wilhelm Windelband.‘, (Schumpeter, 1954, p. 775). 
322 See also the section List‘s Realism versus British Nominalism in chapter 2; 
Epistemology and the English Classical School, and Malthus‘ heirs in the English 
Classical School in chapter 3.  
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which as individuals they could not obtain or could not protect. (Windel-
band, 1893, pp. 174-175) 
 
David Hume, his pupil A.Smith, and J-J. Rosseau, created more re-
fined versions of the hedonistic system. These Enlightenment philoso-
phers created a system ultimately based on the assumption that Man is 
irrational. Action is caused by will based ultimately on feelings or so-
called ―sympathy‖, as Descartes and Spinoza also argued (Cf. Windel-
band, 1893, p. 516-517).  The logical result is to separate morality and 
science where morality deals with (subjective) belief and sympathy 
whereas science deals with (objective) knowledge. 
When List criticises Smith‘s system with such hard words as ―It is a 
doctrine … based upon the most despicable egotism‖ (List, 1837a, p. 
104),323 it should come as no surprise that protests occur against List‘s 
‗unfairness‘. Wilhelm Roscher certainly protests, and praises at great 
length Smith‘s high morals,  
 
… we are told. Political Economy is only the science of selfishness; Adam 
Smith is the prophet of individualism; grow rich per fas et nefas is its ulti-
mate teaching.324 Such a judgment is evidence of much levity and little en-
lightenment. … (Roscher, 1877, § 12)325 
 
But Roscher‘s praise concerns Smith‘s Theory of the Moral Senti-
ments, whereas List criticised his economic ideas as demonstrated in 
The Wealth of Nations. In addition, as Mark Blaug writes, these books 
                                       
323 For an extended quotation see the section, Differentiate private versus 
community interests, in chapter 3. 
324 The expression ‗per fas et nefas‘ is Latin for ‗by right and wrong‘. AMD‘s 
note 
325 Roscher continues; ―The first sentence of his Theory of the Moral Senti-
ments, which is a full resumé of his theory, is as follows: "How selfish soever 
man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature 
which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness neces-
sary to him, though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing 
it." And this is no empty declaration on his part. It is the thought which of all 
in his book is nearest to his heart; and hence he energetically assails those 
philosophers who look upon self-love and the refinements of self-love as the 
universal cause of all our sentiments, and seek to explain sympathy by self-
love.  
La Rochefoucauld, Mandeville and Helvetius never met with a more deter-
mined or energetic adversary. Nowhere have the sweet and amiable virtues, 
such as ingenuous condescension, indulgent humanity, and the respectable 
and severe virtues, such as disinterestedness and self-control which subject 
our movements to the requirements of the dignity of our nature, been better 
understood or interpreted." Adam Smith is the philosopher of sympathy. … 
His theory triumphs over the cowardly and shameful egotism which concen-
trates the moral life of the individual in himself, and separates it from the life 
of the human race of the outre stoicism which refuses the aid of sentiment to 
reason.‖ (Roscher, 1877, § 12) 
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are radically different, respectively using sympathy and self-interest as 
basic axioms,  
 
Adam Smith is a particularly striking case because he in fact employed 
radically different modes of reasoning in different parts of his works. … Giv-
en the pivotal role of sympathy for other human beings in The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments and that of self-interested behavior in The Wealth of Na-
tions, both of these books must be regarded as deliberate attempts by 
Smith to apply this Newtonian method first to ethics and then to economics 
… (Blaug, 1980, p.56) 
 
 
c) Rational and moral perfection 
 
The opposition to materialism (liberalism) was rooted in different 
stakes, as well as in different ethical traditions that had a deontological 
tendency; towards duty based ethics,326 such as Platonism, Stoicism 
and Christianity. All regarded Man's ultimate duty as moral perfection, 
as with Socrates, Augustine, Thomas, Cusa, Leibniz, Wolff and the ide-
alist Renaissance tradition. (Cf. Windelband, 1893, pp. 85, 427-434, 
524) 
In the idealist tradition, morality is rational. Morality and rationality 
are the same. Morality is rational. Rationality is moral. The essence of 
being human is rationality. This sets us apart from animals. Therefore, 
the most human activity is to expand our rationality, and this is the 
most moral thing to do because it will benefit everybody else because of 
the commonality character of immaterial goods (as ‗public goods‘). 
Therefore, there is no reason to separate rationality and morality. Ra-
ther, in and Idealist tradition, the very motivation of science, including 
the economic science, must be moral. According to this line of reason-
ing, the dictum must therefore be that the ultimate concern of econo-
mists must be betterment of society as well as the individual citizen. 
Religious concerns and economic concerns are therefore close. 
 
 
5.06 Perfecting the State 
 
The Renaissance political ideal of perfecting the State into Heaven on 
Earth evidently had a religious background and connotations; there is a 
close affinity between ―utopian‖ views of the State during the Renais-
sance and religiously based views of the contemporary Reformation and 
Protestantism.327 Catholicism on the other hand, regarded the State as 
mundane, according to Windelband,  
 
                                       
326 As opposed to ‗Consequentialism‘. 
327 For more discussions regarding the role of Protestantism, see also the sec-
tion, Religion, science and education, in chapter 4.  
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The Protestant view of the world, … removed the ban of the "profane" 
from the secular spheres of life, saw in the state also a divine order; and the 
Reformation Philosophy of Right, under the lead of Melancthon, limited the 
right of the state more by the right of the invisible, than by the claims of the 
visible Church; indeed, the divine mission of the magistrates afforded a val-
uable support for the Protestant State-church. Much less could the Catho-
lic Church feel itself under obligation to the modern state; and although it 
thereby departed from Thomism, it allowed itself to be pleased by such the-
ories as those of Bellarmin and Mariana, in which the state was conceived 
of as a work of human composition or as a compact. For with this theory 
the state lost its higher authority, and to a certain extent its metaphysical 
root; it appeared capable of abolition; the human will which had created it 
might dissolve it again, and even its supreme head was deprived of his ab-
solute inviolability. While the Protestants regarded the state as an immedi-
ate divine order, for the Catholics, as being a human arrangement, it need-
ed the sanction of the Church … (Windelband, 1893, p. 427) 
 
Thus, we see that in their view of institutions and the State in partic-
ular, Protestantism has its roots in Stoicism, whereas Catholicism has 
its roots in Epicureanism, 
 
… But a greater distinction between the two conceptions of life shows itself 
in the fact that, to the Stoics, human society appeared as a command of 
reason, which must give way only occasionally to the wise man‘s task of 
personal perfection, while Epicurus expressly denied all natural society 
among men, 2 and therefore reduced every form of social conjunction to 
considerations of utility. (Windelband, 1893, p. 174 and 518 ff) 
 
―Protestant‖ Cameralism reached its height in Prussia and Austria‘s 
Cameralists were influenced (e.g. the leading German and Lutheran 
Cameralist J.J. Becker), and even had a parallel with the protestant 
Jean Bodin in France. The perception of the State in ―Protestant‖ Cam-
eralism, as an instrument for perfecting Man, continued with German 
Idealism with its Pietistic Protestants, such as the philosophers Kant, 
Fichte and Hegel. 
They were all involved in a quest for ‗Heaven on Earth‘ so to speak, a 
practical reformist convergence to a utopia starting here and now. In 
fact, this road of convergence, this acting dynamism, was in itself seen 
as a crucial part of this perfection: The ability for active imitation of 
God, by understanding and changing his creation, was Man‘s part tak-
ing in God‘s own dynamic nature, thus perfecting Man, Society, and the 
World. 
This drive for perfection was a common trait in Renaissance thought, 
which continued with the German Enlightenment.328 These political-
religious Renaissance ideas were later also transferred to American poli-
tics and philosophy.329 It took the shape of a Renaissance movement 
                                       
328 For a treatment of the drive for perfection, see Reinert and Daastol, 1998, 
chapters 4 and 6. 
329 See Hans W. Schneider‘s A History of American Philosophy, and the be-
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called ―Congretionalism‖, which set the democratic and mercantile pat-
tern for American social thought. By transforming Man‗s mind into an 
image of God they aimed at creating God‘s Kingdoms on earth. This had 
direct political implications, and even technology was ―Godly‖. 330  Alt-
hough it is ill remembered, in 1776 at the time of the American Decla-
ration of Independence, nine of 13 colonies had state religions inscribed 
in their constitutions.  
 
Somewhat paradoxically for protestant England, English Classical 
economics shares its view of the State with Catholicism and ―ultimately‖ 
with ancient Greek Epicureanism, Leucippus, Democritus, etc. Windel-
band describes the view of Hobbes, Hume and Smith as rooted in Epi-
curean Atomism; carried on as individualistic Nominalism, 
 
All phenomena of the ethical life are thus rooted, according to Hume and 
Smith, in the social life, whose psychological basis is sympathy, … 
The fundamental thought, which the philosophy of the Enlightenment 
would hold as to the great institutions of human society and its historical 
movement, was prescribed for it in advance, partly by its dependence upon 
natural-science metaphysics, and partly by its own psychological tendency. 
…  
This conception was guided into the political and juristic track primarily 
by Hobbes. The state appeared as the work of individuals, … The same Epi-
curean compact-theory, which had revived in the later Middle Ages, passed 
over with Nominalism into modern philosophy and extended its influence 
over the whole eighteenth century. (Windelband, 1893, pp. 518-519) 
 
In his Theory of the Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith illustrates this es-
sentially laissez-faire view of the State in English classical economics,  
 
… the care of the universal happiness of all rational and sensible beings, is 
the business of God and not of man. ... Nature has directed us to the great-
er part of these (means to bring happiness about) by original and immediate 
instincts: ... (which) prompts us to apply those means for their own sake, 
and without any consideration of their tendency to those beneficent ends 
which the great Director of Nature intended to produce them. (Smith, 1759, 
part VI, section II, ch. III, p. 237)331  
                                                                                                                
ginning in his first chapter, The Platonic Heritage of the New England Puritans 
(Schneider, 1946; 1963 ed.) 
330 Schneider writes that, ―Congretionalism was at one time more than a 
sect it; It was a social reform movement with a complete ideology. … it is well 
to begin the study of American philosophy with it, … The New England towns  
… gradually  … embodied a mixture of Platonic idealism and Yankee mercan-
tile prosperity.  …They defined nature as the art (techne) of God. … and the 
discipline of the human mind is the attempt at ordered understanding of the 
divine wisdom. There is no secular science; the so-called ―secondary causes‖ 
are intelligible, not as merely secondary, but as intrinsic instrumentalities of 
God‘s ―economy of redemption‖. ‖Technology‖ is thus sanctified.― (Schneider, 
1946, ch. 1, pp. 3-8) 





5.07 Hegel and the nation - the quest for liberty332 
 
List reflects German Idealism in his famous emphasis on the nation 
state‘s role of mediating between the individual and the global market: 
This is a close parallel to the necessary mediating role of civil society, 
between the individual and the state, on which Hegel insisted. Hegel‘s 
positive focus on social cohesion differs dramatically with the social 
Nominalism, social atomism devoid of inner social cohesion, which 
characterises the sociology of the English Classical School. It is inter-
esting that Marx‘ also here follows the English Classical School. 
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) was the son of an ordi-
nary revenue officer (as List was) in the fiscal service of Württemberg, 
from family of civil servants and pastors in Tübingen. His mother‘s fam-
ily were theologians, lawyers and high-ranking bureaucrats in 
Stuttgart, in Württemberg. He was educated early in classical texts, in 
the original languages. During his studies in Tübingen, his roommates 
were two other prime personalities of the German Idealism, the poet 
Hölderlin and the philosopher Schelling. Hegel in 1818 took over the 
professorial chair in Berlin after Fichte, another main character of 
German Idealism.  
The acknowledged expert on Hegel, Shlomo Avineri describes Germa-
ny‘s lack of unity and Hegel‘s special interest in Württemberg, Hegel‘s 
common homeland with Friedrich List,  
 
The old German Empire at the turn of the eighteenth century was a 
hodge-podge .. all held together by the tenuous semblance of the imperial 
crown, …Hegel‘s first confrontation with one segment of this kaleidoscope is 
a fragment written in 1798 entitled ‗On the Recent Domestic Affairs of 
Württemberg‘. …Hegel‘s obvious interest in Württemberg, his homeland, 
will show itself again after 1815; this is significant not only for purely bio-
graphical reasons, but also because Württemberg was the only German 
Land power and actively participating in administration. Württemberg was 
sometimes called the England of Germany, … (Avineri, 1972, p. 36) 
 
In 1802, Hegel writes the essay, The German Constitution where he 
calls for unification of all the German states into one nation under one 
army and one emperor, 
 
It has been the fate of Italy to come for the most part under the authority 
of foreign powers. … If Germany is not to suffer the same fate as this after a 
few wars, it should re-organise itself as a state. … The only way in which 
the German Empire might continue to exist would be by, organising a polit-
                                                                                                                
metrical opposite of Wealth of Nations, the first based on the axiom of altruism 
and the second on self-love. 
332 See also the section, Freedom in the German tradition, in chapter 2, re-
garding e.g. Rudolf Steiner‘s anti-unitary ideas of State. 
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ical power and restoring the German people‘s connection with Emperor and 
Empire. 
The former could be accomplished by amalgamating the whole military 
strength of Germany into a single army. (Hegel, 1802) 
 
Regarding this essay, Avineri makes the point that it is not national-
ism that makes Hegel support German unification, but rather the dan-
gers of the on-going disintegration and dehumanisation of Germany, 
calling for a modernisation of Germany along French lines. Avineri 
writes, 
 
Though there is no doubt that the total disintegration of the old Holy 
Roman Empire of the German Nation in its confrontation with republican 
France is at the root of Hegel‘s treatise, it would be a mistake to see it as an 
appeal to nationalism or to classify Hegel as ‗an ardent nationalist‘, … As 
we shall see, the essay makes clear that ethnic, linguistic or national ele-
ments are totally alien to Hegel‘s deliberations. Furthermore, in 1814 Hegel 
warmly welcomed the decision of the Congress of Vienna not to set up a 
unified Germany; in an ‗ardent nationalist‘ such an attitude would certainly 
be incomprehensible. (Avineri, 1972, p. 35) 
 
From 1806 to 1813 Hegel supported the French due to their modern 
mode of social organisation and opposed German nationalism, and thus 
Avineri writes, 
 
… from 1806 to 1813 Hegel adopted a line of wholehearted support of the 
French and violently opposed the German nationalist movement as well as 
the anti-French insurrection of 1813 so feverishly advocated by Fichte. He-
gel‘s concern in his essay on The German Constitution is turned in another 
direction. The blows dealt by the French revolutionary army to the anti-
quated system of the historical Reich were not viewed by him in terms of a 
clash of two nations or two national movements but as a clash between two 
kinds of states and political systems. The victory of French arms was evi-
dence of the strength and cohesion of the modern state, as forged in France 
by the combination of absolutist centralism and revolutionary transfor-
mation. … The essay is thus not a call for German nationalism but for the 
modernization of the German political system. (Avineri, 1972, p. 35) 
 
Avineri writes that,  
 
Hegel comes back to the issue of Prussia towards the end of the essay, 
when he attempts to confront the question of how the reconstruction of po-
litical life in Germany can be accomplished. Two candidates, potentially ca-
pable of undertaking the task of political unification and modernization, 
present themselves to Hegel: Prussia and Austria. Hegel chooses Austria, 
out of considerations which derive from his views about the comparative 
political structures of the two entities involved.333  
                                       
333 68: Cf. Haym, Hegel und seine Zeit, p. 74; Habermas, Nachwort zu politi-
sche Schriften, p. 348 (Avineri‘s note) 
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Prussia, as we have seen earlier, is to Hegel the epitome of a mechanistic, 
hierarchical, authoritarian political structure. (Avineri, 1972, p. 57) 
 
Hegel claimed that the history of the World Spirit (‗Weltgeist‘) is a 
process of unfolding and spreading individual liberty to more and more 
people, both within one nation and between nations: Christianity was a 
prime mover for individual liberty. In Hegel‘s time, individual liberty 
was at the peak of focus with the Germanic peoples, and developed 
even further in the USA. Thus, Hegel writes,  
 
America is therefore the land of the future, where, in the ages that lie be-
fore us, the burden of the World's History shall reveal itself. (Hegel, 1837, 
Introduction, p. 104) 
 
Hegel describes his moral view of the constitutional State in his Phi-
losophy of History, and writes, 
 
The History of the world is none other than the progress of the con-
sciousness of Freedom; a progress whose development according to the ne-
cessity of its nature, it is our business to investigate. (Hegel, 1837, Introduc-
tion, p. 33) 
 
The State is the Idea of Spirit in the external manifestation of human Will 
and it‘s Freedom. … We then recognised the State as the moral Whole and 
the Reality of Freedom, and consequently as the objective unity of these two 
elements (Hegel, 1837, Introduction, section 3, The Embodiment Spirit As-
sumes - the State, §50) 
 
Hegel‘s concept of a constitutional State was then developed into the 
German liberal concept of the ‗Rechtsstaat‘, i.e. the ‗Legal State‘ or 
‗Constitutional State‘ and contrasted with the aristocratic state - fore-
most by Robert von Mohl334 (Die deutsche Polizeiwissenschaft nach den 
Grundsätzen des Rechtsstaates, (Mohl, 1832-1834). This ‗Rechtsstaat‘ 
was seen as the precondition for an effective market mechanism and 
has been regarded as such ever since, within European Liberal-
Conservative thought. 
List‘s critical approach towards empty rhetoric and preference for 
unmasking real interests - ‗follow the money‘, as the common expres-
sion is today - could easily have been inspired by Hegel. Hegel writes, 
 
When liberty is mentioned, we must always be careful to observe whether 
it is not really the assertion of private interests which is thereby designated. 
(Hegel, 1837, p. 449) 
 
 
5.08 Hegel’s liking for Civil Society  
 
                                       
334 Mohl became List‘s successor as Professor of Statecraft at the University 
of Tübingen in 1824. 
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Shlomo Avineri claims that although Hegel feared social fragmentation, 
he was a moderniser and not a traditionalist, 
  
It is as a reformer and a modernizer, not as a traditionalist, that Hegel 
levels his radical critique of conditions in Germany, while at the time re-
maining deeply conscious of the historical forces of the past: …..The disso-
lution which has thus overtaken Germany is fraught with dangers. This 
disappearance of the common bond uniting individuals in one body politic 
pushes men into an atomistic isolation which dehumanizes them. … 
The German people may be incapable of intensifying its obstinate adher-
ence to particularism to that point of madness reached by the Jewish peo-
ple – a people incapable of uniting in common life with any other. (Avineri, 
1972, p. 55) 
 
 Hegel claimed that the individual had to be protected against the 
state and the market by in-between institutions like the guilds; the le-
gitimacy of society and of the state was the guarantee of individual lib-
erty, and this has to be the starting point for a philosophy of Law and 
Society; Avineri writes that Hegel,  
 
... in his theory of modern society attaches extreme importance to the in-
termediate stages of social integration that would now come instead of the 
direct, immediate and total integration of the classical polis. (Avineri, 1972, 
p. 23) 
 
In his chapter Hegel's Theory of the State, the long-time Hegel scholar 
Frederick Beiser describes ―Hegel‘s program of wedding liberal princi-
ples with communitarian ideals‖ (Cf. Beiser, 2005, see quotations be-
low). This program of Hegel has been with us ever since. The dissolution 
of social integrity and –coherence, as a result of ―modernisation‖ -  in-
dustrialisation, urbanisation and modern transport - and accordingly 
the increasing dichotomy between community and individual liberty, 
was discussed e.g. by authors who today are classified as sociologists, 
like Ferdinand Tönnies, Max Weber, Georg Simmel and the Frenchman 
Émile Durkheim.  
Adam Müller was an early forerunner of this discussion. However, he 
is a forgotten author in this regard, perhaps because he sided with the 
losing ‗tradition‘ instead of with the winning ‗modernity‘ (Cf. Müller, 
1808-1809). The dilemma and dichotomy of ‗tradition and modernity‘ 
was explicitly stated, perhaps first with Ferdinand Tönnies‘ Community 
and Civil Society (Cf. Tönnies‘, 1887). This dichotomy has since been at 
the core of many anthropological-and sociological studies. In his Tech-
nology and Science as Ideology, Jürgen Habermas describes this lasting 
and wide-ranging field,   
 
By means of the concept of ―rationalization‖ Weber attempted to grasp 
the repercussions of scientific-technical progress on the institutional 
framework of societies engaged in ―modernization.‖ He shared this interest 
with the classical sociological tradition in general, whose pairs of polar con-
cepts all revolve about the same problem: how to construct a conceptual 
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model of the institutional change brought about by the extension of subsys-
tems of purposive-rational action. Status and contract, Gemeinschaft and 
Gesellschaft, mechanical and organic solidarity, informal and formal 
groups, primary and secondary groups, culture and civilization, traditional 
and bureaucratic authority, sacral and secular associations, military and 
industrial society, status group and class—all of these pairs of concepts 
represent as many attempts to grasp the structural change of the institu-
tional framework of a traditional society on the way to becoming a modern 
one. Even Parsons‘ catalog of possible alternatives of value-orientations be-
longs in the list of these attempts, although he would not admit it. (Haber-
mas, 1968, p. 90) 
 
Beiser argues that many contemporaries held similar views to that of 
Hegel and on some issues some even, as Adam Müller, surpassed He-
gel, 
 
One of the most important aspects of Hegel's political theory is his exten-
sive treatment of civil society (bürgerliche Gesellschaft) (§§ 182-256) in the 
Philosophy of Right.   
Hegel's analysis of civil society has been much celebrated, the focus of 
much recent scholarship. 
... 
Supposedly, Hegel was the first thinker of the modern German tradition 
to recognize the importance of economics for social, political and cultural 
life.14 
Unfortunately, such as generous assessment evaporates with a broader 
historical perspective. Hegel was not the first in his generation to perceive, 
or even to analyze, the problems of modern civil society. The young roman-
tics did this in the late 1790s, so in this respect too Hegel was only typical 
of his generation.15 
Furthermore, Hegel did not provide a detailed account to the laws of 
modern political economy, and in this regard was even behind some of his 
contemporaries. The treatment of money, labor and exchange in Adam Mül-
ler's Elemente der Staatskunst (Elements of the Art of State) (1809), sur-
passes anything in Hegel's published works or surviving manuscripts.16 
Still, these points do not diminish the significance of Hegel‘s treatment of 
civil society. Although it is not original in recognizing the importance of civil 
society, and although it does not give a detailed analysis of its economic 
laws, it does contain an interesting attempt to reconcile the values of civil 
society with the demands of community. The chapter ‗Civil Society‘ is one of 
the most important to assess the full meaning of Hegel‘s program of wed-
ding liberal principles with communitarian ideals. (Beiser, 2005, pp. 244-
245, footnotes 14, 15 and 16 omitted) 
 
Like Mikhail Bakunin and Robert Nisbet later, Hegel criticises J.J. 
Rosseau. In principle, Hegel argues that Rosseau is a utopian who 
takes as his starting point a ‗tabula rasa‘ dream; of an ‗clean‘, ‗inno-
cent‘, ‗savage‘ and egalitarian human being, unspoilt by the human in-
stitutions of civil society. We here see a germ for similar ideas within 
radical liberalism in economics, where ‗market forces‘ are to be left 
alone from corrupting influence from institutions, such as intervention 
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from the state. We also recognise the germ of Marx‘ similar detest, for 
the corrupting influences from Civil Society. Beiser writes that, 
 
Hegel placed great value on civil society chiefly because it was a necessary 
stage in the development of freedom. … Hegel‘s defense of civil society in 
the Philosophy of Right made it necessary for him to reckon with his old 
master, Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Throughout the opening section of ‗Civil 
Society‘ (§§182—208), Hegel takes issue, more or less implicitly (§§187, 
194), with Rousseau. Notoriously, in his Second Discourse Rousseau had 
argued that civil society destroys freedom because we lose the power to sat-
isfy our natural needs by ourselves; instead, we acquire new artificial needs 
and depend upon others to satisfy even our natural ones. Flatly contrary to 
Rousseau, Hegel maintains that we do not lose but gain freedom through 
civil society. Hegel sees a false premise behind Rousseau‘s argument: that 
freedom consists in natural independence, the power to satisfy our natural 
needs by ourselves. He insists per contra that freedom involves the power to 
liberate ourselves from our natural needs and to act according to rational 
principles (§187R). (Beiser, 2005, p. 241, Beiser‘s‘ references are to Hegel‘s 
Philosophy of Right, Hegel, 1820) 
 
The Protestant influences on Hegel should here be obvious, both re-
garding the relation to ―natural needs‖, and regarding the desire for 
voluntary self-determination, ‗freedom‘ …  
Hegel‘s argument is that Civil Society empowers individuals, as tools 
and instruments empower individuals. List‘s argues the same later on, 
regarding the State. Thereby, Hegel strove to reconcile a spurious oppo-
sition between individuals and society,335 as Kenneth Westphal writes, 
  
Hegel did espouse an organic conception of individuals and society. How-
ever, it is crucial to understand how he recast the issue. Typically it is sup-
posed that there are two positions on this issue. Either individuals are more 
fundamental than or are in principle independent of society, or vice versa: 
society is more basic than or "prior to" human individuals. Hegel realized 
that these two options form a false dichotomy. … Hegel's views have been 
widely misunderstood and castigated by critics who were beholden to a 
false dichotomy. … Hegel regarded the demand for rational understanding 
and justification of norms and institutions as the hallmark of modern 
times,7 and he sought an account of society and government that met that 
demand (Westphal, 1993, pp. 236-237, endnote 7 omitted) 
 
Many themes that Hegel discussed were, as Beiser pointed out (Cf. 
Beiser, 2005, p. 245), common issues of debate in contemporary Ger-
many. Many later philosophers and politicians were influenced these 
debates, and List is no exception. This dilemma and schism, between 
liberty and community; tradition and modernity, was at the core also of 
                                       
335 For a thorough discussion of this issue see Hjalmar Hegge‘s published dis-
sertation, Freedom, Individuality, and Society (Hegge, 1988). Hegge argues with 
Rudolf Steiner that ―true‖ individuality is developed in the spiritual creative pro-
cess, not in material consumption. 
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Friedrich List‘s discussions of the tension field between progress and 
stability. Therefore, a similar emphasis on the need for intermediate in-
stitutions, as with Hegel, is present also in List and his economic ―na-
tionalism‖; insisting that the Nation must interfere between the Individ-
ual & Firm, versus the global market. As with Hegel, we also find the 
philosophy of history as succeeding stages of development, elaborated 
by List and other German economists. As with Hegel, we also find with 
List the perception that a political system will reflect the mental stage, 
the ―maturity‖, of the citizen in general: Their collective civilisation and 
culture (Cf. List, 1841a, pp. 333-334). 
 
 
5.09 Conservative liking for Civil Society 
 
List‘s view of the nation reflects the Conservative respect for Civil Society 
as intermediating organisations between the individual and the State, as 
an intermediating organisation between the individual and the global 
market. Just as the Conservative Edmund Burke argued for the interme-
diates‘ role in nurturing and securing the individual‘s freedom and oppor-
tunities, so List argues for the parallel role for the nation. Therefore, we 
may describe List‘s position regarding 20th Century political traditions, as 
a pragmatic Conservative rather than as a Liberal, which usually is the 
place reserved for him, by e.g. Theodor Laue (Cf. Laue, 1963, p. 62). 
Once again, the German admirer of Burke, Adam Müller, precedes 
Friedrich List on this issue, with his emphasis of intermediary protective 
institutions, between the individual and the state and market.  
The historian of sociology, Robert A. Nisbet points to the affinity be-
tween Anarchism; Revolutionary Syndicalism; and Conservatism - in 
their common emphasis of the necessity of intermediate institutions 
between the State and the individual, with the former pointing to the 
modern heir of the guilds; the labour unions and the latter pointing to 
the guilds and the Church.  
Nisbet points out that an emphasis on the necessary role of civil soci-
ety, was a core trait of both Conservatism and Anarchism. Civil society 
had a mediating role and a protective role, between the individual and 
the state, and between the individual and the market. The parallel to 
List‘s view is obvious; regarding the Nation‘s mediating- and protective 
role towards the global market. 
Nisbet describes the essence of Conservatism to be love for freedom, 
as opposed to equality and consequently economic redistribution, which 
cripple the liberties of the individual, 
 
Liberty and Equality  
There is no principle more basic in the conservative philosophy than that of 
the inherent and absolute incompatibility between liberty and equality. 
Such incompatibility springs from the contrary objectives of the two values. 
The abiding purpose of liberty is its protection of individual and family 
property - a word used in its widest sense to include the immaterial as well 
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as the material in life. The inherent objective of equality, on the other hand, 
is that of some kind of redistribution or leveling of the unequally shared 
material and immaterial values of a community. Moreover, individual 
strengths of mind and body being different from birth, all efforts to com-
pensate through law and government for this diversity of strengths can only 
cripple the liberties of those involved; especially the liberties of the strong-
est and the most brilliant. This is, in brief, the view which conservative 
writers have unfailingly taken, from Burke on, on the relation between lib-
erty and equality. (Nisbet, 1986, p.47) 
 
Nisbet claims that Conservatism‘s love for the intermediate organiza-
tion of family and family values is rooted in the understanding of the 
Roman Republic, Medieval Times  and consequently  of Conservatism, 
e.g. with Burke and Tocqueville, that family is the best defender of 
property, and vice versa, that family property is the best defender of 
family feeling. Legal arrangements reflect the national roles of such in-
termediate collective organisations. The change of entail and end of 
primogeniture announced the end of traditional society with its collec-
tive family character of property, and the beginning of Individualism 
and Modernity (Cf. Nisbet, 1986, p.55 ff). 
Nisbet describes how the Anglo-Irish statesman Edmund Burke in 
his path breaking exposé of the French Revolution (Burke, 1790), differs 
between the American Revolution‘s quest for individual freedom where-
as with the French Revolution the individual surrendered his rights and 
freedom to the absolute community, creating the national slogan une et 
indivisible. All intermediate social groups were thus conceived as a 
threat to the monolithic community. According to Nisbet, the essence of 
Rosseau‘s Social Contract, was to transform freedom from oppression 
into freedom to participate in the collective; And since Burke, the Con-
servative battle cry has been a warning against the misuse of Power, 
also by the Majority, 
 
The message has been the unfailing object of conservative assault. Power 
is power, Tocqueville said in effect: it does not matter whether the power is 
wielded by one man, a clique, or the whole people. It is still power and 
therefore oppressive. From this position, set forth from the beginning by 
Burke and echoed immediately by de Maistre and Bonald, rose the con-
servative insight into the potentially despotic nature of popular government. 
The seductive thought that enlargement of the base of power would be au-
tomatically to diminish use of power, since the people would not tyrannize 
themselves, would lead, conservatives argued, to a novel form of despotism 
in which the entire people, or a simple majority, might impose its tyrannical 
will upon minorities, creative Elites, and other lesser bodies of human be-
ings in society. A conservative mocked the Rousseauian-Jacobin view of 
freedom by writing: Each morning the citizen would look into the mirror 
while shaving and see the face of one ten- millionth a tyrant and one whole 
slave. (Nisbet, 1986, p.48) 
 
In this Conservative battle-cry against Rosseau, Nisbet is joined by 
the Russian Anarchist Mikhail Bakunin, who argues that precisely the 
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celebrated democrat Rosseau paved the way for the bloody dictatorship 
of Robespierre under the French Revolution and the dictatorship and 
Empire of Napoleon I. 336 
Nisbet furthermore argues that the emphasis of the intermediate 
groups became the essence of the conservative view of freedom, 
 
I mentioned earlier in this section the conservative fondness for the in-
termediate social groups and communities in the social order: those which 
mediate between individual and the larger political power. That was in the 
context of a theory of authority. Here it is important to stress the degree to 
which the same emphasis upon intermediate groups became the basis of a 
conservative view of freedom. Groups of individuals - classes, communities, 
guilds and corporations - seemed to Burke and Tocqueville alike to have 
been the principal victims of the Revolution in France: these rather than 
abstract individuals. Burke repeatedly referred to violations of the corporate 
and communal rights of Frenchmen by the Jacobins: rights in kinship, reli-
gious, economic, and other kinds of associations. (Nisbet, 1986, pp.48-49) 
 
There is an affinity between Western Conservatism and the East-
Asian love of group values: Both balance and combine the collective be-
longing of the individual that makes individual freedom possible. Con-
sequently and furthermore, the economic tradition following List was 
well received in the Confucian- and Shinto countries for this very rea-
son. 
These Conservative and pluralist ideas, where freedom of the individ-
ual is based on the prolific intermediate groups, are shared by Anar-
chists of all sorts, and Nisbet has recognised as much, 
 
There is thus implicit in the conservative defense of groups against the 
sovereign a pluralism that would become one of the more distinctive philos-
ophies of the later nineteenth century. At various times this pluralism - and 
also syndicalism could be taken up by conservative, liberal, and radical 
causes alike - visible in Proudhonian anarchism and in the anarchism of 
Kropotkin later and the liberalism of Mill as well as the conservatism of He-
gel, Tocqueville and Taine. The thesis common to all these causes is the 
very reverse of that enunciated by Rousseau and the Jacobins. The claims 
of intermediate groups upon their members do not add up to tyranny but to 
the reinforcements necessary to the liberty of individuals. If the rights of 
such groups as family, community and province are invaded by the central 
state - and almost predictably in the name of individuals assertedly robbed 
of their natural rights - the true walls of individual freedom will in time 
crumble. (Nisbet, 1986, p.49) 
 
                                       
336 In the middle of a long tirade directed against Rosseau, Bakunin writes, 
―He may be considered as the real creator of modern reaction. To all appearance 
the most democratic writer of the eighteenth century, he bred within himself the 
pitiless despotism of the statesman. He was the prophet of the doctrinaire State, 
as Robespierre, his worthy and faithful disciple, tried to become its high priest.‖ 
(Bakunin, 1871, part III) 
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Nisbet gives us the basic reason why the intermediate groups are so 
important, and just as List argues concerning the nation as against the 
world markets, the intermediate groups are a necessary safeguarding 
and life giving womb for the individual‘s freedom against the unitary 
state, 
 
The conservative position, set forth most eloquently by Tocqueville, is 
that intermediate associations are valuable as mediating and nurturing 
contexts for individuals and equally valuable as buffers against the power of 
the state. In democracies especially, declared Tocqueville, these intermedi-
ate associations are necessary, for they offset, by their very existence and 
the loyalties they win from their members, the ever-mesmerizing power of 
the social democratic state and its creed of equality. 
The conservative stress on such groups as family, church and local 
community is in practice a stress too upon the several social roles which 
exist perforce in these groups. (Nisbet, 1986, p.49) 
 
The essence of the Liberal/Marxian conception of freedom versus the 
Conservative/Anarchistic conception of freedom, seems to be their re-
spective Images of Man and of -Society; ‗Nominalist‘ versus ‗Realist‘, or 
to put the matter in more regular terms;  
A more utopian view of Man as an isolated individual being (a noble 
savage a la ‗Robinson Crusoe‘), versus a more realistic view of Man as a 
social being in a meaningful setting (‗meaning‘ here refers to social-, 
cultural-, symbolic relations and -intentions), and furthermore:  
‗Society‘ as an accidental gathering of individuals; a simple ―sense-
less‖ sum of individuals  
- Versus ‗Society‘ as a collective identity of a larger cultural character 
(more than an aggregate, a simple sum of some sort).  
The general result is that institutions and Civil Society are seen as 
limiting for individual ‗freedom‘ in the Liberal/Marxian tradition, but 
are seen as enabling in the Conservative/Anarchistic tradition. 
We see thus that List‘s criticism of Adam Smith‘s radical liberalism 
resembles the Conservative criticism of the political radicals of France. 
Writing as he did some 20-50 years after the publication of Burke, it is 
likely that he was inspired by Burke‘s arguments, perhaps through 
German interpreters like Adam Müller. 
Nisbet claims that a tradition in Conservatism regards Liberalism as 
the precursor of totalitarianism; due to its individualistic dissolution of 
a people‘s collective spirit, Liberalism may provoke a counter-reaction, 
 
The chief accusation made against liberalism by conservatives is, and 
has been from Burke to Dawson, Eliot and Kirk among moderns that liber-
alism is a kind of Judas goat for totalitarianism. By its incessant liberation-
ist work on the traditional authorities and roles in society, liberalism, it is 
argued, weakens the social structure, encourages the multiplication of 
'mass-types' of human beings and thus beckons in its way to waiting totali-
tarian masters. 'By destroying the social habits of the people', wrote Eliot, 
'by dissolving their natural collective consciousness into individual constit-
uents. ... Liberalism can prepare the way for that which is its own nega-
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tion.' It was during the heyday of Mussolini that Christopher Dawson pro-
nounced Italian Fascism the work basically of modern liberalism. (Nisbet, 
1986, p.50) 
 
There is a parallel in List criticism of Cosmopolitanism. In his criti-
cism of the radical Liberalism of free trade, he makes the argument that 
immediate free trade would only lead to the monopoly of the strongest – 
or dictatorship if you please – of Great Britain. 
 
 
5.10 Marx’s disliking for Civil Society 
 
Hegel‘s and List‘s views on civil society stand in sharp contrast to the 
views expressed in standard Marxism and Liberalism, where civil socie-
ty is seen to interfere with the workings of either the communal state 
(Marx), or that of the market (Smith).  
 This opposed tradition grew out of e.g. Rousseau‘s volonté générale 
(i.e. popular ‗desire‘ or -‗will‘) into Liberalism and Marxism, rejecting 
any intermediation between the individual and the State or the Market, 
which both were seen as more pure expressions of the popular will, by 
the respective movements. A ―marriage‖ between Marxism and Liberal-
ism should after all not surprise since the roots of Marxism lie in Brit-
ish Classical Liberalism, a part of the British Radical movement; being 
materialists and utilitarians.  
Nisbet describes Marx‘ (and Rousseau‘s) discounting view of the al-
ienating and fragmenting egotism of civil society in this way - as op-
posed to the unity in the communal state, 
 
It is the conflict between civil society and the state that strikes Marx‘s at-
tention. Tocqueville too had seen this conflict as we have observed, but in 
altogether different terms. For Marx it is not the state that is the decisive 
influence but rather civil society with its varied combinations of materialis-
tic egoism and forms of alienation. The state offers man (and here we see 
again the strong substratum of Rousseau) a vision of community that 
stands in contrast to all that civil society represents. ―Where the political 
state has attained to its full development, man leads, not only in thought, 
in consciousness, but in reality, in life, a double existence - celestial and 
terrestrial. He lives in the political community where he regards himself as 
a communal being and in civil society where he acts simply as a private in-
dividual, treats other men as means, degrades himself to the role of a mere 
means, and becomes the plaything of alien powers.‖337 …  It is, in short, the 
revolutionary tension between citizenship and membership in civil society 
that Marx like Rousseau is concerned with emphasizing. (Nisbet, 1966, pp. 
134-135) 
 
Nisbet claims that Marx‘s view on civil society and individual rights is 
negative. Civil society is fragmented, tyrannical, and alienating, with 
conflicting loyalties preventing unity. - Ironically, Marx praise of the 
                                       
337 54: Ibid, p. 13 (Nisbet‘s note, referring to Marx, 1964) 
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State somehow contradicts his low respect for the nation, as a relic of 
the past. – The so-called Romantics praised the medieval age for its uni-
ty, but for them the reason was the opposite of what Marx would have 
preferred: Civil society had during the medieval period a stronger posi-
tion as towards the State. Moreover, indeed, Nisbet writes that Marx 
saw civil society as an arena of social tyrannies, such as performed by 
religion in particular, 
 
What Marx writes on the state and its role in European history is pene-
trating. European man, Marx tells us, has emancipated himself politically 
from religion ―by expelling it from the sphere of public law to that of private 
law.‖ Religion, from being a part of the fabric of the state, becomes, through 
such events as the Reformation and the rise of nationalism, a part of civil 
society only. ―It has become the spirit of civil society, of the sphere of ego-
ism and of the bellum omnium contra omnes. It is no longer the essence of 
community, but the essence of differentiation.338  Such a passage gives us 
the clue to Marx‘s view of civil society - an arena of economic, religious, and 
social tyrannies to which the individual is still subjected.  
Unlike Hegel, who found in civil society—family, class, and local commu-
nity - the necessary complement of the state, Marx sees in civil society only 
fragmentation and alienation from which man must someday be extricated. 
He has Rousseau‘s repugnance for all that emphasizes man‘s separate, dif-
ferentiated identity and all of Rousseau‘s love for that which emphasizes 
man in his communal, or what Marx calls ―species― identity . It is in these 
terms indeed that Marx scorns the natural-law school‘s insistence upon in-
dividual rights - precisely as Rousseau had. Rousseau, in his Social Con-
tract, had declared that once man entered into the true political communi-
ty, he would surrender all of his individual rights and acquire new ones 
based upon his membership as a citizen. (Nisbet, 1966, p. 136) 
 
The State, on the other hand, was to provide unity, 
 
If it was from Hegel that Marx got his sense of the historical role of the state 
in Europe, it was from Rousseau (who had of course influenced Hegel) that 
he acquired his sense of the state as a structure resting on the unmediated 
loyalties and devotions of individuals, each freed of conflicting loyalties. 
(Nisbet, 1966, p. 137) 
 
One conflict of different loyalties was for instance seen e.g. in the 
former Eastern Bloc, where Christians in the GDR were discriminated 
against by the State, regarding e.g. the right to education, following the 
logic that one cannot serve to masters at the same time, God and The 
Party. 
The Conservative and Anarchistic view of civil society as a necessary 
mediating role was thus opposed by the dictatorship of the State in 
                                       




Marxism,339 and as opposed to the dictatorship of the Market in Eco-
nomic Liberalism - as represented in ideal types of course.  
In very general terms, radical Liberalism prefers market forces to rule 
undisturbed, and this also goes for Marxism as long as we are talking of 
Capitalism and the need for advance towards a crisis that could pro-
voke revolution and thereby the total abolishment of markets. Indeed, 
Marx and Engels were Social-Darwinists when it came to the global 
struggle for survival of nations and cultures. For the same reasons, also 
Lenin was a champion for free trade policies among Capitalist nations. 
The dichotomy within economic strategies, namely between National-
ism and Liberalism /Marxism parallels the dichotomy within Socialism, 
between Anarchism and Syndicalism on the one hand versus Marxism 
on the other hand. This is part of a greater dichotomy within political 
strategies between Anarchism / Syndicalism and Conservativism, ver-
sus Marxism and Liberalism. The former favour civil society and the 
latter do not.  
 
 
5.11 Marx’ dislike of gradual improvement 
 
In his book, The Two Cultures, the Englishman C. P. Snow, Lord 
Charles, describes the gorge between scientists and intellectuals, 
 
If we forget the scientific culture, then the rest of western intellectuals 
have never tried, wanted, or been able to understand the industrial revolu-
tion, much less accept it. Intellectuals, in particular literary intellectuals, 
are natural Luddites.  
That is specially true of this country, where the industrial revolution 
happened to us earlier than elsewhere, during a long spell of absent-
mindedness. Perhaps that helps explain our present degree of crystal-
lisation. But, with a little qualification, it is also true, and surprisingly true, 
of the United States.  (Snow, 1959, p. 22)  
 
                                       
339 The Russian Anarchist Michael Bakunin was involved with Marx per-
sonally in the International Workingmen‘s Association. In the chapter Critique 
of the Marxist Theory of the State, Bakunin criticises positivism and August 
Comte‘s notion of a social science modelled according to Physics. Bakunin al-
so criticises the notion of a ‗proletarian dictatorship‘ which purports to ex-
press the ‖will of the people‖ as an aristocratic despotism by pseudo-scientists 
(Cf. Marx, The Communist Manifesto, 1848). In a lengthy and visionary ‗tirade‘ 
against Marx, Bakunin writes,  
―What does it mean that the proletariat will be elevated to a ruling class? … 
The Marxist theory solves this dilemma very simply. By the people‘s rule, they 
mean the rule of a small number of representatives elected by the people. ..  
behind which lurks the despotism of the ruling minority, a lie all the more 
dangerous in that it appears to express the so-called will of the people. …‖ 




List‘s practical family background in his father's leather business as 
a tawer340 may be of interest, as a contrast to the utopian Marx. List‘s 
practical family background in a literally dirty and also unhealthy 
handicraft, gave him direct insights into the monotonous toil of ordi-
nary people, in possibly the worst of all professions, and an urge to bet-
ter their conditions, for example through the use of machinery.  
Similarly, List‘s interviews with the emigrants to America and their 
practical and desperate reasons for moving away from family and 
friends also made an impression upon List. He devoted himself to better 
their lot by promoting industry. As a man from practical circumstances, 
List never ceased to stress the importance of evading disruptions in 
consumption and thereby production, therefore promoting stability and 
slow gradual change.  
 
 
Marx - the academic utopian 
 
Karl Marx, however, was less interested in such practical matters; 
gradually improving the lot of the downtrodden many. Marx became a 
romantic utopian who detested industry. 
Marx‘ family background was remote from the unpleasantness of 
practical life. Marx‘s father, Herschel, was an affluent lawyer from a 
long family line of Jewish rabbis and owners of wine yards. Herschel 
converted to Protestantism to avoid anti-Semitic legislation, and 
changed his name to Heinrich. His son Karl Heinrich Mordechai Marx 
finished high school as a devoted Christian, and his first publication 
entitled The Union of the Faithful with Christ. Marx then suddenly con-
verted to Satanism and wrote a number of poems with a most striking 
destructive fervour, reproduced in Wurmbrands‘ Marx and Satan (Cf. 
Wurmbrand, 1986, Ch. 1, see also North, Marx's religion of revolution - 
The doctrine of creative destruction, 1968).  
 
 
Marx - the revolutionary 
 
James Gregor is a scholar on Italian Fascism and Chinese Marxism. He 
describes how the utopians Marx and Engels, who wanted an ―all or 
nothing‖ solution, saw List‘s protectionist strategy at best as resulting 
in patchwork on a rotten civilisation that would prolong the alienation 
of working class life. Gregor writes that Marx therefore supported free 
trade, which would drive the world to extreme misery, chaos, revolution 
and towards a world without industry and markets. Gregor writes, 
 
The treatment accorded the protectionists by the first Marxists was un-
responsive—at best. Neither Marx nor Engels considered the issues ad-
                                       
340 To taw is to convert (skin) into white leather by emulsions, and by mineral 
tanning, as with alum and salt. 
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dressed by List worthy of serious consideration. Marx and Engels were to-
tally unconcerned with national economic development. 
For Marx, Friedrich List's preoccupation with the industrial growth and 
development of Germany was at best quixotic, at worse, calculated decep-
tion. In his most extensive discussion of List's ideas, Marx insisted that the 
developmental program advanced in the National System failed to address 
the real issues facing humankind. … 
For Marx and Engels the primary reality of the modem world was the 
constant, irremediable, and irreducible conflict between classes. The … en-
emy was not underdevelopment, or a foreign nation, it was an indigenous 
and exploitative class. 
If anyone were seriously concerned about "England's industrial tyranny" 
over economically less-developed nations, it was argued, the issue could be 
resolved not by competing with England by industrializing, but by freeing 
the world from the "domination of industry" in general.341 … 
As a consequence, Marx saw little   to choose between developmental 
strategies. He recommended free trade and laissez-faire to less-developed 
economies only because under their auspices the contradictions of modern 
industrial society would mature most rapidly — accelerating the circum-
stances that would "eventuate in the emancipation of the proletarians"342 
through abolition of the market. (Gregor, 1995, pp. 136, 137, 138 and 140) 
 
Robert Nisbet supports the interpretation that for Marx the revolution 
was vitally important. He writes that the ultimate goal was to end Man‘s 
alienation, thus making Marx‘ dislike of industry understandable, 
 
For Marx, as for Rousseau, there is always implicit a conception of man 
as containing naturally within himself sentiments and faculties which, over 
the course of social develop have become alienated from him and vested in 
external institutions. Revolution is the only means by which the end of this 
alienation can be effected and man‘s faculties returned to him. Hence the 
vital political function of revolution in Marx‘s thought. (Nisbet, 1966, p. 
137) 
 
We may therefore claim that whereas List focused on gradually im-
proving practical circumstances by promoting industry and markets, in 
order to elevate civilisation and individual freedom, Marx went the op-
posite way. He focused on the psychology of alienation and in principle 
promoted social chaos, in order to remove economic markets and install 
a political singular rule of society, by the omnipotent state.  
In short: List was a pragmatic reformist, whereas Marx was a utopian 
revolutionary, - and List promoted regulated Capitalism, whereas Marx 
promoted dictatorial Communism (Cf. Marx, 1848). 
 
 
                                       
341 40. Marx, "Draft of an Article on Friederich List's Book Das Nationale Sys-
tem der Politischen Oekonomie," in MECW, vol. 4, 283. (Gregor‘s note) 




5.12 The bureaucratic pitfall 
 
Unlike the English Classical School, the Historical School had a sharp 
focus on institutions, much due to its attention to and promotion of 
regulation – in the Cameralist tradition. This attention was also due to 
contemporary Marxism‘s quest for a unitary and omnipotent state, 
thereby dominating Civil Society entirely.343   
The German Historical School could draw on criticism of such opin-
ions from the Conservative tradition, but not only this; The heydays of 
the German Historical School in economics, of Wilhelm Roscher to 
Werner Sombart, happened to coincide with the heydays of political An-
archism and Syndicalism within the expanding Labour movement.344  
In the chapter ‗Authority and Science‘,345 the Russian Prince and An-
archist Mikhail Bakunin argues against trusting any authorities, be it 
imperfect scientists or  political representatives, arguing that the various 
privileges both enjoy will soon corrupt and deprave both of their genius, 
and thus enslave the population under incompetent rule.346  
Similarly, in 1919 Rudolf Steiner criticises such over-extension of the 
State‘s role and argues that Lenin‘s rule  
 
… is the whole essence of tsarism, only extended for another class, that is, 
tsarism continued in a worse manner. (Steiner, 1919, p. 114)347 
                                       
343 In his Communist Manifesto, Marx  argues for departemental bureaucratic  
rule of industry and finance (Cf. Marx, 1848).  
344 Roughly from the 1850s to the 1920s, from Pierre Proudhon over Mikhail 
Bakunin and Piotr Kropotkin to Enrico Malatesta and Ferdinand Pelloutier. 
345 In the posthumously published book, God and the State (1871), which 
Bakunin originally titled The Historical Sophisms of the Doctrinaire School of 
Communism. 
346 Bakunin writes, ―It is the characteristic of privilege and of every privi-
leged position to kill the mind and heart of men. … A scientific body to which 
had been confided the government of society would soon end by devoting itself 
no longer to science at all, but to ... by rendering the society confided to its 
care ever more stupid and consequently more in need of its government and 
direction.  
But that which is true of scientific academies is also true of all constituent 
and legislative assemblies, even those chosen by universal suffrage. In the lat-
ter case they may renew their composition, it is true, but this does not prevent 
the formation in a few years' time of a body of politicians, privileged in fact 
though not in law, who, devoting themselves exclusively to the direction of the 
public affairs of a country, finally form a sort of political aristocracy or oligar-
chy. Witness the United States of America and Switzerland. Therefore let us 
have no external legislation and no authority. The one is inseparable from the 
other, and both tend to create a slavish society.‖ (Bakunin, 1871, pp. 228-229)  
347 Vladimir ―Lenin‖ Ilyich Ulyanov and his henchman Lev ―Trotsky‖ Da-
vidovich Bronstein followed up Marx by subjugating, even as vital parts of mod-
ern Civil Society as trade unions, under the benevolent yoke of the party leader-
ship‘s omniscience.  Attacking the French Syndicalists, Trotsky writes that, ―In 
the trade unions, the Communists, of course, submit to the discipline of the 




Steiner‘s prime reason for concern is that the death of independence 
for Civil Society is also the death knell for freedom of mind, marking the 
end of creativity and progress.348 As List, Steiner argues that freedom 
and progress are linked profoundly. 
Bakunin likewise argues that the only way to promote liberty and an 
efficient and rational organisation of society is to educate the masses in 
science and the laws of nature.349 The core lesson from the Anarchist 
and Syndicalist experience lies in its sharp focus on the fallibility and 
corruption of authority and bureaucracies; whether public or private; 
whether political or scientific. The Historical School could learn from tra-
dition‘s experiences and arguments. And so they did, critically; authori-
ty-critical insights of anarchists like Proudhon, Bakunin, and Kropotkin, 
were noted and elaborated further by several economists in the German 
Historical School in economics.350 
 
 
5.13 Law, regulation and economics  
 
In economics in general, and also law and economics; the general rule 
of intervention is that as long as there are no externalities, such as 
transaction costs, there is no reason to interfere politically with eco-
nomic affairs, nor is there any reason to interfere with contract rela-
                                                                                                                
general strike and still more to the direct struggle for power. In these condi-
tions, the leading role of the party becomes entirely direct, open, and immedi-
ate.  The trade unions … become the organizational apparatus of the party …‖ 
(Trotsky, 1929, pp.17-18).  
348 See also the treatment of Steiner‘s relation to Civil Society and to the uni-
tary state in the section, Freedom in the German tradition, in chapter 2. 
349 Bakunin writes of this that, ―Once they shall have been recognised by 
science, and then from science, by means of an extensive system of popular 
education and instruction, shall have passed into the consciousness of all, the 
question of liberty will be entirely solved.‖ (Bakunin, 1871, p. 227) With this 
belief in reason, Bakunin was typical of what Sombart calls the ‗rational so-
cialists‘. As opposed to ‗realist socialists‘ such as Marx, who were inspired by 
Conservative theories of ‗power‘ (Cf. Sombart, 1896; 1909 edition, ch. 1 sec. 
2). 
350 Such as by the professors Bruno Hildebrand (1848); Franz Oppenheimer 
(1905); Karl Diehl (1911); Robert Michels (1911); and Werner Sombart (1896, 
and 1934). As an illustration, Michels has 29 references alone to Bakunin.  
Nevertheless, in a lengthy discussion of Anarchist criticism of bureaucracy, 
Michels shows his sharp and independent mind such, ―… anarchism, a 
movement on behalf of liberty, founded on the inalienable right of the human 
being over his own person, succumbs, no less than the Socialist Party, to the 
law of authoritarianism as soon as it abandons the region of pure thought and 
as soon as its adherents unite to form associations aiming at any sort of polit-
ical activity.‖ (Michels, 1911, p.199) 




tions. In the real world, however, transaction costs and externalities are 
a part, and there is a need to internalise the externalities in economic 
calculations. In other words, markets do not behave efficiently by their 
general inherent nature, by themselves alone. Governmental regulation, 
e.g. of contract relations, is therefore needed in order to correct imper-
fections and establish efficient market regimes. If not - regulation may 
rule instead of right - and decrease general efficiency. 
Both law and economics, as separate professions, promote general 
welfare as their ultimate goal, although economists often have claimed 
to be more "objective" and "scientific", professing value-neutrality. This 
simplistic positivism is now gradually letting loose, since its heyday in 
the 1960s. Normally, the goal of legal analysis is perceived as promotion 
of ‗justice‘. The goal of economic analysis and of economic analysis of 
law (law and economics), however, is nowadays perceived as promoting 
‗economic efficiency‘, however weak this may be as a measure of general 
welfare. Therefore, law and economics deals with the efficiency of the 
legal system and intends to arrange it to further economic efficiency, 
taking into consideration aspects that normally do not apply to an eco-
nomic analysis, namely the arrangement of the legal system at large.  
We may define the subject of the economic analysis of law, law and 
economics, as dealing with three questions using economics to predict:  
 
- Which legal rules are efficient?  
- The outcome of law (a legal arrangement and system); 
- And what the legal rules ought to be.  
 
This boils down to efficiency analysis, and a corresponding choice of 
various efficiency regimes. The economic analysis defines legal ques-
tions in economic terms, mainly as phenomena of rationality and, if 
possible, phenomena of pricing and effects on pricing from different le-
gal arrangements.  
More specifically, some important areas within law, tort and contract 
problems can be seen as property rights problems and therefore ques-
tions of necessary measures as long as externalities such as transaction 
costs exist. The (long-term) question of tort is a question of pricing; 
fines, taxes and subsidies, and therefore the kind of intervention pre-
ferred. This applies most of all, however, to the Common Law tradition 
on the basis of the larger room for bargaining within this tradition, than 
within the Code of Law tradition.  
The main assumption of the economic analysis of law is the same as 
in standard economic theory (in the modern Anglo-Saxon dominated 
literature), of the rationality of the actors, be they criminals or judges, 
and of freedom of choice. Any actor has a rational choice regarding his 
behaviour and its intended outcome. This opens the door for rational 
manipulation with behaviour, through changes in the structure of in-
centives presented to the actor, especially monetary incentives. We may 
therefore use the standard neo-classical toolbox, of marginalism and in 
particular of Homo Economicus, i.e. rational economic man, meaning 
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the omnipresent agent of the textbooks. If we, for a moment, accept this 
"normal" understanding of economics, we may say the following. 
Therefore, legal questions of tort and of contracts are in economic 
terms defined as questions of intervention creating (goal directed and 
efficient) incentives in order to make individual actors change their be-
haviour accordingly, thereby benefiting collective welfare. This is done 
by establishing monetary incentives; fines; taxes; subsidies, and prop-
erty right structures in general, in order to create efficient markets, 
which so far has been of performing less than perfect or not at all. This 
line of reasoning may also pertains to public regulation in general; 
where the goal is to make markets function efficiently. In practice, or 
reality, the difference between regulation and law is blurred,351 and I 
will deal with these as various practical instances of the same problem: 
Regulation in general.  
 
 
5.14 Regulation and intervention  
 
Markets do not always function optimally, not for the common good or 
for the individual actors. They may sometimes therefore be in need of a 
benevolent ‗guiding hand‘ in addition to the ‗hidden hand‘. Below we 
will therefore deal briefly with List‘s relation to law and economics as 
well as related issues like transaction costs and public goods. 
A core part of List‘s criticism against Smith and the ‗Cosmopolitan 
School‘ concerns a lack of differentiation between private interests and 
public interests.352 List repeatedly argues that private interests differ 
from national interests, and that unfettered markets cannot take care of 
national interests. National interest therefore requires an active state. 
List accordingly writes, that when dealing with many difficult issues, 
having one common political administration is of great value,353 
 
The advantages of their confederation under one and the same political 
Power in times of war, of national differences, of commercial crises, failure 
of crops, &c., are not less perceptible than are the advantages of the union 
of the persons belonging to a pin manufactory under one and the same 
roof. (List, 1841a, p. 151) 
 
In other words the state, and its multifarious policies of regulation, is 
part of the productive forces. Also earlier and later economists in the 
German tradition explicitly pointed to regulation and to the state as 
core parts of the productive forces. Adam Müller considered the state as 
the most important type of capital of a nation, (Cf. Müller, 1808-1809)  
Also Wilhelm Roscher points out the immaterial aspect, 
                                       
351 A basic difference is that of the right to appeal which is stronger within 
the legal framework than within the regulative framework. 
352 See also the sections, Public regulation of the merchant interest; and Differ-
entiate private versus community interests in chapter 3. 




The state itself is the most important incorporeal capital of every nation, 
since it is clearly indispensable, at least indirectly, to economic production. 
...  (Roscher, 1877, § 42, p. 154) 
 
Like the Cameralists before him, List defined his profession as a duty 
to direct and regulate in search of perfection,  
 
National economy teaches by what means a certain nation, in her partic-
ular situation, may direct and regulate the economy … to create … perfect 
nations … (List, 1827b, Letter I, pp. 25)354 
Along with the philosophers of German Idealism from Cusa and 
Leibniz, to Kant, Fichte and Hegel, List sought primarily to promote le-
gal arrangements that would improve prevalent social matters, and 
prepare for improvements in the future.355 
 
5.15 List's relation to Law and Economics 
 
The prime instrument in List‘s socio-economic strategy was the legal 
system. The relation between law and economics is the practical core of 
his world of ideas and economic efficiency is one goal for his efforts to 
reform the legal system.  
Changing legal regulations promotes social progress, however hard 
the political and bureaucratic battles. This was probably only natural 
and logical to List, since he was educated in accounting and law and 
had practised within the administrative and parliamentary system, first 
as a junior and later as senior tax clerk; then as a student of law; and 
as a professor of statecraft. He then practiced within law making as a 
Member of Parliament in Württemberg.  
Legal reform was the essence of List's reform plans as a local civil 
servant in Württemberg and the essence of his reform plans as a jour-
nalist, consultant and politician for a German, European and Global 
legal and economic system.  
In List‘s definition of the national productive powers, he mentions the 
material factors, but first he mentions the immaterial factors, which 
incorporates institutional factors like laws and institutions, 
 
                                       
354 Here is an expanded quotation: ―National economy teaches by what 
means a certain nation, in her particular situation, may direct and regulate 
the economy of individuals, and restrict the economy of mankind, (9) either to 
prevent foreign restrictions and foreign power, or to increase the productive 
powers within herself; or, in other words, how to create, in absence of a lawful 
state, within the whole globe of the earth, a world in itself, in order to grow in 
power and wealth to be one of the most powerful, wealthy, and perfect nations 
of the earth, without restricting the economy of individuals and the economy 
of mankind more than the welfare of the people permits. ― (List, 1827b, Letter 
I,  pp. 25) 
355 See also the section, Perfecting the State. 
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The productive powers of a nation are not only limited by the industry, 
thrift, morality, and intelligence of its individual members, and by its natu-
ral resources or material capital, but also by its social, political, and munic-
ipal laws and institutions, and especially by the securities for the continued 
existence, independence, and power of the nationality. (List, 1841b, Intro-
duction, translated and reprinted in Hirst, 1909, p. 306) 
 
Laws are institutionalised conventions, and although institutions 
have material aspects like buildings, the essence of institutions are 
immaterial. List here points to various aspects of the immaterial factors. 
List is, as usual, somewhat hazy on definition, but the basic intuition is 
clear. 
List was throughout his life devoted to the issue of arranging first the 
(national and international) legal system to serve economic efficiency, in 
the interest of the common good.  
List argues against J. B. Say, a critical French follower of A. Smith, 
that law and institutions do matter, 
 
Every law, every public regulation has a strengthening or weakening ef-
fect on production or on consumption or on the productive forces. (List, 
1841a, p. 307) 
 
The prosperity of a nation is not, as Say believes, greater in the propor-
tion in which it has amassed more wealth (i.e. values of exchange), but in 
the proportion in which it has more developed its powers of production. 
Although laws and public institutions do not produce immediate values, 
they nevertheless produce productive powers, and Say is mistaken if he 
maintains that nations have been enabled to become wealthy under all 
forms of government, and that by means of laws no wealth can be created. 
(List, 1841a, p. 144) 
 
In the following quotation, List emphasises the importance of liberty, 
law and administration. At the same time, it is yet another example of 
how List thoroughly emphasised the importance of immaterial factors of 
production, 
 
In order duly to estimate the influence which liberty of thought and con-
science has on the productive forces of nations, we need only read the his-
tory of England and then that of Spain. 
 The publicity of the administration of justice, trial by jury, parliamen-
tary legislation, public control of State administration, self-administration 
of the commonalties and municipalities, liberty of the press, liberty of asso-
ciation for useful purposes, impart to the citizens of constitutional states, 
as also to their public functionaries, a degree of energy and power which 
can hardly be produced by other means. We can scarcely conceive of any 
law or any public legal decision which would not exercise a greater or 
smaller influence on the increase or decrease of the productive power of the 
nation. (2)356 If we consider merely bodily labour as the cause of wealth, 
                                       
356 2. Say states in his Economie Politique Pratique, vol. iii. p. 242, 'Les lois 
ne peuvent pas créer des richesses.' Certainly they cannot do this, but they 
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how can we then explain why modern nations are incomparably richer, 
more populous, more powerful, and prosperous than the nations of ancient 
times? [footnote on J.B.Say] (List, 1841a, p. 139) 
 
In List‘s note (2), he states that the laws certainly do not create wealth,  
 
… but they create productive power, which is more important than riches 
… (List, 1841a, p. 139n) 
 
List's stress on freedom (of expression for the press etc.) and univer-
sality of law (jury trial etc.) can be seen as attempts to correct imperfec-
tions of the market for ideas and entrepreneurship, through vested in-
terests and power structures. Through his libertarian ideas, he intend-
ed to establish an efficient market for ideas, for innovation and for en-
trepreneurial activity. His work for security of property and for protec-
tion of investments can likewise be seen as intended to establish a 
market for innovation and for entrepreneurial activity, whatever the 
field, and all intended to secure an efficient working economy to the 
benefit of general welfare.  
For List, there was no great conflict between justice and efficiency 
since justice would serve efficiency, and vice versa. He did not see any 
contradiction between these legal and economic purposes and, quite on 
the contrary, argues that only a free and just legal system could mobi-
lise the mental powers of the individual citizen, in particular as entre-
preneur, crucial to economic development. He argues that injustice was 
a major reason for existing economic problems. The most obvious ex-
ample might be List's repeated attacks on the institution of slavery in 
the southern states of the United States (Cf. List, 1827b, Letter VI, pp. 
86-87; 1837a, p. 184; 1841a, ch. 17, p. 200; p. 416).   
Looking at much of List's agenda against the bureaucracy; freedom of 
expression; accountability; jury trial, he might at first be mistaken for a 
modern Liberal. His opinions on the spiritual origin and character of 
wealth and prosperity and on the corresponding need for moderate and 
differentiated regulation make most of the difference. The ultimate goal 
for List was of an immaterial and moral nature, and closely related to 
law. The prime instrument and crucial tool and lever of his plans for a 
more humane and efficient economic system was, in fact, law and regu-
lation.  
List is also very aware of the need for international legal arrange-
ments in order to promote peaceful agreements, and prevent the primi-
tive right of the strongest to dominate.357  
Here we also see an example of the germ of the German preoccupa-
tion with free trade and freedom of the seas, in the sense of equal rights 
to all parties to trade freely, thereby opposing the dominant British sys-
                                                                                                                
create productive power, which is more important than riches, i.e. than 
possession of values of exchange.  (List‘s note) 
357 Cf. the sections, A universal confederation of nations; and Promote free 
trade by international law, treaties and congresses, in chapter 7. 
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tem of preferential trade within the Empire as such and the more in-
formal Empire, where countries and even empires with their own colo-
nies were informal subjects of Britain. List writes, 
 
Thus the question as to whether, and how, the various nations can be 
brought into one united federation, and how the decisions of law can be in-
voked in the place of military force to determine the differences which arise 
between independent nations, has to be solved concurrently with the ques-
tion how universal free trade can be established in the place of separate na-
tional commercial systems. (List, 1841a, p. 114) 
 
National and international legal arrangements were also the main 
preoccupation of his forerunners in Germany, like Cusa, Leibniz, 
Wolff,358 Kant, Hegel and Fichte, who all contributed considerably on 
the issue. These German authors all belong to the tradition of natural 
(rational) law, code of law as opposed to common law, but to the idealist 
faction that adheres to Thomas Aquinas‘ verdict that the ultimate duty 
of Man is moral perfection.  
Thomas Hobbes, followed by John Locke, dominated the opposed ma-
terialist faction of this tradition of natural law. They saw biological sur-
vival, or self-preservation, as Man‘s ultimate duty.  
List‘s ideas are scarcely noticed among students of law and econom-
ics, in spite of their close affinity to the law and economics approach. 
List insights may qualify him as an important forefather of the law and 
economics profession.  
 
 
5.16 List’s approach versus Law and Economics 
 
Some characteristics of List‘s approach resemble modern law and eco-
nomics analysis and some elements distance him from this type of 
analysis. There is a lot to learn from List‘s insights for students of law 
and economics, as well as for students of history, development, com-
munication and innovation. If analysed in modern economic language, 
this would have been more obvious. Distancing him from the pricing 
inclination of the law and economics tradition would be his emphasis 
on the immaterial production factors. 
Another and related factor would be his corresponding dislike of the 
Values of Exchange school of Adam Smith working mainly with the 
monetary aspect of economics, that is to say with the trade aspect, and 
far less with the productive and creative aspect. List criticized Smith 
explicitly and repeatedly on this point (for example, List, 1841a, ch. 12 
– ‗The theory of the powers of production and the theory of value‘). 
                                       
358 See, for instance, Christian Wolff‘s Jus Gentium, ch. 1: ‗Duties of nations 
to themselves and the rights arising therefrom‘ for instance paragraph 35: ‗Of 
a nation‘s duty to perfect itself and its form of government‘ and paragraph 51: 
‗How far this applies to the ruler of the state‘. (Wolff, 1749) 
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List regarded the factors that cannot be priced on a market, in par-
ticular the immaterial aspects, as the most important factors - for the 
generation of both prosperity and the elevation of culture (Cf. List, 
1827b, pp. 59, 63, 67; 1841a, ch. 12 – ‗The manufacturing power and 
the personal, social and political productive powers of the nation‘). To 
him market prices were only one practical instrument among many, as 
part of a larger plan concerning the ultimate goal, the elevation of hu-
man culture. List might have been critical of several characteristics of 
modern law and economics. This would most likely concern the act of 
pricing legal arrangements, since List had been trained in the code of 
law tradition of the Continent, where you do not bargain over (semi-
religiously) given legal ―axioms‖. On the other hand, List devastatingly 
criticises precisely the Roman legal tradition, which gave birth to the 
Code of Law tradition during the first republic. List would probably also 
have been somewhat critical of the assumption of freedom of choice 
within Law and Economics, since he was aware of path dependencies 
created by historical power structures.  
Nevertheless, the above characteristics of immaterialism and power 
also constitute factors, which unite List with the law and economics 
tradition. Reminding us of the law and economics approach is List‘s 
emphasis on a policy, which uses governmental regulation and law 
making concerning, for example, competition, privileges, taxation and 
subsidies to promote long-term efficiency in the legal system and fur-
thermore within the economic system. 
 
 
5.17 Incentives from law and regulation 
 
In the 21st Century, with the ever-increasing focus on the "new" 
"knowledge-economy" and the ―new‖ "information-economy", List‘s em-
phasis on the immaterial gives his ideas a major edge as opposed to the 
materially oriented school that followed Adam Smith, the Smith-
Ricardo-Mill-Marshall tradition. Comparing the emphasis made by the-
se authors on knowledge, science, and communication (formerly la-
belled as ―transport‖ -of ideas and information) makes this rather obvi-
ous. This issue seems has major implications for the understanding of 
economics of growth. 
List paid much attention to the role of incentives in economics, and 
to how these could be promoted by regulative and legal arrangements. 
He thoroughly discussed the incentive structure in many aspects, for 
instance regarding tax incentives, and regarded it as crucial for entre-
preneurship and the promotion of the mental powers of production. He 
actually devoted a whole chapter to this in his National System (Cf. List, 
1841a, ch. 25, The manufacturing power and the incentives to production 
and consumption, pp. 303 ff). He argues that all regulations have effects 
on production and consumption and patent laws were one legal meas-





Every law, every public regulation, has a strengthening or weakening ef-
fect on production or on consumption or on the productive forces. 
The granting of patent privileges offers a prize to inventive minds. The 
hope of obtaining the prize arouses the mental powers, and gives them a di-
rection towards industrial improvements. It brings honour to the inventive 
mind in society, and roots out the prejudice for old customs and modes of 
operation so injurious among uneducated nations. It provides the man who 
merely possesses mental faculties for new inventions with the material 
means which he requires, inasmuch as capitalists are thus incited to sup-
port the inventor, by being assured of participation in the anticipated prof-
its. (List, 1841a, p. 307) 
 
Reminding us of the role of the US until very recently, List wrote, 
 
By means of her patents laws, England long monopolized the inventive 
genius of every nation. (List, 1841a, p. 56) 
 
Like tariff protection, patents secure a reward for investments, and 
therefore act as a weaker and temporary form of property rights,  
 
Protective duties act as stimulants … . They guarantee a reward ...  (List, 
1841a, p. 307)359 
 
Since List regarded the mental powers as the bedrock of develop-
ment, his emphasis on the entrepreneurial aspect to which the legal 
system is crucial, is only logical. This makes the incentive and legal sys-
tem even more crucial for development in his scheme than it could ever 
be in the so-called ‗classical‘ ‗orthodox‘ and ‗neoclassical‘ economic tra-
dition.360 
Law and economics today, deals specifically with the possibility of 
changing the incentives structure, but mainly within the standard eco-
nomic image of Man, as purely self-interested, i.e. egotistic and in es-
sence asocial.  
List‘s Idealistic approach deals especially with the incentives struc-
ture, due to his wider image of economic realities and conception of 
Man. See List‘s National System, chapter 25: The Manufacturing Power 
and the Inducement to Production and Consumption. Moreover, do notice 
the word ‗inducement‘, illustrating List‘s critical awareness of the im-
portance of this issue. This implies that the Cosmopolitical School of 
economics has a narrower and therefore more unrealistic conception of 
Man and therefore of reality, as noticed e.g. by Windelband and 
                                       
359 See an expanded quotation and discussion on this in the section, Protec-
tion furthers security, freedom, and incentives, in chapter 6. See also the follow-
ing section, Protection promotes foreign investment, in chapter 6. 
360 The same relation has been noted above regarding the emphasis and role 
of regulations and the public bureaucracy, for instance concerning the morals 
of the bureaucracy. 
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Schumpeter (Windelband, 1896 pp. 513-523; Schumpeter, 1912, p. 87), 
errors of which also modern law and economics is prone.  
With List, Man is considered to be fundamentally- and potentially-, 
rational and moral, spiritual and social - in combination, and in addi-
tion to being self-interested. One important effect of this is that List 
acknowledged regulation as a possible way of improving society. This is 
in fact also the case with Adam Smith, who in his Moral Sentiments not 
only praises intervention,361 but also supports the ideas of perfection.362 
In his Wealth of Nations, Smith‘s inclinations were otherwise tilted. 
However, if a hedonistic and ―power-cynical‖ view is carried through 
consistently, then any kind of ‗regulation' can only be regarded as self-
serving – it can only serve the regulator himself – and thus regulation 
must be combatted.  
The irony is that although such ideas pretend to be ‗realistic‘, that 
may be precisely what they are not. The logic of the argument consist-
ently carried through would even preclude organisations as such, since 
any leadership would be self-serving. One may e.g. counter-argue that 
leaders of a private public company are held to reckon by the board, so 
that the principle of self-serving does not rule out organisations in gen-
eral. However, this counter-argument would also apply for regulation, 
as when a government stands trial before the electorate at the next elec-
tion. This is not to deny the fact that the self-serving tendency exists, 
but rather to emphasise that it is only one factor among many. Fur-
thermore, the definition of self-serving or self-interest is open, it may 
well include e.g. law-abiding social honour. 
 
 
5.18 List and the public interest 
 
The problem of potential under-investment and overuse of public goods, 
as well as the need for collective action, has been recognised by 
practically oriented people from the beginnings of civilisation. Many 
marvels of the ancient world would never have been built otherwise, 
ordered by ancient rulers of government and religious leaders, such as 
canals (Egypt, 4000 BC); sewers (Sumeria, 4000 BC); alphabet 
(Sumeria, 3500 BC); irrigation (India and Egypt, 3000 BC); aquaducts 
(Assyria, 700 BC); roads (Persia, 522 BC); and the library and light 
house in Alexandria (Egypt, 250 BC) - of which many are mentioned in 
W. R.. Corliss‘ encyclopedic book Ancient Infrastructure (Cf. Corliss, 
1999). 
                                       
361 Cf. Smith, 1759, part IV, chapter I, § 11, and p. 185 in Liberty Classics‘ 
edition. See quotation in the section, Smith as regulator and protectionist, in 
chapter 7. 
362 Cf. Smith, 1759, part VI, sec. II, ch. II, § 18, and p. 234 in Liberty Clas-
sics‘ edition. See quotation in the section, Smith as regulator and protectionist, 
in chapter 7. 
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Although important in practice, the issue of public goodsdwas long 
disregarded in theory. Economic theoreticians have not always been so 
practically minded, and have often disregarded the necessity of such 
investments. Historically it is only human; one tends to disregard what 
is not seen as a problem: In a coastal and humid state like Great 
Britain in particular, who may utilise the natural waterways as 
infrastructure, there has been a tendency to disregard the problem. 
There is also a marked tendency of economically mature nations to 
disregard the problem as they too can take the infrastructure for 
granted; it does no longer constitute a major problem, for instance 
concerning the issues of trust and credit. An issue is noticed, however, 
whenever it returns as a problem. 
Although, even Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham pointed to the 
necessity of intervention in several instances, it was to a larger extent 
left to the economists of the emerging industrial powers to focus more 
closely on this problem of potential under-investment in public goods 
like infrastructure. 
German economists like List and Schmoller and American 
economists like Carey and Taussig are some examples of this Cf. (Cf. 
List, 1841; Schmoller, 1923; Carey, 1837; Taussig, 1911). This more or 
less German-American tradition that focused on the establishment and 
maintenance of infrastructure could still be found to dominate 
development economics in the period of de-colonisation in the 1950s 
and the 1960s. (Cf. Nurkse, 1953; Rostow, 1960; Gerschenkrohn, 1962; 
Hirschmann, 1967; Senghaas, 1982). 
List never used the phrase ‗public goods‘ nor did he explain their 
basic characteristics – concentrated costs and dispersed benefits (as 
opposed to those of rent seeking: concentrated benefits and dispersed 
costs).  
Nevertheless, his criticism of Smith does in practice take as its cru-
cial and given point of departure the difference between private and 
public interests, and indirectly thereby, the difference between private 
and public goods.  
As with his advocacy of knowledge-based production, he never 
seemed to develop a thorough and analytical theory on this issue, but 
his defence may be that neither had anybody else developed these con-
cepts thoroughly at this historical point. 
 
List often criticised the radical free market school for their 
materialistic and anti-social individualism, which he claimed would be 
destructive to communities - in opposition to his own (idealistic &) 
socially oriented individualism. (Cf. List, 1841a, ch. 14, pp. 169-171)  
List‘s criticism against the Cosmopolitan School could have been re-
garded as a criticism of the passivity of private entrepreneurs, but keep-
ing the incentives structure in mind, this would not have been a just 
charge, since after all the main task of individual "micro" entrepreneurs 
is staying alive as such. List did not make this charge. Rather, he 
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praised the entrepreneurs – the micro actors - for their initiatives (Cf. 
List, 1837a, p. 62).  
Therefore, he often charged directly against the "macro" entrepre-
neur‘s passivity, i.e. governments with long-term responsibility for the 
entirety: They did not fulfil their task of promoting an efficient national 
economy - by using its tools of regulation and law making to this pur-
pose, national efficiency being a prime goal of the nation state as such. 
List's insistence of the necessity of governments to initiate investments 
into innovative production and -infrastructure, read large, was based 
on his experience with insufficient or even lacking private investments 
into such  public goods areas. Shortsightedness was in various ways 
also the target of his criticism, concerning passivity of governments re-
garding such initiatives.  
 
 
5.19 Jurisprudence’s obligation to counter vested interests  
 
List calls for ‗progress‘, and warns against obstacles to progress, such 
as vested interests in established solutions. Implicit in his argument, 
there is therefore an obligation of law and economics to counter vested 
interests against inventions & resulting change of social basis for pow-
er. List writes,  
 
Notwithstanding an absence of liberal institutions may be extremely in-
jurious to a full development of the productive powers of the nations, some 
classes may find their reckoning in this bad state of things. The country 
may suffer from an absence of manufacturing industry, but some people 
may flourish in selling foreign manufactures. Canals and railroads may do 
great good to a nation, but all waggoners will complain of this improvement. 
Every new invention has some inconvenience for a number of individuals, 
and is nevertheless a public blessing. (List, 1827b, Letter VI, pp. 86-87) 
 
One might counter that sometimes inventions are a blessing to indi-
viduals and an inconvenience to the public. In particular, this is true if 
one limits one‘s perspective to the negative aspect of inventions, which 
most inventions will have, such as accidents from automobiles. Neverthe-
less, List‘s view is fertile.  
Like A. Smith before him, regarding merchants‘ conspiracy against 
the public (Smith, 1776, ch. X, Part ii) and T. B. Veblen later on similar 
issues in On the natures and uses of sabotage (Veblen, 1919, pp. 9-20), 
List was very well aware of the sabotage of the public interest that indi-
vidual capitalists were willing to undergo in service of their own inter-
ests.  
As hinted to above, List was a keen observer of power and of social 
structures, and therefore also of the implications of entrepreneurship 
for established power structures. Inventions are a critical threat to 
many parts of establishments, since ultimately relative monopoly and 
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control of some resource is the foundation of any power.363 Technologi-
cal change and economic growth imply change, and therefore a restruc-
turing of the power base, sometimes even on a vast and global scale. 
They can enforce established powers and they can weaken them. Choice 
of technology is therefore not neutral but rather highly political, just 
like choices of law and of organisational structure. 
Although possibly beneficial for the majority of a society, such 
change may be detrimental to some parts of the establishment, which 
in consequence, will try to use its dominant position to block change 
before it is too late, thereby cementing the structure of society and the 
economy, resulting in stagnation, eventual decline, sudden revulsion 
and upheavals. Hegel and Marx have described in a similar way the dy-
namics of social life with their theory of dialectics. It is thus of crucial 
importance for the survival of a community and eventually of a civiliza-
tion, that such impeding behaviour is prevented and that a dynamic 
flow of change is permitted to take place. The question of which social 
powers to promote or restrict, and accordingly in which directions tech-
nology changes should flow, is however, a far more complex and diffi-
cult question, doomed to be the object of intense lobbying activity. This 
line of reasoning applies on the local national level as well as to the in-
ternational community. This problem, in particular, makes law and 
economics a crucial field of study and its students here have a crucial 
obligation to the general public. 
Externalities like vested interests and power structures create trans-
action costs that render markets inefficient. This is a central theme of 
law and economics, which gives us yet another reason to claim that List 
should indeed be regarded as one of the important forerunners of law 
and economics. For List, power was at the core of economics and eco-
nomic policy, both as a result and as a prerequisite. This was the 
source of one of his major criticisms of Adam Smith, who generally and 
conveniently avoided this aspect in his writings, well aware as he was 
that the current power structure favoured England.  
List is wrong, however, in writing that Smith totally excluded this di-
mension, but it may be more right when speaking of his followers. 
Smith sometimes, contradicting other statements of his, was an ardent 
supporter of government intervention (Cf. Smith, 1759, part IV, chapter 
I, § 11, and p. 185 in Liberty Classics‘ edition). He was therefore also a 
firm admirer of military activity and of protection, as the ‗Act of Naviga-
tion‘ illustrates and as List himself also pointed out.364 
List argues that temporary national protection will lead to fiercer 
competition and a more efficient global economy at a later stage. Thus 
                                       
363 This resource can be material, and it can be ideal (mental/ technological/ 
cultural/ institutional/ organisational) and occur on a local scale as well as on 
a global scale. Nevertheless, the ultimate sources of social power are mental: 
First of all, ―individual‖ factual knowledge and abilities and secondly, the men-
tal structure of ―fictions‖ somehow imposed and reinforced upon a collective, 
whether religious and/or social, regarding e.g. hierarchy and property.  
364 See the section, Smith as regulator and protectionist, in chapter 7. 
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List‘s fight for the employment of legal arrangements for protection 
matches the agenda of law and economics, seen from a larger perspec-
tive. Indeed, List‘s concept of economics was in some profound ways 
wider-reaching than today‘s mainstream Law and Economics. 
 
 
5.20 List's contribution to law and economics 
 
List's approach, establishes him within this tradition of Law and Eco-
nomics and its analysis of transaction costs. From his youth, when List 
worked as a clerk in a local tax administration, his proposals were prac-
tical and intended to remedy faults with the administrative practice. In 
other words his approach and work was from the outset a merge of law 
and economics.  
Concerning List's specific contribution to law and economics, or the 
economic analysis of law, there is a time span to consider which makes 
it obvious that List was working with slightly different problems and 
concepts than modern theoreticians in this area, in both theory and 
practice. The basic principles remain more permanent, however con-
temporary the implementation may be.  
List wrote a book on treatment of marriage within Roman law, ‗Out-
line of Roman Law, a pedagogic attempt‘ (Grundriss des Römischen 
Rechts, ein pädagogischer Versuch). The date of publication is still not 
known, but it is probably written in his early years and published later 
(List, 1911). He later damned the influence of the Roman law, since it 
caused confusion and undermined the liberty of the common man. It 
introduced secrecy in public affairs and an unhealthy division between 
the learned and the common man, since the law was foreign to the 
common man, 
 
The introduction of the Roman law weakened no nation so much as the 
German. The unspeakable confusion which it brought into the legal status 
and relations of private individuals, was not the worst of its bad effects. 
More mischievous was it by far, in that it created a caste of learned men 
and jurists differing from the people in spirit and language, which treated 
the people as a class unlearned in the law, as minors, which denied the au-
thority of all sound human understanding, which everywhere set up secrecy 
in the room of publicity, which, living in the most abject dependence and 
living upon arbitrary power, everywhere advocated it and defended its inter-
ests, everywhere gnawed at the roots of liberty. Thus we see even to the be-
ginning of the eighteenth century in Germany, barbarism in literature and 
language, barbarism in legislation, State administration and administration 
of justice; barbarism in agriculture, decline of industry and of all trade up-
on a large scale, want of unity and of force in national cohesion; powerless-
ness and weakness on all hands in dealing with foreign nations. (List, 
1841a, p. 80) 
 
Neither here does List break completely new ground, since Hegel had 
discussed the foreign influences on German culture before List. Rudolf 
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Steiner agrees that Roman law critically undermines freedom and eco-
nomic efficiency in a modern society, because it is in principle static 
and thing-oriented - instead of being dynamic and ability-oriented. In 
their treatment of Steiner‘s socio-economic ideas, Arno Daastøl and Jo-
hannes Hanel write, 
 
The traditional concept of property rights is a remnant of Roman law, 
which functioned in a relatively static, stationary society. Accordingly, this 
judicial system is static and thing-oriented, in a way that rights are seen as 
rights to things - property. Today‘s society is precisely not characterized by 
the individual‘s stable relations to her soil, but by the individual‘s changing 
functions in society. Our time is distinguished by rapid changes both in 
skills and structures and should accordingly have a concept of rights 
adapted to this. In many cases, a dynamic concept of property rights ori-
ented toward the functions required in a globalized economy can be realized 
as tenure by lease or user rights. (Daastol and Hanel, 2011, p.131) 
 
Apart from numerous reports, List later wrote at length on the im-
portance of agricultural reform for democratisation and industrialisa-
tion. A pioneer paper on land reform from 1842 is List‘s ‗Agricultural 
constitution, small business and emigration‘ (Die Ackerverfassung, die 
Zwergwirtschaft und die Auswanderung, List, 1927-36, vol.5, pp. 418-
547). This is a layout of legal reforms in agriculture necessary for higher 
efficiency in agriculture, higher revenue and therefore surplus for in-
vestments in industrialisation. But the political aspect of the agricul-
tural constitution was as important. The Japanese and Korean reforms 
are examples of industrialisation starting with land reform. In both 
countries, the works of List were well known.  
Marx copied large portions from both this work and from ‗The Nation-
al System‘ (Cf. Lenz, 1930, p. 15). Karl Marx writes favourably on List 
such, 
 
F. List remarks correctly: "The prevalence of a self-sufficient economy on 
large estates demonstrates solely the lack of civilisation, means of commu-
nication, domestic trades and wealthy cities. It is to be encountered, there-
fore, throughout Russia, Poland, Hungary and Mecklenburg. Formerly, it 
was also prevalent in England; with the advance of trades and commerce, 
however, this was replaced by the breaking up into middle estates and the 
leasing of land." (Die Ackerverfassung, die Zwergwirtschaft und die Aus-
wanderung, 1842, p. 10.) (Marx, 1867, Vol. III Part VII, Revenues and their 
Sources, Chapter 52, ‗Classes‘) 
 
In this work, List spells out the necessary reforms in order to create 
the political preconditions for a modern representative parliamentary 
system. The civil liberties of this system were supposed to allow crea-
tion of an urbanised and industrial society.  
List advised a golden middle road, creating a class of independent 




This long ignored work is an early systematic work in the historical 
tradition (with its empirical methodology as opposed to the rationalist 
introspective methodology of the classical British school). 
In List‘s comparative country study, he elaborates on the ideas of the 
Cameralist, Justus Möser and thereby establishes himself as a pioneer 
in historical jurisprudence, since he made a comparative country study 
of law before most of the accepted forerunners.365 Furthermore, List 
and the tradition of historical jurisprudence are both accepted as main 
forerunners for the important (Ethical-) Historical School in economics.  
 
5.21 Law, individual freedom and democracy  
 
To Friedrich List, legal action was all the more important a tool, be-
cause of the restrictive effect law has to the potential randomness and 
excesses of the bureaucracy – and precisely this was Leibniz‘ leading 
idea in his work on legal issues 150 years before List (Anners, 1983, p. 
211). Therefore List favoured the jury system. Precisely because he in-
sisted on the important role of regulation, he had all the more reason to 
be critical of the behaviour of the bureaucracy – like the main thrust of 
the Ethical-Historical School in economics, including Max Weber in par-
ticular. List‘s personal experiences underline this point.  
List strongly favoured solid legal arrangements as beneficial to eco-
nomic progress, 
 
... nations in the enjoyment of a good constitutional government succeed 
better than others in industry, commerce and navigation. (List, 1841a, US 
translation, 1856, p. 374; slightly different translation in the English trans-
lation, 1884, p. 295) 
 
And in his Philadelphia speech, List says, 
 
How weak the opposite cause is, she may learn from the reasons they al-
lege, of which the principal is a want of constitutional power. (List, 1827d, 
p. 285)  
 
In his Sergei Witte and the Industrialisation of Russia, the Harvard 
Professor Theodore von Laue describes how List deeply admired the 
English liberal political and cultural system (and how the Russian PM, 
Sergei Witte, was unable to follow up), 
 
Friedrich List, as a liberal, took over the English model in its totality. 
Empire, parliamentary constitution, industrialization, religious toleration—
these qualities constituted civilization itself. All this was far more than Wit-
te could offer. (Laue, 1963, p. 62) 
 
                                       
365 Such as Maitland, Taine, Dopsch, Below, Gierke, Brunner, Vinogradoff, 
but with the exception of Savigny and Eichhorn 
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List argues that the most important factors of administration are sta-
bility and safeguarding of personal liberty and property, 
 
But that in no way proves that people have become rich, i.e. have 
attained the highest degree of economical well-being, under all forms of 
government. History rather teaches us that such a degree of public well-
being, namely, a flourishing state of manufactures and commerce, has been 
attained in those countries only whose political constitution (whether it 
bear the name of democratic or aristocratic republic, or limited monarchy) 
has secured to their inhabitants a high degree of personal liberty and of 
security of property whose administration has guaranteed to them a high 
degree of activity and power successfully to strive for the attainment of their 
common objects, and of steady continuity in those endeavours. For in a 
state of highly advanced civilisation, it is not so important that the 
administration should be good for a certain period, but that it should be 
continuously and conformably good: …  (List, 1841a, pp. 333-334) 
 
 
5.22 A pragmatic social-conservative? 
 
On the background of List‘s (1) pragmatic treatment of political repre-
sentation and of regulation and tariffs in particular, it is more appropri-
ate to place List in the Conservative tradition than in the Liberal tradi-
tion.  
List‘s (2) pronounced valuation of civil society, ‗the confederation of 
Labour‘ and its manifold institutions, strengthens this view - as op-
posed to the low valuation of civil society in the Marxist and Liberal tra-
ditions.366  
Similarly (3) Conservative preference for local and individual ‗varia-
tion‘ over Liberal and Marxist preference for ‗equality‘, corresponds with 
List‘s liking for individual differences.  
Furthermore, List (4) regards the freedom and opportunity to level as 
a social driver for individual exertion, and he expressly understood that 
this presupposes initial variation and inequality. – This, as opposed to 
the emphasis on equality within the Liberal and Marxist traditions.  
This view is further strengthened, when his (5) emphasis on social 
concerns is noticed; referring then to Conservative politicians with a 
social-conservative agenda, like the beacons and icons of such policies; 
Edmund Burke, Benjamin Disraeli, Joseph Chamberlain, Otto von 
Bismarck, Abraham Lincoln, and Sergei Witte – and again this con-
trasts with the (radical) Liberal materialist and often quite cynical tradi-
tion after John Locke (and Hobbes).  
And finally, List‘s (6) stress of the need for stability and slow and 
gradual reforms anchors him in the Conservative bay.  
In total, therefore it seems most appropriate to place List in the Con-
servative tradition, with the somewhat unnecessary epithet ‗social‘: List 
                                       
366 Cf. the sections, Hegel‘s liking for Civil Society; Conservative liking for Civil 
Society; and Marx‘s dislike of Civil Society. 
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was a Social-Conservative, with the high regard for individual freedom 
and variation that this entails. 
As argues above,367 List spells out the necessary reforms in order to 
create the political preconditions for a modern representative parlia-
mentary system. The civil liberties of this system were supposed to al-
low creation of an urbanised and industrial society.  
Generally speaking, List maintains that steadiness is a prime con-
cern for a nation, and that such steadiness will only take place in those 
political systems that allow the representation of all national interests, 
 
Only under those political constitutions in which the national interests are 
represented (and not under an absolute Government, under which the 
State administration is necessarily always modified according to the 
individual will of the ruler) can such a steadiness and consistency of 
administration be secured, as Antonio Serra rightly observes. (List, 1841a, 
p. 334) 
 
It is a matter of debate how such representation is best handled.368 
List continues by adding that even an absolute government may in 
some instances be preferable, in order to secure a stable and progres-
sive administration, 
 
On the other hand, there are undoubtedly certain grades of civilisation in 
which the administration by absolute power may prove far more favourable 
to the economical and mental progress of the nation (and generally is so) 
than that of a limited monarchy. (List, 1841a, pp. 334-335) 
 
As has been shown above,369 List promotes freedom with great fer-
vour and may hardly be blamed for supporting authoritarian regimes, 
in principle. At the same time, List had a pragmatic view not only re-
garding taxation and trade, but also regarding representation. He es-
sentially argues that the government of a people must correspond to the 
maturity of the people. In this approach, List was followed by e.g. Bruno 
                                       
367 See the section above, List's contribution to law and economics. 
368 Many kinds of political system are based on different arrangements of 
representation and delegation, reflecting the distribution of experience, 
knowledge; property, ethnicity, tribes; clans; religions; professions; economic 
classes; or individual outlook (‗political parties‘).  
Some examples (mainly European), are traditional councils of respected el-
ders (always free and often nobles); Germanic and Norse Thing or Folkmote (as-
sembly); Iranian Theocracy; European City States, -Guilds  and -Feudalism; 
English Parliamentarism; Chinese Communism; English Guild Socialism; Span-
ish Anarcho-Syndicalism; Italian Fascism; or Libyan ‗Direct Participatory De-
mocracy‘ (of Muammar Ghadafi). 
369 E.g. in the section, The core of List‘s ideas: Freedom, in chapter 2. 
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Hildebrand (Cf. Hildebrand, 1842, pp. 300-301)370 and by Rudolf Stei-
ner.371  
List argues that a country‘ form of government must suit the maturi-
ty of its population, and if this is not noted trouble follows; a political 
system that is too advanced for the population can cause problems, 
 
We are far from desiring to maintain the absolute preferableness of any 
one form of government compared with others. One need only cast a glance 
at the Southern States of America, to be convinced that democratic forms of 
government among people who are not ripe for them can become the cause 
of decided retrogression in public prosperity. One need only look at Russia, 
to perceive that people who are yet in a low degree of civilisation are capable 
of making most remarkable progress in their national well-being under an 
absolute monarchy. (List, 1841a, pp. 333-334) 
 
The difficulties in imposing a one type of political system upon a peo-
ple that may be ill suited for this system are illustrated with Western 
recent experiences of intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan.372 List‘s 
point is that a political system must have roots in the people itself. It 
must have time to grow organically in the minds and habits of the peo-
ple, and cannot be forced from above or be imported from the ―outside‖. 
On the other hand, reference to the ―immaturity‖ of a populace has 
been the ready excuse for many a dictator … - unwilling to let a people 
educate themselves to political maturity, however difficult.  
 
 
a) England’s constitutional liberties 
 
When List discusses the roots of English success, List dismisses racial 
causes by pointing to earlier misery in England, and dismisses the con-
stitutional liberties by pointing to the earlier lack of them. Instead he 
points to the jury, to the preservation of the common law and to the us-
age of the English language in administrative affairs. All these three el-
ements were democratic tendencies that contributed to the freedom of 
the people to participate in public affairs, 
 
Only one jewel out of the treasure-house of freedom was preserved by the 
Anglo-Saxon-Norman race -- before other peoples of Germanic origin; and 
that was the germ from which all the English ideas of freedom and justice 
have sprung -- the right of trial by jury. 
                                       
370 Cf. quotations in the section, The Historical School on Capital of Mind, in 
chapter 4. 
371 See a discussion of this in the biographic article over Steiner‘s socio-
economic contributions, Developing Society According to Man‘s Development (Cf. 
Daastoel and Hanel, 2011) 
372 Modern democracy, e.g. the English ‗Westminster‘ parliamentarian model 
or the US model, often fails to work well in traditional societies that are organ-
ised along ethnic and tribal lines. 
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While in Italy the Pandects were being unearthed, and the exhumed re-
mains (no doubt of departed greatness and wisdom in their day) were 
spreading the pestilence of the Codes amongst Continental nations, we find 
the English Barons declaring they would not hear of any change in the law 
of the land. What a store of intellectual force did they not thereby secure for 
the generations to come! How much did this intellectual force subsequently 
influence the forces of material production! 
How greatly did the early banishment of the Latin language from social 
and literary circles, from the State departments, and the courts of law in 
England, influence the development of the nation, its legislation, law ad-
ministration, literature, and industry! (List, 1841a, p. 50)373 
 
List‘s praise of the English aristocracy is noteworthy. He describes it 
as approaching meritocracy,  
 
In no European kingdom is the institution of an aristocracy more judi-
ciously designed than in England for securing to the nobility, in their rela-
tion to the Crown and the commonalty, individual independence, dignity, 
and stability; to give them a Parliamentary training and position; to direct 
their energies to patriotic and national aims; to induce them to attract to 
their own body the élite of the commonalty, to include in their ranks every 
commoner who earns distinction, whether by mental gifts, exceptional 
wealth, or great achievements; and, on the other hand, to cast back again 
amongst the commons the surplus progeny of aristocratic descent, thus 
leading to the amalgamation of the nobility and the commonalty in future 
generations. By this process the nobility is ever receiving from the Com-
mons fresh accessions of civic and patriotic energy, of science, learning, in-
tellectual and material resources, while it is ever restoring to the people a 
portion of the culture and of the spirit of independence peculiarly its own, 
leaving its own children to trust to their own resources, and supplying the 
commonalty with incentives to renewed exertion. In the case of the English 
lord, however large may be the number of his descendants, only one can 
hold the title at a time. The other members of the family are commoners. … 
It would require a whole volume to show the effect of this institution upon 
the spirit of enterprise, the colonisation, the might and the liberties, and 
especially upon the forces of production of this nation. (List, 1841a, pp. 52-
53) 
 
Whether the rural oppression was worse in Germany - especially un-
der the eastern ‗Junker‘ class which so often is chastised, than for in-
stance in Great Britain, is questionable. Britain is often been painted in 
too rosy colours by List. In Britain there was massive oppression follow-
ing the land reforms which resulted in forced pauperisation (the enclo-
sure movement between 1455 and 1607) and the detested and oppres-
sive Speenhamland poor law (anti-free labour) until 1834. (Polanyi, 
1944, ch. 7-9) Civil liberties were a luxury of the wealthy. On the other 
hand, Württemberg and Prussia had for centuries been among the most 
                                       
373 Conversely, he blames the contemporary Chinese backwardness on the 
intricate and demanding Chinese logosyllabic writing technique, which he re-
gards as undemocratic (Cf. List, 1837, p. 69). 
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liberal states in Europe (MacDonogh, 1994). List seems not to have un-
derstood the far-reaching oppression in Britain, his model country, or 
perhaps this fact does not fit his agenda which is to show the fruitful-
ness of the Liberal ideology. 
List's suggestions for reform in his early years included, in general, 
proposals intended to make the bureaucracy and the economy function 
more efficiently and more just, for the benefit of general welfare.  
Economic progress was in List‘s mind inseparable from progress in 
civilization, which in List‘s opinion meant a liberal model according to 
the English experience,  
 
… She has shown us what a free, industrious, and well-governed communi-
ty can do in this respect within the brief space of half a century, even in the 
midst of foreign wars. …. The people's innate love of liberty and of justice, 
the energy, the religious and moral character of the people, have a share in 
it. (List, 1841a, p. 49, see also pp. 48–52) 
 
Every political movement, every war upon the Continent, brought Eng-
land vast accessions of fresh capital and talents, so long as she possessed 
the privileges of freedom, the right of asylum, internal tranquillity and 





Laue has an interesting comment to Witte‘s adoption of List in Russia, 
which supplies us with an interesting perspective of the later adoption 
in Korea and today‘s China, Laue writes,  
 
According to the English model, liberty was a prerequisite of industrial 
progress. In Russia on the other hand, liberty was signally absent. Nor did 
the Russian ruling class wholeheartedly embrace industrialization and 
modernization. Friedrich List, as a liberal, took over the English model in 
its totality. Empire, parliamentary constitution, industrialization, religious 
toleration--these qualities constituted civilization itself. All this was far 
more than Witte could offer. (Laue, 1963, pp. 61-62) 
 
In his classic, Sergei Witte and the Industrialization of Russia, Laue 
quotes List‘s advice that the Russian nobility must understand that it is 
in their interests to establish equality before the law, and better institu-
tions and communications.374 Laue writes, 
 
Yet there was one profound catch to the application of Friedrich List's 
theory to Russian realities, as will appear from List's specific advice to Rus-
sia:  
 
                                       
374 He mentions Asia in particular thereby indicating the final construction 
of the Trans-Siberian railroad in 1903, by Witte. 
331 
 
The want of civilization and proper political institutions may prove a 
great obstacle to the advance of Russia in industry and commerce, unless 
the Imperial government should succeed in advancing general civilization in 
accordance with the claims of industry by establishing good municipal and 
provincial organizations, by first regulating and then completely abolishing 
all servitude, by improving the methods of interior communication, and fi-
nally by facilitating the means of transportation to Asia. Such are the 
measures which Russia has to accomplish within this century, such is the 
condition of her further progress in agriculture, manufacturing, industry, 
as well as in commerce, mercantile navigation, and naval power. But that 
such reforms may be possible, that they may be accomplished, it is neces-
sary that the Russian nobility comprehend that their material government 
interests are closely connected with them.375 (Laue, 1963, p. 61)376  
 
Laue continues that List‘s wholehearted embrace of the English lib-
eral political model found no resonance in Russia,   
 
By 1889 serfdom had been abolished, new municipal and provincial or-
ganizations established; the government was improving the methods of in-
terior communication. But these reforms hardly sufficed. The burden of 
List's thinking was that "nations in the enjoyment of a good constitutional 
government succeed better than others in industry, commerce and naviga-
tion."[377] According to the English model, liberty was a prerequisite of in-
dustrial progress. In Russia on the other hand, liberty was signally absent. 
Nor did the Russian ruling class wholeheartedly embrace industrialization 
and modernization. Friedrich List, as a liberal, took over the English model 
in its totality. Empire, parliamentary constitution, industrialization, reli-
gious toleration--these qualities constituted civilization itself. All this was 
far more than Witte could offer. (Laue, 1963, pp. 61-62)378 
 
Laue writes that Witte‘s comments excluded List‘s praise of liberalism, 
                                       
375 Ibid., p.163. (Laue‘s note referring to List, 1841a, ch. 9, p. 93) 
376 My British edition is translated a bit differently than Laue‘s American 
edition, and includes List‘s emphasis on establishing a middle class and a free 
peasant class; 
― Meantime, it cannot be denied that the want of civilisation and political 
institutions will greatly hinder Russia in her further industrial and 
commercial progress, especially if the Imperial Government does not succeed 
in harmonising her political conditions with the requirements of industry, by 
the introduction of efficient municipal and provincial constitutions, by the 
gradual limitation and final abolition of serfdom, by the formation of an 
educated middle class and a free peasant class, and by the completion of 
means of internal transport and of communication with Central Asia. These 
are the conquests to which Russia is called in the present century, and on 
them depends her further progress in agriculture and industry, in trade, 
navigation and naval power. But in order to render reforms of this kind 
possible and practicable, the Russian aristocracy must first learn to feel that 
their own material interests will be most promoted by them.  
377 Ibid., p. 374. (Laue‘s note referring to List, 1841a) 
378 A snippet of this quotation has been used in the section above, Law, indi-




In all Witte's comments one will not find a word of List's liberalism nor of 
the larger social and political implications to Russia of his advice. All the 
reader would gather from Witte's brochure was that industrial development 
fostered by a protective tariff would advance civilization in Russia also. But 
he was warmly directed to consult List himself. One wonders whether List's 
Russian readers realized that the ideal of industrialization carried with it, in 
tiny seeds, the ideals of constitutional government and liberty. With Witte 
these seeds seemingly fell on barren ground. He never ceased to assume 
that the economic factors of industrial growth could be lifted unharmed 
from the surrounding social and political tissues and be made to succor au-
tocracy. (Laue, 1963, pp. 62-63) 
 
As we shall see below, this characterisation of Witte is odd, since 
Laue later describes Witte‘s strong support for individual freedom 
and civil rights, forwarded when Witte was the teacher of the tsar‘s 
brother,  
 
Starting with the condition of Russian agriculture, he deplored the 
obstacles to economic individualism created by the communal life of the 
peasants and praised economic benefits of a system of small individual 
Holdings, … Throughout he impressed upon his pupil the advantages of 
free labor and the respect of individual dignity; 32379 nothing raised a 
country‘s productivity more. … Nor did the city dumas receive any praise; 
they were charged with lukewarmness, unscrupulousness, and inefficiency. 
Witte blamed their shortcomings on the limited suffrage which excluded the 
educated classes.33380 Like a Russian Colbert, Witte criticized the business 
community for its lack of initiative and its habit of relying on government 
orders an taking subsidies.34381 (von Laue, 1963, p. 190) 
 
Laue also quotes Witte‘s own arguments for individual enterprise and 
self-reliance,  
 
But lest the Grand Duke put too much emphasis upon state initiative, 
Witte warned that the state may inspire but does not create: "The true 
creators are the citizens." 
'The more society progresses, the more complex become all the 
functions of the productive process and the more difficult will be the role of 
the people involved in it. In order to fulfil their role they must have not only 
capital but also the necessary qualifications, the spirit of enterprise, and 
energy. These grow only on the soil of self-reliance. Not to stifle independent 
action, but to develop its strength by creating favourable conditions for its 
application, that is the true obligation which in our time the state must 
discharge toward our over more complex national economy.' 38 382 (von 
Laue, 1963, p. 192) 
                                       
379 32 Particularly in Lecture X, pp. 101ff. (Laue‘s note, referring to Witte, 
1912) 
380 33 Konspekt letsii, p.  26,  (Laue‘s note, referring to Witte, 1912) 
381 34 Ibid, p. 183 (Laue‘s note, referring to Witte, 1912) 




In practice, Witte pushed for liberalising reforms. Nevertheless, Witte 
seems to have been a realist concerning what was politically possible, 
regardless of what he personally might have wished for. He fought an 
uphill battle against forces that rejected social compromise between 
―Labour, Capital and Land‖, and the Russian landed aristocracy in par-
ticular. In this defeat lies the seed Russia‘s sorrow: of the Russian 
Revolutions of 1905 and 1917; the Bolshevist Coup-d‘état; and the cha-
otic dissolution of the USSR. John Spargo describes Witte‘s efforts to 
modernise Russia and his defeat by the Reactionaries in his, Bolshe-
vism. The Enemy of Political and Industrial Democracy, 
 
The strong Council of Workmen's Deputies of St. Petersburg, with which 
Witte had dealt as though it were part of the government itself, was broken 
up and suppressed. Witte wanted constitutional government on the basis of 
the October Manifesto, but he wanted the orderly development of Russian 
capitalism. In this attitude he was supported, of course, by the capitalist 
organizations. (Spargo, 1919, p. 37). 
 
After the Bolshevist coup d‘état in 1917, independent Civil Society 
was thoroughly demolished, and organisations were subjugated to 
Communist Party rule. That means that ordinary people have no one to 
defend themselves, for instance against the whims of the markets, ex-
cept the Party. If the Party changes policies, individuals risk being left 
on their own. This happened in Russia both in the late 1920s and in 
the late 1980s, 
 
The policy of "enrich yourselves" provided the foundation on which parts 
of the old and new nomenclature could acquire a new basis of power - as 
during Perestroika. (Daastøl, 1997, p. 268) 
 
The Reaction‘s suppression of independent labour unions and Civil 
Society was intensified,383 but now combined with radical market 
liberalism, leaving the population even more exposed than under the 
Tsarist regimes. Alan M. Ball describes the ―enrich yourself‖ policies in 
his Russia's Last Capitalists. The NEPmen, 1921-1929. 
 
In 1925 Bukharin was, in effect, directing his famous "enrich yourself" 
exhortation at the NEPmen as well as the peasantry, because his analysis 
had concluded that prosperity in the private sector benefited the state. 





List blamed the former decay of China on despotism and moral corrup-
tion and saw a hope in the infusion of European law and government 
                                       
383 See footnote in the section above, The bureaucratic pitfall, for a quote on 
Communist views of labour unions, as instruments of the Party. 
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(Cf. List, 1841a, p. 419).384 Individual freedom and democracy are also 
acute issues regarding today‘s China. The Listian economic model has 
to a large extent been adopted. The scholar on Italian Fascism and on 
Chinese history, James Gregor, describes in great details how Sun Yat-
sen and later Taiwan, followed a policy remarkably similar to List‘s poli-
cy, 
 
Like many of the reactive, developmental nationalisms we will consider, 
Sun's anti-imperialism bears striking resemblance to the national economic 
policies of Friedrich List, who outlined a policy of national growth and in-
dustrialization for nations languishing in underdevelopment. (Gregor, 2000, 
p. 88) 
 
As has been suggested, Sun's proposal bore a surprising similarity to 
that articulated by Friedrich List almost a century earlier. As such, it was a 
program of developmental nationalism, distinct from the "laissez faire" poli-
cies of economic liberals and the "proletarian" policies of international so-
cialism. … 
While the mainland of China sank deeper and deeper into the failures of 
Maoist economic policies, the followers of Sun Yat-sen led Taiwan to phe-
nomenal economic development and industrial growth—while preserving 
equity. (Gregor, 1995, pp. 165-166) 
 
Nevertheless, liberal policies have not been adopted, as the ‗Father of 
the Chinese Republic‘ in 1911, Sun Yat-sen also advised. Like List, Sun 
was a pragmatic, as they both saw absolutism (List) and authoritarian-
ism (Sun) as transitory on the road to a liberal society. This is what 
came to happen in Taiwan, and later South Korea. 
In the chapter, Deng Xiaoping, Sun Yat-sen, and Fascism, Gregor 
claims that in mainland China Deng Xiaoping replaced Maoism with 
Sun‘s economic policy. However, Gregor claims in 2000, Deng never ac-
cepted the political liberalism of List and Sun, and therefore led China 
towards a system that resembles Italian Fascism, as Madame Mao and 
Zhou Enlai had warned about, 
 
Buried in the contemporary discussions taking place in Dengist China 
are issues long neglected by Marxist theoreticians. The discussions that 
have followed the death of Mao have brought them, once again, to the sur-
face. 
Fascist doctrine clearly gave expression to one form of what today in 
Communist China is called the "theory of productive forces." Revolutionary 
China has long been familiar with its own variants. One variant was that of 
Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People. With the passing of Mao 
Zedong, Deng Xiaoping clearly made that variant the heart of "socialism 
with Chinese characteristics."… 
… however much the developmental reforms of Deng Xiaoping share fea-
tures with those of Sun Yat-sen and Fascism, Deng's political postures have 
                                       
384 See quotation in the subsection, Benevolent imperialism - Occidental tute-
lage of the Orient, in chapter 7. 
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more in common with those of Mussolini's Fascism than anything else. 
(Gregor, 2000, pp. 140-144, Gregor‘s numerous references have been omit-
ted)385 
First, we must remember that China has not changed politically 
since Deng. Secondly, Gregor is a scholar on Italian Fascism who also 
has written many books on China with his wife, Maria Hsia Chang, a 
(Chinese) Professor in Chinese history.  
                                       
385 Gregor continued in more details, ―Unlike Sun, Fascists specifically and 
consistently opposed liberal ideals and democratic institutions. In that clear 
sense, Fascists distinguished themselves from the followers of Sun Yat-sen. 
However long the preliminary periods of military rule and political tutelage 
might have been that Sun anticipated for revolutionary China in the 1920s, 
China's non-Marxist revolutionaries always insisted that military rule and po-
litical tutelage would ultimately culminate in constitutional governance- in a 
system substantially like that of the Western industrial democracies. For Sun 
and his followers, the authoritarianism of the system they would initially im-
pose on revolutionary China was always transitional. … It is clear that Deng 
has employed many of the central concepts of Sun's Sanmin zhuyi in his re-
forms, but it is just as clear that he has rejected its ultimate democratic aspi-
rations. While there is ample talk of "democratization" in post-Maoist China, it 
is clear that it is the same kind of "democratization" spoken of by Fascists and 
Leninists. 
Deng has insisted that "we cannot do without dictatorship. We must not 
only reaffirm the need for it, but exercise it when necessary." What ever shape 
the political reforms might take, the "party must lead," Deng has insisted, and 
the reforms "must not imitate the West, and no liberalization should be al-
lowed.'" … ―Deng committed himself to absolute domestic political stability, 
and the unrelieved submission of the Chinese people to the political domi-
nance of the Communist party of China and its policies.'' 
For Deng—as it was for the first Fascists—the "soundness" of a political 
system is measured in terms of political stability, political unity, and unitary 
party rule. There is no real institutionalization of protection for individual po-
litical and civil rights—no defense of the freedom of association, expression, or 
choice."' There is a specific rejection of any system of political or governmental 
"checks and balances" or multiparty alternatives that would limit the discre-
tion of the state or its agents. Governance, for Deng, involves proceeding "un-
der unified central leadership"—the leadership of the party. … 
In post-Maoist China, a clear effort has been made to routinize and in-
stitutionalize charismatic leadership, with the apparent intention of creating a 
durable vanguard party state. Together with the inculcation of patriotism, self-
sacrifice, and obedience, the regime on the Chinese mainland has taken on 
those criterial features that have always been employed to identify fascist rule 
everywhere in the world. … 
That Marxist theory seems to have missed all this appears to be the conse-
quence of Marxism's failure to understand very much about revolution in the 
twentieth century. … 
The charismatic and antidemocratic dispositions of Deng Xiaoping's China, 
combined with the entire syndrome of traits with which we are now familiar, 
render it an approximation of classic Fascism. …‖ (Gregor, 2000, pp. 140-144, 
Gregor‘s numerous references have been omitted) 
336 
 
Gregor regards Fascism as a historical unity coming out of 1) Italian 
anti-imperialist struggle for national emancipation (i.e. a ―Listian‖ ele-
ment, demanding Industrialisation), and 2) class struggle for emancipa-
tion of Labour (i.e. left wing ‗Revolutionary Syndicalism‘, with strong 
emphasis on economic democracy).386 Therefore, keeping in mind the 
fate of labour unions in China, Gregor here seems to have forgotten all 
about Fascist roots in the labour unions. Rather, it seems as if the de-
velopment in China seems to follow some of the same policies in Russia, 
starting with Lenin and his combination of market liberalism under 
Party leadership, where Deng copied Bukharin‘s policy of "enrich 
yourself".387  
The Chinese political system froze after the 1300 person Tianmen 
Massacre in 1989. Reform debates stalled, and the Communist Party 
rules supreme.  
Still, the Communist Party‘s policies have changed dramatically, es-
pecially the economic policies. Nationalist- and Confucian rhetoric is 
increasingly replacing Communist Party Marxism, teaching adherence 
to the nation and authorities. Furthermore, Deng‘s policies were forti-
fied. With the new rule (1989-2002) of Deng‘s successor, Jiang Zemin, 
China‘s Communists definitely threw the proletariat over board and en-
tered the high seas of Capitalism. Chinese Labour was to pay for Chi-
na‘s emergence as a great power. Not only was market economics in-
creasingly introduced, but also Civil Society disappeared; ―labour un-
ions‖, workers‘ rights, and social security network - which used to be 
tied to the individuals life-long work place.  
As in Russia, so also in China, independent Civil Society had been 
thoroughly demolished and organisations subjugated to Communist 
Party rule. Moreover, as in Russia in the 1920s and 1980s, when Party 
rule in China was combined with radical market liberalism in the 
1990s, this left ordinary people doubly exposed.  
The vacuum of Civil Society was partly filled by religious groups. 
Christian congregations increasingly thrive, but the Falun Gong388 
movement‘s size and independence challenged the Party. In 1999, it 
was declared a "heretical organisation", and massively suppressed.  
Nevertheless, the Communist Party already in the mid-1990s called 
for massive efforts to develop science as the main production factor as 
well as construction of infrastructure. This course has since been fol-
lowed, resulting in stupendous increases in productive power and ma-
terial welfare, however unequally distributed.  
It remains to be seen whether Friedrich List was right in denying that 
economic development can progress without civil liberties. 
  
                                       
386 Cf. also Sternhell, Sznajder, and Ashéri, 1994, pp. 31-32. 
387 For a brief discussion of this, see the end of the subsection above, Russia. 
388 Practising qigong; a revival and mixture of ancient Buddhism and Dao-
ism, preaching moral virtue, meditation and slow physical exercise. 
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List observed that a lack of industry in America was the cause of trade- 
and payment imbalances, indebtedness, which again led to a lack of trust 
in the currency, bank failures, general crisis in the economy and deterio-
ration of industrial skills. In essence, a lack of industry, led to destabili-
sation and general social crisis. List argues that the Cosmopolitan 
School‘s solution of not interfering with a self-regulating international 
market was bound to fail, since some nations actually did follow selfish 
policies that undermined other nations. It would therefore be suicidal to 
trust the market alone, and leave oneself unprotected against the winds 
of global events: ―The market is a deceitful mistress‖. List‘s prescribed 
medicine was to protect and boost industry through government interven-
tion.  
List blamed the Cosmopolitan School with conscious neglect of the 
dangers of trade- and payment deficits and indebtedness, resulting in - or 
rather in order to - establish dependency to England.  
The core of List‘s system of productive powers is mental capital. It con-
sists of immaterial factors such as mentality, knowledge and institutions. 
These take a long time, often generations to construct, but may be ruined 
in months. The regulatory authorities must therefore establish domestic 
stability and security, to protect the mental capital. One regulatory tool is 
using tariffs, and promoting security is the primary role of tariffs. 
Disruptions of production have severe consequences for the mainte-
nance and competitive newness of material equipment such as buildings 
and machinery, but the effects on mental capital is far more severe. If 
they are put idle, skills and knowledge soon deteriorate or even emigrate 
from branches, regions and even countries. Furthermore, knowledge is 
generally not an isolated affair, but rather a collective affair, within com-
panies and between companies. Remove one element and then another 
and the network will rot and the functional organism will start to cough 
and lose its momentum. But not only knowledge is network based, trust 
is too. Trust is the origin and on-going foundation for credit. Instability 
therefore threatens the crucial lubrication of the economy. When the 
credit system breaks down the economic machine grinds to a halt, and 
when the economic system coughs, morality soon shows its fragility too, 
thereby threatening the whole social system, both materially and immate-
rially, with long term consequences.  
A newcomer company in an established branch within an advanced 
economy will suffer high barriers to entry, but can benefit from many 
similar and happy circumstances.  
Catching up with leading industrial nations is a complicated, demand-
ing, and time-consuming task. A less developed country always will have 
a hard time establishing industry in branches where other countries are 
since long established, since it lacks know-how;  regulatory experience; 
skilled pools of labour; cheap credit; and the advanced transport facilities, 
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which established companies in the advanced economy may benefit from. 
A newcomer in a less developed country will therefore be doubly discrimi-
nated against in the market.  
List compares the situation with a boxing match between a profession-
al boxer and a child. Furthermore, by various methods, competing estab-
lished foreign companies can undercut domestic newcomers with tempo-
rary price dumping, by better quality and better credit arrangements for 
the customer. The barriers to entry will be far higher for a newcomer from 
a less developed economy, and the more knowledge intensive the industry 
the higher the barriers. 
Given that a less developed country wants to develop its own industry, 
its government has no option but to level the playing field for its infant 
industries, in order to give them more even opportunities. This can be 
done by giving protection to investments, by temporarily raising tariffs. 
This is a weak version of the parallel of giving a temporary monopoly and 
protection to intellectual investment by allowing patents.  
When stability of an industry is secured, investment in capital and ed-
ucation is potentially more profitable. Promoting incentives for investment 
and skills is therefore the second role of tariffs. Giving a fiscal income is 
the third and least important role of tariffs, but this role is improved 
when the revenue is used productively, such as investment in infrastruc-
ture. 
Weak monopolies created by tariffs will temporarily lead to more costly 
products for the consumer, but List regards this as a national investment 
that will be paid back with increased future productivity for the nation, 
and with improved national culture and greater independence.  
Tariffs must be used with discrimination and should therefore be tem-
porary to prevent long-term laziness of producers, as his stage theory ad-
vices no tariffs at an early stage of development, when there are no skills 
to protect. As the branch matures, and skills start to develop they must 
be protected in a sheltered home market, and when finally the branch is 
competitive internationally, tariffs should be removed.  
Tariffs must also be used to discriminate for those branches that 1) 
demand large investments in physical capital, technical knowledge, and 
management; 2) branches that employ many workers (when labour is 
abundant); 3) branches that are keys to the establishment of other indus-
tries (such as credit, transport, and machine tools), and; 4) branches that 
are strategically important for the survival of the nation. 
Since temporarily increased import tariffs can lead to inefficiencies, List 
advices that this be combatted by encouraging domestic competition. But 
since establishing competition in a market is limited by technology (the 
optimal size of an establishment), the prosperity and size of a population, 
smaller nations must unite with other nations to create markets large 
enough to allow domestic competition. Along with the general advance of 
production technology, this issue gains importance. Competition can also 
be increased by improving communications, thereby decreasing the effec-





6.02 Power rests on productive force 
 
Friedrich Ratzel, widely acknowledged as the founder of geopolitics, in 
1897 discusses Friedrich List in a chapter called ‗The Politics of the 
Trade Powers‘ (Die Politik der Handelsmächte). Ratzel praises List‘s in-
sight into English political principles and claims that ―never has a 
prophet more clearly seen and drawn up the future‖,  
 
In the competitive necessity of expansion, it is implied that trading coun-
tries are capable of the least constant interaction. Even Holland and Eng-
land have always co-operated reluctantly. Friedrich List‘s representation of 
the principles of the English politics has to this day retained their value; 
never has a prophet more clearly seen and drawn up the future: … (Ratzel, 
1897, pp. 375-376: Sechzehntes Kapitel. Der Verkehr als  Raumbewältiger; 
234. Die Politik der Handelsmächte.) 
 
In his article Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton, Friedrich List: The 
Economic Foundations of Military Power, Edward Earle argues that List 
continued their approach relating war to productive capacity, 
 
Smith believed that the ability of a nation to wage war is best measured in 
terms of its productive capacity, as was later to be argued so effectively by 
Friedrich List. (Earle, 1943b, p. 121) 
 
The common link or parallel between Friedrich List and Halford 
Mackinder389, which would normally be pointed to, would be the im-
portance of geography, i.e. natural and given circumstances like re-
sources, manpower and position. However, it is easy to see something 
more profound; Mackinder writes, 
 
                                       
389 The Fabian Socialist Halford J. Mackinder, a British Privy Council 
member etc, was the father of modern British geopolitics, and a leading 
British strategist from before the turn of the Twentieth Century until the end  
of the Second World War.  Mackinder advanced the political bipolarity of the 
―Land powers‖ (the Heartland) versus the ―Sea powers‖ (essentially the COM-
ECON dominated by the USSR, versus NATO dominated by the USA, in the 
post WW II period): He is ―noted for his work as an educator and for his geopo-
litical conception of the globe as divided into two camps, the ascendant Eura-
sian ―heartland‖ and the subordinate ―maritime lands,‖ including the other 
continents. Encyclopedia Britannica writes of him;  
―Holding strong imperialist views, he included in his circle of friends simi-
larly minded men, among them the politician L.S. Amery and Lord Milner, the 
imperial administrator.‖ (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2008)  
Leo Amery was a great admirer of List (Cf. Amery, 1906), and also e.g. First 
Lord of the Admiralty and one of the two main Round Table Group backers of 
W. Churchill when N. Chamberlain was replaced in May 1940, after the Nor-
way debacle.  
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Productive power, in short, is a far more important element of reality in re-
lation to modern civilization than is accumulated wealth. (Mackinder, 1919, 
p. 4) 
 
In addition, as Edward Earle argues, this view they shared with Ad-
am Smith and Alexander Hamilton. Earle summarises List‘s economic 
point relating to war such, 
 
The greater the productive power, the greater the strength of the nation 
in its foreign relations and the greater its independence in time of war. Eco-
nomic principles, therefore, cannot be divorced from their political implica-
tions: … (Earle, 1943b, p. 142) 
 
 
6.03 Power rests on mentality - discipline 
 
Friedrich Ratzel likewise argues that List focused on ability (to create) 
rather than wealth itself, and likewise Ratzel also had a special eye for 
immaterial factors, that e.g. Mackinder was to continue,  
 
It is characteristic that Friedrich List created his opinion, that the power 
to create wealth is more valuable for a nation than the wealth itself, with a 
growing people, namely in the United States of America. He aspired to 
transfer the strength of the national idea, which he learnt to know with this 
young people, to his old people. (Ratzel, 1897, p. 263n, Fifth Part, chapter 
12: The Political Space, p. 176: The School of Space) 
 
The parallel that is the far more important as it is forgotten is the role 
of mental factors, immaterial or moral if you like. Poor natural circum-
stances have on several occasions been a spur for development, such as 
in the Netherlands, Prussia and Japan. In addition, List always, from 
his early papers to this last, pointed to the role of morality, mental ca-
pacities, discipline and willpower. Mackinder argues just as List had 
done earlier on,390 
 
... in 1905 I wrote in the National Review on the subject of ―Manpower as a 
Measure of a National and Imperial Strength,‖ an article which I believe first 
gave vogue to the term Man-Power. In that term is implicit not only the idea 
of fighting strength but also that of productivity, rather than wealth, as the 
outcome of economic reasoning. If I now venture to write on these themes 
at somewhat greater length, it is because I feel that the war has estab-
lished, and not shaken, my former points of view. (Mackinder, 1919, pp. 99-
100) 
 
                                       
390 List writes, ―The object is not to gain matter, in exchanging matter for 
matter, …. But it is to gain productive and political power…‖ (List, 1827b, Let-
ter IV, p. 57)  
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Mackinder not only followed List‘s emphasis on natural conditions 
and transportation, but like List also placed a huge emphasis on cul-
tural and immaterial factors, 
 
Man-power—the power of men—is also in these modern days very greatly 
dependent on organization, or, in other words, on the Going Concern, the 
social organism. (Mackinder, 1962 (1919), pp. 99-100) 
 
Regarding Russia before the 1917 Revolution, Mackinder wrote that 
the only remedy against a breakdown of productive habits and –
discipline is realism and forced organisation, 
 
In times of disorder the interlocking of productive habits breaks down 
step by step, and society as a whole becomes progressively poor, though 
robbers of some kind or another may for a while enrich themselves. Even 
more serious, however, is the failure of the habit of discipline, for that im-
plies the loss of the power of recuperation.  … History shows no remedy but 
force upon which to found a fresh nucleus of discipline in such circum-
stances; but the organiser who rests upon force tends inevitably to treat the 
recovery of mere efficiency as his end. Idealism does not flourish under his 
rule. ... The great organiser is the great realist.‘  (Mackinder, 1962 (1919), p. 
13) 
 
Nevertheless, even Adam Smith harboured similar ideas of the pre-
eminence of the (martial) spirit over matter, and this broke with the ra-
ther materialist tendency of his writings. Edward Earle writes that 
Smith, while perhaps inspired by Francis Bacon, argued that this would 
―deserve the most serious attention of government‖, 
 
More than three hundred years ago, Francis Bacon pointed out that the 
ability of a nation to defend itself depended less upon its material posses-
sions than upon the spirit of the people, less upon its stocks of gold than 
upon the iron of determination in the body politic.2 0  391 As a professor of 
moral philosophy, Adam Smith must have been acquainted with the works 
of Bacon. In any case, he believed that "The security of every society must 
always depend, more or less, upon the martial spirit of the great body of the 
people ...‖ And Smith went even further in the belief that "even though the 
martial spirit of the people were of no use towards the defense of the socie-
ty, yet to prevent that sort of mental mutilation, deformity, and wretched-
ness, which cowardice necessarily involves in it, from spreading themselves 
                                       
391 20) Francis Bacon, "Of the True Greatness of Kingdoms and Estates,‖ no. 
19 of Essays Civil and Moral, in The Works of Francis Bacon, ed. James 
Spedding (Boston, 1840), 7:176 ff. (Earle‘s note) Bacon‘s words are: ―Walled 
towns, stored arsenals and armories, goodly races of horse, chariots of war, ele-
phants, ordnance, artillery, and the like; all this is but a sheep in a lion‘s skin, 
except the breed and disposition of the people be stout and warlike. Nay, num-
ber (itself) in armies importeth not much, where the people is of weak courage; 
for (as Virgil saith) It never troubles a wolf how many the sheep be.‖  
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through the great body of the people, would still deserve the most serious 
attention of government;…‖ (Earle, 1943b, p. 330)53 392 
 
 
6.04 Power in international trade 
 
Whereas List‘s position regarding international power is firmly within 
the Realist camp, List regarded Adam Smith as not only an ―Idealist‖ 
but even as a dangerous Utopian; unable to acknowledge the interna-
tional realities and thus leading common understanding astray, 
 
… Although here and there he speaks of wars, this only occurs incidentally. 
The idea of a perpetual state of peace forms the foundation of all his argu-
ments. (List, 1841, ch. 11, p. 120)393 
 
To Friedrich List, the factual setting for a science of political economy 
is an international economic system of competing nations, where trade 
and war were both part of a Mercantilist gamble for power. Since this is 
so often misunderstood, it must be noted that List saw this as the real 
and factual arrangement, and not at all as the ideal and desired ar-
rangement - in other words it was a description, and not intended as 
normative. His desired arrangement was a balanced industrial devel-
opment of all nations, and legal agreements gradually leading to ―true‖ 
free trade – making colonies and navies redundant.394  
 
List claims that international trade is shaped mainly by the respec-
tive power of the nations involved, and therefore is shaped ―in an entire-
ly different manner‖ than domestic trade, which is done under the same 
―roof‖ and rule, 
 
The imports and exports of independent nations are regulated and con-
trolled at present not by what the popular theory calls the natural course of 
things, but mostly by the commercial policy and the power of the nation, by 
the influence of these on the conditions of the world and on foreign coun-
tries and peoples, by colonial possessions and internal credit establish-
ments, or by war and peace. Here, accordingly, all conditions shape them-
selves in an entirely different manner than between societies which are 
united by political, legal, and administrative bonds in a state of unbroken 
peace and of perfect unity of interests. (List, 1841a, p. 272) 
 
Different nations have different abilities to flex their power and they 
follow different national policies. These different policies decide how a 
trade imbalance will be sorted out, whether towards re-balance and 
temporary ―equilibrium‖, or towards greater imbalances. 
                                       
392 53) Smith, Wealth of Nations, bk. 5, ch. I, pp. 738-40. (Earle‘s note) 
393 A more extensive quotation may be seen in the section; A universal con-
federation of nations, in chapter 7. 





List argues that foreign trade must be considered not myopically from 
a short-term ―monetary‖ point of view, but rather from a long-term na-
tional point of view regarding survival, power, and prosperity, 
 
The foreign trade of a nation must not be estimated in the way in which 
individual merchants judge it, solely and only according to the theory of 
values (i.e. by regarding merely the gain at any particular moment of some 
material advantage); the nation is bound to keep steadily in view all these 
conditions on which its present and future existence, prosperity, and power 
depend. (List, 1841a, p. 144) 
 
 
6.05 Wars promote domestic skills and manufactures 
 
List uses the socio-economic effects of wars as an illustration for what a 
highly protective system may accomplish in times of peace; and fur-
thermore that peace - if not accompanied by protective policies - will 
ruin a less developed nation.  
Although List was in favour of politically based and limited economic 
protection and strongly against social interruptions, especially wars, 
List pointed out that wars also had productive results. Wars act as a 
protective system, under which national industries may grow.  
 
War exercises a great influence on the selection of the precise system of 
protection, inasmuch as it effects a compulsory prohibitive system. (List, 
1841a, ch. 26, p. 309) 
 
List also claims that promoters of the Cosmopolitical School do not 
understand how a protective system continues the productive effects 
that wars have on a national industry, 
 
It does not take into account the influence of war on the necessity for a 
protective system; especially it does not perceive that war effects a compul-
sory prohibitive system, and that the prohibitive system of the custom-
house is but a necessary continuation of that prohibitive system which war 
has brought about. (List, 1841a, p. 316) 
List argues that wars and not academic theories is the mother of the 
economic policy of protection. A protective system is normally intro-
duced as the result of real life (i.e. war), and not as a result of theories, 
 
In practice … the introduction of a protective system is generally the re-
sult of a war and has nothing to do with theories advanced by economists. 
(List, 1837a, p. 110) 
 
It is war that has called into existence the more recent systems of protec-
tion; and we do not hesitate to assert, that it would have been to the inter-
est of the manufacturing nations of the second and third rank to retain a 




During wars, List claims, domestic industries are forced to develop in 
the agricultural nation; and self-reliance and vested interests for indus-
try develop accordingly and they continue to be forceful after the war is 
over.  
 
War has a ruinous effect on the reciprocal commercial relations between 
nation and nation. … manufactures and factories will spring up in it in 
consequence of the interruption of international commerce by war. War acts 
on it like a prohibitive tariff system. It thereby becomes acquainted with the 
great advantages of a manufacturing power of its own, it becomes con-
vinced by practical experience that it has gained more than it has lost by 
the commercial interruptions which war has occasioned. The conviction 
gains ground in it, that it is called to pass from the condition of a mere ag-
ricultural State to the condition of an agricultural-manufacturing State, 
and in consequence of this transition, to attain to the highest degree of 
prosperity, Civilisation, and power. But if after such a nation has already 
made considerable progress in the manufacturing career which was opened 
to it by war, peace is again established, and should both nations then con-
template the resumption of their previously existing commercial inter-
course, they will both find that during the war new interests have been 
formed, which would be destroyed by re-establishing the former commercial 
interchange.395 The former agricultural nation will feel, that in order to re-
sume the sale of its agricultural products to the foreigner, it would have to 
sacrifice its own manufacturing industry which has in the meanwhile been 
created; the manufacturing nation will feel that a portion of its home agri-
cultural production, which has been formed during the war, would again be 
destroyed by free importation. Both, therefore, try to protect these interests 
by means of imposing duties on imports. This is the history of commercial 
politics during the last fifty years. (List, 1841a, ch. 15, pp. 182-183) 
 
List‘s description of the effects of the end of a war, and thereby the 
end of protection, to some extent also describes the situation in Eastern 
Europe after the end of the Cold War, when East European industry 
suddenly became exposed - and lost to more efficient industry in West-
ern Europe, 
 
In time of war every country is forced to establish factories to make those 
goods which were formerly imported from abroad in exchange for products 
made at home. The result is the same as that achieved by a prohibitive fis-
cal policy in peace time. The nation is forced to demand great sacrifices 
from consumers in order to create new industries. And this happens just 
when the means available for the establishment of manufactures have been 
reduced to a minimum. If free trade is introduced when hostilities cease the 
newly established industries will be thrown to the tender mercies of foreign 
competitors. In these circumstances a country will lose all the capital, all 
the experience, and all the work of the war years and will return to its for-
mer position of weakness and dependence upon foreigners. (List 1837a, p. 
32; cf. also List, 1827b, p. 131) 
                                       
395 1. Vide Wealth of Nations, Book IV. chap. ii. (TR.)  (Translator‘s note, 




While a war may be a blessing for the productive forces of a nation, a 
peace that brings a return to free import would destroy what has been 
built, and therefore peace becomes a curse incomparably worse than 
war for the nation, 
 
 A war which leads to the change of the purely agricultural State into an 
agricultural-manufacturing State is therefore a blessing to a nation, just as 
the War of Independence of the United States of North America, in spite of 
the enormous sacrifices which it required, has become a blessing to all fu-
ture generations.  
But a peace which throws back into a purely agricultural condition a na-
tion which is fitted to develop a manufacturing power of its own, becomes a 
curse to it, and is incomparably more injurious to it than a war. (List, 
1841a, ch. 15, p. 183) 
 
This was apparently written during a period when wars were relative-
ly speaking civilized; and before ‗total war‘ - also against the civilian 
population - became commonplace, such as in the Anglo-Boer War (Cf. 
e.g. de Kock, 1981; and Pakenham, 1979). Nevertheless, even in the 
cases of Japan and Germany, utterly devastated by WW II, they man-
aged to restore themselves materially astonishingly fast afterwards 
(even though Germany was thoroughly ‗brain-drained‘ by the victorious 
Allies). This has also been the case with South-Korea. This points e.g. to 
the role of popular discipline, as the British strategist Halford Mackin-
der attracted attention to (Cf. Mackinder, 1919, p. 13). 
England made the mistake of imposing restrictions on the import of 
less advanced goods, depriving her competitors of the means to buy 
England‘s products; and thereby indirectly but effectively promoting 
their domestic manufacture of advanced products, by themselves.  
 
England after the conclusion of peace had not committed the monstrous 
mistake of imposing restrictions on the importation of necessaries of life 
and of raw materials, and consequently of allowing the motives which had 
led to the system of protection in the time of the war, to continue during 
peace. (List, 1841a, ch. 15, p. 183) 
 
 
6.06 English dumping and export of commercial crisis 
 
What List writes about English practices reminds us of the currency 
wars being fought out at the start of the 21st century: List writes that 
the English price their goods inexorably low abroad, for instance after 
gluts in the home market, through economics of scale, and aided 
through the operations of the English national bank,  
 
… the English national bank is able by its operations to depress the prices 
of English manufactured goods in the American markets .... (Cf. List, 




List argues that such dumping is a kind of clever export subsidy, 
since  this gift to other countries is later cashed in by the English in the 
shape of less competition, since other countries‘ industry thereby go 
bankrupt and fail to develop their own industry, often resulting in Eng-
lish monopoly with exorbitant prices - and immense gain of English 
power, 
 
Since the time when the Trojans were 'presented' by the Greeks with a 
wooden horse, the acceptance of 'presents' from other nations has become 
for the nation which receives them a very questionable transaction. The 
English have given the Continent presents of immense value in the form of 
subsidies, but the Continental nations have paid for them dearly by the loss 
of power. These subsidies acted like a bounty on exportation in favour of 
the English, and were detrimental to the German manufactories. (List, 
1841a, p. 146) 
 
If the English very often find occasion to offer presents to foreign nations, 
very different are the forms in which this is done; it is not unfrequently 
done against their will; always does it behove foreign nations well to consid-
er whether or not the present should be accepted. (List, 1841a, p. 147) 
 
List writes that the English, as de facto monopolists, use any domes-
tic commercial crisis, overproduction or ‗gluts‘, to dump their goods 
abroad. After a crisis, their competitors abroad have gone bankrupt and 
the English gain from better prices both at home and abroad,  
 
Through their position as the manufacturing and commercial monopo-
lists of the world, their manufactories from time to time fall into the state 
which they call 'glut,' and which arises from what they call 'overtrading.' At 
such periods everybody throws his stock of goods into the steamers. After 
the elapse of eight days the goods are offered for sale in Hamburg, Berlin, or 
Frankfort, and after three weeks in New York, at fifty per cent under their 
real value. The English manufacturers suffer for the moment, but they are 
saved, and they compensate themselves later on by better prices. The Ger-
man and American manufacturers receive the blows which were deserved 
by the English -- they are ruined. (List, 1841a, pp. 146-147) 
 
List continues by explaining how these crises hardly hurt the English 
but shake less developed countries to their foundations. He claims that 
the Cosmopolitan School does not bother to discuss the reasons and 
effects of such crises – let alone remedies and preventive measures. List 
asks, ―ought we not then to become very sceptical‖ of the correctness of 
letting the less developed nations be ruled by this ―theory of values and 
according to cosmopolitical principles?‖ 
 
The English nation merely sees the fire and hears the report of the explo-
sion; the fragments fall down in other countries, and if their inhabitants 
complain of bloody heads, the intermediate merchants and dealers say, 'The 
crisis has done it all!' If we consider how often by such crises the whole 
manufacturing power, the system of credit, nay the agriculture, and gener-
ally the whole economical system of the nations who are placed in free 
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competition with England, are shaken to their foundations, and that these 
nations have afterwards notwithstanding richly to recompense the English 
manufacturers by higher prices, ought we not then to become very sceptical 
as to the propriety, of the commercial conditions of nations being regulated 
according to the mere theory of values and according to cosmopolitical 
principles? The prevailing economical school has never deemed it expedient 
to elucidate the causes and effects of such commercial crises. (List, 1841a, 
pp. 146-147) 
 
List refers to an American Congressman, who states that by following 
modern (Cosmopolitan) principles, our manufactures; our merchants; 
and even our landowners were ruined, 
 
An orator in Congress said afterwards of this crisis: 'We did buy, accord-
ing to the advice of modern theorists, where we could buy cheapest, and 
our markets were flooded with foreign goods; English goods sold cheaper in 
our seaport towns than in Liverpool or London. Our manufacturers were 
being ruined; our merchants, even those who thought to enrich themselves 
by importation, became bankrupt; and all these causes together were so 
detrimental to agriculture, that landed property became very generally 
worthless, and consequently bankruptcy became general even among our 
landowners.' (List, 1841a, p. 95) 
 
  
6.07 Credit as a tool of power 
 
List was extremely aware of the role of the national and the internation-
al financial markets and the danger that free trade in the financial 
markets represented for the stability, sovereignty, and well-being of the 
nation.  
He was well aware that credit (and debit) historically was a power-
tool stronger than any army. In chapter 23, Manufacturing Power and 
the Instrument of Circulation, he discussed this at length. For instance, 
List comment the imbalanced Anglo-American trading situation by say-
ing that prolonged credit to America would be even more harmful, 
 
As a creditor can keep the debtor on his legs for a long time by renewals 
of credit, but the bankruptcy of the debtor must become so much the 
greater the longer he is enabled to prolong a course of ruinous trading by 
means of continually augmented credit from the creditor, so was it also in 
this case. (List, 1841a, p.278) 
 
The Siamese twins of credit and debt have historically been an im-
portant tool in state building, warfare and in the international power-
game (Wallerstein, 1978, p.44; Marx, 1867, Book I, chapter 31: Genesis 
of the Industrial Capitalist Capital; Braudel, 1985, p.241; Kennedy, 
1989, p.89). Similarly, Richard Werner argues that finance has played a 




Wars were often funded by banks, whether it was William of Orange's in-
vasion of Britain or Napoleon‘s international campaigns. Indeed, a cursory 
survey of the history of banking appears to coincide with the history of the 
rise (and fall) of advanced economies and empires. There are few advanced 
civilizations that did not use credit systems. Sparta appears to have been 
one such exception, which perhaps contributed to the rivalry perceived by 
banking-dominated Athens. (Werner, 2005, p.164) 
 
As Niall Ferguson explains, in his The Ascent of Money. A Financial 
History of the World; the bond market is the mother of national and in-
ternational power, 
 
Credit and debt, in short, are among the essential building blocks of eco-
nomic development, as vital to creating the wealth of nations as mining, 
manufacturing or mobile telephony. …  
The evolution of banking was thus the essential first step in the ascent of 
money. The financial crisis that began in August 2007 … was only possible 
because the rise of banks was followed by the ascent of the second great 
pillar of the modern financial system: the bond market. …  
In the words of Bill Gross, who runs the world's largest bond fund at the 
Pacific Investment Management Company (PIMCO), 'bond markets have 
power because they're the fundamental base for all markets. The cost of 
credit, the interest rate [on a benchmark bond], ultimately determines the 
value of stocks, homes, all asset classes.' (Ferguson, 2008, pp. 63; 64; and 
68) 
 
Matthew Smith Anderson, in his classic Europe in the Eighteenth 
Century, explains that Britain‘s advantage over France already at an 
early stage was precisely her access to cheap credit,  
 
In the 1730s the philosopher George Berkeley described it as 'the chief 
advantage England has over France; and three decades later an expert on 
commercial questions spoke of the strength of England's public credit as 
'the permanent miracle of her policy, which has inspired both astonishment 
and fear in the States of Europe'. ... These comments had much 
justification: of the costs of the four great wars fought by Britain in 1702-83 
three-quarters were raised by borrowing. It was borrowing moreover at 
relatively low rates of interest: the ability to raise money cheaply was a 
major British advantage in the country's struggle with France. (Anderson, 
1987, p.108) 
 
In her article, The Fall of Great Britain …, Zara Steiner notices notes 
the crucial role of finance for London in the 20th Century,  
 
It is the present view of some historians that it was Britain's financial 
and commercial role and not it‘s manufacturing base that was, and 
remained, the real source of her wealth. The City of London played the 
dynamic role in overseas expansion and stood at the centre of Britain's 
global prestige. World trade was invoiced in pounds and financed by 




In his classic and mammoth work on the first half of the 20th 
Century, Tragedy and Hope, The Washington historian Carroll Quigley, 
teacher of US President Bill Clinton, explains this change towards 
financial capitalism as of ―overwhelming significance‖, and as a result of 
capital accumulation coupled with oligarchic and clandestine skill in 
London, 
 
Credit had been known to the Italians and the Netherlanders long before 
it became one of the instruments of English world supremacy. ... This new 
stage of financial capitalism, which continued to dominate England, 
France, and the United States as late as 1930, was made necessary by the 
great mobilisations of capital needed for railroad building after 1830. ... The 
third stage of capitalism is of such overwhelming significance in the history 
of twentieth century, and its ramifications and influences have been so 
subterranean and even occult, ... This system had its centre in London for 
four chief reasons. ... great volume of savings ... oligarchical social 
structure ... aristocratic but not noble ... skill in financial manipulation, 
especially on the international scene. (Quigley, 1966, pp. 48-50) 
 
As List was aware of the power of credit, he claimed that open inter-
national capital markets and exchange markets were a security threat 
to sovereign nations, especially small and underdeveloped nations. 
Such unregulated markets were more or less an invitation to destabili-
sation, e.g. through dumping; and then for nations to be bought off 
cheaply; as well as an invitation to foreign dictates over domestic eco-
nomic policy. He was well aware of the destructive effects from rapid 
fluctuations in the financial markets, for consumption as well as for 
production. For all of these reasons, he accordingly called for protection 
of production and regulation of these markets, in order to achieve bal-
ance of trade and economic and social stability, 
 
… as long as separate national interests exist, a wise State policy will advise 
every great nation to guard itself by its commercial system against extraor-
dinary money fluctuations and revolutions in prices which overturn its 
whole internal economy, and it will attain this purpose only by placing its 
internal manufacturing production in a position of proper equality with its 
internal agricultural production and its imports with its exports. (List, 
1841a, ch. 23, p. 282) 
 
 
6.08 Balance of trade 
 
List was worried about unbalanced trade. In 1841, List explained in 
details the American industrial and financial dependence on Britain 
and the crucial role of the balance of trade in creating destructive 
dependency (Cf. List, 1841a, ch. 23 Manufacturing Power and the 
Instruments of Circulation), thereby anticipating modern dependence 
theory by a Century and a half.  
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Adam Smith‘s claim that ―almost all the other regulations of com-
merce are founded‖ upon the ―doctrine of the balance of trade‖,396 is 
remarkable - and just as remarkable it is, that this claim is little no-
ticed today - a very lonely exception can be found in Free Trade Under 
Fire by Douglas Irwin (Irwin, 2002, p.145). 
List criticises the orthodox school for their claim that the balance of 
trade issue was a ridiculous fault in the theories of the Mercantilists. 
List argues to the contrary that an independent nation cannot continue 
for a longer time to maintain a trade deficit, increase its indebtedness 
and at the same time progress in prosperity, 
 
However much the doctrine of the balance of trade may have been 
scorned by the popular school, observations like those above described en-
courage us nevertheless to express the opinion that between large and in-
dependent nations something of the nature of a balance of trade must exist; 
that it is dangerous for great nations to remain for a long period at very 
considerable disadvantage in respect of this balance, … 
What we deny is merely this: that a great and independent nation, as 
Adam Smith maintains at the conclusion of his chapter devoted to this sub-
ject, 'may continually import every year considerably larger values in prod-
ucts and fabrics than it exports; that the quantities of precious metals ex-
isting in such a nation may decrease considerably from year to year and be 
replaced by paper circulation in the interior; moreover, that such a nation 
may allow its indebtedness towards another nation continually to increase 
and expand, and at the same time nevertheless make progress from year to 
year in prosperity.397  
This opinion, expressed by Adam Smith and maintained since that time 
by his school, is alone that which we here characterise as one that has been 
contradicted a hundred times by experience, as one that is contrary in the 
very nature of things to common sense, in one word (to retort upon Adam 
Smith his own energetic expression) as 'an absurdity.' (List, 1841a, p. 286) 
 
Checking Adam Smith‘s original text proves List right; Smith writes, 
 
IN the foregoing part of this chapter I have endeavoured to show, even 
upon the principles of the commercial system, how unnecessary it is to lay 
extraordinary restraints upon the importation of goods from those countries 
with which the balance of trade is supposed to be disadvantageous. 
Nothing, however, can be more absurd than this whole doctrine of the 
balance of trade, upon which, not only these restraints, but almost all the 
other regulations of commerce are founded. When two places trade with one 
another, this doctrine supposes that, if the balance be even, neither of them 
either loses or gains; but if it leans in any degree to one side, that one of 
them loses and the other gains in proportion to its declension from the ex-
act equilibrium. (Smith, 1776, book IV, ch. iii, part ii) 
 
                                       
396  Cf. Smith, 1776, book IV, ch. iii, part ii, Cf. a more extensive quotation 
below. 
397 2: Smith 1776, book IV, ch. iii [List's note] 
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By inference, England‘s trade partners may therefore without worries 
put themselves in debt to England. Trade will always be in equilibrium, 
eventually. 
List claims that the popular school think that trade imbalances will 
solve themselves, since the new level of precious metals (aka devalua-
tion) will lead to lower export prices. This will increase competitive abil-
ity; boost exports; and soon trade and payments will again balance: In 
other words, imbalances are temporary and a just a matter of natural 
oscillations (Cf. List, 1841a, p. 271). List agrees that this is correct con-
cerning domestic trade between states within one customs union, like 
the Zollverein, United States and Great Britain, but the matter is differ-
ent concerning international trade between customs unions and na-
tions (Cf. List, 1841a, p. 272). 
Furthermore, when List criticises the orthodox school for its very 
conscious neglect of the balance of trade issue, he claims that the 
popular school has tried to hide the disadvantages of trade deficits (by 
cunningly using a ‗shop-keeper‘ like calculation) (in order to create de-
pendency, 
 
The popular school has made clever use of all those delusions arising 
from a shopkeeper-like calculation and comparison of the value of the ex-
changes arising from the exports and imports, in order to make us disbe-
lieve in the disadvantages which result from a real and enormous dispro-
portion between the exports and imports of any great and independent na-
tion, … (List, 1841a, p. 287) 
 
Furthermore, List argues that the balance of trade issue is a matter 
of national independence, of sovereignty, and if this problem is not re-
solved successfully, the deficit countries might as well do better as col-
onies of the creditor country, 
 
In general it appears to us that the defenders of free trade would argue 
more consistently in regard to money crises and the balance of trade, as 
well as to manufacturing industry, if they openly advised all nations to 
prefer to subject themselves to the English as dependencies of England, 
and to demand in exchange the benefits of becoming English colonies, 
which condition of dependence would be, in economical respects, clearly 
more favourable to them than the condition of half independence in which 
those nations live who, without maintaining an independent system of 
industry, commerce, and credit of their own, nevertheless always want to 
assume towards England the attitude of independence.  (List, 1841a, p. 
290, cf. also pp. 285-293)398 
 
List argues that the alternative to industrialisation (through a protec-
tive policy and thereby balance or even surplus in trade), would be that 
of becoming a colony of the dominant nation, as the USA had been un-
                                       
398 The following part of this quotation may be found in chapter 6 in the sec-
tion, ‗Independent vassalage‘ and tropical colonies. 
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der England during Adam Smith‘s lifetime (Cf. e.g. List, 1841a, p. 289-
91).  
List‘s remedy against ―money fluctuations and revolutions in prices‖, 
gluts, overproduction and financial and commercial crises, is regulation 
of taxes, tariffs and finance in general in order to secure a sound bal-
ance of trade and of payments.  
 
 
6.09 Commercial crises due to indebtedness 
 
List blames these damaging commercial crises on financial indebted-
ness, that were due, he claimed, to the imbalance in payments resulting 
from poor exports in relation to imports. An independent but non-
industrialised nation, List argues, will be become indebted and then 
torn apart again and again by financial and commercial crises. This na-
tion's independence will therefore be illusory, as would its welfare. List 
claims that agricultural nations suffer more often from disrupting cri-
ses.  
List claims that the American commercial crises were due to her debt 
to England, which was caused by trade deficits and ultimately by the 
lack of American protection and accordingly productive power.  
 
The cause of the latest as well as of former American commercial crises, 
has been alleged to exist in the American banking and paper system. The 
truth is that the banks have helped to bring about these crises in the man-
ner above named, but the main cause of their occurrence is that since the 
introduction of the ‗compromise‘ bill the value of the English manufactured 
goods has far surpassed the value of the exported American products, and 
that thereby the United States have become indebted to the English to the 
amount of several hundreds of millions for which they could not pay in 
products. The proof that these crises are occasioned by disproportionate 
importation is, that they have always taken place whenever (in consequence 
of peace having set in or of a reduction being made in the American cus-
toms duties) importation of manufactured goods into the United States has 
been unusually large, and that they have never occurred as long as the im-
ports of goods have been prevented by customs duties on imports from ex-
ceeding the value of the exports of produce. (List, 1841a, ch. 23, p. 277) 
 
List claimed that America‘s loans merely delayed and increased the cri-
ses,  
 
The blame for these crises has further been laid on the large capital 
which has been expended in the United States in the construction of canals 
and railways, and which has mostly been procured from England by means 
of loans. The truth is that these in loans have merely assisted in delaying 
the crises for several years, and increasing it when it arose; but these very 
loans themselves have evidently been incurred through the inequality 
which had arisen between the imports and exports, and but for that ine-
quality would not have been made and could not have been made. (List, 




List furthermore claimed that the indebtedness and crises allowed 
English interests to procure American state paper and -stocks in rail-
ways, canals and banks, 
 
While North America became indebted to the English for large sums 
through the large importation of manufactured goods which could not be 
paid for in produce, but only in the precious metals, the English were ena-
bled, and in consequence of the unequal rates of exchange and interest 
found it to their advantage, to have this balance paid for in American rail-
way, canal and bank stocks, or in American State paper. (List, 1841a, ch. 
23, p. 277) 
 
A somewhat similar situation can be found in the indebted countries 
in the Eurozone: After the US-reared financial crisis hit Europe in late 
2008, governments sold off and privatised infrastructure to pay public 
debt, after bailing out reckless private banks. 
List insisted that the only way to avoid indebtedness and loss of 
sovereignty and welfare was to build industry, through different stages 
of development and policies. This was also his solution for a country 
that already was in debt, the USA. To get out of debt the USA had to 
improve its balance of trade by expanding its exports. The only way to 
do this was improve the US productivity by increasing the nation‘s 
productive powers.  
 
 




List goes into greater detail on the necessity of balancing imports with 
exports, by protecting the home market from foreign imports, thereby 
placing them on ―on a footing of equality to the exports‖, and more spe-
cifically so by protecting against foreign manufactures and by easing 
export of agricultural produce.  
This failure to do so led to a US trade deficit and indebtedness,  
 
The commercial conditions between England and North America which 
we have above explained, therefore teach: 
(1) That a nation which is far behind the English in capital and manufac-
turing power cannot permit the English to obtain a predominating competi-
tion on its manufacturing market without becoming permanently indebted 
to them; without being rendered dependent on their money institutions, 
and drawn into the whirlpool of their agricultural, industrial, and commer-
cial crises.... (List, 1841a, pp. 280-281) 
 
List argues that a free market allows dumping of English manufac-





(2) That the English national bank is able by its operations to depress the 
prices of English manufactured goods in the American markets .... 
 
According to List, US debt was then covered by US sale of equities to 
England, leading to a semi-colonial status where US matters are decid-
ed abroad, reminiscent of recent developments e.g. in southern Europe, 
 
(3) That the English national bank could effect by its operations the con-
sumption by the North Americans, for a series of years, of a much larger 
value of imported goods than they would be able to repay by their exporta-
tion of products, and that the Americans had to cover their deficit during 
several years by the exportation of stocks and State paper. 
 
Finally, List argues that these disadvantageous fluctuations, in the 
money market and in the banking system, can only be avoided if a bal-
ance of trade is restored, meaning that the nation in question has to 
improve its productive powers and industrialise, 
 
(4) That under such circumstances the Americans carried on their inter-
nal interchange and their bank and paper-money system with ready money, 
which the English bank was able to draw to itself for the most part by its 
own operations whenever it felt inclined so to do. 
 
(5) That the fluctuations in the money market under all circumstances 
act on the economy of the nations in a highly disadvantageous manner, es-
pecially in countries where an extensive bank and paper-money system is 
based on the possession of certain quantities of the precious metals. 
 
(6) That the fluctuations in the money market and the crises which result 
therefrom can only be prevented, and that a solid banking system can only 
be founded and maintained, if the imports of the country are placed on a 
footing of equality to the exports. 
 
(7) That this equality can less easily be maintained in proportion as for-
eign manufactured goods can successfully compete in the home manufac-
turing markets, and in proportion as the exportation of native agricultural 
products is limited by foreign commercial restrictions; finally, that this 
equality can less easily be disturbed in proportion as the nation is inde-
pendent of foreign nations for its supply of manufactured goods, and for the 





List then points to similar experiences in Russia, were free trade also 
was accompanied by crisis - and vice versa; as the introduction of a tar-




These doctrines are also confirmed by the experience of Russia. We may 
remember to what convulsions public credit in the Russian Empire was 
subjected as long as the market there was open to the overwhelming con-
signments of English manufactured goods, and that since the introduction 
of the tariff of 1821 no similar convulsion has occurred in Russia. (List, 
1841a, p. 281) 
 
Russia at the turn of the 20th Century suffered, like the USA before 
her, from a negative balance of trade and many ills resulting therefrom. 
Theodore von Laue explains how PM Sergei Witte,399 used List‘s solution 
for American problems, being indebted to Britain, to plan a remedy for 
Russia (whose exports were ―mono-cultural‖) being indebted to 
Germany and France; Russia suffered from falling grain prices, but 
more industry would restore Russia‘s balance of trade and solve all 
economic problems. Laue writes, 
 
But there was even more for Witte in List's book, for it dealt also with the 
special problems arising out of the economic relations between a 
predominantly agricultural country and a highly industrialized one. During 
his residence in Pennsylvania, List had gained some insight into the 
penalties of economic inferiority. The prosperity of the United States, he 
and his American fellow protectionists had felt, was at the mercy of the 
British. From Witte's perspective, List's account of his American experience 
applied to Russia as well, a Russia heavily indebted to Germany and 
France, depending for her well-being on her exports of grain to a highly 
competitive market with disastrously falling prices, and her credit triply 
undermined by her debts, her uncertain exports, and her paper money. 
List's categorical remedy for all these problems was more national industry. 
Industry would restore the balance of trade, which he, in contrast to the 
free traders, again justified as a government concern. It would reduce the 
country's dependence on foreign markets and on foreign producers, 
strengthen her agriculture, stabilize the currency, and civilize the country 
as a whole. Industrialization, in short, was the panacea for all the economic 
ills of Russia with which the ministers of finance had so vainly tried to 
cope. (Laue, 1963, p. 59) 
 
 
c) The British Empire - and the American 
 
These lessons, of lacking industry and resulting indebtedness and loss 
of sovereignty, are being played out in the West today, but this time in 
the ―chronological reverse‖. List‘s stage theory of development is so to 
speak being played out in reverse. This follows four decades of relative 
deindustrialisation in most Western countries. Dean Kishore Mahbuba-
ni in Singapore, is quoted in an article in China Daily; ‗Move over West, 
Asia is here‘. He says that the West debt crisis is Western because it has 
forgotten how it became wealthy and has to relearn this from Asia,  
                                       
399 Sergei Witte was a Baltic-Russian patriot, Railroad Minister, then Finance 
Minister and finally Prime Minister, who administered the construction of the 




The world is entering a new era, an era marked by two major changes. 
The first is the beginning of the end of Western domination - not the end of 
the West, though. The second is the Asian "renaissance", because the 21st 
century will be the century of Chinese and Indian economies. These are the 
words of Kishore Mahbubani, dean of Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy 
at the National University of Singapore. … 
"This is a Western financial crisis," he says, "because the problems are 
the results of Western leaders' failure to understand that they faced a new 
competition." Western minds couldn't think that other societies were be-
coming more successful than them. People in the US and the EU live be-
yond their means. Does "Western wisdom" say keep borrowing despite 
mounting budget deficits? The West has to "relearn" Western wisdom from 
the East, Mahbubani says.  
"Asian societies are doing well (today) because they understood and ab-
sorbed the main pillars of Western wisdom, including the market, science, 
education and rule of law. But Western societies are gradually walking 
away from these pillars." (Li Yang, 2010, p. 9) 
 
American history is thus repeating much of the same ―cause and ef-
fect‖ that was played out one hundred years earlier – in Great Britain. 
In addition, with the decrease of American manufacturing capability, 
larger deficits and debt, a renewed interest has arrived for alternative 
policies for the USA.400 This too is a repetition of former phenomena: 
Around the turn of the twentieth Century, the most influential strate-
gist circles in Britain, with e.g. Chamberlain, Milner, Amery, Mackinder 
and Salisbury all saw that e.g. List could explain why Britain was fall-
ing behind, and that he gave them a remedy to solve the problem.401 
That they did not pay heed to his advice for a harmony of interests, 
however, surely cannot be blamed on List.  
 
 
6.11 Dangers of monoculture – commodities especially  
 
List warns against the destabilising effects from a lack of industry, 
since export of raw materials is more liable to fluctuations. To this, he 
added the danger and vulnerability of having a one-sided economy, in 
particular when the lack of an industrial sector led to increased de-
pendence upon foreign consumption, for its own economic stability. A 
monocultural primitive economy was more prone to indebtedness and 
commercial crisis than a mature and heterogeneous economy, 
 
It is dangerous to allow the prosperity of a country's arable land to be en-
tirely dependent upon the export of cereals and raw materials in exchange 
                                       
400 This is discussed further in the Introduction; Recent interest in List; and in 
the sections below; Balance of payments, once again, and Protection, once again. 
401 This is briefly discussed in the section British strategists substantiate 
List‘s claims, in chapter 7. 
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for manufactured products. Such agricultural exports are liable to serious 
fluctuations. (List, 1837a, p. 56) 
 
Perilous monoculture is not only a problem for ‗backward‘ agricultur-
al nations, but also is a problem with developed nations like Australia 
and Norway - who both are highly dependent on high demand for their 
commodities in foreign industrialised nations. The demand of their ex-
port products, affect everything from the costs of domestic Labour and 
real estate - to the value of their currency and other export products. 
The opposite of a monocultural development is a balanced develop-
ment in the tradition of e.g. Alexander Hamilton, which List strongly 
supported, and which became a core tenet of the traditions following 
Hamilton and List. Their point was that a balanced development of all 
vital branches, would not only mutually inspire and ignite these; and 
thus fuel the productive forces, but indeed also make this union strong 
and able to resist foreign disturbances.402 
 
6.12 Agriculture most productive 
 
For Alexander Hamilton‘s free trade adversaries, however, agriculture 
was to be preferred to artificial industries, since manufactured products 
can be bought less expensive from abroad, 
 
―If, contrary to the natural course of things, an unseasonable and prema-
ture spring can be given to certain fabrics, by heavy duties, prohibitions, 
bounties, or by other forced expedients; this will only be to sacrifice the in-
terests of the community to those of particular classes. Besides the misdi-
rection of labour, a virtual monopoly will be given to the persons employed 
on such fabrics: and an enhancement of price, the inevitable consequence 
of every monopoly, must be defrayed at the expense of the other parts of so-
ciety. It is far preferable, that those persons should be engaged in the culti-
vation of the earth, and that we should procure, in exchange for its produc-
tions, the commodities, with which foreigners were able to supply us in 
greater perfection, and upon better terms.‖ (quoted by Hamilton, 1790-
1791, p. 116) 
 
Adam Smith has more elaborated reasons for resisting the temptation 
to industrialise; as the Physiocrats, he argues that agriculture is more 
productive. Moreover, as is usual, Smith sees no difference between the 
private economy of individuals and that of the country. In addition, as 
usual he sees growth as a result of saving, 
  
When the capital of any country is not sufficient  … as a greater share of 
it is employed in agriculture, the greater will be … the value which its em-
ployment adds to the annual produce of the land and labour of the society. 
…  
                                       
402 Discussed in the section, Perfecting the balanced harmony of productive 
powers, in chapter 4. 
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The capital of all the individuals of a nation is increased in the same 
manner as that of a single individual by their continually accumulating and 
adding to it whatever they save out of their revenue. (Smith, 1776, book II, 
ch. V, p. 366)403 
 
Smith continues by saying that agriculture was the reason why 
America was so prosperous, and America would fall into ruin if they in-
dustrialised; stopped buying European manufactured products; and 
took over the coastal and foreign trade themselves. In other words, 
America should be content with being a colony fully dependent of the 
British Empire, 
 
It has been the principal cause of the rapid progress of our American colo-
nies towards wealth and greatness that almost their whole capitals have 
hitherto been employed in agriculture. (Smith, 1776, book II, ch. V, p. 
366)404 
                                       
403 The whole quotation reads:  ―When the capital of any country is not suf-
ficient for all those three purposes, in proportion as a greater share of it is 
employed in agriculture, the greater will be the quantity of productive labour 
which it puts into motion within the country; as will likewise be the value 
which its employment adds to the annual produce of the land and labour of 
the society. After agriculture, the capital employed in manufactures puts into 
motion the greatest quantity of productive labour, and adds the greatest value 
to the annual produce. That which is employed in the trade of exportation has 
the least effect of any of the three. 
The country, indeed, which has not capital sufficient for all those three purpos-
es has not arrived at that degree of opulence for which it seems naturally des-
tined. To attempt, however, prematurely and with an insufficient capital to do 
all the three is certainly not the shortest way for a society, no more than it 
would be for an individual, to acquire a sufficient one. The capital of all the in-
dividuals of a nation has its limits in the same manner as that of a single indi-
vidual, and is capable of executing only certain purposes. The capital of all the 
individuals of a nation is increased in the same manner as that of a single indi-
vidual by their continually accumulating and adding to it whatever they save 
out of their revenue. It is likely to increase the fastest, therefore, when it is em-
ployed in the way that affords the greatest revenue to all the inhabitants of the 
country, as they will thus be enabled to make the greatest savings. But the rev-
enue of all the inhabitants of the country is necessarily in proportion to the val-
ue of the annual produce of their land and labour.‖ (Smith, 1776, book II, ch. V, 
p. 366) 
404 The rest of the quotation reads: ―They have no manufactures, those 
household and courser manufactures excepted which necessarily accompany 
the progress of agriculture, and which are the work of the women and children 
in every private family. The greater part both of the exportation and coasting 
trade of America is carried on by the capitals of merchants who reside in Great 
Britain. Even the stores and warehouses from which goods are retailed in some 
provinces, particularly in Virginia and Maryland, belong many of them to mer-
chants who reside in the mother country, and afford one of the few instances of 
the retail trade of a society being carried on by the capitals of those who are not 
resident members of it. Were the Americans, either by combination or by any 
other sort of violence, to stop the importation of European manufactures, and, 
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Against Smith‘s renunciation of the benefit of protective measures, as 
being costly outlays, reducing saving and weakening a nation‘s power of 
acquiring capital, List claims that Smith thinks like a rentier and a 
bookkeeper (it‘s all numbers; and all expenditures are of the same na-
ture). As opposed to an industrialist or a farmer for that matter, or even 
to a family, for whom investments are of a different nature than con-
sumption. List argues that investments will be paid back in the long 
term by a gain in productive power, 
 
If, therefore, a sacrifice of value is caused by protective duties, it is made 
good by the gain of a power of production, which not only secures to the na-
tion an infinitely greater amount of material goods, but also industrial in-
dependence in case of war.  (List, 1841a, p. 145) 
 
 
6.13 The inadvisability of supporting manufactures  
 
Adam Smith attacked differential treatment of branches on the ground 
of his capital and growth theory, which claimed that growth was due to 
1) increased division of labour in larger markets increased by more free 
trade, and 2) increased employment dependent on accumulation of cap-
ital due to saving of revenue (assuming a fixed proportion between la-
bour and capital).  
Smith‘s argument was therefore that artificial regulation of commerce 
would only divert capital‘s natural flow towards the most profitable ac-
tivities, and therefore reduce accumulation and hence –growth,  
 
The industry of the society can augment only in proportion as its capital 
augments, and its capital can augment only in proportion to what can be 
gradually saved out of its revenue. But the immediate effect of every such 
regulation is to diminish its revenue, and what diminishes its revenue is 
certainly not very likely to augment its capital faster than it would have 
augmented of its own accord had both capital and industry been left to find 
out their natural employments. (Smith, 1776, book IV, ch. II) 
 
Smith‘s argument is logical, but only because of his premises, where 
he generalises and fails to see: any differences between the profitability 
of different activities; any difference between the present and the future; 
Smith fails to open up for the dynamic possibility that new lucrative 
trades can be planned for and deliberately learnt. List comments that 
Smith forgets both mental and bodily abilities, 
                                                                                                                
by thus giving a monopoly to such of their own countrymen as could manufac-
ture the like goods, divert any considerable part of their capital into this em-
ployment, they would retard instead of accelerating the further increase in the 
value of their annual produce, and would obstruct instead of promoting the 
progress of their country towards real wealth and greatness. This would be still 
more the case were they to attempt, in the same manner, to monopolize to 





In the above-named argument lies the chief proof of the school against 
the protective commercial policy. …  Adam Smith has merely taken the 
word capital in that sense in which it is necessarily taken by rentiers or 
merchants in their book-keeping and their balance-sheets, namely, as the 
grand total of their values of exchange in contradistinction to the income 
accruing therefrom. 
He has forgotten that he himself includes (in his definition of capital) the 
mental and bodily abilities of the producers under this term. 
He wrongly maintains that the revenues of the nation are dependent only 
on the sum of its material capital. (List, 1841a, pp. 225-226)  
 
In his famous Report on Manufactures, to the US Congress in 1791, 
Alexander Hamilton, the US Treasury Secretary, quoted his adversaries, 
who warned against giving any direction to manufactures, 
 
There are still, nevertheless, respectable patrons of opinions unfriendly 
to the encouragement of manufactures. The following are, substantially, the 
arguments by which these opinions are defended: … 
"To endeavor, by the extraordinary patronage of government, to acceler-
ate the growth of manufactures, is, in fact, to endeavor, by force and art, to 
transfer the natural current of industry from a more to a less beneficial 
channel. Whatever has such a tendency, must necessarily be unwise; in-
deed, it can hardly ever be wise in a government to attempt to give a direc-
tion to the industry of its citizens. This, under the quick-sighted guidance 
of private interest, will, if left to itself, infallibly find its own way to the most 
profitable employment; and it is by such employment, that the public pros-
perity will be most effectually promoted. To leave industry to itself, there-
fore, is, in almost every case, the soundest as well as the simplest policy.‖ 
(Hamilton, 1790-1791, p. 116) 
 
So, the argument has since been heard from mainstream free traders 
that it is not advisable to subsidy one‘s own industry – not even when it 
is faced with foreign subsidies of foreign produce. Then, the argument 
goes, one shall be thankful for the gifts the foreigners are so stupid as 
to give away. List comments, however, that short-term pecuniary gains 
are inferior to long-term and lasting gains in the powers of production,  
 
Into what mistakes the prevailing economical school has fallen by judg-
ing conditions according to the mere theory of values which ought properly 
to be judged according to the theory of powers of production, may be seen 
very clearly by the judgment which J. B. Say passes upon the bounties 
which foreign countries sometimes offer in order to facilitate exportation; he 
maintains that 'these are presents made to our nation.'  (List, 1841a, p. 
145) 
 
Russia‘s leading politician before the Revolutions, Sergei Witte, simi-





During my tenure as finance minister, industry grew so rapidly that it 
could be said that a Russian national industrial system had been 
established. This was made possible by the system of protectionism and by 
attracting foreign capital. 
I was criticized by some blockheads for building up industry too rapidly. 
Also I was criticized for using "artificial means" in promoting industry. What 
does this stupid word mean? By what other means than artificial can 
industry develop? Everything that man does is, to a certain degree, 
artificial.... and the artificial means I employed were far weaker than those 
employed for the same means by other states. This, of course, our salon 
ignoramuses do not know. 
There is a common complaint that I was too liberal in handling out State 
Bank loans to industry. This is not so. In the first place .. it is ridiculous 
that such a sum of money could have provided the "artificial means" for 
giving birth to the industry of such a country as the Russian Empire. In the 
second place, a good part of these loans went to nobles turned 
industrialists, men who either belonged to the court camarilla or who had 
ties with that group. 
Generally speaking, the importance of industry to Russia is not 
appreciated or understood. Only a few men, like Mendeleev - that great 
scientist and scholar and my devoted associate and friend - understood its 
importance and tried to enlighten the Russian people about it. (Witte, 1990, 
pp.320-321) 
 
The history of resisting differential treatment of branches is as old as 
the policy itself, since any branch in disfavour would protest. Smith‘s 
common sense argument is that entrepreneurs, due to their hands-on 
know-how, are superior to state bureaucrats in picking winners a mar-
ket. Therefore, the market should be left alone and thereby let entre-
preneurs do what only they do best; earn money. Smith also warns 
against the large power of such a bureaucracy, 
 
What is the species of domestic industry which his capital can employ, 
and of which the produce is likely to be of the greatest value, every individ-
ual, it is evident, can, in his local situation, judge much better than any 
statesman or lawgiver can do for him. The statesman who should attempt 
to direct private people in what manner they ought to employ their capitals 
would not only load himself with a most unnecessary attention, but assume 
an authority which could safely be trusted, not only to no single person, 
but to no council or senate whatever, and which would nowhere be so dan-
gerous as in the hands of a man who had folly and presumption enough to 
fancy himself fit to exercise it. (Smith, 1776, book, IV, Ch. II, p. 456) 
 
There is little reason to doubt the claim that entrepreneurs in a mar-
ket are the best judges of this market, but as List argues: A single com-
pany (or even a whole branch) has a much narrower task than the 
state, which is obliged to promote all branches and general welfare for 
the whole nation, by internal improvement of the nation. A state‘s task 
is therefore to prioritise and discriminate between branches, in the na-
tional interest. Many economic activities and branches have the charac-
ter of public goods and display underinvestment, leading to the need for 
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action from a ―macro agent‖ with the general welfare at sight. Regarding 
the dangers of a powerful bureaucracy, Max Weber developed this and 
the idea of a rational division of labour into a critical theory of bureau-
cracy.405  
Japan took the consequence of this danger by arranging public 
bureaucracy in a way that favoured hands on experience. Concerning 
the particular ways of Japanese ‗indicative‘ planning, Wassilij 
Leontieff406 writes the following in his review of Prof. Shigeto Tsuru's 
book Japan's capitalism, creative defeat and beyond:  
 
In this connection one can quote the answer given by a young Japanese 
corporate executive when he was asked why the powerful, private, business 
organisations seem to have accepted the voluntary "indicative" suggestions 
- received from MITI and other governmental agencies long after such 
advice ceased to be mandatory: "We have placed in our government" (he 
really meant, government bureaucracy) "our wisest, best educated, and best 
informed people. No wonder we are prepared to follow their advice." 
Co-ordinating planning was successfully used in making what the author 
describes as "anticipatory" public investment that involved the creation of 
factory sites, by reclamation along with providing such infrastructure as 
ports and feeder roads. (Leontieff, 1994) 
 
6.14 Tariffs shall primarily promote stability of home markets 
 
To List, tariffs shall primarily promote the stability of home markets. The 
second role of tariffs was to restructure the industrial makeup of a coun-
try; and obtaining revenue for the authorities only came third.  
List claims that when free trade is interrupted by hostile actions of 
other states, one must take defensive measures,  
 
… the division of labour and the co-operation of productive powers follows 
automatically from the adoption of the policy of free trade. But if the natu-
ral growth of the economy is hindered by the hostile political actions of oth-
er states it would be foolish to expect that the same growth will take place 
that would have occurred if universal free trade existed. In such circum-
stances a nation can expect the industrial sector of the economy to grow 
                                       
405 Cf. e.g. Weber, 1904 and 1922. Critical theories of bureaucracies were 
also developed by other German economists; such as Weber‘s student and 
Syndicalist/Fascist Robert Michels‘ … Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of 
Modern Democracy (Cf. Michels, 1911) and the ‗semi-anarchist‘ Franz Oppen-
heimer‘s The State (teacher of German chancellor Ludwig Erhard, Cf. Oppen-
heimer, 1905). See also the section, A pragmatic social-conservative?, in chap-
ter 5. 
406 Wassilij Leontieff is regarded as the father of input-output analysis. His 
dissertation at the University of Berlin in 1928 under the direction of Werner 
Sombart, concerned Circular Flows in Economics (Leontieff, 1928). Leontieff was 
President of the Econometric Society and a Nobel Laureate in 1973. Three of his 
doctorate students also became Nobel Laureates; Paul Samuelson (1970), Rob-
ert Solow (1983) and Vernon L. Smith (2002). 
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only if defensive measures are taken through political action.  (List, 1837a, 
Letter II, pp. 32-33) 
 
List saw many advantages with tariffs, and his emphasis depended 
somewhat on the issue discussed. Nevertheless, he usually stressed that 
the primary role of tariffs was to secure a nation‘s people, 
 
The object of a tariff is to frustrate any hostile action by foreigners to 
harm a country‘s economy by political action or by acts of war. While 
achieving its immediate object a protective tariff will also foster the natural 
and normal expansion of home industries. (List, 1837a, p. 33) 
 
List argues that it is better to prepare for stability and protect, than 
to mend injuries afterwards,  
 
We may rest assured that it is (as a rule) incomparably easier to perfect 
and extend a business already established than to found a new one. (List, 
1841a, p. 294) 
 
List repeatedly explains the dangers of business cycles and declares 
that the stability of the home market is the most important precondi-
tion for a flourishing society, and therefore as the most important rea-
son for protective tariffs. Indeed, chapter 24 of the National System is 
entitled, ‗Manufacturing power and the principle of stability and continui-
ty of work‘ (List 1841a, p. 294). 
 
There is a general rule applicable to all undertakings that has been en-
tirely overlooked by the founders and disciples of the cosmopolitical theory, 
... This rule is steadiness in prosecuting a branch …. (List, 1827b, p. 111)  
 
Anyone who has tried to estimate profitability of investments and the 
related gross uncertainties would acknowledge the truth content in 
List‘s opinion. Repeated and rampant budget overruns in both private 
and public enterprises are testimony to this.407 List‘s opinion in 1827 is 
supported in 2010 by Richard Lambert, the head of the Confederation 
of British Industry, who says that, 
 




                                       
407 Just one example among many possible; Statoil is the largest company in 
Norway and has 40 years of experience with cost estimation for very large off-
shore projects. The cost of the gas field project Snow White (‗Snøhvit‘) offshore 
Northern Norway was in 2002 estimated at € 5 billion, but by September 2005 
the cost estimate was up by 50% to € 7.5 billion. When the project was finished 
in 2010, the profitability of the Snow White project was threatened further, by a 
48% fall in natural gas prices from 2009 to 2010. In this way, the rate of costs 
to selling price increased with a factor of three! 
365 
 
6.15 Protection of fragile mental capital 
 
List claims that stability and continuity of work in agriculture, is im-
portant, but agriculture quickly recovers,  
 
… continuity has an important influence on agriculture, yet that interrup-
tions to it, in the case of that industry, are much less decided and much 
less injurious when they occur, also that their evil consequences can be 
much more easily and quickly made good than in the case of manufactures. 
However great may be any damage or interruption to agriculture, … 
Even after devastations by war it quickly raises itself up again. (List, 
1841a, p. 297) 
 
According to List, manufactures are much more fragile than agricul-
ture. In a longer crisis material capital will be lost, but retained in a 
shorter interruption. Mental capital, however, will vapour even by a 
short interruption. Craftsmen need a daily income and will soon emi-
grate to other branches, regions, or even countries. During longer inter-
ruptions, even skill itself will be lost and networks will dissolve. This 
risk is higher the more complex and specialised the industry is,  
 
On manufactures, however, the least and briefest interruption has a 
crippling effect; a longer one is fatal. The more art and talent that any 
branch of manufacture requires, the larger the amounts of capital which 
are needful to carry it on, the more completely this capital is sunk in the 
special branch of industry in which it has been invested, so much the more 
detrimental will be the interruption. By it machinery and tools are reduced 
to the value of old iron and fire-wood, the buildings become ruins, the 
workmen and skilled artificers emigrate to other lands or seek subsistence 
in agricultural employment. Thus in a short time a complex combination of 
productive powers and of property becomes lost, which had been created 




6.16 Stability furthered by closeness  
 
- between productive groups and between production and consumption 
 
List claims that one flourishing branch of industry pulls along other 
industries, as Michael Porter claimed in his cluster theory (Porter, 
1990), and vice versa; when one branch is interrupted so are other 
branches in a nation.  
One ‗personal ‘example may be when the last shipyard, Tangen verft, 
was closed down in my birth town Kragerø, on the southeast coast of 
Norway.408 Not only did 300 skilled workers lose their jobs, but also ac-
                                       
408 Due largely to large national oil revenues, a high interest rate, a strong 
currency, and therefore loss of competitive power for industry. My birth town 
lost 40 % of its industrial jobs in one year. 
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cording to the director of the largest engineering company in the coun-
ty, Grenland Offshore, three times as many lost their jobs in the supply 
companies in the region. Furthermore, qualified young workers moved 
to other areas to find jobs, resulting in less demand in local shops and 
less children in the schools. This resulted in shops closing down, 
threatening the attractiveness and competitiveness of the whole town - 
as a desirable shopping centre in the region. The process of scaling 
down also resulted in less tax revenue transferrals to the municipality, 
and brought along a very painful readjustment of the municipality, es-
pecially the school structure, but also social welfare for exposed groups. 
The process started in 2002, and has in 2012 not yet reached its cli-
max. 
The more advanced and complex the national economy is, the broad-
er and deeper are the interruptions, and ultimately the whole confeder-
ation of national labour will be damaged more or less permanently. The 
recognition of this specific danger is the original reason why protective 
duties were thought of, List claims, 
 
 Just as by the establishment and continuance of industry one branch 
of trade originates, draws after it, supports and causes to flourish many 
others, so is the ruin of one branch of industry always the forerunner of the 
ruin of several others, and finally of the chief foundations of the manufac-
turing power of the nation. 
 The conviction of the great effects produced by the steady continuation 
of industry and of the irretrievable injuries caused by its interruption, and 
not the clamour and egotistical demands of manufacturers and traders for 
special privileges, has led to the idea of protective duties for native industry. 
(List, 1841a, p. 298) 
 
Furthermore, List often discusses the interrelationship between con-
sumption and production, and argues that development of domestic 
consumption is important to secure domestic production, both in man-
ufacture and in agriculture.409 Furthermore, both agriculture and man-
ufacture will prosper by geographic closeness and stable exchanges. 
List likens the situation of being under the same political administra-
tion to the stability of persons being under the same roof in a factory, 
 
In like manner the entire manufacturing industry of a State in connec-
tion with its agricultural interest, and the latter in connection with the for-
mer, will prosper the more the nearer they are placed to one another, and 
the less they are interrupted in their mutual exchanges with one another. 
(List, 1841a, p. 151) 
 
Events e.g. in 2011, illustrate the relevance of List‘s point. The huge 
economic rippling effects of the Japanese earthquake and tsunami on 
                                       
409 Events e.g. in 2011, illustrate the relevance of List‘s point. The huge eco-
nomic rippling effects of the Japanese earth quake and tsunami on JIT – just in 
time - deliveries have awakened the world to the dangers of global dependencies 
and lack of any kind of defence thereto. 
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JIT – just in time - deliveries have awakened the world to the dangers of 
global dependencies and lack of any kind of defence thereto. 
Illustrating the point further with an historical example, in the Lon-
don Financial Times, the Oxford historian, Bryan Ward-Perkins uses the 
example of the utter collapse of the British economy, after the Roman 
withdrawal in 410 A.C. This illustrates the dangers and fragility of to-
day‘s complex society. Britain then used close to seven centuries only to 
regain its complex and high degree of civilisation. Ward-Perkins claims 
that the situation today is far more fragile, and concludes, ―If our econ-
omy ever truly collapses, the consequences will make fifth-century Brit-
ain seem like a picnic.‖ This puts List‘s message regarding stability into 
a larger historical perspective. Ward-Perkins writes, 
 
The Romano-British population had grown used to buying their pottery, 
nails, and other basic goods from specialist producers, based often many 
miles away, and these producers in their turn relied on widespread markets 
to sustain their specialised production. When insecurity came in the fifth 
century, this impressive house of cards collapsed, leaving a population 
without the goods they wanted and without the skills and infrastructure 
needed to produce them locally. It took centuries to reconstruct networks of 
specialisation and exchange comparable to those of the Roman period. 
The more complex an economy is, the more fragile it is, and the more 
cataclysmic its disintegration can be. Our economy is, of course, in a differ-
ent league of complexity to that of Roman Britain. Our pottery and 
metal goods are likely to have been made, not many miles away, but on the 
other side of the globe, while our main medium of exchange is electronic, 
and sometimes based on smoke and mirrors. If our economy ever truly 
collapses, the consequences will make fifth-century Britain seem like a pic-
nic. (Ward-Perkins, 2009) 
 
The more complex a society and its economy the more fragile it is. 
The more a nation is dependent upon other nations and markets, the 
more fragile it is, since it does not control outside factors.  
While promoting closeness and stability, List also promotes efficient 
transport, which undermines the former.  List does not point out this 
dilemma and inconsistency.  
To make more sense of List‘s proprieties, he would have to claim that 
closeness took priority over efficient transport, which likewise is sound 
logistics and fair economic reasoning. Indirectly therefore, we might ar-
gue that List promotes only ―necessary‖ transport, which of course is 
sound logistics and fair economic reasoning. - 
A few years later, Henry Charles Carey, also argued for closeness. 
Henry Carey was the son of List‘s Irish-American friend Mathew Carey, 
and an advisor to US President Abraham Lincoln on economic policy. 
Carey relates the creation of a home market to the urgency of avoiding 
commercial crisis. He points out that the object of protection is to bring 
consumption and production close to another, stabilising both them 
and the domestic currency, as well as increasing the value of land and 




The nearer the consumer and the producer can be brought to each other, 
the more perfect will be the adjustment of production and consumption, the 
more steady will be the currency, and the higher will be the value of land 
and labour. The object of protection is to accomplish all these objects, by 
bringing the loom and the anvil to take their natural places by the side of 
the plough and the harrow, thus making a market on the land for the 
products of the land. (Carey, 1851, p. 190)410  
 
Carey studied these "disturbing causes" further in his Financial 
crisis: their causes and effects (Carey, 1864), he claims that throughout 
US history, prosperity has accompanied protection and crisis and 
paralysis has accompanied free trade. He argues in favour of extending 
the home market and claims that regularity in commerce free people, 
 
The nearer the consumer to the producer the more instant and the more 
regular the exchanges of service, …if we should avoid those crises … if we 
would have the regularity of the societary movement - and if we should 
promote the growth of freedom - we must adopt the measures needed for 
bringing together the producers and consumers of food and wool, and thus 
augmenting their power to have commerce among themselves. The essential 
characteristic of barbarism is found in instability and irregularity of social 
action. … you will most assuredly be led to the conclusion, that the stability 
whose absence you deplore, is to be sought by means of measures looking 
to the close approximation of the producer and the consumer and to the 
extension of domestic commerce. … All experience, abroad and at home, 
tends, thus, to prove that men become more free as the domestic commerce 
becomes more regular, and less and less free as it becomes more fitful and 
disturbed. Such being the case, the questions as to the causes of crises, 
and as to how they might be avoided, assume a new importance … (Carey, 
1864, Letter First) 
 
Carey finds the causes of financial crises to lie in speculation that is 
made possible in periods with free trade, since these periods are also 
accompanied with a buyer's market in the labour market. (Cf. Carey, 
1864, Letter Second) 
 
 
6.17 Creation of a home market & feed-back mechanisms  
 
List's strategy concerns, in particular, active fostering of infrastructure 
and of know-how, and concerning the latter, protection of infant indus-
tries as against foreign superiority. Furthermore, as mentioned above, 
the strategy includes a balanced development of all vital sectors of a 
modern economy, agriculture, manufacturing, and commerce. These 
would complement and support each other, as well as establish a high 
                                       
410 A part of this quotation has also been used in the section above, Dangers 
of monoculture – commodities especially. 
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degree of self-sufficiency and robustness against foreign disturbances, 
as in the British Imperial strategy of self-containment.411  
This strategy would thereby create a protected home market that List 
regards as absolutely crucial for the development of a particular new 
and young industry (Cf. List, 1841a, pp. 24, 186-187, 191). Further-
more, this would promote urbanisation and further elevation of civilisa-
tion.412 
Control over the consumption of a nation's production makes stable 
production conditions more likely and thereby provides for stable pro-
gress in a nation's welfare, as List outlined in chapter 24: The Manufac-
turing Power and the Principle of Stability and Continuity of Work (List, 
1841a, p. 294). List argues that possession of the home market enables 
infinitely greater consumption, and implicitly greater domestic produc-
tion (or in other words development towards a perfectly balanced econ-
omy), 
 
… every nation which gains entire possession of its own home market for 
manufactures, gains in the course of time, by its home production and con-
sumption of manufactured goods, infinitely more than the nation which has 
hitherto provided the former with manufactured goods loses by being ex-
cluded; because a nation which manufactures for itself, and which is per-
fectly developed in its economical conditions, becomes more than propor-
tionately richer and more populous, consequently is enabled to consume in-
finitely more fabrics, than it could import while depending on a foreign 
manufacturing nation for its supply. (1841a, p. 191) 
 
Regarding production, List argues that as long as international com-
merce is interrupted by wars, commercial disputes, a nation must pri-
marily focus on perfecting the national confederation of labour. In other 
words, in unstable times, focus must be on improving the home mar-
ket,  
 
The international co-operation of productive powers is, however, a very 
imperfect one, inasmuch as it may be frequently interrupted by wars, politi-
cal regulations, commercial crises, &c. Although it is the most important in 
one sense, inasmuch as by it the various nations of the earth are connected 
with one another, it is nevertheless the least important with regard to the 
prosperity of any separate nation which is already far advanced in civilisa-
tion. This is admitted by writers of the popular school, who declare that the 
home market of a nation is without comparison more important than its 
foreign market. It follows from this, that it is the interest of every great na-
tion to make the national confederation of its productive powers the main 
object of its exertions, and to consider their international confederation as 
second in importance to it. (List, 1841a, p. 139) 
 
                                       
411 Cf. Gipson, 1954, p. 25, and the sections Confederation of Labour, and 
Perfecting the balanced harmony of productive powers in chapter 4. 
412 See the section, Urbanisation furthers communication, innovation and free-
dom, in chapter 4. 
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List‘ argues that industry will induce consumption of its own prod-
ucts and also make consumption of domestic agricultural products in-
dependent of foreign demand, thereby securing domestic agricultural 
production, which makes the nation more affluent, and which again 
increases consumption; and all this in a positive feed-back loop, 
 
Production renders consumption possible, and the desire to consume in-
cites to production. The mere agricultural nation is in its consumption de-
pendent on foreign conditions, and if these are not favourable to it, that 
production dies out which would have arisen in consequence of the desire 
to consume. But in that nation which combines manufactures with agricul-
ture in its territory, the reciprocal inducement continually exists, and there-
fore, also, there will be continuous increase of production and with it aug-
mentation of capital on both sides. (List, 1841a, p. 233) 
 
Protection would serve to safeguard the home market of consumption 
for domestic producers. List stresses the importance of the home mar-
ket as worth more than export markets (List 1841a, pp. 24, 186–7, 191, 
194), and points out that this also was the opinion of the orthodox 
school; Cooper estimates 10-12 times higher importance and Smith 
even estimates 24 times higher importance of the home market (Cf. 
List‘s footnote),  
 
Smith and Say413 themselves estimate the amount of internal industry a 
great deal higher than foreign commerce;  … Mr. Cooper estimates it from 
ten to twelve times higher… to be quite moderate we will follow Mr. Cooper. 
(List, 1827b, p. 109) 
 
Therefore actually basing his arguments also on the claims of the 
Smith, Say, and Cooper, List attacks the allegations of Adam Smith etc. 
that any product that may be bought cheaper abroad, should be bought 
there instead of creating a home market for this domestically produced 
product. The internal market is more important than export markets 
due e.g. to feedback mechanisms.414 List claims,  
                                       
413 85) ... Smith and Say; compare Smith, Wealth. Book II. Chapter V: "A cap-
ital, therefore, employed in the home trade will sometimes make twelve opera-
tions, or be sent out and returned twelve times, before a capital employed in the 
foreign trade of consumption has made one. If the capitals are equal, therefore, 
the one will give four and twenty times more encouragement and support to the 
industry of the country than the other." Compare Say, Traite, Vol. I, Chapter IX, 
pages 85, 86: "En tout pays, le commerce exterieur qui se fait est peu 
considerable, compare au commerce interieur ... Outre qu'en tout pays le 
commerce interieur, ... est le plus considerable, c'est aussi le plus avantageux." 
List later discussed this issue frequently, compare, "Über die Beziehungen der 
Landwirtschaft zur Industrie und zum Handel" (On the Relationship of 
Agriculture to Industry and to Trade), Werke. Vol. 5. (List‘s note and commen-
tary, from List, 1929-36, Werke, vol. II, pp. 349-404, translated by George 
Gregory) 




The school cannot deny that the internal market of a nation is ten times 
more important to it than its external one, even where the latter is in the 
most flourishing condition; but it has omitted to draw from this the conclu-
sion, which is very obvious, that it is ten times more important to cultivate 
and secure the home market, than to seek for wealth abroad, and that only 
in those nations which have developed their internal industry to a high de-
gree can foreign commerce attain importance. (List, 1841a, p. 186) 
 
List also claims that control over the home market is an early step-
ping-stone for an export strategy. In addition, as economics of scale- 
and competition increase, this will eventually lower domestic prices, as 
he had experienced in the USA. In the long run, the effect of protection 
and increased international competition is therefore cheaper products, 
 
… a manufacturing Power which exclusively possesses its home market can 
work so much the cheaper for foreign trade. … for in the same proportion in 
which the German manufacturers have acquired possession of their home 
market, their export of manufactured goods has also increased. Thus the 
recent experience of Germany, like the ancient experience of England, 
shows us that high prices of manufactured goods are by no means a neces-
sary consequence of protection. (List, 1841a, p. 396-397) 
 
 
6.18 Protecting banks by securing home markets  
 
To promote production, implement inventions and build infrastructure, 
a stable and sound credit system is vitally important, as e.g. Alexander 
Hamilton understood.415  
List also paid much attention to the credit system.416 This was due to 
his interest in the function of the national union of labour, as well as 
his interest in the experiences of various crises and their effects, related 
to both domestic real estate booms and busts, and related to interna-
tional balance of payments. List says that many of the effects of disrup-
tion have long-term effects, and that repetitions are ruinous for society, 
 
It cannot afford any great consolation to the North American that in con-
sequence of bankruptcies and diminished consumption, the imports and 
exports between both countries are at a later period restored to a tolerable 
proportion to one another. For the destruction and convulsions of com-
merce and in credit, as well as the reduction in consumption, are attended 
with disadvantages to the welfare and happiness of individuals and to pub-
lic order, from which one cannot very quickly recover and the frequent repe-
tition of which must necessarily leave permanently, ruinous consequences. 
(List, 1841a, p. 280-281) 
                                       
415 Cf. his Reports of the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, on 
Public Credit, on a National Bank, on Manufactures, and on the Establishment of 
a Mint (Hamilton, 1790-1791). 
416 Cf. e.g. his Chapter 23: The Manufacturing Power and the Instrument of 




List describes the devastating results in the USA after the markets 
were opened for import after the war against Great Britain in 1812. List 
claims that the domestic banks did not cause the calamities originally, 
but rather that the instability was imported, 
 
Look fourteen years back; had the United States Government, immedi-
ately after the last war, protected manufacturing industry, wheat, wages, 
land prices, profits would never have sunk so low; banks would never have 
been ruined; not the tenth part of the citizens would have been expelled 
from house and home. This distress of so many land proprietors arose not 
chiefly from the bank mania, as it was generally believed, but from a revolu-
tion in the prices of produce and land caused by the dependence on foreign 
markets, foreign fluctuations of prices, foreign regulations and restrictions.  
(List, 1827b, p. 131) 
 
List argues that to secure a sound credit system and therefore a sta-
ble banking system, production must be secured a home market. If so, 
then the banking system will act as a productive power. However, in an 
open economy, the banking system often destroys industrial credit. In 
the following example List takes his example from agriculture, and indi-
cates the crucial role of the financial system, 
 
The price of land, and the possibility of converting it into money, rises 
and falls with the price of the produce. … Every cause, therefore, which ef-
fects a fall of the prices of the raw products, effects likewise a fall of the 
land prices and of the country bank business, and vice versa. The principal 
condition of a banking system like this is, therefore, steadiness of the mar-
ket of the agricultural products, effectuated by a national system, which 
prevents great fluctuation, which can only be attained by securing the 
home market to the products by a manufacturing industry. Under this con-
dition, a banking system works as a productive power, whilst in an open 
country it destroys from time to time the roots of industry CREDIT. (List, 
1827b, p. 131, List‘s own capital letters) 
 
List also describes a real estate boom and the following bust, which 
destroys morals, industry and credit ‗for 50 years‘, 
 
If such a state of things only lasts for some years, and then breaks at 
once, it will always break the majority of the citizens, and destroy the mor-
als, the industry and the credit of the country, for half a century.  
In Germany we saw the same effects from the same causes … (List, 
1827b, p. 133) 
 
 
6.19 Tariffs shall secondarily promote skills and liberty 
 




Most writers, who describe List‘s ideas, normally focus on his trade the-
ory but seldom even mention the roots of his theory. The roots are, 
‗immaterial‘.  
Ricardo‘s trade theory advises to stay with your original trade, what 
you do best now. List argues that a nation needs to plan strategically 
what it wants to engage in. It has to choose its profession like any 
youngster choosing his life‘s profession. List then argues that industry 
brings more advantages than producing commodities; and that industry 
can be learnt. Learning is therefore core to List‘s dynamic view of how a 
nation‘s circumstances can be changed, wilfully, like with any young-
ster.  
The means was a spiritual elevation of all individual citizens, in order 
to reach the ultimate goal, an elevation of the global civilisation. His ex-
ample of the family that invested in the education of their children and 
reaped the benefits years later, outweighing the initial outlays, was 
used to illustrate the necessity of investments in infant industry. Simi-
larly and with time, the youngsters would eventually be able to pay 
back the costs they had procured upon their parents. With the growth 
of know-how, infant industries would emerge as competitive on the in-
ternational market and would be able to pay back to the nation the ini-
tial burden it had carried for the education of skill and know-how in the 
infant industries. Moreover, he argues, education requires temporary 
sacrifice for future prosperity, 
 
The nation must sacrifice and give up a measure of material property in 
order to gain culture, skill, and powers of united production; it must sacri-
fice some present advantages in order to insure to itself future ones. (List, 
1841a, p. 144) 
 
The German term for an infant industry tariff was Erziehungszoll 
(education tariff) as opposed to Schutzzoll (protection tariff) for "grand-
father industries". This scheme constituted the basis of his plan for the 
German Customs Union (the Zollverein) that eventually, he hoped … 
would be the seed of a customs union that would include all of Conti-
nental Europe.  
His plans for a national railway system in Germany (Cf. List, 1838) 
was the second part of this larger scheme – like ―Siamese twins‖ - and it 
would be connected to his "East-West" railway from Belgium to Bagdad 
and further on to Bombay in India.417  
 
 
6.20 Education tariff – the English model 
 
                                       
417 On my way to the University in Erfurt, I daily crossed Friedrich List 
Straße. The street sign bears a short description of List, which is illuminating of 
his reputation in Germany today. It reads: Friedrich List was the spiritual father 




List describes the difficult situation for the newcomer in more detail, and 
claims that the customer cannot be expected to pay for the ―education‖ of 
domestic newcomers,  
 
The more knowledge, experience, and skill are wanted for a particular 
business, the less individuals will be willing to devote themselves to it, if 
they have not a full assurance of their being able to make a living by it for 
their whole lifetime. 
Every new business is connected with great losses by want of experience 
and skill for a considerable time. The advancement of every kind of manufac-
tories, depends upon the advancement of many other kinds, upon the proper 
construction of houses and works, of instruments and machinery. All this 
makes the commencement of a new undertaking extremely difficult, whilst 
the undertakers have to contend with a want of labourers of skill and experi-
ence; the first cost of starting a business is the heaviest of all, and the wages 
of the unskilled labourers in countries which commence manufactories, are 
higher than the wages of the skilled ones in old manufacturing countries. All 
cost double prices, and every fault in starting the business causes heavy loss-
es, and sometimes the failure of the whole undertaking. The undertakers pos-
sess moreover, in most cases, not a sufficient knowledge of the ways and 
means to get the first materials profitably, and whilst they are struggling 
against all these difficulties, they have great exertions to make to get custom-
ers, and often to contend with the prejudices of their countrymen, who, not 
willing to leave their old way in doing business, are in most cases in favour of 
the foreign manufactories. 
Often they may be right. New establishments are seldom able to procure 
such finished articles in the first and second year, as they would in the third 
and fourth, if supported, and nevertheless their articles must be sold higher. 
It cannot be expected that the consumers, as individuals by their own accord, 
should support a manufactory, by purchasing less accomplished articles at 
higher prices, even if convinced that, in purchasing them, they would encour-
age the manufactures to improve their products, and to procure them after a 
while cheaper than foreign manufactures. (List, 1827b, pp. 48-49) 
 
Therefore, given that a less developed country wants to develop its own 
industry, its government has no option but to level the playing field for its 
infant industries, in order to give them more even opportunities. This can 
be done by giving protection to investments in capital and skill, by tempo-
rarily raising tariffs. This is a weak version of the parallel of giving a tem-
porary monopoly and protection to intellectual investment by allowing 
patents, 
List continues by saying that each failure is harmful because it is a 
discouragement to other entrepreneurs, and because it reduces their 
chances of finding support, 
 
All these circumstances are the cause why so many new establishments 
fail if let alone. Every failure breaks a man, because the greater part of their 
expenditure in building machinery, in procuring labourers from abroad, etc. 
is lost. One example of such a failure effects a discouragement of all other 
new undertakings, and the most advantageous business cannot find 
afterwards a support from capitalists. 
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In old manufacturing countries we observe quite the contrary…. (List, 
1827b, p. 49) 
 
List explains the British practice of importing skill from more devel-
oped nations on several occasions (Cf. List, 1841a, pp. 39; 111) as a 
process of planting an (immaterial) tree  in hostile surroundings and 
therefore protecting and caring for the newcomer with the utmost dili-
gence, using a ―system of restrictions, privileges, and encouragements‖, 
 
The island kingdom borrowed from every country of the Continent its 
skill in special branches of industry, and planted them on English soil, un-
der the protection of her customs system. Venice had to yield (amongst oth-
er trades in articles of luxury) the art of glass manufacture, while Persia 
had to give up the art of carpet weaving and dyeing. Once possessed of any 
one branch of industry, England bestowed upon it sedulous care and atten-
tion, for centuries treating it as a young tree which requires support and 
care. (List, 1841a, p. 39) 
These effects were learned generally by Great Britain from the trade and 
manufacturing industry of the Italians, the Hansards, the Belgians, and the 
Dutch. But having attained to a certain grade of development by means of 
free trade, the great monarchies perceived that the highest degree of civili-
sation, power, and wealth can only be attained by a combination of manu-
factures and commerce with agriculture. They perceived that their newly es-
tablished native manufactures could never hope to succeed in free competi-
tion with the old and long established manufactures of foreigners; that their 
native fisheries and native mercantile marine, the foundations of their naval 
power, could never make successful progress without special privileges; and 
that the spirit of enterprise of their native merchants would always be kept 
down by the overwhelming reserves of capital, the greater experience and 
sagacity of the foreigners. Hence they sought, by a system of restrictions, 
privileges, and encouragements, to transplant on to their native soil the 
wealth, the talents, and the spirit of enterprise of the foreigners. This policy 
was pursued with greater or lesser, with speedier or more tardy success, 
just in proportion as the measures adopted were more or less judiciously 
adapted to the object in view, and applied and pursued with more or less 
energy and perseverance. 
England, above all other nations, has adopted this policy. Often inter-
rupted in its execution from the want of intelligence and self-restraint on 
the part of her rulers, or owing to internal commotions and foreign wars, it 
first assumed the character of a settled and practically efficient policy un-




6.21 Newcomers are disadvantaged  
 
Commenting upon all the advantages of English competitors, List em-
phasises the size of the home market, protection, access to inexpensive 
                                       
418 The first sentence of this quotation has been used in the section below, 
Differentiate tariffs to branch of production. 
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capital, -transport and -communications, and he also argues that ac-
cess to a large domestic capital market is important for competitive-
ness, and enables increased economics of scale and competitiveness, 
 
The possession of larger capital, a larger home market of their own, 
which enables them to manufacture on a larger scale and consequently 
more cheaply, greater progress in manufacture itself, and finally cheaper 
sea transport, give at the present time to the English manufacturers ad-
vantages over the manufacturers of other countries, which can only be 
gradually diverted to the native industry of the latter by means of long and 
continuous protection of their home market, and through perfection of their 
inland means of transport. (List, 1841a, p. 186)  
 
List argues that the Cosmopolitical School does not understand how 
a less developed nations is disadvantaged within the international trade 
competition, and need to protect their industry, 
 
The school fails to perceive that under a system of perfectly free competi-
tion with more advanced manufacturing nations, a nation which is less ad-
vanced than those, although well fitted for manufacturing, can never attain 
to a perfectly developed manufacturing power of its own, nor to perfect na-
tional independence, without protective duties. (List, 1841a, p. 316) 
 
Catching up with leading industrial nations is a complicated, demand-
ing, and time-consuming task.  
A newcomer company in an established international branch within an 
advanced economy will suffer high barriers to entry, but can benefit from 
many happy circumstances, connected to know-how and infrastructure.  
A newcomer company within a less advanced nation will suffer much 
higher barriers to entry, due to weaker know-how and infrastructure, in 
general. 
A less developed country always will have a hard time establishing in-
dustry in branches where other countries are since long established, be-
cause it lacks regulatory experience, skilled pools of labour, networks of 
know-how and technical expertise, cheap credit and cheap transport, 
which the established company in the advanced economy can benefit 
from.  
A newcomer in a less developed country will therefore be doubly dis-
criminated against in the market. List compares the situation with a box-
ing match between a professional boxer and a child. Furthermore, by var-
ious methods competing established foreign companies and their gov-
ernment can undercut domestic newcomers with temporary price dump-
ing, by better quality, marketing, and credit arrangements for the cus-
tomer. The barriers to entry will be far higher for a newcomer from a less 
developed economy, and the more knowledge intensive the industry the 





6.22 Protection furthers security, freedom, and incentives 
 
List claims that tariffs, far from encroach upon the liberty of the indi-
vidual, but rather improve the opportunities of the individual- e.g. by 
helping entrepreneurs and industry to do things they cannot do alone.  
For instance, when the state (macro agent) protects individual in-
vestments (both material and immaterial) they are more prone to take 
place, thereby serving both individuals and hopefully the nation at 
large, 
 
… the State is not merely justified in imposing, but bound to impose, cer-
tain regulations and restrictions on commerce (which is in itself harmless) 
for the best interests of the nation. By prohibitions and protective duties it 
does not give directions to individuals how to employ their productive pow-
ers and capital (as the popular school sophistically alleges); it does not tell 
the one, 'You must invest your money in the building of a ship, or in the 
erection of a manufactory;' or the other, 'You must be a naval captain or a 
civil engineer;' it leaves it to the judgement of every individual how and 
where to invest his capital, or to what vocation he will devote himself. It 
merely says, 'It is to the advantage of our nation that we manufacture these 
or the other goods ourselves; but as by free competition with foreign coun-
tries we can never obtain possession of this advantage, we have imposed 
restrictions on that competition, so far as in our opinion is necessary, to 
give those among us who invest their capital in these new branches of in-
dustry, and those who devote their bodily and mental powers to them, the 
requisite guarantees that they shall not lose their capital and shall not miss 
their vocation in life; and further to stimulate foreigners to come over to our 
side with their productive powers. In this manner, it does not in the least 
degree restrain private industry; on the contrary, it secures to the personal, 
natural, and moneyed powers of the nation a greater and wider field of ac-
tivity. It does not thereby do something which its individual citizens could 
understand better and do better than it; on the contrary it does something 
which the individuals, even if they understood it, would not be able to do 
for themselves. (List, 1841a, p. 167) 
 
The above argument concerns very much the direct liberty of the in-
dividual citizen. List's argument that tariffs promote liberty is also suit-
ed to the situation of a nation and its sovereignty, meaning that when a 
nation progress, both state power and the liberty of the individual citi-
zens benefit. According to List, individual liberty increases with the 
power of the nation. These effects on the citizen are indirect, but im-
portant nevertheless.  
List argues that tariffs have a positive role to play in safeguarding the 
ordinary man‘s efforts to improve his lot, and thereby incentives for im-
provement of skilled labour, incentives for the entrepreneur, as well as 
incentives for the investor.  
List thus argues against a dogma of the Cosmopolitical School, claim-
ing that protection not only delivers security; Protection also furthers 
incentives and freedom, since it promotes security both for invested 
capital of the industrialists and also provide security for the develop-
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ment of skills by the workman. It thus enables the investor, the indus-
trialist and the craftsman. In this way, protection works like a patent, 
by securing a temporary monopoly, and therefore as a weaker form of 
property right. Tariffs give inducements for production both to the en-
trepreneur, to the workman and to the capitalist, 
 
Protective duties act as stimulants on all those branches of internal in-
dustry the produce of which foreign countries can provide better than the 
home country but of the production of which the home country is capable. 
They guarantee a reward to the man of enterprise and to the workman for 
acquiring new knowledge and skill, and offer to the inland and foreign capi-
talist means for investing his capital for a definite and certain time in a 
specially remunerative manner.  (List, 1841a, p. 307) 
 
Protection and thus security serves as a kind of collateral, and there-
fore tariffs facilitate loans to factory owners, says List, 
 
Protection by the imposition of a tariff enables factory owners to raise 
loans from capitalists. Only this protection gives the founder of a new facto-
ry the ability to secure for his undertaking the money with which to buy es-
sential equipment.  … (List, 1837a, p. 89) 
 
List claimed that Germany suffered due to a lack of protection for in-
vested capital and skill, 
 
What we lack is simply and solely a guarantee for our capitalists and ar-
tisans by which they may be protected against loss of capital and want of 
work. (List, 1841a, p. 426) 
 
 
6.23 Protection promotes foreign investment 
 
List argues that investors are attracted to countries with protective poli-
cies - a logical argument that hardly if ever is used by international de-
velopment institutions in the 21st Century, perhaps because it does not 
fit an accepted ‗globalised‘ political agenda, 
 
… by the policy of favouring native manufacture a mass of foreign capital, 
mental as well as material, is attracted into the country.  (List, 1841a, p. 
228) 
 
In his Outlines, Letter 4, List argues that foreign investment from 
abundant countries may develop less developed countries, 
 
Even if there were not capital and skill enough in the country they could 
be drawn from abroad by political measures. Under No. I. I mentioned that 
capital and knowledge have the tendency to extend themselves over the 
whole globe, and that they go from those parts where they are in supera-
bundance to those where they are scarce. (To my knowledge the theorists 
neither observed this tendency, nor did they justice to it.) As this tendency 
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is checked by the policy etc. of other nations, so it can be restored by coun-
teracting that policy. In securing to foreign capital and skill a premium in 
this country, you will attract them from abroad. The United States have this 
more in their power than any other nation, because they possess more 
capital of nature (not yet taken into possession) and more capital of mind 
than any other nation. (List, 1827b, Letter 4, p.71) 
 
In agreement with List‘s goal of industrialisation, List‘s capital-
protective argument applies to investments in long-term productive ac-
tivity, rather than to unstable short-term investments of financial-
speculation. The latter was the scourge of many countries in 1990‘s, 
culminating with the Southeast Asian crisis in 1997.  
In 1988, however, Milton Friedman argues that capital inflow is a 
good, without making a distinction between short-term and long-term 
investment (Friedman, 1988). It may even be argued that short term 
investment are a good because they lubricate and ‗liquidify‘ the capital 
markets which some manufacturers depend upon, in particular ship-
ping with its demand for high and rapid movement of capital. In other 
words, generalisation (also about capital flows) is a risky sport, since 





As so often is the case, List uses England as an example, and states 
that only advanced nations with security and protection can hope to 
attract financial capital, technical knowledge and skilled people. Histor-
ically, all nations that have established industry has done so by the use 
of protection,  
 
In England, the most advanced industrial country in the world, the poli-
cy of protection has safeguarded capital, technical knowledge, and skilled 
labour. People are attracted to a country which safeguards its industries by 
the policy of protection because they wish to share in the advantages pro-
vided by the tariffs. ...  
  It cannot be denied that only advanced civilised countries - ... can hope 
to become industrialised by attracting English capital and technical 
knowledge.  
  The arguments that we have advanced are no mere abstract proposi-
tions. They are based upon established facts. All countries in which, under 
favourable circumstances, industries have been established through the 





List had noticed this point in Alexander Hamilton‘s Reports on Manufac-
tures, which he quoted in his Outlines (Cf. List, 1827b, p. 27fn). Hamil-





When the manufacturing capitalist of Europe shall advert to the many 
important advantages which have been intimated in the course of this re-
port, he cannot but perceive very powerful inducements to a transfer of 





Sergei Witte, the leading Russian politician and follower of List, strongly 
supported the ―exploitive‖ use of foreign capital for domestic industriali-
sation. He taught Tsar Nikolai II‘s brother Grand Duke Mikhail that, 
 
No country has ever developed without foreign capital. Throughout my 
administration I have defended the idea of the usefulness of foreign capital. 
… I declared that I was not afraid of foreign capital, that on the contrary I 
considered it beneficial for Russia. What I feared, I said, was that our 
regime is so peculiar that but few foreigners would care to have anything to 
do with us. Of course, foreign capital would have entered the country more 
abundantly if so many obstacles had not been created against it during my 
administration.  (Witte, 1921, p. 74) 
 
Moreover, in his memoirs, Witte writes that his success was based on 
protection and foreign capital, 
 
During my tenure as finance minister, industry grew so rapidly that it could 
be said that a Russian national industrial system had been established. 
This was made possible by the system of protectionism and by attracting 
foreign capital. (Witte, 1991, p.322) 
 
In his Russia's Last Capitalists. The NEPmen, 1921-1929. Alan M. Ball 
shows that also Lenin argued for the Hamiltoninan principle of 
development through an ―exploitation‖ of imperialism, - in agreement 
with US interests419 and which Stalin later developed to a far grater 
degree in the 1930s. Ball writes, 
 
Bukharin's contention that the NEPmen played an important role in the 
restoration of state industry, and hence in the development of socialism in 
the Soviet Union, resembled Lenin's view after 1921 that communism 
would have to be built in Russia with non-communist hands. Pushing this 
point further, Bukharin noted on a number of occasions that private 
entrepreneurs were also a source of tax-revenue, funds that helped nourish 
the industrial sector. Viewed from this perspective, the NEPmen, in spite of 
themselves, seemed to occupy a position in the front ranks of the movement 
to build the world's first socialist state.420 (Ball, 1987, p.46) 
 
 
                                       
419 Cf. Sutton, 1968 and 1974.  





The father of the first Chinese revolution in 1911 and its first President, 
Sun Yat-sen, carried these ideas further into a grand plan for an inter-
national development of China‘s vast territory. This manual, The Inter-
national Development of China, resembles List‘s book The German Na-
tional Transport System (List, 1838), but Sun expands this into a gen-
eral plan for development.  
Sun argues that China must industrialise and her workers will be 
―glad to welcome any capitalist who would even put up a sweat shop to 
exploit them.‖ The shortest road to public profit is not through national 
competition, but through co-operation. In the conclusion, Sun therefore 
proposed an international Consortium, which would finance Chinese 
development and end cutthroat competition in that part of the world. 
Sun writes,  
 
International war is nothing more than pure and simple organized rob-
bery on a grand scale, which all right-minded people deplore. … We, the 
Chinese people, who desire to organize China for peace will welcome hearti-
ly this new Consortium provided it will carry out the principles which are 
outlined in these programs. Thus, cooperation of various nations can be se-
cured and the military struggle for individual and national gain will cease 
forever.  
Commercial war, or competition, is a struggle between the capitalists 
themselves. This war has no national distinction. It is fought just as furiously 
and mercilessly between countries as well as within the country. The method 
of fighting is to undersell each other, in order to exhaust the weaker rivals so 
that the victor may control the market alone and dictate terms to the con-
suming public as long as possible. The result of the commercial war is no 
less harmful and cruel to the vanquished foes than an armed conflict. This 
war has become more and more furious every day since the adoption of ma-
chinery for production. It was once thought by the economists of the Adam 
Smith school that competition was a beneficent factor and a sound economic 
system, but modern economists discovered that it is a very wasteful and ru-
inous system. …  
I intend to make all the national industries of China into a Great Trust 
owned by the Chinese people, and financed with international capital for mu-
tual benefit. Thus once for all, commercial war will be done away with in the 
largest market of the world.  … 
Class war is a struggle between labor and capital. The war is at present 
raging at its full height in all the highly developed industrial countries. … 
China, however, owing to the backwardness of her industrial development, 
which is a blessing in disguise, in this respect, has not yet entered into the 
class war. Our laboring class, commonly known as coolies, are living from 
hand to mouth and will therefore only be too glad to welcome any capitalist 
who would even put up a sweat shop to exploit them. …  
However, China must develop her industries by all means. Shall we fol-
low the old path of western civilization? … As a late comer, China can great-
ly profit in covering the space by following the direction already charted by 
western pioneers. Thus we can foresee that the final goal of the westward-
ho in the Atlantic is not India but the New World. So is the case in the eco-
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nomic ocean. The goal of material civilization is not private profit but public 
profit. And the shortest route to it is not competition but co-operation. In 
my International Development Scheme, I propose that the profits of this in-
dustrial development should go first to pay the interest and principal of for-
eign capital invested in it; second to give high wages to labor; and third to 
improve or extend the machinery of production. Besides these provisions 
the rest of the profit should go to the public in the form of reduced prices in 
all commodities and public services. Thus, all will enjoy, in the same de-
gree, the fruits of modern civilization. This industrial development scheme 
which is roughly sketched in the above six programs is a part of my general 
plan for constructing a New China. In a nutshell, it is my idea to make capi-
talism create socialism in China so that these two economic forces of hu-




6.24 Protection of sovereignty - conditions for sound protection 
 
As long as domestic industry is not protected, foreign regulations and 
legislation will rule our capital and industry (and accordingly our very 
lives), List claims, 
 
The allegation of the school, that the system of protection occasions un-
just and anti-economical encroachments by the power of the State against 
the employment of the capital and industry of private individuals, appears 
in the least favourable light if we consider that it is the foreign commercial 
regulations which allow such encroachments on our private industry to 
take place, and that only by the aid of the system of protection are we ena-
bled to counteract those injurious operations of the foreign commercial pol-
icy….  If the English shut out our corn … In these cases a direction is evi-
dently given by foreign legislation to our capital and our personal produc-
tive powers … those who nationally belong to foreign nations possess them-
selves the very same monopoly, and those who belong to us are merely 
thereby put on the same footing with them. (List, 1841a, p. 168) 
 
List argues in a realistic manner, that any country had the right to 
protect itself by tariffs, and he praised Russia for setting up a system 
that actually was injurious to Germany. His advice to Germany was to 
follow the example of Russia, 
 
… The most enlightened and discerning statesman of Russia, Count Nessel-
rode, … declared in an official circular of 1821: 'Russia finds herself com-
pelled by circumstances to take up an independent system of trade …‘ … It 
is foolish for Germans to try to make little of this progress and to complain 
of the injury which it has caused to the north-eastern provinces of Germa-
ny. Each nation, like each individual, has its own interests nearest at heart. 
Russia is not called upon to care for the welfare of Germany; Germany 
must care for Germany, and Russia for Russia. It would be much better, in-
stead of complaining, instead of hoping and waiting and expecting the Mes-
siah of a future free trade, to throw the cosmopolitan system into the fire 




In the Natural System …, List mentions seven conditions for sound 
protection for a nation that has started industrialisation. He focuses on 
protection from foreign disturbances and stimulation for investments, 
competition and expansion, while making sure that the needed re-
sources are adequate, 
 
For a state in the second or third phase of industrialisation there can be 
no doubt that it is both necessary and desirable to adopt the fiscal policy of 
protection. 
The protection which a nation can give to its industries will be more ef-
fective if certain conditions are fulfilled: 
1. The policy of protection should be in accord with the natural and 
human resources - as well as the social and political structure - of the na-
tion. 
2. The policy should aid not only manufacturers but also mining and 
agriculture. 
3. The policy should ensure a steady expansion of industrial output. 
4. The policy should safeguard industry and agriculture from fluctua-
tions in trade and from slumps. 
5. The policy should stimulate the competitive power of a country‘s in-
dustries. In time these industries should be able to face foreign competition 
successfully. The policy of protection should, however, continue to ensure 
the further expansion of the country‘s industries. 
6. The policy of protection should be adjusted so that foreign capital 
and skill are attracted to a country. 
7. The policy of protection should be so well balanced and should be 
established on so firm a basis that it cannot be harmed by any measures - 




6.25 Differentiate tariffs to stage of development  
 
List argues against protection of commodities and therefore of agricul-
ture in the German situation, precisely as Ricardo and later Cobden 
argued for free trade of agriculture - and Adam Smith argued for free 
trade for manufacture, NB: in the British situation. List argues that tax 
and tariff policy protection should be adjusted according to the needs of 
the particular nation and the particular industry at the particular mo-
ment - and most of all with the future in mind! This is the practical core 
of his stage theory.  
List argues that free trade in raw materials is beneficial at all levels of 
development; protection is only beneficial when it corresponds to a na-
tion‘s stage of development; and any exaggeration of protection is harm-
ful, 
 
We have previously explained that free trade in agricultural products and 




According to our former deductions, protection is only beneficial to the 
prosperity of the nation so far as it corresponds with the degree of the na-
tion's industrial development. Every exaggeration of protection is detri-
mental; nations can only obtain a perfect manufacturing power by degrees. 
(List, 1841a, p. 324) 
 
It is evident that he did at least have some basic notion of a stage 
theory already around 1820 (Cf. his Vienna Memorandum to Prince Met-
ternich, List, 1820, p.539). List nevertheless says that he developed his 
stage theory after his American Experience,   
 
It was here, that it first became clear to me, how the economy develops 
step by step. (List, 1827b, 161) 
 
Following Hegel‘s view of history as a succession of stages, List de-
tails three stages of development, thereby going from a barbarous state 
via a developing state to a civilised industrial state, and advises respec-
tively a policy of free trade, restrictive trade and back to free trade, all in 
order to reach the goal of industrialisation.  
According to List‘s theory of economic development stages, any coun-
try wishing to industrialise would have to go through the mentioned 
three stages; 1) a period of free trade with export of commodities and 
gradual introduction of industry; followed by 2) a period of moderate 
protective trade policy and navigation laws, in conjunction with devel-
opment of infrastructure. Finally, there would be 3) a return to free 
trade when all important economic branches had been developed.  
List summarises his stage theory such, and points out that history 
teaches us that nations must ―modify their systems according to the 
measure of their own progress‖, and that only Great Britain has yet 
reached the final stage of development, 
 
Finally, history teaches us how nations which have been endowed by Na-
ture with all resources which are requisite for the attainment of the highest 
grade of wealth and power, may and must -- without on that account for-
feiting the end in view -- modify their systems according to the measure of 
their own progress: in the first stage, adopting free trade with more ad-
vanced nations as a means of raising themselves from a state of barbarism, 
and of making advances in agriculture; in the second stage, promoting the 
growth of manufactures, fisheries, navigation, and foreign trade by means 
of commercial restrictions; and in the last stage, after reaching the highest 
degree of wealth and power, by gradually reverting to the principle of free 
trade and of unrestricted competition in the home as well as in foreign 
markets, that so their agriculturists, manufacturers, and merchants may 
be preserved from indolence, and stimulated to retain the supremacy which 
they have acquired. In the first stage, we see Spain, Portugal, and the King-
dom of Naples; in the second, Germany and the United States of North 
America; France apparently stands close upon the boundary line of the last 
stage; but Great Britain alone at the present time has actually reached it. 




List writes, that the regulatory procedure that agrees with the normal 
stages of development, is to go from free trade via protection to free 
trade. The less developed, the more a nation will benefit from free trade; 
and the more thoroughly developed the greater the disadvantages from 
free competition with more developed nations. The core reason in prin-
ciple is that the ‗barbarous nation‘ has no mental capital to loose, and 
thus can only gain from intercourse with more advanced nations. The 
less developed nation, however, has attained ‗a higher level‘ of mental 
capital that it risks to loose in competition with the stronger, and thus 
it must protect. List again points out what history teaches us,   
 
The industrial history of nations, and of none more clearly than that of 
England, proves that the transition from the savage state to the pastoral 
one, from the pastoral to the agricultural, and from agriculture to the first 
beginnings in manufacture and navigation, is effected most speedily and 
advantageously by means of free commerce with further advanced towns 
and countries, but that a perfectly developed manufacturing industry, an 
important mercantile marine, and foreign trade on a really large scale, can 
only be attained by means of the interposition of the power of the State. 
    The less any nation's agriculture has been perfected, and the more its 
foreign trade is in want of opportunities of exchanging the excess of native 
agricultural products and raw materials for foreign manufactured goods, 
the deeper that the nation is still sunk in barbarism and fitted only for an 
absolute monarchical form of government and legislation, the more will free 
trade (i.e. the exportation of agricultural products and the importation of 
manufactured goods) promote its prosperity and civilisation.  
    On the other hand, the more that the agriculture of a nation, its in-
dustries, and its social, political, and municipal conditions, are thoroughly 
developed, the less advantage will it be able to derive for the improvement of 
its social conditions, from the exchange of native agricultural products and 
raw materials for foreign manufactured goods, and the greater disad-
vantages will it experience from the successful competition of a foreign 
manufacturing power superior to its own. (List, 1841a, ch. 15, pp. 177-178) 
 
List continues by arguing that only able nations that are threatened 
with established competition should engage in commercial restrictions, 
tariffs should be moderate and not fully exclude foreign competition;  
tariffs should be changed only gradually, and only last for a limited pe-
riod of time, 
 
Solely in nations of the latter kind, namely, those which possess all the 
necessary mental and material conditions and means for establishing a 
manufacturing power of their own, and of thereby attaining the highest de-
gree of civilisation, and development of material prosperity and political 
power, but which are retarded in their progress by the competition of a for-
eign manufacturing power which is already farther advanced than their 
own -- only in such nations are commercial restrictions justifiable for the 
purpose of establishing and protecting their own manufacturing power; and 
even in them it is justifiable only until that manufacturing power is strong 
enough no longer to have any reason to fear foreign competition, and 
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thenceforth only so far as may be necessary for protecting the inland manu-
facturing power in its very roots. 
    The system of protection would not merely be contrary to the princi-
ples of cosmopolitical economy, but also to the rightly understood ad-
vantage of the nation itself, were it to exclude foreign competition at once 
and altogether, and thus isolate from other nations the nation which is 
thus protected. If the manufacturing power to be protected be still in the 
first period of its development, the protective duties must be very moderate, 
they must only rise gradually with the increase of the mental and material 
capital, of the technical abilities and spirit of enterprise of the nation. (List, 
1841a, ch. 15, pp. 178-179) 
 
List says that although free trade with industrialised nations  is the 
best policy for a transition from a lower stage to a higher stage, unfor-
tunately some advanced nations in short-sighted self-interest sabotage 
the progress of other nations in order to obtain a monopoly in manufac-
turing. Therefore, a system of protection - a tariff system - has to be 
implemented by late-coming nations that try to catch up, 
 
Every nation, which attaches any value to its independence and contin-
ued existence, must strive to pass with all speed from a lower stage of cul-
ture to a higher, and to combine within its own territory agriculture, manu-
factures, shipping, and commerce. The transition from savagery to the pas-
toral state, and from the latter to the agricultural state, are best effected by 
free trade with civilized, that is, manufacturing and commercial nations. 
The transition from an agricultural community into the class of agricultur-
al, commercial, and manufacturing nations could only take place under free 
trade if the same process of development occurred simultaneously in all na-
tions destined to manufactures, if nations put no hindrance in the way of 
one another's economic development, if they did not check one another's 
progress through war and tariffs. But since individual nations, through 
specially favourable circumstances, gained an advantage over others in 
manufactures, trade, and shipping, and since they early understood the  
best means of getting and maintaining through these advantages political 
ascendency, they have accordingly invented a policy which aimed, and still 
aims, at obtaining a monopoly in manufactures and trade, and at checking 
the progress of less advanced nations. The combination of the details of this 
policy (prohibition of imports, import duties, restrictions on shipping, boun-
ties on exports) is known as the tariff system. (List, 1841b, Introduction, in 
Hirst, 1909, pp. 304-305) 
 
 
6.26 Differentiate tariffs to national circumstances  
 
List‘s pragmatic attitude towards regulation of trade was and is perhaps 
more normal in practice than we might think nowadays, and contrary 
to theoretical economic doctrines of free trade.  
List criticised ―excessive‖ protection that did not confirm to the pro-
moting principles of awaking and sharpening the productive powers of 
the nation, but instead stupefied and blunted them. He also criticised 
protection of the wrong products (with little content of skill) or at the 
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wrong moment (Cf. List, 1841a, pp. 309-311) and was almost hostile to 
bounties. 
 
Protection can be afforded, either by the prohibition of certain manufac-
tured articles, or by rates of duty which amount wholly, or at least partly, to 
prohibition, or by moderate import duties. None of these kinds of protection 
are invariably beneficial or invariably objectionable; and it depends on the 
special circumstances of the nation and on the condition of its industry 
which of these is the right one to be applied to it. (List, 1841a, pp. 309) 
 
List's theory of tariffs emerged from his historical understanding of 
how policy had to be adjusted according to the factual circumstances of 
the nation in question. One clear indication of this is his description of 
French economic history, 
 
… Every nation must follow its own course in developing its productive 
powers; or, in other words, every nation has its particular Political Econo-
my. (List, 1827b, p. 75) 
 
In regard to the expediency of protecting measures, I observe that it de-
pends entirely on the condition of a nation whether they are efficacious or 
not. (List, 1827b, p. 33) 
 
A hero of List in the early history of economics as a science, in addi-
tion to the French statesman Jean Baptiste Colbert, was the Italian 
economist Antonio Serra. Serra comments that the same economic poli-
cy has different results in different circumstances. He metaphorically 
comments that the sun melts butter but makes clays hard (Cf. List, 
1841a, p. 333; Serra, 1613). Concerning Colbert‘s efforts to transform 
France, List comments that, 
 
Both France and England adopted a policy of protection but they did so 
under very different circumstances… So we see that the same fiscal system 
made England prosperous but left France backward. (List, 1837a, p. 145) 
 
For the record, List here blamed this French failure not on Colbert, 
but on the self-serving and shortsighted establishment, king, aristocra-
cy and clergy.  
 
 
6.27 Differentiate tariffs to suitable time  
 
List argues that different countries need different tariff arrangements at 
different times. Tariffs ought to be, so to say, "bell shaped" along the 
time axis. First tariffs ought to be low, when there was no industry in 
the concerned branch to protect, then as there emerged something to 
protect tariffs ought to rise, and as industry would grow, competitive 
tariffs should be lowered. This ―stage theory‖ of tariffs and taxation is 
discussed thoroughly in his Natural System ... (Cf. List, 1837a, chapter 
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2: National Economics, pp. 30 ff). One reason why tariffs should first be 
moderate; then raised and finally lowered again - is that this will lower 
the distress to consumers. Furthermore, high tariffs will not produce 
high revenues and foreigners should be allowed a fair share of a mar-
ket,   
 
The best policy would be to start with moderate duties and to raise them 
by a predetermined sliding scale until they are high enough to assure the 
industry of a dominant position in the home market. On each occasion that 
the import duty is raised there will be an equivalent increase in the compe-
tition between manufacturers so that the price of the manufactured goods 
will progressively decline. When this happens the consumers will have no 
cause to complain of the import duties. As we explained in chapter 16 the 
expansion of a country‘s industrial power is accompanied by an improve-
ment in the standard of living of its citizens. As soon as manufacturers 
have secured a dominant position in the home market, the import duty can 
be reduced on a sliding scale so that competition from foreign factories is 
gradually allowed. This competition, however, should be permitted to exist 
to only a limited extent. The appearance of foreign goods will stimulate 
competition between rival firms at home. Foreigners should be allowed no 
more than a fair share of the annual expansion in the demand for manufac-
tured goods. Every nation which enjoys a harmonious balance between in-
dustry and agriculture enjoys also an annual increase in population and 
production, which automatically increases the demand for manufactured 
goods every year. (List, 1837a, p. 115) 
 
A minister of state should have the authority to change tariffs over-
night in case of sudden events like a commercial crisis, 
 
But if, for any reason, circumstances change, a government should re-
verse its policy. Suppose that foreigners succeeded in gaining more than 
their fair share of the increased demand. Suppose that they were actually 
able to supply all the increased demand and threatened to restore the situ-
ation that existed before the imposition of the tariff. This might happen be-
cause, for some reason, foreign manufacturers enjoyed a temporary ad-
vantage over home producers. Owing to a trade recession, for example, they 
might decide to get rid of their surplus goods at any price. If this happened 
the government should promptly restore higher import duties until the for-
mer position was re-established. A minister of state should be empowered to 




6.28 Differentiate tariffs to branch of production 
 
List argues for special protection only of the most important branches. 
Moreover, regarding differentiated protection of these special branches, 
List as usual urged the necessity of using English tariff policy as a 




The island kingdom borrowed from every country of the Continent its 
skill in special branches of industry, and planted them on English soil, un-
der the protection of her customs system. (List, 1841a, p. 177)421 
 
Furthermore, List argues that the less important braches will rise up 
around these under less protection. He lists a number of criteria for 
various degrees of ‗importance‘, such as the involvement of capital, ma-
chinery, skill, necessities and employment, 
 
Neither is it at all necessary that all branches of industry should be pro-
tected in the same degree. Only the most important branches require spe-
cial protection, for the working of which much outlay of capital in building 
and management, much machinery, and therefore much technical 
knowledge, skill, and experience, and many workmen are required, and 
whose products belong to the category of the first necessaries of life, and 
consequently are of the greatest importance as regards their total value as 
well as regards national independence (as, for example, cotton, woollen and 
linen manufactories, &c.). If these main branches are suitably protected 
and developed, all other less important branches of manufacture will rise 
up around them under a less degree of protection. It will be to the ad-
vantage of nations in which wages are high, …. to give less protection to 
manufactures in which machinery does not play an important part, than to 
those in which machinery does the greater part of the work,… (List, 1841a, 
p. 179) 
 
Manufacturing is of particular concern of List, since they were 
knowledge- and energy intensive: They give opportunities for employ-
ment of machines; for productive mechanisation, and as such, they are 
effective in lifting the productivity of labour. They also promote a divi-
sion of labour far greater than agriculture and thereby; and on the oth-
er hand, manufactures also would give greater opportunities for a more 
complete and corresponding confederation of labour; being more com-
plete; -complex; and -rewarding:  
The result of this greater confederation was that a far greater variety 
of skills could be developed and further specialised, through employ-
ment of science, knowledge, so as to create more forceful productive 
synergies. 
Knowledge intensive activities were the economic activities to be pro-
tected more than any other activity, since these activities had most to 
give at a later stage through lifting the productive potential of the econ-
omy. Knowledge-intensive activities were also the most vulnerable since 
they were more difficult to foster and maintain. Accordingly, they had to 
be cultivated and protected, with the most careful attention.  
List‘s advice is not to encourage the development of all branches at 
the same time, but to concentrate on those branches with a large home 
market and potential for success, 
 
                                       
421 A more extensive quote may be found in the section above, Education tar-
iff – the English model. 
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There are many ways in which tariffs can encourage the development of 
industries. Countries with different material and human resources and dif-
ferent economies will require different tariffs. … 
No country should try to promote the immediate expansion of all branch-
es of manufacture. At first - for the reasons that we have mentioned - it 
should attempt to stimulate only those industries which have an assured 
home market and appear to have the best chance of success. 
Even these industries should not at first be protected by high import du-
ties. Such duties would not increase the revenues of the state and would be 
oppressive as far as consumers are concerned. (List, 1837a, p. 115) 
 
List thereby advices to single out branches of special importance for 
other branches, and furthermore to pick among those, branches with a 
high domestic demand and success ratio. 
Interestingly, List claims that the best strategy for contemporary key 
industries like coal and iron is actually not tariffs, but rather to improve 
internal communications - and if capital is in want the State should in-
vest in companies. This is particularly so too with machine producing 
industry, where the State could set up model companies.  
 
Pig iron and coal are imports of considerable significance. It is desirable 
to consider very carefully if the natural resources of a country favour the 
opening up of coalmines or the establishment of ironworks. If conditions are 
unfavourable there is no point in levying import duties on coal or pig iron. 
The country should facilitate the importation of coal and pig iron since they 
are materials which are indispensable to the expansion of the economy. 
But if the necessary natural resources are available, import duties 
should be imposed upon coal and pig iron, though they should not be so 
high as to reduce consumption. The best policy would be for the state to fos-
ter these industries by improving internal communications - canals and 
railways - as much as possible. And if there is not enough private capital 
available for the development of the mining industry the state should itself in-
vest in joint stock mining companies and it should forego any dividend on its 
shares so long as private investors are not receiving any interest on their 
capital. (List, 1837a, pp. 116-117) 
 
Whilst there would be differentiated protection, limited by time and 
branch, from external competition, there would be no internal barriers 
to trade. In this way national production and trade was made efficient 
by internal competition - a classic Mercantilist strategy of unification.422  
 
 
6.29 Pragmatism - focus on potential and value added 
 
The core organiser of List‘s stage strategy of development was to be the 
legal system, mainly using incentives and trade restrictions. List‘s 
strategy is pragmatic and he repeatedly advices to adapt tariffs to the 
local circumstances, and he advices specifically to pay attention to the 
                                       
422 Cf. the section below, Mercantilism promoted competition and efficiency. 
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levels of wages and prices of the branch in question, to see whether 
there is a potential competitive edge.  
Furthermore, one must focus on whether domestic potentials exist or 
not, regarding requisite skills, capital and raw materials for domestic 
production. - And the higher the value added, the more important the 
branch is, ‖The more that is done .. the greater .. the protection.‖  
 
The principle that we have suggested for levying import duties on textiles 
should be reversed for iron goods. The less work that is done on iron goods 
in the manufacturing process the lower should be the duty levied on im-
ports. The more that is done in the manufacturing process the greater 
should be the protection afforded to such products. Iron is a raw material 
that influences all the productive powers of a country. The less the work put 
into the manufacture of iron products the more damaging and dangerous 
are the consequences of making them more expensive. (List, 1837a, p. 117) 
 
List pragmatically argues that when in short supply, the machine 
tool industry is a possible exception to protective duties. This is due to 
its importance for other industries. In addition, when capital is in 
shortage, the state should invest in vital industries (Cf. List, 1837a, p. 
117)423 
Furthermore, when considering the level of tariff rates of it is im-
portant to take into consideration the level of prices and wages, and the 
availability of raw materials, capital and efficient communications,  
 
In general it may be observed that in fixing the rates of import duties to 
protect home industries it is important for a government to consider the level 
of prices and wages as well as the availability of capital and raw materials. 
The government should also assess the efficiency of the communications be-
tween its own country and the foreign countries with which it trades and with 
which it may have to compete. (List, 1837a, p. 117) 
 
Therefore the USA should not protect low-wage and labour-intensive 
industries (as long as there is alternative employment). The US should 
rather import such products, since this would stimulate production of 
other goods for export. In other words, one should ‗economise‘ with re-
sources, 
 
A country such as the United States which has had a high level of wages for a 
long time should not attempt to protect industries, such as the manufac-
ture of silks, which rely upon artistic patterns and upon operatives who 
have considerable skill but are prepared to work for moderate wages. The 
success of the silk industry depends upon skills handed on from one gener-
ation of workers to the next. The United States should not protect a silk in-
dustry of its own so long as it can import silks in exchange for some of its own 
products. If an import duty were levied on silks it should be regarded as a 
revenue duty on the rich. Large imports of silks will not harm the productive 
                                       




powers of the nation. Indeed they will stimulate the production of the goods 
which are exported in exchange for silks. (List, 1837a, p. 116) 
 
 
6.30 Fiscal income has last priority in tariff policy 
 
The period in which List was active (1811- 1846), had a poorly devel-
oped system of economic regulation in comparison to modern systems 
almost 200 years later. The easiest or sometimes even the only way to 
regulate in List‘s time was mainly through the crude means of prohibi-
tion and tariffs. This is why the same strategy today would suit the de-
veloping countries best, with their relatively speaking poorly developed 
regulatory structure and infrastructure. More industrially developed 
countries, on the other hand, potentially have many more financial reg-
ulatory instruments available, which can be relatively fine-tuned. Many 
of these instruments are not being used today because of free-trade 
treaties, customs unions - and for reasons of ideology. 
Fiscally, when starting a phase of industrialisation, this would imply 
an immediate rise of revenue from tariffs when domestic production 
was still small. Later this source of revenue would decline, as tax reve-
nue from domestic production would grow and this type of imports 
would fall. The initial rise would secure a basis for potential public 
spending on infrastructure or subsidies for other domestic public goods 
production. The later rise in tax-revenues from domestic production 
would secure a domestic basis for new revenue-producing projects to be 
launched. However, List argues, 
 
To raise money for the state should be only a secondary object of a tariff. 
Again import duties should not be levied in the hope of enticing specie into 
the country - and of keeping it there. This is a discredited aspect of the 
mercantile system. Such a policy would weaken rather than strengthen the 
country's productive power. 
Import duties should be levied to protect and gradually to increase the 
nation's productive power. With this in mind the rates of duties levied un-
der a tariff should be adapted to the needs of a particular country. (List, 
1837a, p. 36)  
 
List seems here to have forgotten that in 1827 he claims that stabil-
ity; steadiness is the general rule of running a brach and therefore the 
primary object of tariffs (Cf. List, 1827b, p. 111). In his Natural System 
in 1837, List made the point that, 
 
The object of a tariff is to frustrate any hostile action by foreigners to 
harm a country‘s economy … (List, 1837a, p. 33)  
 
Moreover, in his National System, chapter 24 made the point of Man-
ufacturing power and the principle of stability and continuity of work 
(List, 1841a, p. 294). This rather makes fiscal income the third object of 
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a tariff policy, not the second as he claims here. In any case, fiscal in-
come is not a first priority when determining tariff policy.  
 
 
6.31 Differentiate tariffs - according to ranking order 
 
List thoroughly elaborated a system of differentiating and temporary 
protective tariffs.424 List recommends several ranking orders for a sound 
economy policy, concerning ultimate goals,425 concerning political in-
struments in general, concerning capital, concerning branches, and 
concerning taxation and tariffs.  
The ultimate goal is perfection and progress of freedom, moral stand-
ards and civilisation. Material wealth is s tool in this quest. 
List describes a ranking order for political tools, where positive in-
citements rank top and prohibitions ranks lowest, since freedom is a 
key motivator in modern society, and of dear value to List and the Ger-
man tradition of thought that he follows.  
List prescribes a ranking order for capital; where mental capital is 
both more the fragile and more important than physical capital. The 
latter may always be recreated by the former, but not vice versa. 
Differentiated policies are advised to accommodate a ranking order 
for different branches, where some are considered as being the precon-
dition and foundation for other branches.  
List‘s order of priorities for taxation seems to be Stability; incentives; 





1) Stability of home markets and banks 
2) Education of mental capital 
3) Fiscal income 
 
This is the ranking order of more intermediate goals, which an econ-
omy should strive for and use as beacons in the global storm. First of 
all the preservation of mental and physical capital must be protected; 
then it should be expanded and improved; and finally it must be fi-
nanced. Revenue is the least important consideration, since stability 
and incentives are the precondition for public revenue, and since many 
actions to improve stability and incentives are regulative measures that 
do not cost much. Furthermore, taxation ought to affect the productive 
power of the working class positively, e.g. by making absolute necessi-
ties less expensive. 
 
                                       
424 A small index of where he treated various policies may be found in appen-
dix 2. 




6.32 National monopolies are tools for the public good 
 
As mentioned above, List‘s protectionist taxation-arrangements were 
designed to incite willingness to invest in production and commerce. 
Such protection offers no eternal privilege to any individual: For List, 
protection should convey temporary privileges to all who are willing to 
risk a portion of their life (i.e. time to acquire skill or capital) for the 
public good. Protection must be limited to the period during which it 
serves public interest the most, e.g. the time it takes to build national 
know-how. Property rights to monopolies - and similarly customs 
agreements and other fiscal measures - are therefore short-term tools, 
which authorities pragmatically regulate for the long-term public good.  
List discusses the issue of monopolies rather thoroughly in his Natu-
ral System, in ch. 15 entitled, Does the Protection of Industry by a Tariff 
give Manufacturers a Monopoly prejudicial to the Consumers of the Goods 
they make?,(Cf. List, 1841a, pp. 174 ff)  
List critically comments merchants‘ negative attitude to monopolies 
(unless it favours them, he ironically argues elsewhere). He argues that 
the privilege of protection is enjoyed by the whole nation, at the expense 
of other nations, 
 
Merchants produce nothing. They make a living by buying and selling 
goods. It is in their interest to denounce any measure that hampers the 
freedom to buy and sell. Merchants have condemned as a "monopoly" any 
system of protection that is introduced in a country to safeguard the home 
market in manufactured goods for citizens of that country. … 
The policy of protection confers no privilege on one citizen at the expense 
of another. The privilege is one enjoyed by a whole nation at the expense of 
another. (List, 1837a, p. 81) 
 
List claims the criticism from merchants; that tariffs would create 
monopolies, to be somewhat faulty, since foreigners (in List‘s time) en-
joy international monopolies, which this protection is designed to dis-
solve - by establishing domestic production. Tariffs would place nation-
al production on the ―same footing‖ with foreign production, as List 
phrases it - or ‗levelling the playing field‘ as we might put it today. Fur-
thermore, the domestic privilege will be held in check by domestic com-
petition, it will be repaid and the consumers will enjoy it, 
 
If the school maintains that protective duties secure to the home manu-
facturers a monopoly to the disadvantage of the home consumers, in so do-
ing it makes use of a weak argument. For as every individual in the nation 
is free to share in the profits of the home market which is thus secured to 
native industry, this is in no respect a private monopoly, but a privilege, se-
cured to all those who belong to our nation, as against those who nationally 
belong to foreign nations, and which is the more righteous and just inas-
much as those who nationally belong to foreign nations possess themselves 
the very same monopoly, and those who belong to us are merely thereby 
put on the same footing with them. It is neither a privilege to the exclusive 
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advantage of the producers, nor to the exclusive disadvantage of the con-
sumers; for if the producers at first obtain higher prices, they run great 
risks, and have to contend against those considerable losses and sacrifices 
which are always connected with all beginnings in manufacturing industry. 
But the consumers have ample security that these extraordinary profits 
shall not reach unreasonable limits, or become perpetual, by means of the 
competition at home which follows later on, and which, as a rule, always 
lowers prices further than the level at which they had steadily ranged under 
the free competition of the foreigner. If the agriculturists, who are the most 
important consumers to the manufacturers, must also pay higher prices, 
this disadvantage will be amply repaid to them by increased demands for 
agricultural products, and by increased prices obtained for the latter. (List, 
1841a, ch. 14, p. 169) 
 
List claims that depending on the circumstances, there are therefore 
both good and bad monopolies. Bad national monopolies raise domestic 
prices permanently, whereas good national monopolies lower them in 
the longer term, e.g. by counteracting a foreign monopoly, 
 
There are useful monopolies as well as harmful and unjust monopolies. 
Thus a useful and just monopoly is one granted to an inventor who enjoys 
the exclusive use of his discovery for a definite period of time. … 
The granting of exclusive privileges in the home market to industrialists 
is open to criticism only if those privileges cause manufactured goods to be 




6.33 Protect against monopolisation 
 
The natural quest for monopoly and tendency to eliminate competition 
justifies protection, according to List. He describes how competition, 
which inside an economy serves to make it more efficient, can be a dis-
aster when it comes from abroad. Dumping used by the strongest com-
petitor is but one tool in the quest for international monopoly, which 
may wreck national industry, 
 
By free competition it is often hoped to oblige the competitor to discon-
tinue work which has compelled the manufacturer or merchant to sell his 
products under their legitimate price and often at an actual loss. The object 
is not merely to prevent the interruption of our own industry, but also to 
force others to discontinue theirs in the hope later on of being able by bet-
ter prices to recoup the losses which have been suffered. 
In any case striving after monopoly forms part of the very nature of man-
ufacturing industry. This circumstance tends to justify and not to discredit 
a protective policy; for this striving, when restricted in its operation to the 
home market, tends to promote cheaper prices and improvements in the art 
of production, and thus increases the national prosperity; while the same 
thing, in case it presses from without with overwhelming force on the inter-
nal industry, will occasion the interruption of work and downfall of the in-




In the long run, the effect of no protection and decreased internation-
al competition is therefore more expensive products. Protection may 
therefore be seen as a remedy to correct market imperfections where 
some actors have the upper hand. This was indeed, List‘s opinion, con-
cerning the strong position of English producers in his day. List was not 
at all to become a loner in this line of argument, as his arguments were 
to be backed even by orthodox English economists,  
 
This is the argument which was developed in theory by Henry Sidgwick to 
show that ultimately the world at large might gain by the temporary protec-
tion of the constituent nations. And on the practical side it is this argument 
which is most popular in the British colonies. (Nicholson,1885, in his ‗In-
troductory Essay‘ to the translation of List‘s National System) 
 
The utilitarian Henry Sidgwick was allegedly described by Alfred Mar-
shall, founder of the Cambridge School of economics, as his "spiritual 
mother and father." In his Principles of Political Economy, Sidgwick in 
great details lays out the argument that the protectionists are right, 
when the tariff issue is seen in economic terms and with a broader geo-
graphical view, 
 
What Free Traders usually urge against this as a practical conclusion is  
that experience shows that such a duty when once imposed is not likely to 
be taken off, — that the protection designed to be temporary will practically 
become permanent. And I admit fully the force of this appeal to experience: 
but the consideration thus adduced does not strictly belong to economic 
theory: it is a political argument, the use of which tacitly concedes the eco-
nomic correctness of the protectionists' reasoning. … 
§ 3. It will be seen that the argument for temporary protection, — in both 
the cases above stated, — is theoretically valid from what I have called a 
"cosmopolitan" point of view; — that is, if we consider the interests of the 
two districts taken together, and not merely that of the district whose in-
dustry is protected. (Sidgwick, 1883, Book V, pp. 492-493ff)  
 
 
6.34 Customs unions counteract monopolies and inefficiency 
 
Nevertheless, whilst arguing for potential benefits from temporary na-
tional monopolies, List repeatedly also claims that protection might be 
damaging in a small nation, as it is likely to establish an inefficient mo-
nopoly, 
 
A small state can never bring to complete perfection within its territory 
the various branches of production. In it all protection becomes mere pri-
vate monopoly. Only through alliances with more powerful nations, by part-
ly sacrificing the advantages of nationality, and by excessive energy, can it 




Various measures could counter the danger of creating monopolies, 
such as making sure a market had several producers, for instance by 
making sure the market was large enough - by merging local markets 
and expanding markets through better transport and -communication. 
Furthermore, protection intended to support the creation of multiple 
domestic producers, would thereby establish internal competition, as 
opposed to a monopoly of the foreign powers. 
Small nations therefore would have to co-operate through customs 
unions arranged by means of international conferences and legal 
agreements. List therefore advised nations to join into customs unions, 
for reasons of efficiency, and expressly preferred this to older methods 
like conquest and annexation, 
 
In modern times a fourth means has been adopted, which leads to this 
object in a manner much more in accordance with justice and with the 
prosperity of nations than conquest, and which is not so dependent on ac-
cidents as hereditary succession, namely, the union of the interests of vari-
ous States by means of free conventions. (List, 1841a, p. 176) 
 
 
6.35 Transportation and urbanisation promotes competition 
 
To List, urbanisation was the direct result of two socio-technical phe-
nomena, centralisation and improved transport. List did not especially 
approve of centralisation as such, except as a tool for other worthwhile 
purposes, so his advice - in order to promote (virtual) urbanisation - 
was to improve transport, or in today‘s language, improve communica-
tions. The effect of improved transport was to lessen the effective (sic!) 
distances, moneywise and time wise, thereby effecting a virtual central-
isation.  
Urbanisation was therefore to be realised by technological, economic 
and political integration. This was to be realised through political activity 
and through innovations and investments into activities related to 
transport (communications) first of all, but also investments into industry 
and agriculture. In particular the combination of innovation and 
transport (communications) would be not only doubly efficient but would 
treble efficiency, in that improved innovative communications would in-
crease innovation even further, by bringing separate minds and markets 
closer together. All in a positive feedback loop.  Improved transportation 
would thus bring about improved culture and wealth.426 
                                       
426 Cf. also the sections in chapter 4: Mental side of transportation; Urbanisa-
tion furthers communication, innovation and freedom; Communication furthers 




List interestingly claims that the best strategy for the promotion of 
key industries is not tariffs, but improvement of internal communica-
tions. (Cf. List, 1837a, pp. 116-117)427 
A core tool of List was to counteract monopolisation by promoting more 
efficient transportation, for the simple reason that the reduction of effec-
tive distance that more efficient transport allows for creates larger mar-
kets and thereby also allows greater competition. This enlargement of 
markets may be seen as virtual urbanisation, making a nation imitate the 
population density of cities. The effect of increased competition may be 
observed in the geographical equalisation of prices. This was in the tradi-
tion of State Mercantilism‘s promotion of infrastructure, read large. 
 
 
6.36 Mercantilism promoted competition, efficiency- and profita-
bility 
  
A classic Mercantilist strategy of unification was to improve national 
efficiency - production and trade - by increasing internal competition. 
Although, there would be differentiated protection from external compe-
tition, there would be no internal barriers to trade and improved trans-
portation and standards of measurement, law and trade. Thus, Gustav 
Schmoller writes that Mercantilism at the core was a unifying system, 
using public finance to forge the forces of policy and economy into one 
strong tool, as opposed to the fragmented and localised feudal system, 
 
What, to each in its time, gave riches and superiority first to Milan, Venice, 
Florence, and Genoa; then, later, to Spain and Portugal; and now to Holland, 
France, and England, and, to some extent, to Denmark and Sweden, was a 
state policy in economic matters, as superior to the territorial as that had 
been to the municipal. … the state organisation assisted the national econo-
my and this the state policy; and, quite unlike earlier times too, public fi-
nance served as the bond of union between political and economic life. It was 
not only a question of state armies, fleets, and civil services; it was a question 
rather of unifying systems of finance and economy … (Schmoller, 1884) 
 
In Eli Hecksher‘s book Mercantilism, the first volume has the title 
Mercantilism as a Unifying System. In the second volume and the chap-
ter Mercantilism force freer trade upon towns and provinces within the 
national boundaries, he writes that Mercantilism was a liberating force - 
inside national boundaries - since it, 
 
… opposed everything that bound down economic life to a particular place 
and obstructed trade within the boundaries of the State. (Hecksher, 1935, 
Vol. II, p. 273) 
 
                                       





Polanyi quotes Hecksher such, 
  
―Competition was often artificially fostered (nationally)...in order to organise 
markets with automatic regulation of supply and demand.‖ (Heckscher). 
The first modern author to recognize the liberalizing tendency of the mer-
cantile system was Schmoller (1884). (Polanyi, 1957, p. 278, from Heck-
sher, Vol. II, 1935)   
 
 
6.37 Balance of payments, once again  
 
Trade- and payment deficits and trade protection are not out-dated is-
sues. As List would have argued that as long as the world is divided in-
to different political entities with different currencies and monetary ar-
rangements, they will remain important practical issues. Milton Fried-
man428  provides one example. In 1988, Friedman writes an article in 
the WSJ, Why the Twin Deficits are a Blessing, using an argument 
seemingly in the Adam Smith tradition (Friedman, 1988). More specifi-
cally, Friedman argues that the trade- and payments deficits were un-
important scarecrows, in relation to the real problem of excessive taxa-
tion and regulation, 
 
The media and the public have been sold a bill of goods. They have become 
convinced that the so-called twin deficits—the federal budget deficit and the 
foreign trade deficit—are time bombs that will sooner or later undermine 
our prosperity and prospects for growth. Nothing could be farther from the 
truth. 429 (Friedman, 1988, Wall Street Journal) 
                                       
428 Milton Friedman was a Nobel Laureate receiver (1976), and ―founder‖ of 
the neo-classical ‗Chicago School‘ and ‗monetary economics‘ (as opposed to 
‗Keynesianism‘ and ‗neo-Keynesianism‘), comprising a whole series of Nobel 
Laureate receivers in the ―Rational Expectations‖ tradition (out of 26 ‗Chicago 
Laureate‘ alumni in economics);  George J. Stigler (1982); Merton Miller, Harry 
Markowitz, and William Sharpe (1990); Ronald H. Coase (1991); Gary S. Becker 
(1992); Robert Fogel and Douglass C. North (1993) and Myron Scholes (1997).  
429 Friedman continues: ―True, budget deficits and foreign-trade deficits can 
be disastrous under some circumstances—witness Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, 
or Chile under Allende. But they can also be beneficial under other circum-
stances. And I submit that those ―other circumstances‖ prevail in the U.S. to-
day, and have prevailed for some years. … Do you really believe that the liber-
al Democrats who told the country for decades that deficits were an effective 
tool for stimulating and stabilizing the economy have seen the light and be-
come born-again budget balancers? …  
They are rattling the scarecrow of deficits to frighten the public—and not 
least, the president—into accepting higher taxes. But higher taxes will not 
eliminate the deficit. … 
The capital inflow that is the other side of the current-account deficit has 
enabled productive investment in the U.S. to be higher than the amount U.S. 
residents were willing to finance. It has thereby contributed to a higher na-
tional output and a more rapid rate of growth. That is precisely how the U.S. 




Friedman argues that the debt burden (in 1988) is on par with earlier 
decades, or lower. Furthermore, the balance of payments deficit is a 
positive sign of increased future wealth, since it was a result of sound 
capital inflows, higher foreign investment in the US after the implemen-
tation of Reaganomics. On the other hand Friedman argues that the 
public deficit is a result of unsound governance; being excessive and 
ineffective public spending.  
One may object to Friedman‘s argument that capital inflow may not 
lead to higher real investment, but instead to e.g. asset inflation, which 
has several detrimental effects to the productive forces of a nation.430 
Furthermore, today, the situation has changed - after decades of in-
creased and inefficient public spending (as Friedman warned against), 
but combined with decreased investments as opposed to the situation 
(which Friedman viewed favourably). 
Illustrating the resulting and increased indebtedness of the USA and 
her lack of ability to pay for herself, in 2011 Bill Gross of Pimco,431 ex-
plained that he had dumped US bonds due to the immense US public 
indebtedness, estimated at 500 % of GDP. Gross argues, in line with 
Friedman (1988) above, that even without expenditures to agriculture, 
housing, defence, and infrastructure read large, the US deficit is still 
enormous - due to entitlements, and unless this is fundamentally ad-
dressed soon the USA will default,   
 
Without attacking entitlements – Medicare, Medicaid and Social Security 
– we are smelling $1 trillion deficits as far as the nose can sniff. Once dom-
inated by defense spending, these three categories now account for 44% of 
total Federal spending and are steadily rising.  …  after defense and interest 
payments on the national debt are excluded, remaining discretionary ex-
penses for education, infrastructure, agriculture and housing constitute at 
most 25% of the 2011 fiscal year federal spending budget of $4 trillion. You 
could eliminate it all and still wind up with a deficit of nearly $700 billion! 
                                                                                                                
funds from Britain and elsewhere. It was a good deal for the foreign investors–
but also for the U.S. 
Let us put aside the scarecrows of the twin deficits and face up to the real 
problems that threaten U.S. growth and prosperity: excessive and wasteful 
government spending and taxing, including in particular the real time bomb in 
Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid programs; concealed taxes in the form 
of mandated expenditures on private business; excessive and misguided regu-
lation of individuals as well as businesses; the changes in tort legislation that 
are discouraging innovation; and not least, the recent increase in protection-
ism and the threat of a further major increase. We should and can do some-
thing about these problems, not allow ourselves to be diverted by politically 
convenient scarecrows.‖ (Friedman, 1988, Wall Street Journal) 
430 A similar forgetfulness (of financial investments resulting in asset infla-
tion) appears when economists assume that saving equals (real) investment. 
431 I.e. the CEO of Pimco, ‗Pacific Investment Management Co‘, headquar-
tered in Newport Beach, California, USA; the world‘s biggest bond investor; 
owned by Allianz SE, Germany. 
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So come on you stinkers; enough of the Pepé Le Pew romance and promis-
es. Entitlement spending is where the money is and you need to reform it.  
… 
… the only way out of the dilemma, absent very large entitlement cuts, is 
to default in one (or a combination) of four ways … (Gross, 2011, April Out-
look) 432 
 
 One problem for the USA is a degression into low productivity per 
capita, as outsourcing has left US industry starved of investments. 
Another problem is a lack of quality Labour. The desire to deal with 
these problems, have led to a slow but increasing revival of interest in 
historical parallels and e.g. the writings of Friedrich List.  
 On the other hand, and in the practical financial world, other 
economists went back to the ideas of List, claiming that deficits did 
matter. Late in 2004, a Managing Director of US based PIMCO433, Chris 
P. Dialynas, writes a highly profiled article on PIMCO‘s web pages, 
Trouble Ahead - Trouble Behind, Restructuring the Global Economy - A 
New Marshall Plan, on the prospects due to global trade imbalances. In 
chapter 5a) Dialynas writes,  
 
V. How Did Global Imbalances Arise? A Tale of Two Fallacies 
A. Friedrich List and the Free Trade Illusion 
… 
List‘s ideas are of great importance today. The global trade imbalances 
and wealth transfers that concerned List are most prevalent today. … To-
day‘s global trade imbalances are a manifestation of a competitive struggle 
for markets by "particular economies" in a time of war. (Dialynas, 2004, ch. 
5A, see a larger extract in appendix 2) 
 
This article was much noticed and commented, and was placed on 
top by Reuter in their review of the financial experts‘ forecasts for 2005. 
Dialynas writes about the situation that the USA faces today, when so 
much of its former industry has either outsourced to the cheap-labour 
countries or been outcompeted by them due to a US combination of 
higher wages (including pension claims etc.), deteriorating infrastruc-
ture and skills. In essence, Dialynas writes about a situation where the 
                                       
432 Wall Street Journal writes, ―In addition to the $9.1 trillion in federal debt 
seen on the books, Gross is worried about the hefty portion of each year's 
budget that goes toward non-discretionary and entitlement spending. Includ-
ing obligations for Medicare, Medicaid and Social Security, the "true but unre-
corded" U.S. debt is $75 trillion, Gross said, which amounts to near 500% of 
gross domestic product.  … 
"Unless entitlements are substantially reformed, I am confident that this 
country will default on its debt; not in conventional ways, but by picking the 
pocket of savers," Gross said, pointing to inflation, currency devaluation and 
low to negative real interest rates as the "stealth" forms of default--all of which 
are detrimental to Treasury holders. ― (Lin, 2011) 




USA after 180 years have returned to the position List wrote about in 
1827; a country in need of a larger export industry to support its import 
- only this time the ―dangerous‖ trading partner is not England but 
China. 
As we shall see below, a leading main stream scholar like Paul Sam-
uelson had a pragmatic view on these matters of trade policy, and in 
fact supported Mercantilist practices;434 Recently, the ―Nobel‖ Laureate 
Paul Krugman wrote an editorial opinion in The New York Times, warn-
ing China, 
 
… there‘s the claim that protectionism is always a bad thing, in any cir-
cumstances. If that‘s what you believe, however, you learned Econ 101 
from the wrong people — because when unemployment is high and the 
government can‘t restore full employment, the usual rules don‘t apply. 
Let me quote from a classic paper by the late Paul Samuelson, who more 
or less created modern economics: ―With employment less than full ... all 
the debunked mercantilistic arguments‖ — that is, claims that nations who 
subsidize their exports effectively steal jobs from other countries — ―turn 
out to be valid.‖ He then went on to argue that persistently misaligned ex-
change rates create ―genuine problems for free-trade apologetics.‖ The best 
answer to these problems is getting exchange rates back to where they 
ought to be. But that‘s exactly what China is refusing to let happen. 
The bottom line is that Chinese mercantilism is a growing problem, and 
the victims of that mercantilism have little to lose from a trade confronta-
tion. So I‘d urge China‘s government to reconsider its stubbornness. Oth-
erwise, the very mild protectionism it‘s currently complaining about will be 
the start of something much bigger. (Krugman, 2009) 
 
Both Samuelson‘s and Krugman‘s articles similarly illustrate that the 
balance of trade and payment issues that both Mercantilism and Frie-
drich List struggled with, are of high current and practical interest.  
In a syndicated article in 2009, Dani Rodrik, an expert of interna-
tional trade at Harvard University, claims that the only way to solve the 
immense trade and payment imbalances between the US and China, is 
to rewrite the WTO rules, allowing China to reintroduce industrial poli-
cies. In other words, and unlike Krugman, Rodrik lays the blame not at 
China, but at the doorstep of the countries that dominate the WTO, 
 
China‘s undervalued currency and huge trade surplus pose great risks to 
the world economy. They threaten a major protectionist backlash in the 
United States and Europe. … 
Before it joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, China had a wider 
range of policy instruments for achieving this end. It could promote its in-
dustries through high tariffs, explicit subsidies, domestic content require-
ments on foreign firms, investment incentives, and many other forms of in-
dustrial policy. But WTO membership has made it difficult, if not impossi-
                                       
434 Cf. the article by Paul A. Samuelson, quoted by Paul Krugman, Theoretical 
notes on trade problems, chapter 6: ‗Deficits, Overvaluation, and Mercantilism‘, 
(Samuelson, 1964, p. 146) 
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ble, to resort to these traditional forms of industrial support. China‘s tariffs 
declined precipitously in the late 1990‘s, and many of the other induce-
ments were also phased out. Currency undervaluation has become a sub-
stitute.  
… China must live with restrictions on its industrial policies that none of 
these other countries, in pre-WTO days, had to abide by.           
So we are left, it seems, with two equally unappetizing options. China 
can maintain its currency practices, but at the risk of large global macroe-
conomic imbalances and a major political backlash in the US and else-
where. Or it can let its currency appreciate, at the risk of inducing a growth 
slowdown and political and social unrest at home. It is not clear that advo-
cates of this option have fully comprehended its potentially severe adverse 
consequences.  
There is, of course, a third path, but it would require re-writing the 
WTO‘s rules. If China were allowed a free hand with industrial policies, it 
could promote manufactures directly while allowing the renminbi to appre-
ciate. This way the increased demand for its industrial output would come 
from domestic rather than foreign consumers.  
It is not a pretty solution, but it is the only one. The great advantage of 
industrial policies is that they enable growth-promoting structural change 
without generating trade surpluses. They are the only way to reconcile Chi-
na‘s continued need for industrialization with the world economy‘s require-
ment of lower current-account imbalances. (Rodrik, 2009) 
 
Similarly, ―Nobel‖ laureate and former chief economist at the World 
Bank, Joseph Stiglitz, blames not China but rather US hypocrisy and 
selective use of arguments. Under the subtitle ―In reality, the US has 
only itself to blame for its swelling trade deficit‖, he writes in The Guard-
ian, 
 
For those who recall east Asia's crisis of five years ago, much of this 
seems to run counter to what was said then. China was urged not to float 
its currency. … 
In fact, China's overall trade surplus today is small, around 1% of its 
GDP. Of course, the Bush administration wants to shift the blame, but nei-
ther China, nor anyone else, should be fooled. This is reminiscent of what 
happened 20 years ago, when President Reagan engineered huge tax cuts 
which incited huge fiscal deficits, which in turn led to huge trade deficits. 
Back then, Japan was blamed!  
The harsh truth is that neither the IMF nor the Bush administration re-
ally believes in free markets. They interfere with markets when it suits their 
purposes. Bush supported bailouts for airlines, unprecedented subsidies 
for agriculture and tariff protections for steel. (Stiglitz, 2003) 
 
In exchange for a differentiated industrial- and tariff policy China is 
supposed to have been ―forced‖ into a policy of general export subsidies 
by sticking to an under-valued currency. Now, there are reasons not to 
take this US debate concerning Chinese surplus too seriously, since 
there are facts pointing in other directions: The Chinese foreign trade 
currency, the renminbi, has repeatedly been re-valued by double-digit 
figures. Furthermore, China‘s trade surplus is with the West and not 
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general, since it has a trade deficit with many Asian trading partners. – 
And, as has been pointed out so oft, the US itself conceals her own dif-
ferentiated tariff policy under various garments, in particular concerns 
of ―national security‖. 
 
 
6.38 Protection, once again?  
 
List's support of restrictions to national and international financial ac-
tivity and support for naval construction, in addition to this support of 
trade restrictions, sought to remedy inefficient monopoly situations 
where Britain had the upper hand.  
In her monopoly-like situation Britain could enforce trade agree-
ments more or less at its own will through debt & credit agreements 
and through naval force using blockades etc., to the detriment of its 
emerging competitors - precisely as the Phoenicians, Greeks, Venetians, 
Norse, Hanse, Dutch, etc. had done before them.  
Many would claim the (Anglo-) Americans have been doing the same 
during the post WWII period through the international organisations 
they still just about dominate under the UN umbrella (WTO, IMF, IBRD 
(The World Bank) ILO, FAO, UNDP, etc.). - And when the Americans 
have not got matters their way, they have tended to forget these organi-
sations and their policy - as has been demonstrated in the past. This 
has not been done directly, but under the cover of legal pretences, such 
as a claim of dumping, for which retort is allowed. A legal case may take 
years to sort out and act upon, and by then the problem may have re-
solved itself.  
One practical instance is the punishment tariff put on a Quebec 
based magnesium producer during the 1980s435, a second case is the 
help that US auto producers received in 2008 (see below), a third case 
is the long-lasting 26 % punishment tariff put on all salmon imported 
from Norway, and a fourth case is the steel tariffs imposed by Pres. G. 
W. Bush on China in 2002 (Bush, 2002). The latter was legitimised by 
blaming foreign interventions in the market, forcing American authori-
ties to retaliate in order to restore the free market forces, 
 
These safeguards are expressly sanctioned by the rules of the World 
Trade Organization, which recognizes that sometimes imports can cause 
such serious harm to domestic industries that temporary restraints are 
warranted.  This is one of those times. 
I take this action to give our domestic steel industry an opportunity to 
adjust to surges in foreign imports, recognizing the harm from 50 years of 
foreign government intervention in the global steel market, which has re-
sulted in bankruptcies, serious dislocation, and job loss.  We also must 
                                       
435 I.e. the Norwegian company Norsk Hydro which supposedly was subsi-
dised by the Canadian government with cheap electricity. The complainant was 
a US company with outdated and polluting technology (Source: ‗kitchen talks‘ 
with my late father, who was in charge of the Quebec factory). 
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continue to urge our trading partners to eliminate global inefficient excess 
capacity and market-distorting practices, such as subsidies. (Bush, 2002) 
 
No legal arrangement is ever water tight, since there always will be 
room for interpretation. Therefore, no trade treaty is water tight, includ-
ing WTO treaties and regulations. In the end it all comes down to con-
venience and flexing power muscles. I again refer to Joseph Stiglitz‘ ar-
gument, that both the IMF and President G.W. Bush are pragmatists 
who interfere with markets and use protection as it suits non-
ideological purposes.436 
The very generous US car loans in 2008 is a fitting illustration. They 
caused EU carmakers to ask for similar arrangements within the EU, 
arguing that the US was subsidising its own car producers by making 
rules that exempted foreign owned producers in the US, 
 
Europe‘s carmakers are to ask the European Commission for a €40bn 
($55bn) loan to develop environmentally-friendly products in response to a 
US move to support domestic manufacturers. … 
The US loan has caused some concern among German carmakers such 
as Volkswagen, which think it could discriminate against non-US manufac-
turers. Although the full details need to be decided, at present the US loan 
would apply only to factories older than 20 years – ruling out most foreign-
owned plants. (Milne, 2008) 
 
The point is that the principles regarding production and trade that 
List tried to extract from his historical research, may prove to be expe-
dient and of much use, still.  
An increasing number of books and articles have appeared since the 
1980s both pro and con List‘s ideas, in relation to the present US situa-
tion of increasing competition from Asia - not only in the academic 
community but also in the financial- and strategic communities.437 No-
ticeable are James Fallows‘ article in The Atlantic (Fallows, 1993), and 
Michael Lind‘s articles Hamilton's Legacy, The Op-Ed history of America, 
and The time is ripe for the third man (Lind, 1994a, 1994b and 1998). 
Lind starts – and ends - his last article such,  
 
Forget Marx and Smith. Friedrich List is the economist for us. … Listian 
liberalism can provide the centre-left with a programme. (Lind, 1998) 
 
Lind makes a notable comment in 1994 that is even more acute to-
day – for the EU as for the USA. Lind argues that developing countries 
must be allowed to protect themselves, or the developed countries will 
be swarmed with refugees, 
 
                                       
436 Cf. Stiglitz, 2003, quoted in the above section; Balance of payments, once 
again. 
437 See the section in the Introduction above; Recent interest in List; and the 




… , if today's industrial countries, all of which developed through protec-
tion, instruct Third World countries that they can catch up by means of un-
restricted free trade policies, then we as well as they will pay a price for our 
ill-informed counsel, when the laissez-faire experiment fails and impover-
ished refugees crowd our borders. (Lind, 1994b) 
 
Likewise, List has been criticised by other vocal intellectuals, most 
notably the Nobel laureate Paul Krugman (1994a, 1994b, 1996). As an 
indication, of the renewed interest in non-free trade solutions we may 
quote what Nicholas D. Kristof wrote in an op-ed article ‗The New Dem-
ocratic Scapegoat‘ in The New York Times in 2007, 
 
For eight years, Mr. Clinton tugged Democrats away from protectionist 
impulses and toward pro-growth and pro-trade policies that elevated Amer-
ica‘s standard of living. Now the Democratic Party as a whole is retreating 
from that free trade legacy. (Kristof, 2007) 
 
The revisionist movement on the Republican side of American poli-
tics started even before that. Since at least 1991,438 Pat Buchanan439 
has repeatedly pointed to the lessons from List. Buchanan illustrates 
how these historical events are understood in more popular literature: 
 
To David Ricardo's argument that we should abandon the home industry 
and rely on imports if a foreign nation could manufacture more cheaply, 
Friedrich List's reply was withering: "Who would be consoled for the loss of 
an arm by the knowing that he had nevertheless bought his shirts forty 
percent cheaper?" (Buchanan, 1996, p. 195) 
 
Buchanan also makes a comment about a form of taxation, tariffs, 
that is well suited to developing countries because of its simplicity,  
 
A shift in taxation away from incomes, onto foreign goods, is how Bis-
marck built the German nation. (Buchanan, 1996, p. 299) 
 
However, Buchanan opportunistically turned List's argument for in-
fant-industry protection in order to further higher productivity into an 
argument (of his own) for protection of grandfather-industries, with pre-
cisely the opposite effect from what List had promoted. 
 The interest in protection goes far beyond the theoretical, as is 
evident with the increasing number of US imposed trade restrictions, 
thus adding to the traditional protection of its farmers and very broadly 
defined ―armaments industry‖. The USA in practice never relinquished 
                                       
438 With the book America Asleep. The Free Trade Syndrome and the Global 
Economic Challenge. A New Conservative Foreign Economic Policy for America 
(Cf. Buchanan, 1991). 
439 Patrick Buchanan is a former Republican senior advisor to American 
Presidents Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Ronald Reagan (both periods), and 
a Presidential Candidate for the Republicans in 1992 and 1996, and for the Re-
form Party in 2000. 
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its trade regulations dating from before the Civil War, contradicting the 
US rhetoric, but the new element in the situation is that the trade 
restrictions are rapidly increasing. This is increasingly a hot issue 
between the USA and other major world traders.  
Recent convulsions in global markets have haunted believers in un-
fettered markets, although some may still see the effects of instability 
as beneficial in a longer term. Trade imbalances leading to currency in-
stabilities have played their part in provoking financial crisis. 
The following quotation hints at a counterargument to the vulgarised 
version of Werner Sombart‘s concept of ‗creative destruction‘, later pop-
ularised by Joseph Schumpeter, known as ‗Schumpeter‘s gale‘. The 
original significance of the concept describes the process of transfor-
mation that accompanies radical innovation. Nevertheless, some have 
used the concept to argue that business crises serve a useful purpose, 
by cleansing and purifying the economic system - thereby rendering it 
more efficient in the longer run. The following headings from the credit 
crisis in 2008 illustrate, 
 
What crisis? This is creative destruction.440 
 
‗CREATIVE DESTRUCTION‘ – THE MADNESS OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMY441 
 
Dani Rodrik, writes in his blog about Martin Wolf, a leading column-
ist of the London based Financial Times,  
 
Martin Wolf has written the best thing I have seen in a very long time on 
the momentous transformation the world economy is undergoing. (Rodrik, 
2007) 
 
―It is capitalism, not communism, that generates what the communist 
Leon Trotsky once called ―permanent revolution‖. It is the only economic 
system of which that is true. Joseph Schumpeter called it ―creative destruc-
tion‖. Now, after the fall of its adversary, has come another revolutionary 
period. Capitalism is mutating once again. 
 
―Much of the institutional scenery of two decades ago – distinct national 
business elites, stable managerial control over companies and long-term re-
lationships with financial institutions – is disappearing into economic histo-
ry. We have, instead the triumph of the global over the local, of the specula-
tor over the manager and of the financier over the producer. We are wit-
nessing the transformation of mid-20th century managerial capitalism into 
global financial capitalism.‖ (Wolf, 2007)  
 
                                       
440 Cf.: 
<http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/2008/11/whatcrisisthisiscreativedestru






Dani Rodrik comments that the imbalance between unfettered finan-
cial powers and fragmented political structures invites global rethink-
ing,  
 
I am among those who see the future risks as being substantial. I think 
there is a fundamental incompatibility between unfettered global finance 
and a fragmented system of political sovereignty at the national level.. I am 
also not convinced that this new international financial capitalism has ac-
tually lived up to its promise: it has on the whole not been beneficial to de-
veloping nations, and it has created great inequality in the rich countries 
(as Wolf acknowledges). So we need a substantial rethink. (Rodrik, 2007) 
 
The huge efforts internationally to help e.g. the financial industry 
through the financial crisis from 2008, is an indication that what mat-
ters for governments short term, in an unstable situation, is to secure 
the creditary infrastructure, a core part of mental capital, and an inte-
gral part of the national confederation of Labour.442 It should be re-
membered that there are considerable vested interests involved as well, 
when major creditors risk taking a haircut. In addition, a returning and 
major problem in e.g. the US economy is the impact of its political sys-
tem, where politicians are financed out of private purses, in particular 
Wall Street‘s. Thus, the priorities of a politician may soon benefit bene-
factors rather than people‘s economy. 
Nevertheless, the huge efforts to help e.g. the car industry through 
the financial crisis, is an indication that in an unstable situation it still 
matters for governments to secure the mental capital. It is relatively 
easy to preserve buildings and machinery for the short- to medium 
term, but technical-,  commercial-, and  social skills and -networks are 
fragile, for instance since wage earners need to be paid per week or 
month to pay their bills. If not, they may move to other jobs elsewhere. 
The juridical and regulatory point here, regarding interventions, con-
cerns preference of pro-active promotion of stability as against re-active 
punishment of acts committed after the decay of wealth and morality, 
illustrating that regulation to prevent crime is better than punishing it 
after it has been committed. 
 
  
                                       
442 Adam Smith clearly sees the fragility of credit: ―The capital, however, that 
is acquired to any country by commerce and manufactures is all a very 
precarious and uncertain possession till some part of it has been secured and 
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List argues that England for centuries followed a consciously laid out 
policy of monopolising productive power and material wealth, and has 
done so successfully. In doing so, England has accomplished many 
praiseworthy things, as in science, technology and the arts, but she has 
also used her immense powers to obstruct and undermine the efforts of 
other nations to develop into civilised and prosperous states, ―kicking 
away the ladder‖ which she herself had climbed, as List put it. This was 
partly an inheritance from the strategies of other nations, partly a re-
sult of England‘s geographical position, and … of choice. 
England protected her interests in two ways, with theory and in prac-
tice. 
List argues that Smith‘s theory was designed to confuse competitors, 
and thus to prevent them from using the strategy that England herself 
had used. Historically England had used strong protection and regula-
tion to achieve industrial and naval supremacy. List also argues that 
Smith in reality was a protectionist, while sailing under a free trade and 
anti-regulations banner. 
England‘s practice as against competing nations was to use Smith‘s 
theory of comparative advantages to negotiate trade treaties that would 
undermine the aspirations of competitors abroad. Furthermore, by us-
ing her close to monopoly power in most types of manufacturing, she 
was able to use temporary price dumping against competitors. Fur-
thermore, since she had access to cheaper credit and faster transport, 
England managed to slay competition abroad, sometimes also by dump-
ing. 
List argues that if English de facto monopolies were to meet greater 
competition from newcomers abroad this would level the playing field 
and cure global market imperfections. This would not only create mate-
rial and immaterial wealth in England and in countries other than Eng-
land, but it would also improve global economic efficiency and elevate 
global civilisation. 
List accordingly argues that less developed nations must defend 
themselves in two ways, theoretically and in practice. 
First, the less developed nations must understand how England 
tricks them. List asked for development of and education in an alterna-
tive theory, which also would expose the errors of Smith‘s theory.  
English theory and practice were two different planets List argues, 
the first made for export and the second made for domestic consump-
tion.  
In practice, List argues that less developed nations have a duty to 
protect its citizens and develop their productive powers.  
This can in principle be done in two ways, unilaterally (and bilateral-
ly) as in Mercantilism, or multilaterally as in Liberalism – ‗Cosmopoli-
tanism‘ as List calls it.  
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List is a political realist, taking notice of how the world actually has 
been working and will work for the foreseeable future, and he develops 
a theory of economic unilateralism, economic nationalism. 
He understands that this is not an optimal arrangement, involving 
much strife and inefficiency among nations, and he develops a strategy 
of how economic multilateralism, economic internationalism - free 
trade, can be approached. 
To establish sovereignty the unilateral way, there are certain general 
requirements that a nation must meet. A nation must be able to supply 
itself with all necessities, also in times of war and crises. These necessi-
ties are both manufactured goods and raw materials, and the nation 
must control its immaterial and material infrastructure, such as health, 
education, credit and transportation. These requirements are seldom at 
hand in smaller nations and have to be acquired by expanding one‘s 
territory. Expansion can be accomplished in several ways, by conquer-
ing land as in the past and by unification. List argues that wars are de-
structive in both moral and material ways, and therefore the time of ac-
complishing this by violence should be over and gone. The time has 
come for free- and peaceful negotiations and agreements, he claims. 
Lists position on ‗strategic geography‘ is very much focused on water-
based transport: A nation that has none, or does not control any; coast, 
rivers; navy; and merchant marine, is dependent on other nations. 
Thus, it suffers from limited sovereignty (Cf. List, 1841a, p. 176). 
Nevertheless, he was to argue that the constrcution of extensive 
railroad networks was to change this situation dramatically for the 
Eurasian continent. 
For Germany it was necessary to gain control over its main transport 
artery, the River Rhine, and the Netherlands ought therefore to join the 
German Customs Union. Likewise, Germany needed to control its coast 
and harbours. Therefore, Denmark and the Netherlands ought to join 
the Zollverein. Denmark and the Netherlands would also gain from this 
since they would gain access to the large German market, but by them-
selves alone, they would be pawns in the hands of larger nations.  
Furthermore, Germany needed access to colonial products, and 
therefore needed colonies in the tropical sphere. To trade abroad Ger-
many needed a merchant fleet, and to protect its commerce abroad 
Germany needed an adequate navy. Railroads could accomplish on land 
what a merchant fleet could accomplish on the oceans, and List advised 
the construction of a railroad from Berlin to Bombay in British occupied 
India. 
‗Adequate‘ navy, means being able to fend off the greatest forces to be 
confronted with, and in List‘s day this was England. List saw that the 
naval and railroad strategy was inviting severe international complica-
tions, and invited England to see the mutual interest in an alliance be-
tween England and Germany. This was turned down by Lord Palmer-
ston and Sir Robert Peel in 1846. 
The strategy of development that List suggested, was in principle the 
English strategy as it had been followed in practice. The difference was 
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that England sought world dominance over other nations, as had been 
the tradition for centuries. List on the other hand sought equality of na-
tions, apart from tropical colonies, which were subject states for ‗climat-
ic‘ reasons, according to List.  
Were other nations to continue to seek national sovereignty along the 
distrustful, self-asserting, egotistical, and non-co-operative lines that 
the English and other nations before her had chosen, this was certain 
to cause confrontation.  
Therefore, if a neo-mercantilist strategy was destructive, a gradual 
and legally oriented road to mutual trust and free universal trade ought 
to be found - in a Harmony of Interests. 
List accordingly develops a ―parallel‖ multilateral strategy of how to 
approach a universal political and commercial union of real free trade, 
as opposed to phoney free trade under English domination.  
List argues that the advanced nations, including England, would gain 
from opening up their monopoly trade with their colonies, to other na-
tions. This would set free competition and commerce lift the civilisa-
tions of both the advanced countries and the colonies. List argues that 
to respect and place all nations on an equal basis; they must all first be 
allowed to follow the unilateral road of development. This would allow 
all nations to develop their productive forces, thus making them men-
tally and physically fit for peaceful co-operation with other countries, 
universal peace and prosperity. 
In parallel, however, efforts should be made towards gradual unifica-
tion, first on a national level (Germany), then on a Continental level 
(Europe) and finally on a global level. This would gradually be institu-
tionalised in legal frameworks such as trade agreements and in organi-
sations, such as a ‗World Trade Congress‘, a ‗World Customs Union‘, 
and eventually in a ‗World Government‘. This would lead to an interna-
tional - and eventually a global rule of law. France and the United 
States should take the initiative and England would then follow, List 
argues. This would be in England‘s interest, as she then would avoid 
domination by the United States‘ egotism in the future. The question of 
universal free trade connects tightly to the question of political unifica-





This chapter is not needed to understand List‘s system of productive 
forces, being primarily based on mental capital, but the theme of sover-
eignty and international power, illuminates the problem that List‘s 
strategy of domestic wealth creation faced in an international setting, 
and the solutions that he suggested.  
In List‘s opinion, he was a constructive and realistic reformer in the 
pursuit of free trade and universal progress. The Cosmopolitan School 
on the other hand were destructive utopian revolutionaries, who really 
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had an agenda other than free trade – namely continued English mo-
nopoly. 
Because of his insights into the complex web of inter-relationships of 
economics, we may say that List viewed economic affairs from a cultur-
al and political point of view, i.e. he regarded himself as a student of 
political economy. In fact, it might be more appropriate to name his ap-
proach one of geo-cultural economics, as he was deeply concerned with 




7.03 War and strategic geography 
 
In his classic Makers of Modern Strategy… , Edward Earle values List‘s 
understanding of the sources of military power favourably and writes 
that, 
 
List had a keen appreciation of the factors which enter into the military 
potential. (Earle, 1943b, p. 141 and footnote) 
 
Earle writes that List admired the realist politics of Alexander Hamil-
ton and the nationalism of Andrew Jackson,  
 
… List was first, last, and above all a German. He was always an unhap-
py exile in America … He admired, … the Realpolitik of Hamilton, the lusty 
nationalism of Jackson, the American enthusiasm for railways and canals, 
and the seemingly unlimited possibilities for the future of the United States 
as a world power.67 (Earle, 1943b, p. 141) 
 
In a footnote, Earle notes that in List‘s opinion, the USA would soon 
surpass Britain, 
 
(67) List firmly believed that the United States would, within a century, 
surpass Britain in industry, wealth, commerce, and naval power. The Na-
tional System, pp. 40, 77-86, 339. (Earle, 1943b, p. 141n) 
 
List emphasises that the increasing importance of the technical sci-
ences for warfare causes manufacturing to become a political question, 
and Earle ends a long quotation from List such, 
 
At a time where technical and mechanical science exercise such im-
mense influence on the methods of warfare, …  - at such a time, more than 
ever before, must the value of manufactures be estimated from a political 
point of view. (List, 1841a, p. 209)443 
                                       
443 It is noteworthy that List also here mentions several immaterial issues 
related to the state of a people, such as intelligence, energetic, and sympathy; 
A more extensive quotation reads: ―At a time where technical and mechanical 
science exercise such immense influence on the methods of warfare, where all 




It is noteworthy how the path-breaking figure in geography, Friedrich 
Ratzel (1844-1904), perceived List‘s system. Ratzel developed his sci-
ence field into geopolitics, by fusing politics and geography. With Ratzel, 
one can notice much of the same focus on geographical preconditions 
for national independence (necessitating political- and therefore eco-
nomic power). Friedrich Ratzel is generally accepted as the father of ge-
opolitics,444 although following in the Erdkunde445 (‗Earth-knowledge‘) 
tradition of Karl Ritter and Alexander von Humboldt. 
A row of eminent and critical scholars emanated in the footsteps of 
Ratzel.446 Ratzel was born two years after List died, and grew up during 
the period when List‘s ideas gained momentum in Germany. Ratzel ar-
gues that List was among the first economists to recognise the ―signifi-
cance of the land territory of a nation‖,  
 
Friedrich List was the first among economists to clearly recognize the 
economic and political significance of the land territory of a nation. When 
he set up his system, economics was under the influence of Adam Smith‘s 
teachings, in which he only recognized ―a system of private economy of all 
individuals of a country‖. Against Smith List set his teachings, … (Ratzel, 
1897, p. 190) 
 
                                                                                                                
where successful defence greatly depends on the questions, whether the mass 
of the nation is rich or poor, intelligent or stupid, energetic or sunk in apathy; 
whether its sympathies are given exclusively to the fatherland or partly to for-
eign countries; whether it can muster many or but few defenders of the coun-
try -- at such a time, more than ever before, must the value of manufactures 
be estimated from a political point of view.‖ (List, 1841a, p. 209) 
444 ―German geographer and a founder of modern political geography, the 
study of the influence of environment on politics. …  The German geographers 
Ferdinand von Richthofen and Alfred Hettner brought the ideas of Humboldt, 
Ritter, and Ratzel into a coherent system.‖ (Encarta Encyclopaedia, 2009, 
‗Friedrich Ratzel‘ and ‗Geography‘), and, ―German geographer and ethnog-
rapher and a principal influence in the modern development of both disci-
plines. He originated the concept of Lebensraum, or living space, which relates 
human groups to the spatial units where they develop. … Though influenced 
by the evolutionary theories of Darwin and of the German zoologist Ernst 
Heinrich Haeckel, Ratzel became critical of the mechanistic quality of their 
views. Philosophy, rather than biology, came to dominate his later thought.― 
(Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2009, ‗Friedrich Ratzel‘) 
445 Literary ‗Earth knowledge‘, meaning physical geography. 
446 Such as Rudolf Kjellén in Sweden, who coined the term ‗geopolitics‘, 
Halford J. Mackinder in Great Britain, Karl Haushofer in Germany and then 
Jordis von Lohausen in Germany, Anton Zischka in Czechoslovakia, Georgi 
Plekhanov in Russia, and Sun Yat-sen in Russia/China – in addition to influ-
encing Anton Mohr and Einar Maseng in Norway and Zbigniew Brezinski in 
the USA (Cf. e.g. Brezinski, The Great Chess Game, 1997, where he focuses on 




List shaped the field of economic and military geography considera-
bly. I will excerpt a little from my studies on this issue to establish the 
point.  
List was not without forerunners. Largely forgotten is the influence 
on List from domestic German sources, like General Christian Massen-
bach (1758– 1827), also from Württemberg. He was educated as a 
mathematician and served as a topographic engineer, and staff strate-
gist under Prussian and Russian commandoes. He is credited with 
founding the German concept of a ‗general staff‘ as the intellectual cen-
tre of military strategy. 
 
 
7.04 England’s geographical position  
 
Friedrich List had a watchful eye to the defensive geographical ad-
vantages of the leading nation of the day, allowing England to develop 
her political institutions and manufactures in relative peace. Besides, 
through British involvement in foreign wars, British manufacture re-
ceived immense orders and therefore opportunities to develop. List 
writes, 
 
The geographical position of England, too, has exercised an immense in-
fluence upon the independent development of the nation.  England in its re-
lation to the continent of Europe has ever been a world by itself; and was 
always exempt from the effects of the rivalries, the prejudices, the selfish-
ness, the passions, and the disasters of her Continental neighbours. To this 
isolated condition she is mainly indebted for the independent and unalloyed 
growth of her political constitution, for the undisturbed consummation of 
the Reformation, and for the secularisation of ecclesiastical property which 
has proved so beneficial to her industries. To the same cause she is also in-
debted for that continuous peace, which, with the exception of the period of 
the civil war, she has enjoyed for a series of centuries, and which enabled 
her to dispense with standing armies, while facilitating the early introduc-
tion of a consistent customs system. 
By reason of her insular position, England not only enjoyed immunity 
from territorial wars, but she also derived immense advantages for her 
manufacturing supremacy from the Continental wars. Land wars and dev-
astations of territory inflict manifold injury upon the manufactures at the 
seat of hostilities; …  While in Germany this condition of things recurred 
twice in every hundred years, and caused German manufactures to retro-
grade, those of England made uninterrupted progress. English manufactur-
ers, as opposed to their Continental competitors, enjoyed a double and tre-
ble advantage whenever England, by fitting out fleets and armies, by subsi-
dies, or by both these means combined, proceeded to take an active part in 
foreign wars. (List, 1841a, pp. 53-54) 
 
List also notices the more offensive geographic strategy of England, 
but forgets to mention how England actively hindered other nations 




England has got into her possession the keys of every sea, and placed a 
sentry over every nation: … She possesses every important strategical posi-
tion …  She needs only the further acquisition of the Dardanelles, the 
Sound, and the Isthmuses of Suez and Panama, in order to be able to open 
and close at her pleasure every sea and every maritime highway. Her navy 
alone surpasses the combined maritime forces of all other countries, … 
Her manufacturing capacity excels in importance that of all other na-
tions. (List, 1841a, pp. 46-47)447 
 
It may have been ‗natural‘ for a global empire like the British- to 
think in global terms, and to export global ―free trade‖ ideas to coun-
tries that were far from global. Nevertheless, British promotion of free 
trade had a political side that seldom is mentioned. By making other 
countries dependent on trade to survive they also became dependent on 
transport overseas, where the British Empire totally dominated in both 
peace and war. The British were anxious to preserve this hegemony and 
were successful for a long time; the British Navy ruled the waves and 
continued to do so until the end of WW II.   
Sir Walter Raleigh, the British explorer of the Americas confronting 
Spain‘s supremacy, based Great Britain‘s strategy for domination of the 
world on the famous words, 
 
For whosoever commands the sea commands the trade; whosoever com-
mands the trade of the world commands the riches of the world, and conse-
quently the world itself. (Raleigh, 1615, p. 325) 
 
In his book on international law at sea (‗World despotism and liberty 
at sea‘; Aall, 1939) Prof. at Law, Herman Harris Aall, quotes Sir Cecil 
Hurst, who was the British representative at a meeting at the League of 
Nations (in Geneva, 12 Sept. 1924). Hurst declared that,  
 
There is no international law – in particular not at sea. (Quoted in Aall, 
1939, the preface, retranslated by me)  
 
Aall also quotes the British strategist Prof. John Robert Seeley, who 
was even more direct,  
 
We hold that the oceans belong to us according to the will of nature, and 
along this Road of Kings, we work to subdue the earth. (Quoted in Aall, 
1939, Ch. 9, retranslated by me) 
 
England did not intend to be wing-clipped at sea by international 
laws and regulations. Earle argues that Britain learnt that it was in her 
self-interest to abandon trade protection but never supremacy at sea,  
 
                                       
447 ‗the Sound‘ refers to Oeresound (Øresund), the entrance to the Baltic 
Ocean. List could have mentioned many strategic outposts, such as Gibraltor, 
Heligoland, South Africa, Jemen, St. Helena, the Falksland Islands, Singapore 
and Hong Kong. 
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Insofar as Great Britain was concerned, the heart of the mercantilist sys-
tem - the ark of the covenant - was the Navigation Acts. Mercantilism in its 
other aspects may have been essential at an earlier period of its develop-
ment, but by the end of the eighteenth century England was so far ad-
vanced industrially that protectionism was of much less importance to it 
than to France and the German states. The British could have afforded, if 
necessary, to dispense with duties on most manufactures because they 
were without serious competition in their domestic and overseas markets. 
Indeed, Great Britain was later, in self interest, to abandon its earlier re-
strictive policies because it had learned, as Bismarck said, that "free trade 
is the weapon of the strongest.‖ But sea power was another matter, and an-
ything related to it had to be judged by different criteria. The safety of the 
homeland and the empire demanded that Britain have virtually unchal-
lenged control of the ocean highways; … (Earle, 1943b, p. 122) 
 
 
7.05 English protectionism 
 
Several historians argue that one important reason for British commer-
cial and imperial success not at all was its free trade practice, but ra-
ther its stronger co-ordination and centralisation than that of her com-
petitors (Cf. e.g. Harper, 1939; Bairoch, 1983; Hudson, 1992; Israel, 
1992). In Trade, Development and Foreign Debt, Michael Hudson writes, 
and quotes British Parliamentary debates regarding the protectionist 
British Navigation Laws,448 where the argument is that just as England 
‗stole the robe‘ from the Netherlands with the help of protectionism, 
USA was now applying the same game towards England, 
 
The self-centred, nationalistic ideal of British free trade, like that of earli-
er mercantilism, held that strong economies would grow stronger while less 
developed countries would become more dependent. This view was epito-
mised during the Corn Law debates in 1846, when (as Semmel quotes), ‗one 
Whig, speaking before the House of Commons ... described free trade as the 
beneficent ―principle‖ by which ―foreign nations would become valuable 
Colonies to us, without imposing on us the responsibility of governing 
them.‖ All that was necessary was for England to repeal its Corn Laws ‗to 
create a vast English market for foreign grain; in this way, the agricultural 
nations of the world might be given a stake in England‘s Empire of Free 
Trade.'‘ 
British protectionism had run its course. It had fulfilled its function of 
endowing Britain with the world‘s pre-eminent industrial plant, but it was 
no longer economically feasible. How could Britain expect of the countries 
                                       
 448 The British Navigation Laws were introduced in 1651, caused the first 
Anglo-Dutch war, and were modeled on the Hanseatic navigation laws which 
again were modeled on the Venetian navigation laws, which again may have 
been modeled on the Phoenician navigation Laws since the Venetians had 
learned other practices from the Phoenicians, basing trade on manufacture as 
this was conceived as more rewarding than purely on entrepot trade (import-
export without refining the goods); and therefore as well: glass production (Cf. 
Rawlinson, History of Phoenicia, 1889, p. 97; and Ch. 8-9).  
418 
 
to open their markets to British products if it kept its own markets closed? 
The parliamentary architect of British free trade, William Huskinsson, 
summarised the issue explicitly in 1826:449 
…  Did the United States of America, … carry, even further than we had 
ever done, in respect to foreign Ships, this principle of discriminating duties 
against our Shipping? Can we shut our eyes to the fact that other nations 
have followed, or are following their example? Do we not see them, one after 
the other, taking a leaf out of our own book? …  Did the success of the 
United States of America create no desire in those countries to follow her 
example? 
Under what circumstances did England found her Navigation System? 
When her commercial Marine was, comparatively, insignificant, her wealth 
inconsiderable, before manufactures were established, and when she ex-
ported corn, wool, and other raw materials. When, on the other hand, Hol-
land and the Netherlands were rich, possessed of great manufactures, and 
of the largest portion of the carrying trade of Europe and the world. What 
has followed? The commercial Marine of the latter countries has dwindled 
away, and that of Great Britain is now immense. But, in the progress of the 
change, England is become the great seat of manufactures and trading 
wealth, frequently importing, and never exporting corn; drawing raw mate-
rials from, and sending out manufactured goods to, all parts of the world. 
This was our state, though in a far less degree than at present, when Amer-
ica became independent. She started by applying towards us the system, 
which we have applied towards Holland. (Hudson, 1992, pp.95-96) 
 
Friedrich List advocated governmental interventions in order to de-
velop a country, and as his prime example he pointed to the successful 
history of England,  
 
Whoever is not yet convinced … let him first study the history of English 
industry before he ventures to frame theoretical systems, or to give counsel 
to practical statesmen to whose hands is given the power of promoting the 
weal or the woe of nations. … The fruits it has borne lie revealed to the eyes 
of the whole world. (List, 1841a, pp. 39-40) 
 
List continues by arguing that that English policy for centuries delib-
erately promoted ―exportation of manufactured goods and the importa-
tion of foreign raw material‖,  
 
Under George I English statesmen had long ago clearly perceived the 
grounds on which the greatness of the nation depends. At the opening of 
Parliament in 1721, the King is made to say by the Ministry, that ‗it is evi-
dent that nothing so much contributes to promote the public well-being as 
the exportation of manufactured goods and the importation of foreign raw 
material.450 
 
This for centuries had been the ruling maxim of English commercial poli-
cy, as formerly it had been that of the commercial policy of the Venetian 
                                       
449 The quotation from Huskinsson has been shortened. (AMD‘s note) 
450 1: See Ustaritz: Theorie du Commerce, ch. Xxviii. … (List‘s note) 
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Republic. It is in force at this day (1841) just as it was in the days of Eliza-
beth. The fruits it has borne lie revealed to the eyes of the whole world. 
(List, 1841a, pp. 39-40) 
 
List sums up a whole range of British state regulations on commerce 
and manufacturing intended to further these two activities (exportation 
of manufactured goods and importation of foreign raw materials), 
 
In our previous chapters we have pointed out the results of such dena-
tionalisation, and shown that the culture and civilisation of the human race 
can only be brought about by placing many nations in similar positions of 
civilisation, wealth, and power; that just as England herself has raised her-
self from a condition of barbarism to her present high position, so the same 
path lies open for other nations to follow: and that at this time more than 
one nation is qualified to strive to attain the highest degree of civilisation, 
wealth, and power. Let us now state summarily the maxims of State policy 
by means of which England has attained her present greatness. They may 
be briefly stated thus: 
Always to favour the importation of productive power, in preference to 
the importation of goods. 
Carefully to cherish and to protect the development of the productive 
power. 
To import only raw materials and agricultural products, and to export 
nothing but manufactured goods.  
To direct any surplus of productive power to colonisation, and to the 
subjection of barbarous nations. 
To reserve exclusively to the mother country the supply of the colonies 
and subject countries with manufactured goods, but in return to receive on 
preferential terms their raw materials and especially their colonial produce. 
To devote especial care to the coast navigation; to the trade. Between the 
mother country and the colonies; to encourage seafisheries by means of 
bounties; and to take as active a part as possible in international naviga-
tion. 
By these means to found a naval supremacy, and by means of it to ex-
tend foreign commerce, and continually to increase her colonial posses-
sions. 
To grant freedom in trade with the colonies and in navigation only so far 
as she can gain more by it than she loses. 
To grant reciprocal navigation privileges only if the advantage is on the 
side of England, or if foreign nations can by that means be restrained from 
introducing restrictions on navigation in their own favour. 
To grant concessions to foreign independent nations in respect of the im-
port of agricultural products, only in case concessions in respect of her own 
manufactured products can be gained thereby.  
In cases where such concessions cannot be obtained by treaty, to attain 
the object of them by means of contraband trade. 
To make wars and to contract alliances with exclusive regard to her 
manufacturing, commercial, maritime, and colonial interests. To gain by 
these alike from friends and foes: from the latter by interrupting their com-
merce at sea; from the former by ruining their manufactures through sub-
sidies which are paid in the shape of English manufactured goods. (List, 




English protectionism was even professed openly in Parliament, List 
writes, 
 
These maxims were in former times plainly professed by all English min-
isters and parliamentary speakers. The ministers of George I in 1721 openly 
declared, on the occasion of the prohibition of the importation of the manu-
factures of India, that it was clear that a nation could only become wealthy 
and powerful if she imported raw materials and exported manufactured 
goods. Even in the times of Lords Chatham and North, they did not hesitate 
to declare in open Parliament that it ought not to be permitted that even a 
single horse-shoe nail should be manufactured in North America. (List, 
1841a, p. 367) 
 
 
7.06 Smith as regulator and protectionist  
 
List points out that Smith himself argues for protection, and even for 
retaliation, 
 
Adam Smith allows in three cases the special protection of internal in-
dustry: firstly, as a measure of retaliation in case a foreign nation imposes 
restrictions on our imports, and there is hope of inducing it by means of re-
prisals to repeal those restrictions; secondly, for the defence of the nation, 
in case those manufacturing requirements which are necessary for defen-
sive purposes could not under open competition be produced at home; 
thirdly, as a means of equalisation in case the products of foreigners are 
taxed lower than those of our home producers. J. B. Say objects to protec-
tion in all these cases, but admits it in a fourth case—namely, when some 
branch of industry is expected to become after the lapse of a few years so 
remunerative that it will then no longer need protection. 
Thus it is Adam Smith who wants to introduce the principle of retaliation 
into commercial policy—a principle which would lead to the most absurd 
and most ruinous measures, … (List, 1841a, ch. 27, p. 318) 
 
List, however, dismisses revenge as such. He claims that retalia-
tion only is justifiable if it serves ―the industrial development of the 
nation‖, and that the second and third arguments (defence and 
equalisation) in principle justifies the whole system of protection, 
 
… really justifies not merely the necessity of protecting such manufac-
tures as supply the immediate requirements of war, such as, for instance, 
manufactories of arms and powder, but the whole system of protection as 
we understand it; … (List, 1841a, ch. 27, p. 319) 
 
In The Theory of Moral Sentiments Adam Smith praises government 
in general (Smith, 1759, part VI, chapter I). This was, however, before 
he went to France in 1765 to learn about the French Physiocratic 
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School from Smith‘s favourite writer Baron Turgot,451 to whom he 
wanted to dedicate his Wealth of Nations. Condorcet wrote of Turgot‘s 
essay that, 
 
This Essay May be Considered as the Germ of the Treatise on ―The 
Wealth of Nations‖, written by the Celebrated Smith. (Condorcet, 1786, p. 
74) 
 
Parallel to his mechanistic perception of the universe and the plane-
tary system as a perfect machine, Smith seems to have gone from the 
ideal of ―police‖ or ―politicks‖ (government) as a perfect machine to the 
market as such a machine. In his earlier writings, The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, (TMS), he therefore claimed that, 
  
The same principle, the same love of system, the same regard to the 
beauty of order, of art and contrivance, frequently serves to recommend 
those institutions which tend to promote the public welfare. … The perfec-
tion of police [AMD: i.e. policy], the extension of trade and manufactures, 
are noble and magnificent objects. The contemplation of them pleases us, 
and we are interested in whatever can tend to advance them. They make 
part of the great system of government, and the wheels of the political ma-
chine seem to move with more harmony and ease by means of them. We 
take pleasure in beholding the perfection of so beautiful and grand a sys-
tem, and we are uneasy till we remove any obstruction that can in the least 
disturb or encumber the regularity of its motions. All constitutions of gov-
ernment, however, are valued only in proportion as they tend to promote 
the happiness of those who live under them. This is their sole use and end. 
From a certain spirit of system, however, from a certain love of art and con-
trivance, we sometimes seem to value the means more than the end, and to 
be eager to promote the happiness of our fellow-creatures, rather from a 
view to perfect and improve a certain beautiful and orderly system, than 
from any immediate sense or feeling of what they either suffer or enjoy.  
(Smith, 1759, part IV, chapter I, § 11, and p. 185 in Liberty Classics‘ edi-
tion) 
 
                                       
17 Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot, Baron de Laune (1827-1781), of French-
Norman stock. Indicating his interests, in his 1774 essay Reflections on the 
Formation and Distribution of Wealth (Turgot, 1774), Turgot mentions 
‗transport‘ twice, ‗road‘, ‗canal‘, ‗rail‘, and ‗legal‘ not at all and ‗law‘ 15 times. 
Compare this with List: 83/15/26/18/6/132. A similar look at British theo-
retical Mercantilists is equally revealing of their poor interest in practical mat-
ters like infrastructure, which is the necessary physical foundation of any 
market.   
This could be explained, however, by the British situation in infrastructure: 
It might be so good, relatively speaking, that there was no need for any dis-
cussion thereof. Nevertheless, practical men both France and England must 
have spent an enormous amount of time in the construction and maintenance 




In addition, Smith adds a warning, that evil men may obstruct the 
great machine of government, 
 
There have been men of the greatest public spirit, who have shown 
themselves in other respects not very sensible to the feelings of humanity. 
And on the contrary, there have been men of the greatest humanity, who 
seem to have been entirely devoid of public spirit. (Smith, 1759, part IV, 
chapter I, § 11, and p. 185 in Liberty Classics‘ edition) 
 
In Smith‘s Theory of Moral Sentiments, there is also a more moderate 
praise of government, 
 
Some general, and even systematical, idea of the perfection of policy and 
law, may no doubt be necessary for directing the views of the statesman. 
(Smith, 1759, part VI, sec. II, ch. II, § 18, and p. 234 in Liberty Classics‘ 
edition)  
 
This differs with Smith‘s Lecture On Jurisprudence only three years 
later, where he most emphatically advocates governmental non-
intervention (Cf. Smith, 1762).  
Edward Earle argues that Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton and 
Friedrich List‘s policies only can be understood ―within the framework 
of their times‖ regarding British hegemony following centuries of Mer-
cantilist policies, 
 
It was against the background of mercantilism and of a triumphant Eng-
land that Smith the Briton, Hamilton the American, and List the German 
outlined economic and political policies for their respective countries. What 
they had to say concerning the economic foundations of military power can 
be understood only within the framework of their times and the spirit and 
special conditions of their respective countries. (Earle, 1943b, p. 120) 
 
Earle argues as List, that Smith‘s policies did not differ much from 
power-orientation of Mercantilism, 
 
Smith‘s most trenchant criticisms of mercantilism were directed at its 
monetary theories …   
Despite the fact that The Wealth of Nations became the bible, and Adam 
Smith the intellectual progenitor, of the laissez-faire school of nineteenth-
century British economic theorists, the truth is that Adam Smith did not 
really repudiate certain fundamentals of mercantilist doctrine. He rejected 
some of its means, but he accepted at least one of its ends—the necessity of 
state intervention in economic matters insofar as it might be essential to 
the military power of the nation. His followers were more doctrinaire free 
traders than Smith was himself, and they certainly were more ardent paci-
fists. (Earle, 1943b, p. 121) 
 
In addition, as Edward Earle writes, the real test as to the relation to 
power and in Britain‘s geographical case is therefore naval affairs, 
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where Smith explicitly aims to give Britain a monopoly on her own 
trade,452  
 
For these reasons the real test of Adam Smith‘s view on mercantilism 
and power politics was his stand on the Navigation Acts and the fisheries. 
"The defense of Great Britain,‖ he said, "depends very much upon the num-
ber of its sailors and shipping. The act of navigation, therefore, very proper-
ly endeavours to give the sailors and shipping of Great Britain the monopo-
ly of the trade of their own country.‖ (Earle, 1943b, p. 122, referring to 
Smith, 1776, Book 4, Ch. 2, section 24) 
 
Like Friedrich List before him, Edward Earle argues that although 
Smith was a free trader in theory, the crucial test is whether ―the eco-
nomic power of the nation should be cultivated and used as an instru-
ment of statecraft‖, 
 
Adam Smith was a free trader by sincere conviction. He completely de-
molished some of the theories that underlay mercantilism; and mercantilist 
practices, as they existed in the British Empire of his day, were repugnant 
to him. He was suspicious of state interference with private initiative, and 
he was no worshiper of state power for its own sake. But the critical ques-
tion in determining his relationship to the mercantilist school is not wheth-
er its fiscal and trade theories were sound or unsound but whether, when 
necessary, the economic power of the nation should be cultivated and used 
as an instrument of statecraft. The answer of Adam Smith to this question 
would clearly be "Yes‖—that economic power should be so used. 
This has not been altogether understood. Smith‘s followers, particularly 
in nineteenth-century England, were responsible for presenting him as an 
uncompromising free trader. Some of his critics, particularly the Germans 
Schmoller and List, allowed cries of "free trade‖ to drown out the rest of 
Smith‘s teachings which would have been music to their ears. (Earle, 
1943b, p. 121) 
 
Earle‘s criticism is not entirely correct since, as we have seen above, 
List indeed notices Smith‘s Mercantilist tendencies.  
 
As noticed above, markets for public goods are a responsibility of the 
macro agent - the government. As Adam Smith agreed in principle, de-
fence is such a market. As a firm believer in the public good of defence 
and therefore an admirer of military activity, Smith writes that, 
 
The art of war is certainly the noblest of all arts. (Smith, 1776, book V, 
Ch. II, Part I) 
 
The same insight that List claimed, that ―power is more important 
than wealth‖, was also Smith‘s reason for hailing the British Act of Nav-
igation of 1651: Although it injured commerce (in the short term), it 
strengthened the navy, 
                                       




The Act of Navigation is not favourable to foreign commerce … As de-
fence, however, is of much more importance than opulence, the act of navi-
gation is, perhaps, the wisest of all commercial regulations of England. 
(Smith, 1776, book IV, ch. II, § 30, p. 464-465 in the Liberty Classics edi-
tion)  
 
Accordingly, Smith also promoted bounties on export of strategic 
products, such as gunpowder, in order to promote the domestic produc-
tive power and thereby strengthen domestic military power. (Smith, 
1776, IV, v.a. p. 36) 
This insight into the nature of power was also Smith‘s reason for ap-
plauding the very protectionist British Act of Navigation, 1651, since it 
injured commerce (in the short term) but strengthened the navy (Smith, 
1776, bk. IV, ch. ii).  
 
This act shut out Dutch ships from British commerce, and occa-
sioned an Anglo-Dutch war (1653) which almost decided upon the win-
ner in the battle for world hegemony, at the time and the centuries to 
come: Government and protection was good for England (Cf. List, 
1837a, pp. 132-134).  
List points out that the protectionist English ‗Act of Navigation‘ of 
1651 built on the model of Venetian and Hanse protectionist laws. 
Smith defended the Act of Navigation, as List also points out (see below) 
but for martial reasons and not for commercial reasons,453  
 
Adam Smith, when he maintains that the Navigation Laws have not been 
beneficial to England in commercial respects, admits that, in any case, the-
se laws have increased her power. And power is more important than 
wealth. That is indeed the fact. Power is more important than wealth. And 
why? Simply because national power is a dynamic force by which new pro-
ductive resources are opened out, and because the forces of production are 
the tree on which wealth grows, and because the tree which bears the fruit 
is of greater value than the fruit itself. Power is of more importance than 
wealth because a nation, by means of power, is enabled not only to open up 
new productive sources, but to maintain itself in possession of former and 
of recently acquired wealth, and because the reverse of power -- namely, 
feebleness -- leads to the relinquishment of all that we possess, not of ac-
quired wealth alone, but of our powers of production, of our civilisation, of 
our freedom, nay, even of our national independence, into the hands of 
those who surpass us in might, as is abundantly attested by the history of 
the Italian republics, of the Hanseatic League, of the Belgians, the Dutch, 
the Spaniards, and the Portuguese. (List, 1841a, p. 46) 
 
The British Act of Navigation ‗accidentally‘ promoted British manu-
facture and power in the long run and led to the Anglo-Dutch wars, 
                                       
453 As an indication of how much List stressed this point, he mentions "pow-
er" on four times as many occasions throughout his National System than 
Smith in his Wealth of Nations (355/174 in a book half as long). 
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which started the year after in 1652. The eventual English victory ce-
mented English sea power and world domination, later perpetuated by 
the Unites States.  
 
 
7.07 Contradiction between free trade theory and British practice 
 
List repeatedly points out the contradiction between the theoretical 
claims for free trade and Britain‘s successful practice with protection. 
Simultaneously List praises the honesty of Adam Smith, regarding the 
British conscious suppression of American manufacture. For other na-
tions than Britain Smith advised otherwise, and this led economists of the 
American System and like-minded to assert that Smith‘s system was meant 
only for export, 
 
The North American colonies were kept, in respect of trade and industry, 
in such complete thraldom by the mother country, that no sort of manufac-
ture was permitted to them beyond domestic manufacture and the ordinary 
handicrafts. So late as the year 1750 a hat manufactory in the State of 
Massachusetts created so great sensation and jealousy in Parliament, that 
it declared all kinds of manufactories to be ‗common nuisances,‘ not except-
ing iron works, notwithstanding that the country possessed in the greatest 
abundance all the requisite materials for the manufacture of iron. Even 
more recently, namely, in 1770, the great Chatham, made uneasy by the 
first manufacturing attempts of the New Englanders, declared that the col-
onies should not be permitted to manufacture so much as a horseshoe nail. 
To Adam Smith belongs the merit of having first pointed out the injustice 
of this policy. 
The monopoly of all manufacturing industry by the mother country was 
one of the chief causes of the American Revolution; the tea duty merely af-
forded an opportunity for its outbreak. (List, 1841a, pp. 94-95) 
 
List mocks academic economists, i.e. Smith, for their inability to see 
the roots of national wealth, believing that England became prosperous 
in spite of her commercial policy. The comment parallels comments 
concerning economic policy in Southeast Asia, being a free-trade expe-
rience. They apparently prospered in the period 1960-1997, and pros-
per again today, in spite of and not because of their economic policy.454 
List commented Smith‘s claims such, 
 
ADAM SMITH and his disciples have repeatedly asserted that England‘s 
commercial policy has not been responsible for her resent prosperity. They 
argue that England became prosperous in spite of her commercial policy. 
Our own arguments would fall to the ground if this were true. We believe 
that we can reveal Adam Smith‘s errors. We consider that Adam Smith‘s bi-
ographer was right in complaining that this profound thinker was prone to 
make paradoxical assertions. 
                                       
454 The typical example is the World Bank report, The East Asian Miracle. 
Economic Growth and Public Policy (IBRD, 1993).  
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Before the twelfth century England was a very poor and primitive agricul-
tural country. ... (List, 1837a, p. 128) 
 
Similarly in 1841, List mocks the economists of the radical free trade 
school; ‗the theorists‘,  
 
The theorists have since contended that England has attained to wealth 
and power not by means of, but in spite of, her commercial policy. (List, 
1841a, ch. 4: The English, p. 40) 
 
In the Introduction to his National System, List argues that  
 
The ruling theory, on the contrary, founded by Adam Smith on the 
dreams of Quesnay, …  is forced even to deny the influence of the English 
Navigation Acts, the Methuen Treaty, and English commercial policy in 
general, and to maintain a view entirely contrary to truth that England has 
reached wealth and power not by means, but in spite of, its commercial pol-
icy. (List, 1841b, Introduction, in Hirst, 1909, pp. 292-293)455 
 
List claims that the policy of keeping the American people down 
would force them into the interior,456 
 
If a power existed that cherished the project of keeping down the rise of 
the American people and bringing them under subjection to itself industri-
ally, commercially, or politically, it could only succeed in its aim by trying to 
depopulate the Atlantic states of the Union and driving all increase of popu-
lation, capital, and intellectual power into the interior. (List, 1841a, p. 103) 
 
Concerning  government trade policies in general, and not specifically 
related to Great Britain, List explains the reasons for the ―great gulf 
which separates their words from their deeds‖ as a result of conflicting 
interest and shortage of time, 
 
All governments are under conflicting pressures from these opposing in-
terests. On the one hand, they may favour greater freedom of trade yet at 
the same time, they will realise the necessity of preserving and protecting 
existing interests to avoid any violent convulsion, which might endanger the 
finances, credit or security of the state. 
However enthusiastically they may pay lip service to the profundity of the 
doctrine of free trade, all governments recognise that it is much easier to 
declare their determination to establish free trade than it is to adopt a poli-
cy that will overcome all the difficulties and will achieve the object that they 
have in mind. They have neither the time not the desire to make a detailed 
examination of the doctrine of free trade and they are continually distracted 
by the demands of various pressure groups and by the actual situation in 
which the country finds itself. Faced with such an awkward and embar-
                                       
455 This quotation has also been used more extensively in the section, Differ-
entiate future from present, in chapter 3. 
456 This also happened as a result of the British policy in South Africa at the 
same time – when the Boers departed into the interior during the 1830s. 
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rassing situation it is quite natural that governments should take the easi-
est course open to them to surmount the difficulties with which they are 
beset. This accounts for the great gulf which separates their words from 
their deeds. (List, 1837a, p. 23) 
 
List describes the English strategy as cunning and hypocritical and 
as ‗preaching free trade while doing the opposite‘, in order to dominate 
other countries and ―reduce them to a condition of slavery‖, 
 
In England, where the free trade doctrine was born and received the 
greatest support, a recent attempt to put the theory into practice failed. … 
it was decided to leave things as they were. … 
What did the great champions of free trade - men like Canning and 
Huskisson - ever do … 
These men actually proclaimed that they had taken a great step forward 
towards free trade. But their hypocrisy was obvious since their true pur-
pose was simply to trick those countries into making tariff concessions on 
the English goods which they imported. … 
Sensible impartial observers have to admit that although England 
preaches free trade, she practises something very different. …  
There is therefore a real danger that the strongest nations will use the 
motto ―Free Trade‖ as an excuse to adopt a policy which will certainly ena-
ble them to dominate the trade and industry of weaker countries and re-
duce them to a condition of slavery.457 … (List, 1837a, pp. 24-25)458 
 
List continues by arguing that free trade is beneficial for a country‘s 
internal trade but dangerous for its external trade, leaving a country 
vulnerable and exposed to interests abroad; and ultimately slavery, 
 
Inside a country the policy of free trade is beneficial … But free trade in 
foreign commerce is far from beneficial. Indeed it is the equivalent of com-
mercial slavery. … - if introduced unilaterally - permits foreign competitors 
to ruin native industry while denying to native manufacturers the right to 
compete on equal terms with foreign rivals in markets abroad. Such ―free-
dom‖ leaves us to the tender mercies of foreigners. (List, 1837a, p. 25) 
 
 
7.08 England’s strategy of confusion  
 
List regarded Smith‘s errors in trade theory as being a calculated mis-
take in order to confuse potential followers of Great Britain into another 
                                       
457 1. Montesquieu in his Esprit des Lois writes: "Free trade is not a licence 
granted to merchants to do as they please. It is a servitude imposed upon them. 
If the state imposes restrictions upon the individual merchant, it does so in the 
interest of commerce in general. Trade is never subjected to greater restrictions 
than in free nations, and it is never subjected to fewer restrictions than in na-
tions under despotic governments." And again: "England restricts the individual 
merchant but promotes commerce in general." [List‘s note] 
458 A more complete quotation is found in Appendix 1c.  
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path than the one chosen by her earlier in history and to considerable 
degree followed by her at his time as well.  
In his Outlines, List compares these only apparently well founded 
―castles in the air‖ to the hypothetical situation where Napoleon would 
ask his enemies to give up their armies and fleets (Cf. List, 1827b, Let-
ter I and III). List pointed out in particular the teachings of Adam Smith 
as a strategy designed to confuse and distract potential followers, 
 
...his system, considered as a whole, is so confused and distracted, as if the 
principal aim of his books were not to enlighten nations, but to confuse 
them for the benefit of his own country. (List, 1927-1936, Vol.2 1930, p. 
160, i.e. his ‗Philadelphia Speech‘) 
 
List writes the English only started to favour free trade after the fall 
of Napoleon, and only when this would promote their export, 
 
With the fall of Napoleon, English competition, which had been till then 
restricted to a contraband trade, recovered its footing on the continents of 
Europe and America. Now for the first time the English were heard to con-
demn protection and to eulogise Adam Smith‘s doctrine of free trade, a doc-
trine which heretofore those practical islanders considered as suited only to 
an ideal state of Utopian perfection. But an impartial, critical observer 
might easily discern the entire absence of mere sentimental motives of phi-
lanthropy in this conversion, for only when increased facilities for the ex-
portation of English goods to the continents of Europe and America were in 
question were cosmopolitan arguments resorted to; (List, 1841a, pp. 73-74) 
 
List writes that the cosmopolitical theories were designed to conceal 
the true policy of England,  
 
In Adam Smith‘s time, a new maxim was for the first time added to those 
which we have above stated, namely, to conceal the true policy of England 
under the cosmopolitical expressions and arguments which Adam Smith 
had discovered, in order to induce foreign nations not to imitate that policy. 
(List, 1841a, p. 368) 
 
Nations pursue policies in reality and as a stage-play for the audi-
ence, and England would thereby be kicking away the ladder she her-
self had used to achieve greatness, and it was William Pitt the Elder 
(1708-1778), who designed this clever strategy. List writes, 
 
It is a very common clever device that when anyone has attained the 
summit of greatness, he kicks away the ladder by which he has climbed up, 
in order to deprive others of the means of climbing up after him. In this lies 
the secret of the cosmopolitical doctrine of Adam Smith, and of the cosmo-
political tendencies of his great contemporary William Pitt, and of all his 
successors in the British Government administrations. 
Any nation which by means of protective duties and restrictions on navi-
gation has raised her manufacturing power and her navigation to such a 
degree of development that no other nation can sustain free competition 
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with her, can do nothing wiser than to throw away these ladders of her 
greatness, to preach to other nations the benefits of free trade, and to de-
clare in penitent tones that she has hitherto wandered in the paths of error, 
and has now for the first time succeeded in discovering the truth. 
William Pitt was the first English statesman who clearly perceived in 
what way the cosmopolitical theory of Adam Smith could be properly made 
use of,… 
… By nature he said France was adapted for agriculture and the produc-
tion of wine, as England was thus adapted to manufacturing production. 
These nations ought to act towards one another just as two great mer-
chants would do who carry on different branches of trade and who recipro-
cally enrich one another by the exchange of goods.459 Not a word here of the 
old maxim of England, that a nation can only attain to the highest degree of 
wealth and power in her foreign trade by the exchange of manufactured 
products against agricultural products and raw materials. This maxim was 
then, and has remained since, an English State secret; it was never again 
openly professed, but was all the more persistently followed. (List, 1841a, 
pp. 368-9) 
 
In addition, as we see in List‘s footnote, Pitt emerges as the probable 
originator of the theory of comparative advantages. It was therefore not 
Ricardo, as is often claimed, nor Adam Smith, who developed this theo-
ry of absolute advantages. 
 
 
7.09 England’s strategy of domination  
 
List‘s insistent and repeated criticism of cynical British power policies 
towards its emerging competitor states should not make us forget that 
Britain was his model country, both regarding its civilized liberal politi-
cal regime at home and in its imperial strength.  
Nevertheless, List argues that England desired to monopolise the 
world‘s manufacturing power and keep the rest of the world in vassal-
age,  
 
English national economy has for its object to manufacture for the whole 
world, to monopolize all manufacturing power, even at the expense of the 
lives of its citizens, to keep the world and especially her colonies in a state 
of infancy and vassalage by political management as well as by the superi-
ority of her capital, her skill and her navy. (List, 1827b, Letter II) 
 
List was not at all blind to England‘s accomplishments, but he ques-
tioned the legitimacy of erecting an English global empire on the ruin of 
all other nations, 
                                       
459 2 France, said Pitt, has advantages above England in respect of climate 
and other natural gifts, and therefore excels England in its raw produce; on the 
other hand, England has the advantage over France in its artificial products. …. 
This is a reciprocal condition and a basis on which an advantageous 




Who can tell how far behind the world might yet remain if no England 
had ever existed? And if she now ceased to exist, who can estimate how far 
the human race might retrograde? Let us then congratulate ourselves on 
the immense progress of that nation, and wish her prosperity for all future 
time. But ought we on that account also to wish that she may erect a uni-
versal dominion on the ruins of the other nationalities? Nothing but un-
fathomable cosmopolitanism or shopkeepers‘ narrow-mindedness can give 
an assenting answer to that question. (List, 1841a, p. 366) 
 
List notices the tendency of English trade treaties, which were de-
signed to extend the sale of her own manufacturing products and ruin 
the native manufacturing power of other countries, 
 
We thus find that in all treaties of commerce concluded by the English, 
there is a tendency to extend the sale of their manufactures throughout all 
the countries with whom they negotiate, by offering them apparent ad-
vantages in respect of agricultural produce and raw materials. Everywhere 
their efforts are directed to ruining the native manufacturing power of those 
countries by means of cheaper goods and long credits. If they cannot obtain 
low tariffs, then they devote their exertions to defrauding the custom-
houses, and to organising a wholesale system of contraband trade. The 
former device, as we have seen, succeeded in Portugal, the latter in Spain. 
(List, 1841a, pp. 66-67) 
  
According to Prof. Helmut Diwald, Chancellor Bismarck later said 
about Great Britain that, 
 
The English are filled with irritation and envy, that we have fought great 
battles - and won. They do not welcome the rise of the little ‖ruppigen‖ 
Preussen. The view of the British gentry is that this is a people, which only 
exists to wage wars for payment. They never wished us well, and always 
harmed us according to ability. (Diwald, 1980, p. 378) 
 
 
7.10 Combating Britain’s monopolies and unfair treaties  
 
List claimed that Britain had already established monopoly in many 
trades, by technical skill and indeed with skilful treatises (Cf. List, 
1841a, pp. 60-67 regarding Portugal and List, 1841a pp. 94-95, regard-
ing North America).  
List explains that immediate free trade would lead to the universal mo-
nopoly of the already established and strongest nation, 
 
… under the existing conditions of the world, the result of general free trade 
would not be a universal republic, but, on the contrary, a universal subjec-
tion of the less advanced nations to the supremacy of the predominant 
manufacturing, commercial, and naval power, is a conclusion for which the 
reasons are very strong and, according to our views, irrefragable. (List, 




The Methuen Treaty of 1703 allowed English manufactured products 
into Portugal while allowing wine into England. It ruined Portuguese 
industry, and made Portugal and her colonies into de facto colonies of 
Great Britain, but relieving Britain from the administrative toil. The 
treaty became a template for Britain‘s later commercial treaties, and 
Adam Smith set up a theory to legitimise them, the theory of absolute 
trade advantages. Accordingly, Adam Smith claimed that the treaty gave 
no special advantages to Great Britain, 
 
The yearly exports of England to Portugal exceed the imports from that 
country by the amount of one million sterling. This favourable balance of 
trade lowered the rate of exchange to the extent of fifteen per cent to the 
disadvantage of Portugal…. 
All the merchants and political economists, as well as all the statesmen 
of England, have ever since eulogised this treaty as the masterpiece of Eng-
lish commercial policy. … 
For Adam Smith alone it was reserved to set up a theory directly opposed 
to this unanimous verdict, and to maintain that the Methuen Treaty had in 
no respect proved a special boon to British commerce.  
Were not the Portuguese cloth manufactories totally ruined, to the ad-
vantage of the English? Did not all the Portuguese colonies, especially the 
rich one of Brazil, by this means become practically English colonies? Cer-
tainly this treaty conferred a privilege upon Portugal, but only in name; 
whereas it conferred a privilege upon the English in its actual operation and 
effects. A like tendency underlies all subsequent treaties of commerce nego-
tiated by the English. By profession they were always cosmopolites and 
philanthropists, while in their aims and endeavours they were always mo-
nopolists. 
According to Adam Smith‘s second argument, the English gained no par-
ticular advantages from this treaty, (List, 1841a, pp. 61-63) 
 
 
7.11 Combatting Britain’s monopoly trade with colonies 
 
Some know that List advocated freedom of trade and freedom of the 
seas, but normally forget that he did so in particular regarding an open-
ing up of trade with Britain‘s colonies. Britain kept the trade with her 
colonies behind a curtain of ‗preferential trade‘, in other words a system 
of self-supporting protectionism, from the very first days of colonialism 
to the very last days of colonialism.  
List claimed that opening up trade with Britain‘s colonies and re-
nouncing her sea power, would also benefit England itself, as well as be 
of mutual benefit, 
 
It might, at first sight, appear to be asking too much to expect England 
to open her colonies to the commerce of all nations and to renounce the ad-
vantages to be gained by using her sea power to force distant backward 
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countries  … but would confer upon England greater advantages than upon 
anyone else. (List, 1837a, p. 49)460 
 
Whereas the British conception and policy of ‗The Free Seas‘461 in List 
opinion indicated free seas for the British, List promoted free seas for 
all countries.  
List returns to the problem of Britain‘s mercantilist and protectionist 
policy later in his Natural System, and advocates collaboration, first 
through a congress, to force England to accept free trade and interna-
tional law.  He then correctly prophesies that the same problems will 
arise when the USA will dominate the world. List therefore advices Eng-
land to prepare for this situation by sharing he position with other in-
dustrial nations, 
 
It is obvious that the United States is developing into a maritime power 
which before long will inevitably surpass that of England. … . England 
would in these circumstances be well advised to give up voluntarily a su-




7.12 British strategists substantiate List’s claims  
 
List‘s ideas were influential beyond Germany and the USA, for instance 
in the British Empire through e.g. Joseph Chamberlain; Sir Alfred 
Milner; and his ‗organisational heir‘ Sir Leo Amery. As we shall see be-
low, British strategists agree that England had built her wealth on pro-
tection and had tried to trick her competitors into believing otherwise. 
In addition, the influential Joseph Chamberlain463 criticised the lib-
eral policy of A. Smith and Richard Cobden. He claimed it had tripped 
up Britain more than its international competitors had, since they real-
ised what Britain was planning. André Maurois describes Chamber-
lain‘s campaign and quotes him,  
 
The Colonial Secretary started an oratorical campaign in the country, in 
which he displayed such strength and irony and forthright eloquence that 
                                       
460 This quotation has also been used in the section below; Common interest 
in free trade, where the subject of mutual benefits from free trade is discussed 
further. 
461 Mare Liberum or The Freedom of the Sea was written by Hugo Grotius 
(1583-1645), who claimed that the sea was international territory and therefore 
all nations were free to use it for trade. Grotius wrote as a counsel to the Dutch 
East India Company and argued against the Portuguese claim of monopoly on 
the East Indian Trade through the ‗Mare Clausum‘ policy. 
462 This quotation has also been used in the section below; Common interest 
in free trade, where the subject of mutual benefits from free trade is discussed 
further. 
463 British Secretary of Trade, then Secretary of Colonial Affairs and in gen-
eral a crucial person in British strategic affairs at the turn of the 20th Century. 
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his opponents, so confident to start with, began to take fright.  … Chamber-
lain‘s arguments were simple. To strike at the Free Trade religion he first 
scrutinized its prophet. Richard Cobden had been a worthy man, but exam-
ined in the light of the pasty fifty years his prophecies had all proved wrong. 
… 
―Mr. Cobden based his whole argument upon the assumption that he 
made in good faith that if we adopted free trade it would mean free ex-
change between the nations of the world; that if we adopted free trade, five 
years, ten years would not pass without all other nations adopting a similar 
system. That was his belief, and upon the promise - the prediction - which 
he offered, the country adopted free trade. Unfortunately he was mistaken. 
He told the people of his day that what he wanted to do was to keep Eng-
land as the workshop of the world, and the rest of the world was to be the 
wheatfield of England. I came across a passage in Mr. Morley‘s ‗Life of Cob-
den‘ the other day which really now, when you think of what has actually 
happened, seems to be almost astounding. Mr. Cobden said that the United 
States of America, if free trade were adopted, would abandon their prema-
ture manufactures. That workmen in their factories would go back to the 
land. Mind, now I am quoting his exact words, ‗They would dig, delve, and 
plough for us.‘ If that had been true, I doubt whether I should have been 
here tonight; but it was not true. The Americans have not so conceived their 
national destiny. They have not believed that they were created by Provi-
dence in order to ‗dig, delve, and plough for us.‘ They have thought that 
they have natural resources even greater than our own. They have thought 
that they could manufacture as well as us, and I am afraid that their ideas 
of the future have been much more correct than Mr. Cobden‘s.‖ (Mau-
rois, 1933, pp. 128-129)464 
 
While having the prominent position of ‗Secretary of Colonial Affairs‘, 
Chamberlain appealed to his countrymen for their solidarity with Brit-
ish subject in the Colonies by granting them ‗preference‘. In King Ed-
ward and his Times, André Maurois writes and quotes Chamberlain, 
 
… After the conclusion of peace he had himself gone out to South Africa. 
Returning in May, 1903, he brought back an Imperialist programme. …  
―You are Englishmen, you are Scotsmen, you are Welshmen, but you are 
no longer the inhabitants of a small island. You are an Imperial race. In 
every clime you have brothers of your breed and blood. These brothers are 
only asking to tighten their links with you. ... Let Empire products enter 
England freely; tax those of other countries. That will enable you to obtain a 
more favourable treatment for your own goods, and above all to strengthen 
the bonds that unite all the Dominions and Colonies to England.‖ (Maurois, 
1933, pp.127-128) 
 
In a speech in 1907, published in Constructive Imperialism, Milner465 
argues in a Listian spirit for a pragmatic trade policy under the guiding 
star of benefits for the home producer, 
                                       
464 List comments upon this hypocritical British policy e.g. in his The Natural 
System …. (List, 1837a, pp. 24) quoted here in e.g. Appendix 1d. 




… there is an increasing invasion of our markets by goods from abroad 
which we used to produce ourselves, and an increasing tendency to exclude 
our goods from foreign markets. The Tariff Reform movement is the inevita-
ble result of these altered circumstances ….  
This country became one of the greatest and wealthiest in the world un-
der a system of rigid Protection. It has enjoyed great, though by no means 
unbroken, prosperity under Free Trade. Side by side with that system of 
ours other countries have prospered even more under quite different sys-
tems. These facts alone are sufficient to justify the critical spirit, which is 
the spirit of the Tariff Reformer. He does not believe in any absolute right or 
wrong in such a matter as the imposition of duties upon imports. Such du-
ties cannot, he thinks, be judged by one single test, namely, whether they 
do or do not favour the home producer, and be condemned out of hand if 
they do favour him. (Milner, 1907, Tariff Reform) 
 
In The Fundamental Fallacies of Free Trade, the leading British strat-
egist Leo Amery466 describes the positive results of Bismarck and List‘s 
policies as evidenced by the growth in population, 
 
… the dense populations of the towns and industrial districts of modern 
Germany is the direct offspring of Bismarck‘s policy. … the emigration from 
Germany was enormous. Since the economic development of Germany … 
the position has changed entirely as regards the birth-rate ...  Germany 
nowadays actually has an excess of immigrants. … Cologne. The inhabit-
ants of that city, and of many another German city, are the children of 
Bismarck‘s statesmanship, the grandchildren of List‘s far-seeing genius. 
Would a purely agricultural Germany be capable of supporting her present 
population, or be growing at the rate of a million souls a year? (Amery, 
1906, pp. 34-35) 
 
Amery admitted that free trade was so favourable to Britain that she 
would have dominated the world, ―more powerful than any political em-
pire has ever been‖ and ―The Free Traders of that day fully realised 
this‖, 
 
                                                                                                                
the most influential person in the British Empire between 1897 and 1925 - and 
beyond through his networks; ‗Milner‘s Kindergarten‘ and ‗The Round Table‘ 
group. 
466 We can indicate Leo Amery‘s importance by noting that in 1922 he be-
came member of the Royal Privy Council and was appointed First Lord of the 
Admiralty; and was appointed Colonial Secretary of the entire British Empire 
in 1924. He fought for closer economic relations within the Empire and estab-
lished the Empire Marketing Board. Furthermore, and not the least, Leo Amery 
was the political heir of Alfred Milner, who passed the baton on from Cecil 
Rhodes, as the foremost promoters of the British Empire on the world stage in 
this period. He was also one of two main promoters of Winston Churchill as 
Prime Minister. The other was Duff Cooper, first lord of the admiralty. Their 
efforts led to the fall of PM Neville Chamberlain in May 1940, and escalated 
animosities by ending the ‗Phony War‘ against Germany. 
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Sixty years ago England had a special aptitude or a special advantage in 
practically every branch of manufacture, more especially in the manufac-
tures that were of most universal use and capable of supporting the largest 
population. To the England of Cobden‘s day universal Free Trade would 
undoubtedly have been an enormous benefit. It would have fastened our 
economic yoke upon the whole world, and made us the centre of a great 
trade empire, more powerful than any political empire has ever been. The 
Free Traders of that day fully realised this. … the introduction of Free Trade 
in 1846 may have been well worth the risk; indeed, it may have been a pity 
that it was not introduced much earlier. But it was a speculation none the 
less, and it ought to have abandoned as soon as it became clear that the 
other side was not prepared to take up the offer, say by 1880 at the very 
latest.  (Amery, 1906, pp. 52-53) 
 
 
7.13 British policy after List - the Edwardians 
 
England continued her policy of trade - seemingly and rhetorically ‗lib-
eral‘, for decades after List – and she continued to add vast areas to the 
British crown (Cf. e.g. Cain and Hopkins, 1993). With time, however, 
competitors for markets and power, such as the USA, Japan and Rus-
sia, but in particular Germany, arose and became the bogeyman and 
reason for British re-armament especially from the 1890s and onwards. 
In his Economic Development of the North Atlantic Community, Dudley 
Dillard writes that due to Germany‘s economic advance in the late 19th 
Century, she took the place of France as Britain‘s main foe, 
 
Germany‘s rapid growth towards becoming the leading industrial country 
in the years between 1870 and 1914 disturbed the political and military 
balance of power between the European nations. At least from the time of 
Louis XIV until Napoleon I France had been the most powerful nation in 
Europe. Great Britain took care of the balance of power both over against 
Louis XIV and Napoleon‘s France. By alternately supporting Prussia, Aus-
tria and other of the continental rivals of France, the British could hold 
France in check. By the beginning of the 20 century Germany had taken 
the place of France as the strongest nation on the continent. In order to 
uphold the balance of power in Europe the British now allied with France 
against Germany. (Dillard, 1973, pp. 92-93)  
 
At the turn of the 20th Century, there was a heated debate in the 
British Empire regarding how to deal with the fact that Germany and 
the USA were overtaking Great Britain.467 It is interesting to observe 
that the USA overdid Britain in manufacturing more than Germany, but 
                                       
467 In this debate Cecil Rhodes‘ close friend and editor of the London Times, 
William Stead, promoted an transatlantic ‗Sea-powers‘ alliance between the 
British Empire and the USA, an effort that was adopted and continued well into 
WW II and beyond (Cf. Stead, 1899; and Adams, 1900; as well as Amery, 1906; 
and Williams, 1888 and 1896 - not forgetting Viscount Milner‘s Constructive 
Imperialism; Milner, 1907) 
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she was not considered as a major threat. Furthermore, although USA 
overdid Britain in armament far more then Germany, she was still not 
considered as a major threat.   
André Maurois describes how dissolution with the old Liberal policy 
led to a search for a new ideology in England, and found it in the Tory 
social-Imperialism (of Benjamin Disraeli) rejuvenated by Joseph Cham-
berlain et al, which led to the Anglo-Boer war, 
 
A common platform was not easy to find. Masses are animated and kept 
moving only by a single faith. And this faith was the Imperialism of Disraeli, 
rejuvenated by Chamberlain. Why did a policy rejected in 1880 triumph in 
1895? Firstly because in political strife defeat is the path to victory. A party 
in power wears out its strength. ... Those upper classes  ...  were ... becom-
ing conservative. The Liberal party missed their money bags. ...  
The younger intellectuals, thirsting after new ideas, were turning away 
from doctrines of Liberalism which, though bold in 1830, had a outworn 
look in 1880. They were soon to turn either to Fabian socialism or to Tory 
democracy. And finally the halfpenny Press … called for great events. ―What 
sells a newspaper?‖ ...  
―The first answer is War. ... Imperialism ... won over the Press as it won 
over the brewers.  
But a policy of self-interest, pride and spectacles would not have sufficed 
to attract the English voter. ... Imperialism could only if it became what 
Gladstone‘s pacifism had formerly been, a moral movement. But the diffi-
culty of synthesizing conquest and duty had by then been realized by some 
great spiritual chemists. Cecil Rhodes, the Napoleon of South Africa, be-
lieved in the heaven-sent mission of the British race. ... Kipling was the po-
et of this religion. ... He sang the duty of taking up the White Man‘s Burden, 
... Throughout the  world as in Palmerstone‘s time, British interests were 
protected with acerbity and a disdainful superiority. And such an attitude 
was fatally bound to lead to conflict when some other race was brought to 
stand up against this intrinsic will. The South African War was the natural 
outcome of Chamberlain‘s politics.‖ (Maurois, 1933, pp. 82-84) 
 
The (fifth) Anglo-Boer war 1899-1902,468 (often called ‗The Second 
South African War‘), made a huge impression on the world and on the 
                                       
468 In order to pressure the sovereign Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek into sub-
mission (aka the Transvaal Republic, today a region in South Africa), London 
e.g. in 1895 ―first‖ tried to stage a fake rebellion from within; then she tried en-
circlement and trade blockade, but neither worked (Cf. van Zyl, 1981, p. 312). 
When it finally came to full blown war, London sent in 450 000 well equipped 
soldiers from all over the Empire to quell about 90 000 Boer commandos - 
mainly with rifles on horseback, and in fighting age between 13 and 65. Statis-
tics are unreliable but fighting and disease probably claimed some 24,000 Brit-
ish lives; 12,000 African lives; and 7.000 Afrikaners. ( 
Furthermore General Kitchener, introduced ‗methods of barbarism‘: The Brit-
ish Empire fought the guerilla and the rest of the population by building a forti-
fied wall right across the land; scorching the land; burning farms and villages; 
killing the life-stock; as well as poisoning wells and salting fields. A quarter of 
the population, some 118.000 women and children were imprisoned in 'concen-
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British Empire. France and Russia even asked Germany to join them in 
an intervention to support the Boers, but interestingly Germany turned 
it down and this saved England (Cf. Aall, 1939, Ch. 25). In effect, Ger-
many ‗sacrificed‘ the Boers in order to please London, it seemed - and 
in vain: The German Emperor was also able to play it cynical - and in-
tricate. As the Russian PM Sergei Witte recounts in his Memoirs: Ger-
many set the Boers up, in order to distract and weaken England, as 
Germany tried with Russia in the East,469  
 
… it had been the intention of German diplomacy and of the German Em-
peror himself to drag us, by hook or crook, into Far-Eastern adventures, so 
as to divert our forces to the East and leave them a free hand in Europe. It 
may properly be mentioned here that Emperor William is also partly to 
blame for the Boer War. He ostentatiously encouraged President Krüger to 
refuse England's demands, sending him a most demonstrative and provoca-
tive telegram. Of course, when the war broke out, he discreetly withdrew in-
to the background. As a result, the Republic of the Transvaal was destroyed 
and England considerably weakened for the time being. For those who wor-
ship nationalism in the extreme Emperor William is an ideal example of an 
eminent ruler. He stops at nothing to benefit the country and the people he 
governs. (Witte, 1921, pp. 411-412) 
 
Eventually London won the South African War, but the poor British 
performance470 as against a band of poorly equipped farmers made 
                                                                                                                
tration camps, deliberately under miserable conditions in order to pressure the 
combatting men into surrender; Starvation, measles and typhus etc. killed app. 
28 000 of the captives, a culling rate of some 25 %. In addition, app. 25 000 
prisoners of war were sent to ‗concentration camps‘ abroad, and 115.000 Afri-
cans were interned in local concentration camps. Whole regions were depopu-
lated and a 65 % majority of the dead Afrikaners were children. (Cf. e.g. de 
Kock, 1981. The Anglo-Boer War, 1899-1902, pp. 350, 353, 356 and 360; Pa-
kenham, The Boer War, 1979: the Epilogue ‗Winners and Losers‘, p. 572 ff)  
In a speech on July 25, 1900, the future PM of Great Britain, Lloyd George 
said: "A war of annexation, however, against a proud people must be a war of 
extermination, and that is unfortunately what it seems we are committing our-
selves to …" (Gilbert, 1987, p. 183) 
469 A parallel is how the Western powers incited and set up Poland in 1939, 
described by the British military strategist Liddell Hart in his classic, History of 
the Second World War (Cf. Hart, 1970, pp. 10-13), in order to trigger a war with 
Germany; make Germany focus eastwards; resulting in a clash with Russia and 
weakening them both.  
470 Thomas Pakenham describes the British humiliation in his classic The 
Boer War, and begins the Introduction in this way, ―The war declared by the Bo-
ers on 11 October 1899 gave the British, in Kipling‘s famous phrase, ‗no end of 
a lesson‘.  The British public expected it to be over by Christmas.  It proved to 
be the longest (two and three-quarter years), the costliest (over £200 million), 
the bloodiest (at least twenty-two thousand British, twenty-five thousand Boer 
and twelve thousand African lives) and the most humiliating war for Britain be-
tween 1815 and 1914.‖ (Pakenham, 1979, Introduction) 
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London realise that she was hardly fit to tackle a modern industrial 
contender, like Germany. Bernard Semmel writes,  
 
It was a time of crisis, a period of domestic violence (suffragette, Or-
angeman, syndicalist), and of heightening fears of Imperial Germany. 
(Semmel, 1960, p. 244)  
 
In her article The Character of Edwardian Nationalism, Ann Summers 
describes the media hype and scare,471 
 
The number and frequency of invasion scares in the Edwardian period 
seem barely credible to us today, and some contemporaries were also highly 
suspicious of them. James Anson Farrer, a member of the Anglican Peace 
League and an unremitting opponent of the National Service League, wrote 
in 1909:21 
‗An ‗ignominious panic of invasion‘ is the only chance that Jingoism has 
for inducing us to surrender our liberty at the dictation of the restless am-
bitions of our military advisers, who wish to see us cut a figure in the fu-
ture wars of the Continent.‘ (Summers, 1981, p.75, footnote omitted) 
 
Research in how this media scare came about has brought many in-
teresting links to the contemporary military complex.472  
A fitting metaphor might be to say that the British Empire acted like 
a tiger forced into a corner; the South African experience to an extraor-
dinarily degree moulded the British elite and shaped its view of the sit-
uation regarding the prospects of the British Empire, both concerning 
a) Socio-political affairs; b) Strategic and military affairs; and c) Eco-
nomic affairs.  
 
a) Socio-political affairs;  
 
In the period after the major crash in 1873 until 1932, Great Britain 
found herself gradually in the process of being overtaken industrially, 
by initially less advanced- and protectionist countries.  
Several social movements473 reacted to this development, and pro-
moted change in the hitherto liberal policy (domestically and regarding 
foreign trade). They saw this as a needed remedy, to preserve the glory 
of the Empire, as well as Industry and employment, and the welfare of 
the common people. Their mutual main agenda seem to have consisted 
                                       
471 She thus reminds us of similar policies recently, if one substitutes ‗terror-
ism‘ for ‗invasion‘. 
472 Cf. e.g. Morris, The Scaremongers; The Advocacy of War and Rearmament 
1896-1914, 1984 and Pugh, The Cost of Sea Power. The Influence of Money on 
Naval Affairs from 1815 to the Present Day, 1986 
473 They were; various Social- Imperial movements; National Efficiency 
movements; Tariff Reform movements; the English Historical School in econom-
ics; and even the Labour elite groups: The Fabian Society and The Coefficient 
Club. (Cf. Semmel, 1960; Imperialism and Social Reform: English Social-Imperial 
Thought 1895-1914.  
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in two intertwined goals, serving each other: Preserving the Empire, se-
curing, and lifting the social position of the working class.  
 
The core political themes of the period were: 
 
1) Explicit emulation of Bismarck‘s German tariff union (disagree-
ment). 
2) ―Breeding an Imperial Race‖ fit to rule the Empire (agreement). 
a) Explicit emulation of Bismarck‘s social reform (disagreement on 
how to finance it). 
b) Eugenics - or ‗racial cleaning‘ – permeating all political parties: 
Liberals, Conservatives and Socialists alike, except the Cobde-
nites.474  
At the turn of the 20th Century and the most heated debate, there 
were largely four factions: 
 
1. Working class movement (Labour + the trade unions) vacillated. 
2. Anti-imperialists (The Liberal Party‘s ―Radicals‖, i.e. ‗Cobdenites‘) 
were free traders. 
3. Imperial-Liberals (The Liberal Party‘s ‗Imperial‘ faction) were free 
traders. 
4. Imperial-Unionists (Tory, Conservative Party‘s majority) were pro-
tectionists.475  
 
The protectionist group argued for ‗imperial preference‘, explicitly 
modelled on the German ‗Zollverein‘, By stressing the common fate of 
the nation, the movements served to prepare the way for Corporatism; 
as with post-WW I Fascism; and with post-WW II Social-Democracy. 
Almost all promoted the breeding of an ‗Imperial Race‘ and many saw 
elitist rule as fit to repair the dwindling powers of the Empire. There-
fore, all the elements of Fascism were vividly present on England‘s polit-
ical scene before WW I, but historians most often pass by this inconven-
ient cultural-political phenomenon.476  
According to Bernard Semmel, Imperialism and Social Reform: English 
Social-Imperial Thought 1895-1914 there was unanimous support for 
                                       
474 The eugenics tradition goes at least back to the academic tradition from 
the 1850s of Charles Darwin, Francis Galton and Herbert Spencer, and most 
likely far further back in order to legitimise e.g. the old slave trade that finally 
was forbidden in 1807 and the colonial empire. The Cobdenites were the ‗Rad-
icals‘ (Liberalists), as opposed to the Liberal-Imperialists within the Liberal 
Party. 
475 It was strengthened when Joseph Chamberlain brought in the Unionist 
faction of the Liberal Party in 1895. The term ‗Unionist‘ refers to the prefer-
ence for a continued union with Ireland. 
476 It is nevertheless described in e.g. The Crisis of Liberalism: New Issues of 
Democracy (Cf. Hobson, 1909), on a larger cultural canvas in The Strange Death 
of Liberal England (Cf. Dangerfield, 1936); and in The Origins of the Lloyd George 
Coalition: The Politics of Social-Imperialism 1900-1918 (Cf. Scally, 1975). 
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‗Social-Darwinism‘ of two kinds, one for domestic use and one for Impe-
rial use, Internal - and External Darwinism, as Semmel calls them.  
As a part of his passion for ‗national efficiency‘, Francis Galton and 
his student Karl Pearson claimed state responsibility for creating a race 
fit for imperial endeavours, ―a race fit to rule‖ (Cf. Semmel, 1960; and 
also Searle, 1971; and Searle, 1976).477 This entailed imperial expan-
sion and the ―duty to civilise‖ less developed nations.478  
 
b) Strategic and military affairs 
 
London prepared herself for the upstart militarily, by a radical trans-
formation of the complete military system, starting in earnest in 1902 
after the coronation of King Edward VII. His personal adjutant, Sir John 
Fisher, was appointed First Sea Lord in 1904 and immediately intro-
duced the so-called ‗Naval revolution‘. In 1904 Lord Fisher favoured 
larger battle ships and their location in the North Sea, since he saw the 
Baltic as Germany‘s weak flank. Fisher planned to force through the 
Danish sounds followed by a landing in (German) Pomerania and a 
forced march 150 km south to Berlin, accompanied by the Russians. 
Fisher describes a, 
 
… landing 90 miles from Berlin on that 14 miles of sandy beach in 
Pommerania impossible of defence against a battle fleet …  (Fisher, 1919a, 
p. 212) 
 
In 1905, Berlin watched the emerging British strategy with nervous-
ness and worries, since it could ram them in their heart, and threaten 
them with a blockade. Therefore, also Germany continued its naval ar-
                                       
477 ‗Internal Darwinism‘ was a matter of achieving a sound stock of people, 
especially the working class, fit to fight for Imperial glory. The scientific meth-
od of the day for the breeding of an Imperial Race came under the name of 
Eugenics, which caught the minds of broad parts of the people like religion.   
‗External Darwinism‘ was a matter of viewing the British people as fit to 
rule the conquered territories with their manifold races scattered around the 
world. In this way, External Darwinism to some extent was dependent upon 
the success of Internal Darwinism. So, being an adherent of one kind of Dar-
winism did in no way preclude adherence to the other kind of Darwinism. 
According to Semmel, early external Darwinists included Conservative 
thinkers like T. Carlyle, B. Kidd, C. Kingsley (all critical of ―inferior races‖, and 
many of the below e.g. Spencer and Ruskin), and Liberal thinkers like H. 
Spencer, C. Dickens and J. Ruskin. Internal Darwinists included Liberal 
thinkers like John Stuart Mill, H. Spencer, T. Huxley, Bright and C. Darwin. 
Social Darwinism also had its devoted supporters among the Socialists such 
as the Fabians, and the leading persons were H. G. Wells, G. B. Shaw, S. 
Webb and often forgotten: W. Hewins and H. Mackinder (Cf. Semmel, 1960 
and Searle, 1971 and 1976). 
478 In a Norman tradition that started with the ―civilising‖ efforts in ―barbari-
an‖ Ireland, in 1169 AD, designed to bring the ‗heretic‘ Irish Church under the 
control of the Holy Sea of Rome. 
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mament. But according to Heinz Neukrichen‘s Seemacht im Spiegel der 
Geschichte (‗Naval Power in the Mirror of History‘), the German navy in 
1906 was little in comparison with the later adversaries in WW I, and 
amounted to 12,5 % of their naval forces taken all together. Therefore, 
the German navy hardly constituted a threat (Cf. Neukirchen, 1982, p. 
314). Nevertheless, as Lord Fisher wrote, there was still reason to cull 
newcomers, 
 
I approached His Majesty and quoted certain sayings of Mr. Pitt about 
dealing with the probable enemy before he got too strong. It is admitted that 
it was not quite a gentlemanly sort of thing for Nelson to go and destroy the 
Danish fleet at Copenhagen without notice, but  — it seemed to me simply a 
sagacious act on England‘s to seize the German Fleet when it was so very 
easy of acomplishment in the manner I sketched out to his Majesty. … 
(Fisher, 1919a, p. 18) 
 
According to Theodore Ropp‘s War in the Modern World, the encircle-
ment of Germany also took place at sea, and existing British forces were 
relocated thanks to a row of new treaties around the world, with Japan, 
France and the USA, 
 
As might have been predicted from a really careful study of British histo-
ry, Britain had met the threat by agreements with her other rivals which 
enabled her to concentrate against Germany. (Ropp, 1959, p.195) 
 
First Sea Lord Fisher continues,  
 
All were against me in 1904, … — when the navy was turned inside out 
— ships, officers, men. A New Heaven and a New Earth! 160 ships put on 
the scrap. - They squirmed when I concentrated 88% of the British Fleet in 
the North Sea, … And they squirmed me now when I say at one stroke the 
war could be ended. It could be! (Fisher, 1919a, p. 36)479 
 
Lord Fisher writes that the goal was to enter the Baltic (and Germa-
ny),  
 
Mr. Churchill was behind … the Baltic project, and also in his belief that 
the decisive theatre of the war was beyond doubt in Northern waters; and 
both he and Mr. Lloyd George, the chanceller of the Exchequer, 
magnificently responded to the idea of constructing a great Armada … 
(Fisher, 1919a, p. 55) 
I remember that at the War Council held on January 28th 1915 11.30 
a.m. Mr. Churchill announced, that the real purpose of the Navy was to 
obtain access to the Baltic, … the third phase was the clearing of the Baltic. 
Mr. Churchill laid stress on the importance of this latter operation, because 
                                       
479 Discussed at length by the Ambassador Einar Maseng, in his Perspective 
on the foreign policy of the North-European countries in the last centuries, 1972, 
Vol. III, Ch. 6. 
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Germany always had been and still was very much afraid of being attacked 
in the Baltic. (Fisher, 1919a, p. 56) 
 
Great Britain countered the efforts towards a Scandinavian pact of 
neutrality since this would hinder their access to the Baltic and Ger-
many and the supporting use of Norwegian ports as well as increase the 
resistance to the unpopular British blockade policy. Great Britain also 
counteracted ‗Nordismen‘ or ‘Scandinavism‘ (Scandinavian co-operation 
efforts) and also encouraged the Danes to refuse Germany‘s suggestion 
in 1864 regarding a split of the German Duchy of Schleswig480 along the 
language barrier, in order to counteract the unification of the German 
speaking peoples into Germany. Furthermore, London encouraged 
Sweden to resist Norwegian demands for independent representation 
abroad, thus fuelling Norwegian demand for complete independence. 
Thereby London could gain full control over German access to the North 
Sea. (Cf. Maseng, 1972, Vol. III, Ch. 2). The topping of the Nordic cake 
came when the Danish Prince Frederick, whose highest wish it was to 
become a British naval officer, was selected to be King Haakon VII of 
Norway and married to King Edward VII‘s daughter Princess Maud. 
 
c) Economic affairs 
 
The crucial political issue around the turn of the 20th Century was how 
to win votes from the Labour movement, through promises of employ-
ment, wages, and social reforms. The major economic debate was over 
trade policy and its effect on employment etc. Eventually the Imperial-
Liberal group, had won by 1908 with the support of Labour, and man-
aged to implement major social reforms explicitly modelled on Bis-
marck‘s reforms, along with imperial expansion and explicit ‗jingo‘ 
preparations for war with Germany. In a nutshell, it seems as if Labour 
was ‗bought‘ off by the City. The factor that continuously split the So-
cial Imperialism movement was the question of tariff policy: ―Free‖ or 
―fair‖. 
The protectionist wing - the Conservatives and (formerly Liberal) Un-
ionists, who saw Britain‘s future as the continued workshop of the 
world - lost out in the election of 1908, against the coalition of the City 
(the Liberal Imperialists and the Radicals of the Liberal Party) and La-
bour, seeing the future of Britain as a financial and logistic hub. How-
ever, the same coalition invited the protectionists into the core of power, 
as an elitist agreement within the ‗Governing Group‘. (Cf. Semmel, 
1960, p. 231 ff) 
In sharp contrast to the tradition developed by Leibniz, List and the 
American System who all hailed the strategy of the Harmony of Inter-
ests, the predominant tradition among the elite in England - a more 
                                       
480 The German Duchy of Schleswig was ruled by the Danish King, due to his 
parallel position as Duke of Schleswig. 
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brutish tradition of Malthusian-Darwinistic mode of thought481 - con-
tributed to British neo-Mercantilism before and after WW I.  
Gustav Schmoller commented, concerning the Edwardian period after 
1903 and concerning Joseph Chamberlain‘s policy, that violence took 
the place of honest competition in trade policy, leading to WW I,  
 
... a brutal imperialism of conquests and alliances took the place of the 
conservative Chamberlainian imperialism with the solution: Germaniam es-
se delendam.482 It is the Great British policy which had to lead to the world 
war in 1914. It is the retreat into mercantilist policy of violence of the 17. 
and 18. Century. One intends to remove the unpleasant competition by vio-
lence and destruction instead of through better ships and goods. 
It is the politics which as a consequence likewise has prevented the idea 
of a trade league in Middle-Europe,  ...  a most mutually favouring customs 
union which would reach from Belgium through Germany to the Persian 
Gulf. (Schmoller, 1900-1919, vol. II, p. 734) 
 
In spite of his great efforts, ‗Red Joe‘ Chamberlain did not succeed in 
turning around the trade policy of the British Empire. The adoption of 
protection by influential persons of the British Empire did not succeed 
totally, since this faction lost when the tariff debate culminated in 1903 
with the Commonwealth Tariff Conference. Eventually protection was 
adopted, so-called Imperial Preference policy, at the Imperial Conference 
in 1932 in Ottawa, Canada, and through the efforts of Joseph Cham-
berlain‘s son, Neville Chamberlain. 
This system of ‗preferential trade‘ was dismantled only after US Pres-
ident Franklin D. Roosevelt‘s Lend-Lease terms were agreed to by (the 
half-American) British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in 1941. Mi-
chael Hudson describes the process in the chapter, Lend Lease and 
Fracturing of the British Empire, 1941-45. Hudson begins the chapter 
with a quotation,  
 
Along with its immediate purpose, lend-lease had from the beginning an 
important postwar aspect. . . . Lend-lease was a successful case of postwar 
planning in wartime. – Council on Foreign Relations, The United States in 
World Affairs, 1945-47 (New York: 1947), p. 344. (Quoted in Hudson, 2003, 
ch.4, p. 119) 
 
The unravelling of the British Empire‘s preferential system finally al-
lowed the US to fulfil her long-run dream of free access to the British 
colonial markets for US industry. With some reason, we may therefore 
say that it was Britain‘s closest friend that killed the British Empire, for 
the American companies, in a classic trade war - mercantilist style.  
Roosevelt thereby dissolved the preferential trade system of the Brit-
ish Empire, just as List had called for, but Roosevelt also placed the US 
                                       
481 Cf. the section Reductionism and consequences – a contrast, in chapter 3. 
482 Meaning, ‗Germany is to be destroyed‘. This is close to Emperor Cato's 
claim that ‗Carthago nihil esset‘. (My comment) 
444 
 




7.14 German awakening 
 
Commenting upon Dr. John Bowring‘s Report on the German Zollverein 
to Lord Viscount Palmerston, 1840, and the English proposals for a 
trade agreement with Germany, List wrote that England planned to de-
stroy German industry and reduce Germany to an agricultural colony of 
England, 
 
It is therefore no exaggeration if we maintain that the tendency of the 
English proposals aims at noting but the overthrow of the entire German 
protective system, in order to reduce Germany to the position of an English 
agricultural colony. (List, 1841a, p. 402) 
 
List claimed that the Britons treated the Germans worse than they 
treated a conquered people,  
 
Nevertheless the all-monopolising islanders would not even grant to the 
poor Germans what they conceded to the conquered Hindoos, viz. to pay for 
the manufactured goods which they required by agricultural produce. In 
vain did the Germans humble themselves to the position of hewers of wood 
and drawers of water for the Britons. The latter treated them worse than a 
subject people. Nations, like individuals, if they at first only permit them-
selves to be ill-treated by one, soon become scorned by all, and finally be-
come an object of derision to the very children. (List, 1841a, p. 398)  
 
List writes that at first the Prussian bureaucracy and universities 
were taken by Smith‘s theory, but the reality of industrial distress 
changed the opinion, 
 
… the Prussian customs tariff had undergone many changes in the direc-
tion of absolute free trade, and no longer afforded any sufficient protection 
against English competition. At the same time the Prussian bureaucracy 
long strove against the country‘s cry for help. They had become too strongly 
imbued with Adam Smith‘s theory at the universities to discern the want of 
the times with sufficient promptness. There even still existed political econ-
omists in Prussia who harboured the bold design of reviving the long-
exploded ‗physiocratic‘ system. Meanwhile the nature of things here too 
proved a mightier force than the power of theories. The cry of distress 
raised by the manufacturers, hailing as it did from districts still yearning 
after their  former state of connection with France, whose sympathies it was 
necessary to conciliate, could not be safely disregarded too long. (List, 
1841a, p. 86) 
 
List explains how German belief in the cosmopolitan system, was be-





… people in Germany have ceased to indulge in cosmopolitical dreams. 
People here now think for themselves—they trust their own conclusions, 
their own experience, their own sound common sense, more than one-sided 
systems which are opposed to all experience. They begin to comprehend 
why it was that Burke declared in confidence to Adam Smith ‗that a nation 
must not be governed according to cosmopolitical systems, but according to 
knowledge of their special national interests acquired by deep research.‗ 
People in Germany distrust counsellors who blow both cold and hot out of 
the same mouth. People know also how to estimate at their proper value the 
interests and the advice of those who are our industrial competitors. Final-
ly, people in Germany bear in mind as often as English offers are under 
discussion the well-known proverb of the presents offered by the Danai-
dae.483 (List, 1841a, p. 397) 
 
List continues by writing that a popular opinion gained weight, that 
the English strategy was to undermine the wealth and power not only of 
North America and Germany, but also of the whole European Continent 
by stifling the baby in the cradle, and two Parliament speeches in Lon-
don added weight to this new German opinion, 
 
More and more the opinion spread at the time that the English Govern-
ment were favouring in an unprecedented manner a scheme for glutting the 
markets on the Continent with manufactured goods in order to stifle the 
Continental manufactures in the cradle. This idea has been ridiculed, but it 
was natural enough that it should prevail, first, because this glutting really 
took place in such a manner as though it had been deliberately planned; 
and, secondly, because a celebrated member of Parliament, Mr Henry 
Brougham (afterwards Lord Brougham), had openly said, in 1815, ‗that it 
was well worth while to incur a loss on the exportation of English manufac-
tures in order to stifle in the cradle the foreign manufactures.'‘ This idea of 
this lord, since so renowned as a philanthropist, cosmopolist, and Liberal, 
was repeated ten years later almost in the same words by Mr Hume, a 
member of Parliament not less distinguished for liberalism, when he ex-
pressed a wish that ‗Continental manufactures might be nipped in the bud.‘ 
(List, 1841a, pp. 86-87)484 
 
 
7.15 Essential requirements for a sovereign nation 
 
List describes a European dilemma, and argues that the political divi-
sion of Europe is suboptimal for the development of the individual na-
tions, that conquest by force is unsound policy, but at present a just 
and wise division is unrealistic, 
 
                                       
483 The Danaidae were the fifty daughters offered by King Danaus of Egypt to 
his nephews. They all but one killed their husbands. (My note) 
484 Lord Brougham‘s speech in the House of Commons is printed in full in 
The Edinburgh Review (Brougham, 1816, p. 264).  
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As yet, the apportionment of territory to the European nations does not 
correspond to the nature of things. ... If every nation was already in posses-
sion of the territory which is necessary for its internal development, and for 
the maintenance of its political, industrial, and commercial independence, 
then every conquest of territory would be contrary to sound policy, ... A just 
and wise apportionment of territory is, however, at this day not to be 
thought of... (List, 1841a, pp. 410-411) 
 
List‘s argument was that small nations can only manage well in peri-
ods of peace and as a long as they do not threaten the interest of larger 
nations, i.e. they will manage as long they serve as client states of the 
larger nations. Smaller countries wanting to defend their interests had 
only one option and that was to change the borders. In modern and 
more humane times, they could unite themselves freely by their own 
will (Cf. List, 1841a, pp. 175-177, see quotation below).  
This has been happening all over the world, most notably now in Eu-
rope, as it happened in the US two centuries earlier on. A part of this 
strategy was international trade agreements prepared through interna-
tional conferences on trade, the details of which he spelled out. 
List‘s description of the relation between the Netherlands and Ger-
many touches upon his ideas of the prerequisites of a sovereign and 
therefore viable nation, in the sense that it would be sufficiently self-
sustained to withstand any kind of outside attack, an old political goal 
of Mercantilism - also of the British Empire. List argues e.g. that small 
states cannot fully develop all necessary industrial branches to the ex-
tent that they possess effective and requisite internal competition, 
 
A large population, and an extensive territory endowed with manifold na-
tional resources, are essential requirements of the normal nationality ... A 
nation restricted ... can only possess a crippled literature, crippled institu-
tions for promoting art and science. A small state can never bring to com-
plete perfection within its territory the various branches of production. In it 
all protection becomes mere private monopoly. Only through alliances with 
more powerful nations, by partly sacrificing the advantages of nationality, 
and by excessive energy, can it maintain with difficulty its independence. 
A nation which possesses no coasts, mercantile marine, or naval power, 
or has not under its dominion and control the mouths of the rivers, is in its 
foreign commerce dependent on other countries; ...485 
A nation not bounded by seas and chains of mountains lies open to at-
tack of foreign nations, and can only by great sacrifices, and in any case 
only very imperfectly, establish and maintain a separate tariff system of its 
own. 
Territorial deficiencies of the nation can be remedied either by means of 
hereditary succession ... purchase ... or by conquests ... 
                                       
485 This situation appeared as a result of royal succession in the Habsburg 
Empire and the Netherlands thus came under Spanish rule. It was thereby split 
away from the traditional area of the first German Empire, never to return. 
Germany thereby lost control over a considerable part of its coastline and also 
lost control over its main internal transport artery, the Rhine River. (My note) 
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In modern times a fourth means has been adopted, which leads to this 
object in a manner much more in accordance with justice and with the 
prosperity of nations than conquest, and which is not so dependent on ac-
cidents as hereditary succession, namely, the union of the interests of vari-
ous States by means of free conventions. 
By its Zollverein, the German nation first obtained one of the important 
attributes of its nationality. But this measure cannot be considered com-
plete so long as it does not extend over the whole cost, from the mouth of 
the Rhine to the frontier of Poland, including Holland and Denmark. A nat-
ural consequence of this union must be the admission of both these coun-
tries into the German Bund, and consequently into the German nationality, 
whereby the latter will at once attain what it is now in need of, namely, 
fisheries and naval power, maritime commerce and colonies. Besides, both 
these countries belong, as respects their descent and whole character, to 
the German nationality. The burden of debt with which they are oppressed 
is merely a consequence of their unnatural endeavours to maintain them-
selves as independent nationalities, and it is in the nature of things that 
this evil should rise to a point when it will become intolerable to those two 
nations themselves, and when incorporation with a larger nationality must 
seem desirable and necessary to them. 
Belgium can only remedy by means of confederation with a neighbouring 
larger federation her needs which are inseparable from her restricted terri-
tory and population. (List, 1841a, pp. 175-177) 
 
Gipson writes that the core of British imperial economic policy was 
self-containment, 
 
It should be understood that fundamentally the elaborate system of eco-
nomic controls that were supposed to bind the British Empire in 1763 was 
in essence not only a protectionist system but one designed to make the 
Empire as nearly as possible economically self-contained. (Gipson, 1954, p. 
25) 
 
This indicates that the trade policy of British mercantilism was the 
model both for the American System as well as for List‘s Industrial sys-
tem, as List himself clearly argues. This also indicates a break in Brit-
ish policy, which actually came with the free trade policy of Britain‘s 
Prime Minister Gladstone after 1852. This lasted a few decades, until 
Joseph Chamberlain et al tried to return to the old Mercantilist princi-
ples, at the turn of the 20th Century. 
When Germany (and other before her) tried to copy Great Britain‘s 
success, a clash was inevitable. List‘s idea of a viable sovereign state 
included construction of a navy, able to defend its overseas trade and 
ports from attacks and blockades. Cain and Hopkins quote the very in-
fluential Viscount Esher‘s reaction to the moderate German navy plans 
at the end of the 19th Century, where he pointed to Germany as Great 
Britain‘s natural enemy,  
 
―Germany is going to contest with us the Command of the Sea, and our 
commercial position. She wants sea power and the carrying trade of the 
world. Her geographical grievance has got to be redressed. She must obtain 
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control of the ports at the mouths of the great rivers which tap the middle 
of Europe. She must get a coastline from which she can draw sailors to her 
fleets, naval and mercantile. She must have an outlet for her teeming popu-
lation, and vast acres where Germans can live and remain Germans. These 
acres only exist within the confines of our empire. Therefore, ―L‗Ennemi 
c‗est L‗Allemagne.‖ 486 (Cain and Hopkins, 1993, vol. I, p. 456) 
 
Furthermore, Germany‘s strength seemed to constitute the largest 
threat to Britain for one century,  
 
Indeed, the extent of Germany‘s economic power, its overseas ramifica-
tions and the apparent attempt to combine her formidable military strength 
with a navy as powerful as Britain‘s, were felt to be a threat greater than 
anything Britain had faced in over a century. (Cain and Hopkins, 1993, vol. 
I, p. 458) 
 
 
7.16 Access to sea, navies and blockades  
 
List saw lost opportunities in the past for German splendour and pow-
er. After the Netherlands and thereby the mouth of the main transport 
artery for Germans, the Rhine River, was parted from the Austrian 
Habsburg empire, the German-speaking territories no longer possessed 
the necessary requirements for a sovereign nation, since the access to 
sea was no longer secured. The Habsburg Charles V, Holy Roman Em-
peror (1500-1588) spoiled this opportunity for German greatness, 
 
Had Charles V. cast away from him the crown of Spain as a man casts 
away a burdensome stone which threatens to drag him down a precipice, 
how different would have been the destiny of the Dutch and the German 
peoples! As Ruler of the United Netherlands, as Emperor of Germany, and 
as Head of the Reformation, Charles possessed all the requisite means, 
both material and intellectual, for establishing the mightiest industrial and 
commercial empire, the greatest military and naval power which had ever 
existed—a maritime power which would have united under one flag all the 
shipping from Dunkirk as far as Riga. 
The conception of but one idea, the exercise of but one man‘s will, were 
all that were needed to have raised Germany to the position of the wealthi-
est and mightiest empire in the world, to have extended her manufacturing 
and commercial supremacy over every quarter of the globe, and probably to 
have maintained it thus for many centuries. 
Charles V. and his morose son followed the exactly opposite policy. (List, 
1841a, p. 31) 
 
List frequently refers to various barriers to free trade such as the 
English blockade against Hamburg and Bremen (Cf. List, 1841a, p. 
389) in order to prove that without a navy there is no free and stable 
                                       
21. M.V. Brett, ed. Journals and Letters of Reginald Viscount Esher (1934), II, 




trade for the merchant, no security nor prosperity for the citizens of 
Germany. Of course, this kind of policy was old within the state mer-
cantilist tradition. Since other nations could not be trusted, the mother 
country and colonies would form an autarchy. Colonies were part and 
parcel of this strategy since these would supply the mother country 
with raw materials and markets for manufactured products. Cardinal 
Richelieu and then Colbert487 were feverish in their ambitions to con-
struct fortified ports, a French merchant fleet and above all a navy that 
could match the British, as had Charles V, all with poor results, 
though. The later American ambitions on this area were more success-
ful in overcoming the British resistance mainly due to 1) the successful 
unification of a greater nation – a whole continent – as a parallel to the 
British overtaking of the Dutch city states, and 2) the imitation of Brit-
ish(-Dutch-Venetian) economic policy. 
In the early seventeenth century-France, Richelieu used the Venetian 
system of taxation (Cf. Palm, 1922, p. 79) and navy construction as a 
model for France in order to beat them in their own game, economic 
expansion and further to establish a strong nation-state, creating a 
take-off in science later continued with the policies of Colbert. As the 
Venetian educated Flemish mercantilist Usselincx, Richelieu intended 
to build a navy for the purpose of depriving Spain of its hegemony of the 
seas. In addition, Colbert later desired to deprive England of its domi-
nance of the colonial trade and pirating business.  
Richelieu and later Colbert regarded a strong navy as the key to 
prosperity, as they both envied Holland of her position. The Dutch and 
among others the Venetians, strongly resented the pursuits of a strong 
French navy (Cf. Palm, 1922, pp. 149-150). Concerning similar later 
attempts by Colbert, Paul Kennedy writes,  
 
―The only parallel‖, notes Professor Jones ―is the similar work of Tirpitz 
in the years before 1914‖ - and the reaction on this side of the Channel 
was similar in both cases.488 (Kennedy, 1976, p. 73) 
 
By constructing a German navy, the international ―security market‖ 
or ―power market‖ might become less dominated by the contemporary 
monopolist, Britain. This would allow for greater competition and effi-
ciency in many other markets. A central part of the strategy of relieving 
Britain of her monopoly position would logically have to include the 
admission of the regions bordering the North Sea into the German cus-
toms union. The reason was getting free access for German goods 
through the mouth of the river Rhine (controlled by the Dutch), and the 
mouths of the rivers Elbe and Weser (blocked by the English through 
the occupation of Heligoland – parallel to the 205 year long Dutch 
blockade of Antwerp). Another reason was getting free access for inland 
                                       
487 Chief ministers of the French kings Louis XIII, and Louis XIV respectively. 
488 J.R. Jones: Britain and Europe in the Seventeenth Century, London 1966, 
p. 55 (Kennedy‘s note) 
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German goods through the ports of the ports of Belgium, the Nether-
lands and the Hanse towns, who so far had taxed these goods heavily. 
It also called for the inclusion of Denmark into the customs union in 
order to have free passage between the North Sea and the Baltic Sea 
through Oeresund (or the inclusion of Holstein in order to build the Kiel 
Canal, which was Bismarck‘s compromise). List wrote, 
 
… the German protective system only accomplices its object in a very im-
perfect manner, so long as Germany does not spin for herself the cotton ... : 
so long as she possesses no perfect system of transport by river, canal, or 
railway: so long as the German Zollverein does not include all German mar-
itime territories and also Holland and Belgium. (List, 1841a, p. 426) 
 
England has shown the world how powerful is the effect of facilities of 
transport in increasing the powers of production, and thereby increasing 




7.17 Railroads and the balance between Land- and Sea powers 
 
England as an island and coastal nation depended on maritime 
transport inland and offshore. From the 17th Century, she increased 
this dependence by gradually increasing her dependence on overseas 
colonies for supplies and markets for her products, and gradually es-
tablished superiority on the seas. Any nation that established marine 
activity, and even more so a navy, would per definition potentially 
threaten England‘s supply lines. Moreover, any nation that established 
a productive power potentially large enough to potentially create a navy, 
would also be regarded as a threat, especially if in her neighbourhood.  
Infrastructure is obviously a tool of great importance for an economy. 
Without transport, no market - from the local farmer and his village - to 
the global network container ships and harbours. By being a precondi-
tion for markets, infrastructure is a vital part of a nation‘s productive 
force and power. Militarily too, logistics is a vital part of any war effort.  
As long as any Continental nation mainly depended on maritime 
transport, she was under the sway of England‘s dominance at sea. 
However, with the invention of effective land based transport, the situa-
tion changed dramatically. 
Palmer and Colton indicate the immense role of the invention of rail-
ways. Concerning Napoleon‘s Continental System and blockade against 
Britain, they write, 
 
One obstacle was transportation. Much trading between parts of the 
Continent had always been done by sea: this coastal traffic was now 
blocked by the British. Land routes were increasingly used, ... But land 
transport, at best, was no substitute for the sea. Without railroads, intro-
duced some thirty years later, a purely Continental economy was impossi-
ble to maintain. 
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Another obstacle was tariffs. (Palmer and Colton, 1995, p. 434) 
 
Railroad construction not only made a local economy function more 
efficiently, it also would make military mobility more efficient. Thereby 
land-powers would more strongly challenge the monopoly and upper 
hand sea-powers had so far in history (Cf. List, 1837a, p. 51; 1837b, p. 
135, org.pag. pp. 25-25a.)  
List‘s opinions in this matter, regarding the changed position of Ger-
many, from being the battlefield of Europe to becoming the fortress of 
Europe, was later adopted by one of his students, the central British 
geopolitician Halford Mackinder (Mackinder, 1904), regarding Britain‘s 
historical prime enemy, Russia.  
Edward Earle argues that List‘s contribution regarding the strategic 
importance of railways is remarkable, explaining how it could totally 
transform Germany‘s position in Europe,  
 
 The greatest single contribution that List made to modern strategy was 
his elaborate discussion of the influence of railways upon the shifting bal-
ance of military power. … 
His interest in the economic effects of railways was to be expected, alt-
hough he was much more foresighted than most of his contemporaries. But 
his understanding of the strategic implications to Germany of steam trans-
portation is surprising and by any objective standards quite remarkable. ... 
List saw sooner than anyone else that the railway would make the geo-
graphical situation of Germany a source of great strength, instead of one of 
the primary causes of its military weakness. With political unification forti-
fied by a nation-wide link of railway communications, Germany could be 
made into a defensive bastion in the very heart of Europe.  … and thus pre-
vent the recurrent invasions that had been going on for over two hundred 
years.  … When it is considered that all of the foregoing was written before 
the American Civil War gave the first definitive proof of the military value of 
railways, it shows truly remarkable prescience. (Earle, 1943b, pp. 148-151) 
 
One might disagree slightly with Earle in this, and add that List‘s 
elaboration of how to promote the productive powers surpassed his 
forerunners and was of a far more profound nature than List‘s insight 
into ―railway strategy‖.  
In Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hit-
ler, Edward Earle writes that List‘s memorandum on the issue of an 
Anglo-German alliance,  
 
… reveals an acute appreciation of some of the strategic realities facing 
both countries in the middle of the nineteenth century. To begin with, List 
foresaw what Sir Halford Mackinder was to elucidate more than half a cen-
tury later, that there was nothing eternal about British maritime suprema-
cy. The development of steam railways and steam navigation, he thought, 
might give the Continental powers advantages in relation to the British … 




Edward Earle writes that List suggested that mutual benefits might 
arrive from the construction of a railway link to Asia,  
 
In his project for an Anglo-German alliance he proposed that British com-
munications with India and the Far East should be improved by railway 
lines extending from the English Channel to the Arabian Sea. (Earle, 1943b. 
p. 151) 
 
Nevertheless, the construction of the Berlin-Baghdad railway added 
to the geopolitical challenge for Britain, of which the result was, accord-
ing to some, WW I with WW II as an appendix through the Treaty of 
Versailles.  
Several British historians therefore counter the point of view on the 
peace-creating ability of infrastructure and therefore, indirectly, of free 
trade. The British military historian, Sir Michael Howard, claimed in the 
summer of 1993 (lecture in the Ditchley Foundation), that the German 
railroad construction brought about two world wars, and that new civil-
ian technology may provoke new wars in the future,  
 
… the growth of railways (in particular) created a new major political and 
economic power in the centre of Europe which was to shatter the interna-
tional system with a new series of wars - wars that began with the Prussian 
challenge to the Austrian Empire in 1866 and did not really conclude until 
the defeat and destruction of Nazi Germany in 1945. It would be an ex-
traordinarily rash person who asserted today that similar economic and 
technological changes will not sooner or later transform the underlying 
power-structure of the world in a way that may have to be tested - as it has 
always been tested in the past - by military conflict. This is, alas, a long-
term possibility that cannot be lost to sight. (Howard, 1993) 
 
Also the British historian, Peter Hopkirk, claims that WW I was a re-
sult of the German railroad project Berlin-Baghdad, which was created 
out of the ideas of ―the first German imperialist‖, the economist Frie-
drich List. (Cf. Hopkirk, 1994)  
Mackinder wrote on this theme the same year List was republished in 
London, and one year after the opening of the Trans-Siberian railroad, 
which List in principle had suggested in 1841 (Cf. List, 1841a, ch. 9, p. 
93),  
 
The Russian railways have a clear run of 6000 miles from Wirballen in 
the west to Vladivostok in the east. The Russian army in Manchuria is as 
significant evidence of mobile land-power as the British army in South Afri-
ca was of sea power. True that the Trans-Siberian railway is still a single 
and precarious line of communication, but the century will not be old be-
fore all Asia is covered with railways. The spaces within the Russian Empire 
and Mongolia are so vast, and their potentials in population, wheat, cotton, 
fuel and metals so incalculably great, that it is inevitable that a vast eco-
nomic world, more or less apart, will there develop inaccessible to oceanic 
commerce. ...  
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... Russia replaces the Mongol Empire. ... The oversetting of balance in fa-
vour of the pivot state, resulting in its expansion over the marginal lands of 
Euro-Asia, would permit of the use of vast continental resources for fleet-
building, and the empire of the world would be in sight. This might happen 
if Germany were to ally herself with Russia. ...  
In conclusion, it may be well expressly to point out that the substitution 
of some new control of the inland area for that of Russia would not tend to 
reduce the geographical significance of the pivot position. Were the Chinese, 
for instance, organised by the Japanese, to overthrow the Russian Empire 
and conquer its territory, they might constitute the yellow peril to the 
world‘s freedom just because they would add an oceanic frontage to the re-
sources of the great continent, an advantage as yet denied to the Russian 
tenant of the pivot region. (Mackinder, 1904, pp.260-264) 
 
The construction of the Trans-Siberian railroad was an achievement 
of immense importance strategically, regarding trade and power, threat-
ening British control over Indian and Eurasian trade (Cf. the so-called 
Great Game between Russia and Great Britain, in the 19th century).  
Preceding the achievement of the Eurasian railroads, the Trans-
Siberian- and the Berlin-to-Bombay, and of equal importance in this 
correction of geo-political ‗market failures‘, was the construction of the 
American Trans-Continental railways during the civil war, forging the 
US northern states into an effective challenger of British world hegemo-
ny, the ally of the US southern states.489  
US President Abraham Lincoln, precisely for this reason sent his best 
expert and civil engineer, General Grenville M. Dodge, to help his ally 
Alexander II in Russia, build the Trans-Siberian based on the experi-
ence of the American model of development corridors along transport 
lines - reaping the benefits of an ―artificial‖ high level of population den-
sity. - As well as sending Erasmus Peshine Smith, the modern founder 
of Economics of Energy, or Physical Economics, to Japan for the same 
strategic reason: Challenging the British hegemony. 
 
 
7.18 ‘Independent vassalage’ and tropical colonies  
 
An ironic argument that List makes, is to advice England‘s trading 
partners to apply for colonial status under England, as they would 
surely be better treated and protected as English subjects, than when 
sabotaged and fought against as foes. He ironically suggests this for 
Portugal, Germany, Europe and points to all the advantages that India 
has gained, 
 
Do not we see what Portugal would have gained if she had been governed 
since the Methuen Treaty by an English viceroy—if England had trans-
planted her laws and her national spirit to Portugal, and taken that country 
(like the East Indian Empire) altogether under her wings? Do not we per-
                                       
489 Russia had helped the northern states in the US civil war by breaking the 
British blockade on her ports and trade. 
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ceive how advantageous such a condition would be to Germany—to the 
whole European continent? 
India, it is true, has lost her manufacturing power to England, but has 
she not gained considerably in her internal agricultural production and in 
the exportation of her agricultural products? Have not the former wars un-
der her Nabobs ceased? Are not the native Indian princes and kings ex-
tremely well off? Have they not preserved their large private revenues? Do 
not they find themselves thereby completely relieved of the weighty cares of 
government (List, 1841a, pp. 290-291)490 
 
And List ironically suggest that also the USA might benefit from re-
turning to the status of colonies in the British Empire, 
 
…, it may be urged against us that it would be incomparably more to the 
advantage of the United States if they returned again to the position of an 
English colony. To this we answer, yes, provided always that the United 
States do not know how to utilise their national independence so as to cul-
tivate and develop a national industry of their own, and a self-supporting 
system of commerce and credit which is independent of the world outside. 
(List, 1841a, p. 289) 
 
List then answers; yes, the USA would do better if they had no ambi-
tions for their nation. Furthermore, as colonies the problem would re-
main, because the colonists have no insurance that the mother country 
will continue to treat them well as colonies. Independence and self-
determination of a sovereign nation is the only durable solution and in-
surance of national wealth. 
 
 
7.19 Colonies, division of labour and free trade 
 
When we get to the issue of colonies there might be more substance to 
criticism of List, since List clearly and explicitly was in favour of acquir-
ing colonies.  List‘s system is on this point somewhat inconsistent, but 
not totally so, as we shall see at the end of this section, regarding free 
trade. 
First, it is interesting to note that List believed that other nations are 
capable of raising themselves to the same degree of liberty and devel-
opment as his model country, England, 
 
It is especially owing to her civil, mental, and religious liberty, to the na-
ture and excellence of her political institutions, that the commercial policy 
of England has been enabled to make the most of the natural riches of the 
country, and fully to develop the productive powers of the nation. But who 
would deny that other nations are capable of raising themselves to the 
same degree of liberty? (List, 1841a, p. 322)491 
                                       
490 The preceding part of this quotation may be found in chapter 5; in the 
section, Balance of trade 




Nevertheless, List does not believe that tropical countries are able to 
industrialise. But List does not disfavour non-Europeans for reasons of 
ethnicity; in the following quotation List where he makes an argument 
based on climatically conditions, that disqualifies Texas as fit for indus-
trialisation, a state mainly settled by protestant North-West Europeans,  
 
… Central and South America … 
The above-mentioned countries, including Texas, are for the most part 
adapted for raising colonial produce. They can and will never make great 
progress in manufacturing industry. (List, 1841a, p. 432) 
 
Even so, List explicitly notices the contrary facts, that the East was 
more industrialised than Europe,  
 
Before the discovery of the route round the Cape, the East still far 
surpassed Europe in manufactures. … (List, 1841a, p. 263) 
 
Furthermore, List notices that the diligence of the Indians will lead to 
expansion of production,  
 
It is well known that the Hindoos, owing to great industry and great 
moderation in their food and other wants, especially in consequence of the 
precepts of their religion, which forbid the use of animal food, are 
excessively frugal. To these must be added the want of capital among the 
natives, the great fruitfulness of the soil in vegetable products, and the 
restriction of caste and the great competition of those in want of work. 
The result of all this is, that wages in India are incomparably lower than 
in the West Indies and South America, whether the plantations there are 
cultivated by free blacks or by slaves; that consequently the production of 
India, after trade has been set free in that country, and wiser principles of 
administration have prevailed, must increase at an enormous rate, and the 
time is no longer distant when England will not only be able to supply all 
her own requirements of colonial produce from India, but also export great 
quantities to other countries. (List, 1841a, pp. 417) 
 
Still, List does not mention any need for Indian sovereignty. He 
makes the matter look as if the Indians simply had surrendered by free 
will, and thus makes it a matter of national will and spirit. There is also 
no mention of India‘s repeated riots and protests against English rule. 
This lenient attitude towards England‘s colonial behaviour, contrasts 
with List strong protests against English unfavourable treatment of her 
European trading partners.  
List‘s claim that the tropical nations - like Texas - cannot industrial-
ise is thus left hanging, and even more so when we observe their ad-
vances in the past decades. 
List strongly supports acquiring colonies, for the traditional economic 
reasons regarding access to raw materials and access to a consuming 




a) Natural division of labour 
 
According to List, foreign trade and colonies are a natural consequence 
of industrialization, 
 
It is from manufactures that the nation's capability originates of carrying on 
foreign trade with less civilised nations, of increasing its mercantile marine, 
of establishing a naval power, and by founding colonies, of utilising its sur-
plus population for the further augmentation of the national prosperity and 
the national power. (List, 1841a, p. 209) 
 
List argues that it was essential that a sovereign nation should ac-
quire colonies, and therefore a merchant fleet to carry on trade with the 
colonies and an able navy to protect that trade. List argues that colo-
nies were the requirement that, when fulfilled, would complete the sov-
ereign nation, 
 
The highest means of development of the manufacturing power, of the in-
ternal and external commerce proceeding from it, of any considerable coast 
and sea navigation, of extensive sea fisheries, and consequently of a re-
spectable naval power, are colonies. 
The mother nation supplies the colonies with manufactured goods, and 
obtains in return their surplus produce of agricultural products and raw 
materials; this interchange gives activity to its manufactures, augments 
thereby its population and the demand for its internal agricultural prod-
ucts, and enlarges its mercantile marine and naval power. The superior 
power of the mother country in population, capital, and enterprising spirit, 
obtains through colonisation an advantageous outlet, which is again made 
good with interest by the fact that a considerable portion of those who have 
enriched themselves in the colony bring back the capital which they have 
acquired there, and pour it into the lap of the mother nation, or expend 
their income in it. (List, 1841a, p. 269) 
 
In his list of activities to be promoted, List mentions that manufac-
tures are to be reserved for the mother country, in a preferential system 
that in the British Empire lasted until 1941,492 
 
To import only raw materials and agricultural products, and to export 
nothing but manufactured goods.  
To direct any surplus of productive power to colonisation, and to the 
subjection of barbarous nations. 
To reserve exclusively to the mother country the supply of the colonies 
and subject countries with manufactured goods, but in return to receive on 
preferential terms their raw materials and especially their colonial produce. 
(List, 1841a, p. 367)493 
 
                                       
492 When F.D. Roosevelt forced W. Churchill to accept this as a condition for 
arms support; the Lend-Lease agreement mentioned above, in British policy af-
ter List. 
493 This quotation has also been used in the section, English protectionism 
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List argues that the division of labour between the mother country 
and her colonies, is based upon natural causes,  
 
The exchange of manufactured goods for natural products is the funda-
mental condition on which the position of the present colonies continues. … 
But this exchange between the countries of the temperate zone and the 
countries of the torrid zone is based upon natural causes, and will be so for 
all time. Hence India has given up her manufacturing power with her inde-
pendence to England; hence all Asiatic countries of the torrid zone will pass 
gradually under the dominion of the manufacturing commercial nations of 
the temperate zone; .. (List, 1841a, p. 270) 
 
List argues that the resources and markets of the East constitute 
great opportunities for the European nations, 
 
If we reflect on the course which such a regeneration might possibly 
pursue, the first consideration that strikes one is that the greater part of 
the East is richly provided by nature with resources for supplying the 
manufacturing nations of Europe with great quantities of raw materials and 
necessary articles of every kind, but especially for producing tropical 
products, and in exchange for these for opening unlimited markets to 
European manufacturers. (List, 1841a, pp. 419-420) 
 
b) Colonial goods as a catalyst for activity 
 
List maintains that luxury products are necessary, but not in them-
selves: Because they symbolise social stratification, they act as a source 
for productive exertion of all individuals. There are many types of luxu-
ry goods, some produced domestically and some produced in the tropi-
cal colonies.494 List‘s argument for the necessity of colonial produce de-
pends on the necessity of these specific luxury products.  
List‘s argument for the necessity of colonial imports is rather ad-
vanced. List argues that colonial products have no nutritional value and 
are goods suited for luxury consumption, such as sugar, tobacco, and 
spices.  
 
Colonial products, so far as they do not consist of raw materials for 
manufacturing purposes, evidently act more as stimulants than necessary 
means of subsistence. No one will deny that barley coffee without sugar is 
as nutritious as mocha coffee with sugar; and admitting also that these 
products contain some nutritious matter, their value in this respect is 
nevertheless so unimportant that they can scarcely be considered as 
substitutes for native provisions. With regard to spices and tobacco, they 
are certainly mere stimulants, i.e. they chiefly produce a useful effect on 
society only so far as they augment the enjoyments of the masses, and 
incite them to mental and bodily labour. (List, 1841a, p. 305) 
 
                                       




List argues that this import employs a great many trades and people 
in trade, transport and also in manufacturing in order to pay for im-
ports, 
 
The exchange of colonial products for manufactured goods is of manifold 
use to the productive powers of the countries of the temperate zone. These 
articles serve either, as e.g. sugar, coffee, tea, tobacco, partly as stimulants 
to agricultural and manufacturing production, partly as actual means of 
nourishment; the production of the manufactured goods which are 
required to pay for the colonial products, occupies a larger number of 
manufacturers; manufactories and manufacturing business can be 
conducted on a much larger scale, and consequently more profitably; this 
commerce, again, employs a larger number of ships, of seamen, and 
merchants; and through the manifold increase of the population thus 
occasioned, the demand for native agricultural products is again very 
greatly increased. (List, 1841a, p. 263) 
 
In this way this ―superfluous‖ taste for colonial produce, acts ―as 
stimulants to agricultural and manufacturing production‖, and as 
stimulants to trade, transport, and the production of such means. The 
colonial imports thus act as a kick-starter and catalysts for general 
economic activity. List‘s argument for colonial import resembles his ar-
gument for the beneficial results from demand for luxury products. This 
is only natural since colonial import also constituted a kind of luxury 
products, but of a far grander scale. 
However, this ‗necessity‘ luxury goods and colonial products is not a 
matter of what List prefers personally. The ‗necessity‘ is a matter of re-
ality; what real people actually think and act according to. It is not like-
ly that a nation like Germany would be able to stem a popular demand 
for colonial products, since they would be victims to the tight cultural 
integration of European nations, with Germany surrounded on all bor-
ders by nations that would enjoy colonial products.  
The problem is, as the spirit in the bottle, once out - you cannot get it 
back. If e.g. the Germany states had tried to do just this, their borders 
would have been flooded with contraband, promoting organised crime 
on a grand scale. 
So, in the end, perhaps List was right on this point, given the histori-
cal and geographical circumstances.  
 
c) Benevolent imperialism - Occidental tutelage of the Orient  
 
In 1827, in The American Economist, List promoted a scheme of benevo-
lent imperialism, 
 
It is the task of politics to civilise the barbarous nationalities ... It is the task 
of national economy to accomplish the economical development of the na-
tion, and to prepare it for admission into the universal society of the future. 




Benevolent imperialism has been fashionable during many other oc-
casions in time and space. One remarkable instance was during the de-
scending highlight of the British Empire.495 496 
In 1841, List deals extensively with the decay of the Orient and the 
necessity of Occidental tutelage. He blames the decay of nations and 
empires in Asia and the Middle East on moral corruption, 
  
… it cannot be ignored that the Continental powers have a great national 
economic interest in common in the Eastern question. … It is a conclusion 
long arrived at by all thoughtful men, that a nation so thoroughly 
undermined in her religious, moral, social, and political foundations as 
Turkey is, is like a corpse, which may indeed be held up for a time by the 
support of the living, but must none the less pass into corruption. The 
case is quite the same with the Persians as with the Turks, with the 
Chinese and Hindoos and all other Asiatic people. (List, 1841a, p. 419) 
 
List argues that only an infusion of European morals, vitality, and or-
der will put the house in order, 
 
Wherever the mouldering civilisation of Asia comes into contact with the 
fresh atmosphere of Europe, it falls to atoms; and Europe will sooner or 
later find herself under the necessity of taking the whole of Asia under her 
care and tutelage, as already India has been so taken in charge by England. 
In this utter chaos of countries and peoples there exists no single 
nationality which is either worthy or capable of maintenance and 
regeneration. Hence the entire dissolution of the Asiatic nationalities 
appears to be inevitable, and a regeneration of Asia only possible by means 
of an infusion of European vital power, by the general introduction of the 
Christian religion and of European moral laws and order, by European 
immigration, and the introduction of European systems of government. 
(List, 1841a, p. 419) 
 
List‘s Russian ―follower‖, Prime Minister Sergei Witte, installed 
similar ―benevolent‖ ideas with the Tsar Nikolai II‘s brother Grand Duke 
Mikhail; Witte argues for an educating and protective Russian imperial-
ism in the East; ―In contrast with the Western powers‖, 
 
                                       
495 Many in British society in the latter part of the 19th Century argued for 
the duty to civilise the world, or in Rudyard Kipling‘s words: White Man‘s Bur-
den. Some of these promoters were J.R. Seeley, James Anthony Froude, 
Charles Dilke, John Parkin, and Joseph Chamberlain. Especially John Ruskin 
at Oxford had an immense influence, for instance on Cecil Rhodes in South 
Africa, Parkin especially influenced Viscount Alfred Milner. These politicians 
and writers foresaw the fall of the British Empire unless something drastically 
was done. Their solution was a new kind of Imperialism that legitimised itself 
in bringing light to the world, in the robe of British civilisation. (Cf. e.g. Sem-
mel‘s Imperialism and Social Reform, 1960). One might also mention thinkers 
who inspired the above, such as James Harrington (1611-1677), Thomas Car-
lyle (1795-1881), and T. H. Green (1836-1882).  
496 See also the section above, British policy after List. 
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Russia‘s tasks abroad carry not only a pacific but even a highly cultural 
character in the best sense of the word. In contrast with the Western 
powers, which aim at economic and frequently even political subjugation of 
the peoples of the East, Russia‘s mission in the East must be a protective 
and educational one. It is Russia‘s natural task to guard her neighboring 
Eastern lands which lie in her sphere of influence against the excessive 




d) Colonial free trade 
 
List argues that the barbarous nations of the Occendent will benefit 
from free trade and that furthermore also the Europeans mutually will 
benefit from agreeing on free trade and free seas, without any excluding 
other Europeans from any Occendental market, 
 
From this circumstance, nature appears to have given an indication that 
this regeneration, as generally is the case with the civilisation of barbarous 
peoples, must proceed by the path of free exchange of agricultural produce 
against manufactured goods. For that reason the principle must be firmly 
maintained above all by the European nations, that no exclusive 
commercial privileges must be reserved to any European nation in any part 
of Asia whatever, and that no nation must be favoured above others there 
in any degree. (List, 1841a, p. 420) 
 
Given an international setting where nations behaved egotistically, 
there was no way in getting colonial products except by engaging in the 
scramble for Africa and other areas. 
As List clearly saw that this would lead to conflicts with other indus-
trialised nations, he repeatedly promoted peaceful solutions through 
free trade and free seas. He argues that all nations, especially England, 
would gain from universal free trade, especially with raw materials. Free 
trade would make the global economy more efficient, as indeed was the 
argument of the radical free traders of the Cosmopolitan School, thus 
expanding demand for both raw materials and also for advanced manu-
factured goods (from England). This would eliminate economic reasons 
for colonies as well as the need for navies to protect overseas trade. The 
only remaining reason for colonies would then be civilising, and he uses 
France regarding North Africa and Germany regarding Turkey as exam-
ples. Such civilising projects would have the mutual benefit of helping 
the less developed nations and expanding the world economy to the 
mutual benefit of all (Cf. List, 1837a, p. 49 and pp. 126-127, and List, 
1841a, pp. 422-423).498 
 
                                       
497 28 Ibid., p. 203. (Laue‘s note, referring to Witte, 1912) 
498 This has also been dealt with in this chapter, in the sections, Combatting 




7.20 List and German policies  
 
There have been many efforts to connect List, and later German econo-
mists in ―his‖ tradition, to the later policies under e.g. Chancellor Otto 
von Bismarck; the start of WW I; the National Socialists; and the start 
of WW II.   
Regarding Bismarck there is some truth to this when it comes to his 
socio-economic policy, and excepting his military campaigns. Somewhat 
ironically perhaps, Bismarck opposed the establishment of German 
tropical colonies. List promoted this for the traditional and normal Eu-
ropean reasons; in order to supply Germany with raw materials and 
markets for industrial goods, in a typical Mercantilist tradition common 
for all contemporary and major European powers. 
Regarding the claims to connect List to the reasons for WW I, and 
WW II, this would be stretching the facts overly. It is a bit peculiar that 
so many insist on blaming List for events that happened almost a cen-
tury after he died, especially so when he held quite contrary opinions 
on almost all these issues, whether war, expansionism, race, slavery or 
dictatorships.499 One exception to this is his views on colonies, where 
his view may be characterised as ‗benevolent‘ imperialism. 
If we move to the specific and immediate events that started WW I and 
WW II - the geo-political theater is so complicated that time and space 
forbids me from going into this. Nevertheless, I will point out some gen-
eral developments on crucial areas, related especially to WW I, but also 
to WW II to the degree that these event are seen as results of a shifting 
of centres technology and trade wars. 
Overall, we may say that List‘s program contributed to the develop-
ment that led to WW I and thereby WW II, at least for the following 
three reasons. His central ideas concerned customs unions, railroads 
(infrastructure), and naval construction. These ideas he had in common 
with the so-called Mercantilist school - with most British politicians 
(especially before Gladstone), Colbert, and with the modern American 
System of Political Economy.  
The difference between some of the latter and List would be that 
whereas List expected and supported mutual benefits to accrue from 
such endeavours, others were less likely to favour the mutual aspect to 
that of monopoly - of power and wealth. Whereas List favoured mutual 
human power over nature, others favoured singular power over other 
peoples. 
The first part of List‘s program, a customs union, would potentially 
shut out English goods, thereby threatening British power and welfare.  
                                       
499 Discussion of List political and pragmatic Liberalism may be found in 
chapter 6, in the sections, Law, individual freedom and democracy, and A 
pragmatic social- liberal. His view on freedom may be found in chapter 2, in the 
sections The core of List‘s ideas: Freedom, and in the section, Industrialisation 
fosters freedom and a humane civilization, in chapter 4.  
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The second part, railroad construction, would create effective mar-
kets in countries where there formerly were none, would elevate the 
productivity of business in these countries, would make army and sup-
ply movements within these countries much more efficient, and when 
laid into underdeveloped areas would open up new markets for the in-
dustry attached to this network. This would strengthen the industrial 
and political competitors of Great Britain. When these ―new‖ areas hap-
pened to be adjacent to a British dominated territory, India, which both 
the Berlin- Baghdad railway and the Trans-Siberian more or less point-
ed towards: This could easily be seen as a provocation and a direct 
threat.  
The third reason, naval construction, was a direct threat to British 
naval supremacy and questioned the British tradition of setting the 
terms in all areas attached to the global seas such as the right to take 
prize in even neutral ships in times of war. Additionally it challenged 
British defence of domestic supplies and communication with its over-
seas territories.500 
Therefore, all these three part of List‘s strategy of developing Germa-
ny and the European Continent by copying the British success, con-
tributed to these two wars and others, not at all because List promoted 
war as such, but rather since their implementation challenged the 
hegemonist of world power, Great Britain.  
Whether List was right or wrong in promoting his ideas is certainly a 
matter of dispute. Nevertheless, List argues that there never was, nor is, 
any objective reason why any one nation should monopolise technical 
and economic progress and thereby dominate world markets single-
handedly (Cf. List, 1841a, p. 366).  
 
 
a) Against racism 
 
Franz Neumann was the legal adviser to the German Social Democratic 
Party. In his Behemoth, The Structure and Practice of National Socialism, 
Franz Neumann in 1942 argues that List and the Katheder Socialists in 
the Historical School developed an imperial theory ―based on German 
racial superiority‖,  
 
The influence of the so called state or Katheder socialists upon the ulti-
mate development of National Socialist racism seems far more important. 
The writings of Friedrich List and Adolph Wagner clearly show the factors 
that contributed to the triumph of racial ideas. These men were attempting 
to counteract socialist theories of class struggle by repudiating liberal polit-
ical thought and by setting up a state capitalist scheme that would ‗incor-
porate‘ the working classes and imbue the whole people with the spirit of 
racial superiority... List was thus to the first to develop the theory that Hit-
                                       
500 Concerning the Berlin-Baghdad railway or the Haldane Mission of re-
straining Tirpitz naval construction programme, see e.g. Quigley, 1966, p. 218. 
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ler brought to full flower … on the basis of German racial superiority. 
(Neumann, 1942, p. 104-106) 
 
One may defend List against such claims of racial superiority, as with 
Franz Neumann above, first because there is scant proof of it, and sec-
ondly because he spent his whole life in promoting the development of 
backward countries, thirdly because he repeatedly attacked slavery, 
fourthly, because he claims that countries with mixed races may be su-
perior.  
Nevertheless, he also airs the opinion that the German race (people) 
has been selected by providence, but is this ‗racism‘ proper? One may 
claim some ignorance of List concerning his view of the lacking poten-
tials of countries in the ‗torrid‘ (tropical) zone, but this can hardly be 
construed as racism. This is especially so, since one of his examples, 
Texas, to a large degree was populated by German Protestants.  
List being a child of the philosophical Idealism that dominated con-
temporary Germany501, is also a strong indication of his anti-racist 
stance: It is logically unlikely that an idealist will claim that matter, or 
say genetics, dominates spirit - as opposed to the human reductionism 
practiced by Thomas Malthus and his followers in Great Britain.502 
List points out that nations of mixed races have ―have surpassed all 
other nations‖, but he adds the precondition ―a crossing of race fre-
quently repeated and comprising the whole nation‖, indicating a fully 
integrated nation and community with a shared identity, since this ob-
viously facilitates communication and trust, which takes time, 
 
It is an old observation, that the human race, like the various breeds of 
animals, is proved mentally and bodily by crossings; … It is undeniable that 
the mixing of two quite different races results, almost without exception, in 
a powerful and fine future progeny; and this observation extends to the 
mixing of the white race with the black in the third and the fourth genera-
tion. This observation seems to confirm more than anything the fact, that 
those nations which have emanated from a crossing of race frequently re-
peated and comprising the whole nation, have surpassed all other nations 
in power and energy of the mind and character, in intelligence, bodily 
strength, and personal beauty.503 (List, 1841a, p. 220) 
 
In the footnote of this quotation, List elaborates further,  
 
The advantages of the crossing of race are not only apparent in the mix-
ing of different nations, but also in the mixing of different family stocks in 
one and the same nation. … If this is a law of nature, the rise and progress 
which the cities of the Middle Ages displayed shortly after their foundation, 
                                       
501 With e.g. Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, based in the Neo-Platonism of 
Plato, Bruno, Kepler, Cusa and Leibniz. 
502  Cf. the sections, Critic of Malthus‘ materialism; Reductionism and conse-
quences – a contrast, in chapter 3; and the subsection Reductionism in chapter 
2. 
503 2. According to Chardin, …. (List‘s note) 
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as well as the energy and fine bodily appearance of the American people, 
are hence partly explained. (List, 1841a, p. 220n) 
 
In his Race and Reich: The Story of an Epoch, Joseph Tenenbaum 
likewise claims that List was the forerunner of German predatory na-
tionalism and laid the foundation for a racial state, 
 
The tragedy was that Germany was united not by humanitarian or egali-
tarian slogans, but by the sword of Prussian militarism. The tragedy was 
the greater in that the German type of predatory nationalism, so successful 
in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, became an exportable commodity, ably 
advertised in the market of ideas. The noble conception of humanitarian 
nationalism was captured by the unholy forces of reaction and fettered to a 
tribal totem of Teutonic might. Even political economy was moulded on the 
German pattern of national egotism, under the cloak of national interests 
and economic protectionism.  Friedrich List was the prophet of the new na-
tionalistic economic system of neo-mercantilism, with tariff barriers erected 
for the sake of shutting out competition, and striving for national economic 
self-sufficiency. In his National System of Political Economy, List built an 
economic floor under the pyramid of the future racial state. He envisioned a 
German Reich, extending from Dunkirk to Riga and from the North Sea to 
the Adriatic, ―safeguarded by a wall of political and economic impregnabil-
ity.‖ Bismarck‘s blood and iron nationalism, a predatory bird with the claws 
of an eagle and the beak of a vulture, was the culmination of these tenden-
cies. (Tenenbaum, 1976, p. 8) 
 
Tenenbaum is right in pointing out that List favoured a unification of 
the German speaking peoples, but the geographical places he mentions 
are a related to the enlarged customs union he envisioned, and not a 
part of the nation of Germany that List had hoped for. Tenenbaum 
could have be granted some credit in that List‘s use of the phrase ‖un-
der one flag‖ invites misunderstanding, but the phrase is taken from a 
description of what happened in the 16th Century,504 not of what List 
desired of the future. The allegation of Tenenbaum is a typical example 
of a quotation out of context. 
Tenenbaum is right in pointing out that most of Germany was united 
by Prussia and under the sword, but this was not the dream of many 
Germans, especially West-Germans: They preferred more liberal tradi-
tions, such as with Hegel and List. And when Tenenbaum claims that 
List ―built an economic floor under the pyramid of the future racial 
state‖ he might as well blame a car factory for making the car that a 
                                       
504 The quotation reads such: ―As Ruler of the United Netherlands, as 
Emperor of Germany, and as Head of the Reformation, Charles possessed all 
the requisite means, both material and intellectual, for establishing the 
mightiest industrial and commercial empire, the greatest military and naval 
power which had ever existed -- a maritime power which would have united 




drunkard used to run over a child - or blame Jesus Christ for the Inqui-
sition.  
 
b) Against slavery 
 
When some scholars have seen List as a forerunner of National Social-
ism or Nazism, they confuse List‘s idealist nationalism with the latter‘s 
materialist nationalism and affinities with genetics and eugenics.  
List‘s awareness of the role of power also made him aware of the role 
of racial matters. He argues against slavery both on humanitarian and 
economic reasons. List sees ―abolition of slavery and of vassalage‖ as a 
rich source of productive power (Cf. List, 1841a, p. 139)505 
 
This is an example that he in general saw no conflict between justice 
and economic efficiency and rather found that they mutually supported 
each other in an atmosphere of Harmony of Interests.  
When Neumann claims that List was ―repudiating liberal political 
thought‖, he becomes laughable, since he is accusing a devoted demo-
crat who was sentenced to jail several times for his liberal opinions and 
work, and finally had to emigrate. Furthermore, when Behemoth uses 
List‘s argument for a German customs union as a proof for Hitler‘s ex-
pansionism, he confuses peaceful defence by legal customs regulation, 
with violent military attack. 
 
c) Naval armament 
 
Using naval armament as a suitable example to illustrate the facts more 
closely, in the area where Britain was especially sensitive, since it was 
most crucial both for the island of Britain itself and to her imperial am-
bitions. According to Prof. Hellmut Diwald‘s Der Kampf um die Weltmere 
(‗The Battle for the World Oceans‘), German armament was negligible in 
comparison to British armament up to 1908. Between 1887 and 1898, 
Great Britain, USA, France and Russia doubled their naval fleets, while 
Germany‘s fleet was at a standstill. Great Britain‘s battleships 
(‗Schlachtschiffe‘) in 1883 corresponded to all the other fleets all togeth-
er. Between 1883 and 1897, the ratio of the Axis powers‘ naval forces 
was halved, as it sank from 14 % to 7.6 % of the total naval force of the 
warring parties in WW I (Cf. Diwald, 1980, p. 379 ff.). 
It must also be remembered that Great Britain also could count on 
the navies and other forces of the dominions and colonies of the British 
Empire; Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa etc. which 
are not included in the above statistics. The disparity above is therefore 
underestimated.  
Like England, Germany was very dependent upon trade overseas and 
on both Haag conventions before WW I, she promoted international 
rules of law at sea. In 1912, Germany suggested to halt her construc-
                                       
505 See a larger quotation in the section, Capital of mind, in chapter 4. 
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tion of a naval fleet, if England would accept private property rights at 
sea. This was rejected by England, thereby retaining her supreme rule 
at sea. (Cf. Aall, 1939, Ch. 25)506 
 
 
d) The Anglo-German alliance 
 
List actively favoured an alliance between Britain and Germany, but 
Lord Palmerston and Sir Robert Peel turned down his suggestions in 
1846. Franz Neumann goes perhaps more than a bit too far when he 
blames List for later German alliance policies of quite another nature, 
and even blames List for craving for a semi-global German empire, 
 
List was thus to the first to develop the theory that Hitler brought to full 
flower in Mein Kampf and the National Socialist foreign policy attempted to 
realize during the years preceding the German Russia non aggression pact 
of 1939: a redivision of the earth between Germany and England … (Neu-
mann, 1942, p. 106) 
 
Regarding the Anglo-German alliance that List suggested, this in no 
way means what Neumann superficially interprets as an alliance for ―a 
redivision of the earth‖. What List attempted was peaceful avoidance of 
destructive trade wars between England and Germany, and between 
England and the Continent for that matter.507 List did not suggest a 
military alliance but rather a trade relationship for mutual benefit, and 
an understanding of mutual protection – e.g. of railway lines to India. 
He tried to show that England would benefit and prosper more if she 
allowed Germany to protect herself temporary and thus progress, since 
this would establish larger and more advanced export markets for Eng-
lish products. He tried to convince England that this would be a win-
win policy for all and everyone, as in the final chapter 6, of his proposal 
for an ‗alliance‘ named,  
 
Evidence, that England already has benefitted and also will benefit in the 
future, from the industrial prosperity of Germany through its moderate pro-
tective system (Cf. e.g. List, 1846c, p. 461 ff, my translation).508  
 
There was every reason for List to discuss with England on this is-
sue, since Britain obviously felt threatened by the upstarts.509 Some 70 
years after List, the same problem of protecting one‘s own interests 
without unduly confronting the interests of other nations, is discussed 
                                       
506 See also the section above; England‘s geographical position. 
507 See also the sections below, where these issues are discussed, starting 
with A European defence union, and Common interest in free trade. 
508 In the German original: VI. Beweis, das England bereits gewonnen hat und 
auch in die Zukunft  gewinnen wird durch die industrielle Prosperität Deutsch-
lands und durch sein gemäßigtes Schutzsystem. 
509 See also the section above, British policy after List, 
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by Gustav Schmoller in the context of German unification through a 
customs union: The British foreign secretary, 
 
Palmerston announced this Zollverein to be a measure directed against 
England and against which reprisals must be made. (Schmoller, 1900, vol. 
II, p. 705) 
 
The hope of achieving an amiable understanding with England never-
theless continued, and as Kaiser Wilhelm II, said; ―it was his intention 
to establish the best of relations with her.‖ (Cf. Witte, 1921, pp. 408) 
 
 
e) Customs union as expansionism? 
 
Franz Neumann makes an effort to connect List to National Socialists 
expansionism. He argues that List and the Katheder Socialists in the 
Historical School developed an imperial theory,  
 
England must recognize, List declares, that Germany cannot become 
strong on the basis of free trade. Free trade is a fit doctrine only for a nation 
that is already powerful. Germany is disunited and weak, and only protec-
tive tariffs can assure her political unity and economic power. Germany has 
to become strong so that she is able to keep England‘s competitors, France 
and Russia, at bay ... (Neumann, 1942, p. 104) 
 
Edward Mead Earle writes in the heat of 1944, that List was the 
founder of a tradition of German expansionism in Europe. Unfortunate-
ly, Earle does not go into the details, which would have revealed that 
List‘s strategy was peaceful and not about military conquests, 
 
List has been adopted by the expansionists, the Pan-Germans, and even 
the Nazis as a patron saint. … The foregoing is not very different from pre-
sent-day German definitions of Lebensraum, as will be obvious from List‘s 
program for a Greater Germany.  (Earle, 1943b, p. 141 n68, and p. 144) 
 
Moreover, Earle writes,  
 
List did not hesitate to take the step. He wanted a unified Germany to 
hold sway from the Rhine to the Vistula and from the Balkans to the Baltic. 
(Earle, 1943b, p. 141) 
 
It is somewhat common to confuse List‘s suggestion for a Continental 
defence league against England, in the shape of a customs union, with 
a quest for German Empire, with colonies. Neumann is correct to the 
extent that List wanted Germany to become strong in order to defend 
herself, as opposed to having been the battle ground of other nations in 
Europe. Nevertheless, Neumann forgets List‘s peace-promoting recom-
mendations, regarding e.g. international conferences and trade agree-
468 
 
ment - in order to accomplish true free trade, as opposed to the rule of 
the mightiest (of the contemporary British Empire).  
List‘s plans for an extended German Customs Union that included 
Germany‘s natural coastline and the estuaries of her greatest navigable 
rivers: Holland, Belgium and Denmark (Cf. List, 1841a, pp. 175-176) 
was therefore of a different nature than Neumann and Earle claim.  
Furthermore, the strategy of creating a middle-European customs 
union, in ‗Mitteleuropa‘, has often been connected to List, although he 
in effect argues for a North-European customs union.510 Here is one in-
stance of this misunderstanding, also blaming List for the disaster of 
WW I: Megan Davies writes, 
 
The most serious result of List‘s ideas, however, was a change in people‘s 
thinking and perception. Instead of seeing trade as a cooperative process of 
mutual benefit, politicians and businessmen came to regard it as a struggle 
with winners and losers. Germany‘s leaders, instead of seeing Russia‘s rap-
id growth after 1890 as an opportunity and blessing, agonized over it as a 
terrible threat. Their response was the idea of ―Mittel Europa,‖ a customs 
union including Germany, Austria-Hungary, and the Balkans, which would 
supply Germany with raw materials while providing a captive market. The 
leaders also advocated colonies outside Europe and a ―blue water‖ navy. 
This provoked a similar and hostile response from other powers, especially 
from Russia. The result was a clash of imperialisms in the Balkans, and in 
july 1918 the German elite took the (insanely foolish) decision to fight a war 
with Russia and France. Had they seen the world differently this would not 
have happened. (Davies, 2004) 
 
Megan Davis obviously confuses List‘s realistic description of the vio-
lent past with his promotion of a peaceful future regulated by interna-
tional law. Davis also forgets List‘s defence of Russia‘s right to develop 
herself, no matter whether this damaged German interests (Cf. List, 
1841a, pp. 92-93). 
The term ‗Mitteleuropa‘ was furthermore not invented by List, but 
goes back at least to the geographer Johann August Zeune (1778-
1853).511  
Schmoller‘s mentioned suggestion512 of a customs union ―from Bel-
gium .. to the Persian Gulf‖ (Cf. Schmoller, 1900, vol. II, p. 705) follows 
List‘s promotion of a railway line from Ostende in Belgium to Bagdad - 
and further on to Bombay, India (Cf. List, 1846c). The plans of List and 
of Schmoller are not parallel, but complement each other. 
 
 
                                       
510 As noted above; including Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Den-
mark. 
511 Zeune used the term in his book Gea – Versuch einer wissenschaftlichen 
Erdbeschreibung (‗Attempt of a scientific description of the earth‘). (Zeune, 
1808) 
512 See the section above, British policy after List,  
469 
 
f) German expansionism 
 
A closer look at the behaviour of the great powers in the period after 
1871 and before WW I, will show that quite contrary to rather common 
belief; Germany was the least aggressive of the great powers, relatively 
speaking. This can be illustrated with the areas conquered along its 
own borders as well as colonies conquered.  
As Chancellor Otto von Bismarck unified the German speaking areas 
in Europe, Prussia added no areas other than those populated by Ger-
man peoples, and for political reasons he did not try to incorporate Aus-
trian administered areas.513  
After Bismarck‘s resignation in 1890 and until WW I, under German 
chancellor Leo von Caprivi, Germany added no areas in Europe other 
than the former German coastal island of Heligoland in 1890.514 In this 
period, Germany acquired some colonies in Africa.515 
During this period, the other great powers likewise hardly engaged in 
expansion at home but on the other hand engaged in massive expan-
sion abroad, in particular in Africa and Asia. France, Belgium, Russia, 
Japan, the USA, and Britain in particular, added enormous areas as 
colonies. The older colonial powers of Portugal and the Netherlands still 
had sizeable colonies in Africa and Asia, although considerable portions 
had been occupied by the British Empire. The older colonial powers re-
tained these colonies at the mercy of Britain who ruled the seas, in ex-
change for commercial privileges to British companies. And as Gal-
lagher and Robinson writes, 
 
It ought to be a commonplace that Great Britain during the nineteenth 
century expanded overseas by means of 'informal empire‘. (Gallagher and 
Robinson, 1953) 
 
South American countries had liberated themselves from Spain and 
Portugal with British help, thereby opening up these markets for British 
companies which were particularly active in railway construction in Ar-
gentina, Chile and Brazil. The US was later more direct and forcibly re-
                                       
513 Out of a total population of 56 million in the (second) German Empire in 
1900 , the major minorities were 3.6 million Slavs in the east, mainly Poles (3) 
notably in the former administered Prussian regions, plus 0.15 million Danes, 
and 0.1 million Dutch and Frisians. They had the same civilian and political 
rights as any other German citizen (Cf. Statistik des Deutschen Reichs, Vol. 150, 
1903). The Austrian-Hungarian Empire was a very mixed pot of ethnicities, 
which might not have appealed to a stability seeking realist like Bismarck… 
514 Heligoland was occupied by Britain in 1807, and it was re-acquired by 
Germany as an exchange object with Great Britain, for the giving up the claim 
to the island of Zanzibar in East-Africa.   
515 They were; Cameroon; Zanzibar; German East Africa (Tanganyika, now 
Tanzania, Ruanda-Urundi, now Rwanda and Burundi); and German South 
West Africa (now Namibia). These were all lost in WW I, mainly to Great Britain 
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moved Spain from its last sizeable colonies in the US‘s hemisphere, the 
Philippines and Cuba.  
Regarding indications of ‗authoritarianism‘, there is scant reason to 
argue that Germany in no way was more aggressive and militaristic 
than other great European powers of the same period.  
Furthermore, before WW I Germany had a democratic system with a 
higher representation of the lower classes through the Marxist Social 
Democratic Party, than any other country. Why is then Germany seen 
as the more militaristic and despotic nation in the common historical 
perception? Paradoxically, the reason may be the more democratic na-
ture of Germany. In The Pity of War: Explaining World War I, Niall Fer-
guson claims that the reason is that the anti-militaristic forces were far 
stronger in Germany than in any other great power, and that they 
therefore were heard much more easily in their rather successful fight 
against militarism, 
 
Paradoxically, the anti-militarists in Wilhelmine society were so numer-
ous and so vociferous that we have come to believe their complaints about 
the militarism of Germany, instead of realizing that the very volume of their 
complaints is proof of the reverse. Thus there is now a dauntingly large lit-
erature on German militarism, not all of which acknowledges that the term 
itself originates in left-wing propaganda. (Ferguson, 2003, p. 26)  
 
 
7.21 A European defence union 
 
When referring to List‘s description of the German difficulties of trade 
and the recent disaster in Europe, Adolph Wagner declares in 1947 
that, 
 
We must create a form of United States of Europe. (Wager, 1947, p. 314) 
 
List argues that England holds her colonial power due to her manufac-
turing power, and if the European Continental nations wish to take part 
in colonisation they too must industrialise and build merchant fleets 
and navies. If England hinders them they must unite, 
 
England owes her immense colonial possessions solely to her surpassing 
manufacturing power. If the other European nations wish also to partake of 
the profitable business of cultivating waste territories and civilising barba-
rous nations, or nations once civilised but which are again sunk in barba-
rism, they must commence with the development of their own internal 
manufacturing powers, of their mercantile marine, and of their naval power. 
And should they be hindered in these endeavours by England‘s manufac-
turing, commercial, and naval supremacy, in the union of their powers lies 
the only means of reducing such unreasonable pretensions to reasonable 




Russia‘ traditional friend was Germany and its traditional foe was 
England, regarding for instance India. List‘s admirer, Russian Prime 
Minister Sergei Witte, went further than List and included Russia in a 
future European Continental Union. Witte here refers to a conversation 
in 1897 with the German Kaiser Wilhelm II, regarding competition with 
overseas nations, 
 
I went on to say that to the rest of the world Europe seemed to be like a 
woman in her declining years, that if Europe continued on her present 
course, she would become totally enfeebled in a few centuries and lose her 
international primacy, while the overseas countries would become strong; 
in a few centuries the greatness of Europe would seem like a thing of the 
past, like the greatness of the Roman Empire, Greece, Carthage, and some 
of the states of Asia Minor. I added that the time might come when Europe 
would be treated with the respect shown to aging, well-bred beauties on 
their last legs.  
The German Emperor was astonished by my prognosis and asked what 
should be done to prevent such a decline. I said:  
 
Imagine Your Majesty, the European countries united in one entity, one 
that does not waste vast sums of money, resources, blood, and labor on ri-
valry among themselves, no longer compelled to maintain armies for wars 
among themselves, no longer forming an armed camp, as is the case now, 
with each fearing its neighbor. If that were done, Europe would be much 
richer, much stronger, more civilized, not going downhill under the weight 
of mutual hatred, rivalry, and war.  
The first step toward attaining this goal would be the formation of an al-
liance of Russia, Germany, and France. Once this were done, the other 
countries of the European continent would join the alliance. As a conse-
quence Europe would be freed of the burdens created by existing rivalries: 
Europe would be mighty, would be able to maintain a dominant position for 
a long time. But, if the European countries continue on their present 
course, they will be risking great misfortune. (Witte, 1990, p.268)  
 
After referring to the unbreakable tie which exists between political pres-
tige and economic power, I declared to His Majesty that, among the coun-
tries of the world, Europe seemed to me like a decrepit old woman. Unless a 
radical change is brought about, I went on, Europe will soon have to yield 
her dominating place in the world to the mighty empires which are rising 
beyond the seas. The time is not far off, I said, when this continent will be 
treated with that condescending respect which well-mannered people ac-
cord to venerable old age, and before the next few centuries are past, the 
greatness of Europe will be to the inhabitants of our planet what the gran-
deur of Rome, the glory of Greece, and the might of Carthage are to us.  
The German Emperor was deeply impressed by my words and inquired 
how I proposed to deal with the disastrous situation I envisaged. "Your Maj-
esty," I said, "picture a Europe which does not waste most of its blood and 
treasure on competition between individual countries, which does not 
maintain millions of soldiers for internecine wars, which is not an armed 
camp with each country pitted against its neighbour, a Europe which is, in 
brief, one body politic, one large empire. Then, of course, we would be rich-
er, and more vigorous, and more cultured, and Europe, instead of withering 
472 
 
under the -burden of strife, would become truly the mistress of the world. 
To achieve this ideal we must seek to create a solid union of Russia, Ger-
many and France. Once these countries are firmly united, all the other 
States of the European continent will, no doubt, join the central alliance 
and thus form an all-embracing continental confederation, which will free 
Europe from the burden of internecine competition and establish its domi-
nation over the world for many years to come." (Witte, 1921, pp .408-409) 
 
A basic reason why Germany was vulnerable was lack of raw materi-
als relative to her population. Richard N. Coudenhove-Kalergi writes in 
1943, in his Crusade for Pan-Europe that France was in a very different 
situation. Whereas the logical solution for Germany was a European 
union, this might be suicidal for French industry,  
 
Another difference between the two nations arose from the fact that 
France‘s problems were primarily political, Germany‘s main problem cen-
tered in its overpopulation, a problem complicated by its poor soil and its 
lack of raw materials. In order to live and produce, Germany had to import. 
In order to pay for its imports, it had to export. Unless imports and exports 
balanced each other on the national credit sheet, the country faced starva-
tion and ruin.  
As long as the old system of economic sovereignty prevailed in Europe, 
Germany always feared that its neighbors would raise their customs tariffs 
to a ruinous extent. What it needed was a safe market which could not be 
closed by high-handed or self-sufficient neighbors. Pan-Europe provided 
such a market, for it implied an economic and monetary union. It also im-
plied free access to raw materials in tropical colonies.  
France had none of Germany‘s economic problems. She had no surplus 
population. She had a rich colonial empire that she had only begun to ex-
ploit. Products of her industry were absorbed by the home markets; export 
was a luxury, not a vital need; in fact, the majority of the French industrial-
ists were more occupied with defending their national markets against 
German, British, Belgian and American competition than with conquering 
new markets abroad. Postwar France was a protectionist country. She was 
well aware of Germany‘s superior methods of production and thought it su-
icidal to give such dangerous competition a chance in her own market. 
(Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1943, pp. 121-122) 
 
Robert Strausz-Hupé founded the US based FPRI, the Foreign Policy 
Research Institute, in 1955. Strausz-Hupé claims that it is natural that 
in a continental system, a giant state, one people will dominate, 
 
As policy evolves towards several continental systems, and technology 
accentuates the strategic importance of large, contiguous areas. Thus the 
era of overseas empires and free world trade closes. If this reasoning is 
pushed to its absolute conclusion, the national state is also a thing of the 
past, and the future belongs to the giant state. Many nations will be locked 
in a few vast compartments. But in each of these one people, controlling a 




List sees Germany as the natural centre of a united Europe, that 
could withstand English supremacy and secure Continental peace, but 
Germany is hindered by her own sluggishness, 
 
Nothing, however, at this time so greatly impedes a closer union of the 
continent of Europe as the fact that the centre of it still never takes the po-
sition for which it is naturally fitted. … 
If, on the other hand, Germany could constitute itself with the maritime 
territories which appertain to it, with Holland, Belgium, and Switzerland, as 
a powerful commercial and political whole—if this mighty national body 
could fuse representative institutions with the existing monarchical, dynas-
tic, and aristocratic interests, so far as these are compatible with one an-
other—then Germany could secure peace to the continent of Europe for a 
long time, and at the same time constitute herself the central point of a du-
rable Continental alliance. 
That the naval power of England greatly exceeds that of all other nations, 
if not on the number of ships, yet certainly in fighting power—that hence 
the nations which are less powerful at sea can only match England at sea 
by uniting their own naval power, is clear. (List, 1841a, pp. 412-413) 
 
List was well aware of the dangers of a confrontation between Eng-
land and Germany, and between England and the united European 
Continent. His point of view and his goal, was that the only lasting so-
lution would be a world free trade, with global free trade and united 
under one law, 
 
Sooner or later the countries which have reached the second and third 
stage of industrialisation will have to unite to establish a new Continental 
System if ever England should show any inclination to use her superior sea 
power to injure the manufactures or commerce of these countries. 
An attempt to set up a new Continental System, however, would endan-
ger the prosperity not only of England but of all nations and -as we have 
shown in the last chapter - the only satisfactory solution to the problem 
would be the establishment of world free trade. (List, 1837a, p. 52) 
 
List writes that Napoleon‘s Continental System was based on the cor-
rect view that the nations on the European Continent have much in 
common as against the English and would benefit from a union. How-
ever, Napoleon made the mistake of replacing English dominance with 
French dominance, and that provoked the other nations on the Conti-
nent, 
 
If we only consider the enormous interests which the nations of the Con-
tinent have in common, as opposed to the English maritime supremacy, we 
shall be led to the conviction that nothing is so necessary to these nations 
as union, and nothing is so ruinous to them as Continental wars. The his-
tory of the last century also teaches us that every war which the powers of 
the Continent have waged against one another has had for its invariable re-
sult to increase the industry, the wealth, the navigation, the colonial pos-
sessions, and the power of the insular supremacy. 
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Hence, it cannot be denied that a correct view of the wants and interests 
of the Continent underlaid the Continental system of Napoleon, although it 
must not be ignored that Napoleon desired to give effect to this idea (right in 
itself) in a manner which was contrary to the independence and to the in-
terests of the other Continental powers. The Continental system of Napole-
on suffered from three capital defects. … (List, 1841a, pp. 421, for the rest 
of the quotation, see the section, Napoleon‘s legacy, in chapter 2) 
 
List claims that a Continental system is the only way the Continental 
nations can secure their overseas interests in the colonies, and that the 
union must be voluntary,  
 
An effective Continental system can only originate from the free union of 
the Continental powers, and can succeed only in case it has for its object 
(and also effects) an equal participation in the advantages which result from 
it, for in that way only, and in no other, can the maritime powers of second 
rank command respect from the predominant power of England in such a 
way that the latter without any recourse to the force of arms will concede all 
the just requirements of the less powerful states. Only by such an alliance 
as that will the Continental manufacturing powers be able to maintain their 
relations with tropical countries, and assert and secure their interests in 
the East and the West. (List, 1841a, pp. 422-423) 
 
List claimed that English resistance to industrialisation of the Conti-
nental nations should soon end and be replaced by an alliance, when 
Britain understood that she would be surpassed by far by the United 
States, 
 
In any case the British, who are ever too anxious for supremacy, must 
feel it hard when they perceive in this manner how the Continental nations 
will reciprocally raise their manufacturing power by mutual commercial 
concessions and by treaties; how they will reciprocally strengthen their nav-
igation and their naval power; how they will assert their claim to that share 
for which they are fitted by nature in civilising and colonising barbarous 
and uncultivated countries, and in trade with tropical regions. Neverthe-
less, a glance into the future ought sufficiently to console the britons for 
these anticipated disadvantages. … For the same causes which have raised 
Great Britain to her present exalted position, will (probably in the course of 
the next century) raise the United States of America to a degree of industry, 
wealth, and power, which will surpass the position in which England 
stands, as far as at present England excels little Holland. (List, 1841a, p. 
423) 
 
List claimed that in the future, England would have to join the Euro-
pean Continent in order to defend itself, against American supremacy, 
and that she should prepare herself for this, 
 
Even if the nineteenth century should pass without the doctrine ―free 
ships, free goods‖ being generally accepted, the twentieth century will sure-
ly see its adoption. 
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When that time comes England will be the country to advocate the 
adoption of the principle and people will discuss how best to check the arbi-
trary power of the United States of America.  (List, 1837a, p. 128)516 
 
Thus in a not very distant future the natural necessity which now im-
poses on the French and Germans the necessity of establishing a Continen-
tal alliance against the British supremacy, will impose on the British the 
necessity of establishing a European coalition against the supremacy of 
America. Then will Great Britain be compelled to seek and to find in the 
leadership of the united powers of Europe protection, security, and com-
pensation against the predominance of America, and an equivalent for her 
lost supremacy. 
It is therefore good for England that she should practise resignation be-
times, that she should by timely renunciations gain the friendship of Euro-
pean Continental powers, that she should accustom herself betimes to the 
idea of being only the first among equals. (List, 1841a, pp. 423-424) 
 
With the experience gained in the soon to be two centuries since List 
wrote this, he may be said to have been either very lucky or having had 
prophetic insight: As most nations, the US has acted according to its 
own interests. In the recent past, the US has often stretched interna-
tional law and agreements, for instance often using tariffs against ―un-
fair competition‖ against its own industry.  
Interestingly and according to the Russian PM Sergei Witte; some 60 
years after List, Kaiser Wilhelm II suggested to Emperor Nicolai II of 
Russia that Europe should erect a Continental economic union of de-
fence against the USA. Witte warned that Britain‘s interest were not 
similar to the Continent, but in any case Russia wanted to continue a 
friendly relationship to the USA, 
 
… After a while the Emperor drew me into the Ambassador's study, where 
we remained alone.  
He opened the conversation by calling my attention to the dangers which 
were threatening Europe from beyond the seas. America, he said, is growing 
rich at Europe's expense, and it is necessary to build a high tariff wall 
around Europe so as to make it impossible for America to flood us with its 
products. The European countries must unite to shut out the transatlantic 
competitor, who is growing very dangerous, especially as regards agricul-
ture, and thus to arrest the development of the United States of America. I 
took the liberty then of observing to the Emperor that the interests of conti-
nental Europe were not identical with those of Great Britain and that, 
therefore, she would have to be excluded from the contemplated European 
union. His Majesty retorted that England constituted no danger for the ag-
riculture of Europe and that she could not be excluded, for the reason that 
it was his intention to establish the best of relations with her. The tariff wall 
should be erected against America alone, he reiterated.  
Thereupon I pointed out that, whether or not England was included, an 
economic war against America was not practicable, because many Europe-
                                       
516 This quotation has also been used in the section below; Promote free trade 
by international law, treaties and congresses 
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an countries were not likely to agree to it. Speaking for Russia, I went on 
saying that we would be loath to embrace His Majesty's viewpoint, for the 
reason that ever since the American Revolutionary War we had been on the 
best of terms with the United States of America and that we did not intend 
to quarrel with that country. (Witte, 1921, pp. 408) 
 
 
7.22 Common interest in free trade  
 
List argues that advanced countries including England would gain from 
opening their monopolies on colonial trade, and that the selfish and 
greedy policy of rival nations is the greatest hindrance to universal pro-
gress. By adopting free trade, the advanced nations would strike at the 
root of this evil of national selfishness. England should for her own 
benefit agree to share before she is overrun by history; the development 
of new means of transport (read: railroads etc.); and armaments.  
List attacks English agricultural protectionism and sabotage of Con-
tinental manufacturing as silly and counterproductive, because it hin-
ders Continental nations in getting an income sufficient to pay for more 
advanced English products, 
 
How can England indulge the hope of selling manufactured goods to 
countries whose colonial products she cannot take in exchange? Or how 
can a great demand for colonial produce spring up in the continent of Eu-
rope, if the Continent is not enabled by its manufacturing production to pay 
for, and thus to consume, these goods? 
It is therefore evident, that keeping down the manufacturing industry of 
the Continent, though it certainly hinders the progress of the Continental 
nations, does not in the least further the prosperity of England. … (List, 
1841a, p. 193) 
 
England should instead encourage the industrial development of its 
potential competitors since this would open up for exports of more ad-
vanced products from England and thereby make further cultural ad-
vance in England not only possible but necessary. This was unfortu-
nately naïve reasoning, but probably the only possible reasoning for List 
as a humanist.  
List expresses hope for the future of manufacturing on the European 
Continent and argues that first the home market must be secured by 
establishing a German commercial union which will pay for tropical 
products with manufactured goods, 
 
The advance which England has made in manufactures, navigation, and 
commerce, need therefore not discourage any other nation which is fitted 
for manufacturing production, by the possession of suitable territory, of na-
tional power and intelligence, from entering into the lists with England‘s 
manufacturing supremacy. 
A future is approaching for manufactures, commerce, and navigation 
which will surpass the present as much as the present surpasses the past. 
Let us only have the courage to believe in a great national future, and in 
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that belief to march onward. But above all things we must have enough na-
tional spirit at once to plant and protect the tree, which will yield its first 
richest fruits only to future generations. We must first gain possession of 
the home market of our own nation, at least as respects articles of general 
necessity, and try to procure the products of tropical countries direct from 
those countries which allow us to pay for them with our own manufactured 
goods. This is especially the task which the German commercial union has 
to solve, if the German nation is not to remain far behind the French and 
North Americans, nay, far behind even the Russians. (List, 1841a, p. 194) 
 
List argues that the establishment of a European Union, a new Con-
tinental System, would not suffice to ensure international free trade  
and therefore France and the United States should take the lead and 
invite all nations to a world trade congress with the goal of establishing 
a world customs union. A new Continental System for the common de-
fence against England would, however, endanger the interests of all and 
can only be avoided by adopting universal free trade, which would es-
tablish a win-win situation for all. Furthermore, the growth of the USA 
makes it inevitable that England would benefit from preparing to share 
her position with others in order to check the future whims of the USA.  
Here are a few extracts regarding the mutual interest in free trade,517 
 
Here is a great opportunity to apply the principles of the doctrine of cos-
mopolitan economics in a practical way. Far from injuring any country this 
would bring together the special interests of every nation in a valuable 
common enterprise. 
… industrial states can promote the expansion of shipping, commerce, 
and manufacture‘ much more by opening their overseas possessions to the 
trade of all nations than by monopolising the commerce of their colonies. … 
A liberal policy of this kind would strike at the very root of the evil of 
economic selfishness. (List, 1837a, pp. 48-51) 
 
 
7.23 Common interests? – recent development  
 
China has for a decade been blamed of having a skewed trade- and 
payments balance, harming the interests of the established industrial 
nations. The recent development of China, however, illustrates how the 
development of a late coming country also may benefit the already es-
tablished industrial nations. 
China has for some time gradually changed its balance of trade to a 
larger import to export ratio, and increasingly the import consists of 
more complicated and demanding goods and services. In 2010 alone 
China‘s import grew by 40 %. Jim O‘Neill; ‗Mr. Bric‘,518 was interviewed 
by BBC in the article, The year in business: 2010, pointing to the recent 
                                       
517 List‘s discussion from 1837 on these matters is so important that a 
lengthy quotation has been supplied in appendix 1b. 
518 Chairman of Goldman Sachs Asset Management. In 2001 he coined the 
term ‗BRIC countries‘ to designate the new upcoming developing nations. 
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surge in Chinese import that creates opportunities for Western compa-
nies and countries, 
 
Mr O‘Neill says the US trade deficit with China is now falling sharply. 
‖The US current account deficit year-to-date is running about half what it 
was before the crisis and the Chinese trade surplus is not much more than 
3% of GDP.‖  
He believes, however, that due to the rather emotional atmosphere in Wash-
ington, such data seems to be completely ignored by Congress. … 
The Chinese currency has risen by over 20% the past five years. Chinese 
import growth is rising at over 40% - in the year to date, Chinese import 
growth has been close to $400bn. 
Many people would argue that such figures are mainly due to the import of 
raw materials. 
‖No it is not,‖ says Mr O‘Neil. 
‖Look at countries that are really good at exporting, like Germany. 
Some of Germany‘s top companies are employing people on overtime purely 
because of exports to China.‖ (BBC, 2010) 
 
Just as illustrating, in 2010 China overtook the USA as the single 
most important country for German exports. (The Local, 2011b). In 
2010 Germany‘s exports rose 18,5 % (The Local, 2011a) and were 
booming in particular in the upcoming markets. This is even more illus-
trating and important since German exports are relatively sophisticat-
ed. Due to higher wages in China, the demand for German in increas-
ingly for products that will reduce Chinese production costs, such as 
machinery tools and robotics. The German news service The Local re-
ports that, 
 
The boom regions for German exports were China, Southeast Asia, Brazil 
and the Arabian peninsula, … 
Machine tools, cars, chemicals and electronic equipment were the big 
sellers. 
Official figures from the Federal Statistical Office show that in the third 
quarter of 2010, exports to Russia rose 42.4 percent and exports to China 
climbed 34.3 percent. (The Local, 2010) 
 
In 2008, Jim O‘Neill wrote that the global middle class is exploding 
and therefore reducing global income inequalities. This is closely related 
to the above point, since the global growth of the middle-class increases 
the demand for sophisticated products from the established industrial 
nations, 
 
Linked to the current mood, commentators often depict an embattled 
and shrinking middle class, with sharply rising financial inequality. Howev-
er, globally, this is simply not true. One of the most startlingly positive 
phenomena for many generations continues to unfold around the world. We 
are in the middle of an explosion of the world‘s middle class. … 
This is a Bric-driven phenomenon, but the ―next 11‖ are making their 




O‘Neill continues by saying that, 
 
It is important for everyone in the so-called developed world to be con-
stantly aware that these powerful shifts in global wealth are good not only 
for the developing world, but for them too. If you take a look at a chart of 
recent US export growth, you may well think you are looking at the wrong 
data series. But you are not. US exports are indeed growing at close to 20 
per cent and it is this that is stopping the housing and credit crunch from 
driving the US into a deep recession. Aspects of the same phenomenon can 
be seen in Japan, Germany and even the UK.  (O‘Neill, 2008) 
 
The German export of luxury cars to China is illustrative of the point 
that the development of emerging markets can be a boon to the estab-
lished industrial nations, who therefore ought to continue to improve 
themselves, 
 
―2011 will be the German car industry‘s best year ever and 2012 will be 
even better,‖ said Helmut Becker, director of the Munich-based Institute for 
Economic Analysis and Communication. … 
Strong demand in export markets, particularly the US and China, kept 
the factories of German luxury car markers humming all of last year. … 
Chinese demand for luxury cars is even more robust. The luxury car 
segment expanded by more than 40 percent in 2010, led by Audi. Nine of 
the top selling luxury nameplates in China are German, … (Deutsche Welle, 
2011)519 
 
Nevertheless, the Chinese devotion to education and to research 
should alert established industrial nations that their head start may 
soon come to an end. According to a report from the OECD, in 2006 
China surpassed Japan in absolute spending on R&D, 
 
The report is the latest indication of the dramatic rise in research spend-
ing in China, which is beginning to cause concerns among western govern-
ments.  
 
Dirk Pilat, head of the OECD‘s science and technology division, said the 
surge in Chinese research was ―stunning‖. He added: ―Chinese investment 
has been growing rapidly for some time, but it is still a surprise that it has 
overtaken Japan so quickly.‖ 
                                       
519 Perhaps contrary to common belief, Germany‘s export success also has a 
positive effect on her closest neighbours, 
"Strong growth of the German economy is also having a positive effect in our 
neighbouring countries," Commerzbank analyst Ulrike Rondorf noted. 
"Solid domestic demand is pushing imports up, including imports from the 
eurozone," she said. 
Almost 60 percent of German exports last year went to fellow EU member 
countries, while they accounted for 63 percent of German imports. … 
For the full EU, German exports gained 14 percent, but imports rose by 
17.5 percent. (Deutsche Welle, 2011) 
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Mr Pilat said that the bulk of the spending in China was on development 
work, to alter products for the fast-growing Chinese market, rather than 
basic scientific research.  
The number of patents coming from China that were registered with the 
patent office in the US, Europe and Japan is still low and a string of recent 
scandals over academic fraud have also raised questions about how well 
the money is spent. 
But Mr Pilat added that some multinationals were beginning to move 
genuine research to China because of the high numbers of skilled scientists 
they could recruit in Shanghai or Beijing. ―There are some signs that they 
are starting to do fundamental or breakthrough work in China,‖ he said. 
As well as increasing spending on university science departments, the 
government has also been eager to attract multinational companies to open 
research centres in the country. (China overtakes Japan on R&D, Financial 
Times, 2006) 
 
But what may be more enervating to the established industrial na-
tions is the increasing speed, by which China is catching up and sur-
passing the West in R&D. According to the BBC, a study by the Royal 
Society, UK,520 claims that China may soon and deliberately so overtake 
even the US in scientific output, 
 
―Projections vary, but a simple linear interpretation of Elsevier‘s publish-
ing data suggests that this could take place as early as 2013‖, it says. …  
The authors describe ―dramatic‖ changes in the global scientific land-
scape and warn that this has implications for a nation‘s competitiveness.  
… 
However the report points out that a growing volume of research publica-
tions does not necessarily mean in increase in quality. … 
Although China has risen in the ―citation‖ rankings, its performance on 
this measure lags behind its investment and publication rate.  
As to China‘s motivation, Dr Cao believes that there is a determination 
not to be dependent on foreign know-how - and to reclaim the country‘s 
historic role as a global leader in technology.  (BBC, 2011) 
 
 
7.24 Curing global market imperfections 
 
Although England, by striving for supremacy, increases the productive 
powers of the world, she hinders the integration of all other nations, 
thereby sabotaging global economic efficiency, List argues,    
 
What they all have to fear at this time is solely the preponderating com-
petition of England. 
Thus it appears also from this point of view, that the supremacy of that 
island in manufactures, in trade, in navigation, and in her colonial empire, 
constitutes the greatest existing impediment to all nations drawing nearer 
to one another; although it must be at the same time admitted that Eng-
                                       




land, in striving for this supremacy, has immeasurably increased, and is 
still daily increasing, the productive power of the entire human race. (List, 
1841a, p. 325) 
 
In a larger perspective, regulation and protection limited by time (and 
branch) may be seen as contributing more to competition than immedi-
ately introducing free trade. Protection may be seen as a remedy to cor-
rect international market imperfections where some actors have the 
upper hand. National temporary protection thereby serves to increase 
long-term global competition. Indeed, this was List‘s opinion concerning 
the strong position of English producers in his day, and this way of in-
terpreting List is not new.  
As J. S. Nicholson points out, in his ‗Introductory Essay‘ to the 1904 
reprint of List‘s National System,  
 
This is the argument which was developed in theory by Henry Sidgwick 
to show that ultimately the world at large might gain by the temporary pro-
tection of the constituent nations . And on the practical side it is this argu-
ment which is most popular in the British colonies. The colonies are protec-
tionist because they wish to become complex industrial nations, .. (Nichol-
son, 1904) 
 
Nicholson furthermore writes that the distinction between free trade 
and protectionism is somewhat superficial, since at bottom both are 
tools for the greater good, the productive force, 
 
On List‘s view there is no real opposition between free trade and protec-
tion, because neither is an end in itself, but simply a means to achieve a 
certain end, namely, the greatest development of productive power. Which 
policy may be better at any time depends on the stage of development of the 
nation in relation to the development of other nations. For the time being a 
protective duty involves a loss. But the present loss is justifiable if in the fu-
ture there will be a greater gain. (Nicholson, 1904) 
 
Furthermore, the national parallel to this international problem is of 
course anti-trust legislation, which is a widely accepted form of regula-
tion also among ardent liberalists and the incentive stems from the 
natural monopolising tendency of unregulated capitalism, as described 
by Adam Smith, 
 
People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and 
diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or 
in some contrivance to raise prices. It is impossible indeed to prevent such 
meetings by any law which either could be executed, or would be consistent 
with liberty and justice. (Smith, 1776, vol. I, book I, ch. 10, p. 145) 
 
Not only did Smith deem countermeasures such as anti-trust laws 
impossible, but he conveniently left out the international interpretation 




Temporary national protection will eventually lead to fiercer competi-
tion and a more efficient global economy at a later stage. List answered 
his critics with precisely this argument and claimed that foreign domi-
nation of domestic markets consisted in a monopoly (Cf. List, 1841a, 
pp. 169–71, 176–7). He saw no advantage in a foreign (British) monopo-
ly over that of, not a domestic monopoly, but rather internal competi-
tion (Cf. List, 1841a, pp. 184, 189–93). He therefore set out to establish 
domestic production to replace the foreign monopolies (‗import substi-
tution‘) as a first step of development. On the other hand, establishing 
infrastructure was one important element of making this come about 
and at the same time increase the competition, since neither division of 
labour, markets nor competition can exist without communication. One 
of the chief effects of improved infrastructure is precisely more efficient 
competition, levelling prices of many local markets. 
List may be a greater free trader than the so-called free traders, in 
the sense that List‘s strategy would promote long-term competition to a 
larger degree, and thereby promote global wealth-creation more effi-
ciently, by their own arguments. This was indeed List‘s own opinion (Cf. 
List, 1841a, p. 131). This is a matter of perspective; of time and eco-
nomic complexity, regarding for instance inter-relationship between 
markets. List would claim that Smith might be said to be a free trader 
only from a static short-term and relatively superficial perspective con-
cerning the interests of Britain only, and that this was the deliberate 
choice of Smith. And indeed Ricardo, who elaborated Smith ideas into 
the theory of comparative advantage, has been criticised for having es-
tablished a static trade theory (e.g. Cypher & Dietz, 1998) that does not 
take into account learning, which in its very essence is dynamic.  
List, as Smith, had a global perspective and an historical perspective. 
List, however, claims to be more aware of wider and deeply rooted social 
and international interrelationships especially concerning power-
relations. List‘s criticism of the free trade policy of Adam Smith‘s follow-
ers, was by force of the prevailing situation; British policy and domina-
tion 
List promoted the establishment of domestic manufacturing in order 
to erect competition to foreign monopolies that might dictate domestic 
consumption and production. In fact, List writes that monopolisation is 
the nature of industry, and precisely this justifies protection, 
 
In any case striving after monopoly forms part of the very nature of man-
ufacturing industry. This circumstance tends to justify and not to discredit 
a protective policy; for this striving, when restricted in its operation to the 
home market, tends to promote cheaper prices and improvements in the art 
of production, and thus increases the national prosperity; while the same 
thing, in case it presses from without with overwhelming force on the inter-
nal industry, will occasion the interruption of work and downfall of the in-
ternal national industry.  
The circumstance that there are no limits to manufacturing production 
(especially since it has been so extraordinarily aided and promoted by ma-
chinery) except the limits of the capital which it possesses and its means of 
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effecting sales, enables that particular nation whose manufacturing indus-
try has continued for a century, which has  accumulated immense capitals, 
extended its commerce all over the world, dominated the money market by 
means of large institutions of credit (whose operations are able to depress 
the prices of fabrics and to induce merchants to export), to declare a war of 
extermination against the manufacturers of all other countries. Under such 
circumstances it is quite impossible that in other nations, ‗in the natural 
course of things‘ (as Adam Smith expresses himself), merely in consequence 
of their progress in agriculture, immense manufactures and works should 
be established, or that those manufactures which have originated in conse-
quence of the commercial interruptions caused by war should be able, ‗in 
the natural course of things,‘ to continue to maintain themselves. The rea-
son for this is the same as that why a child or a boy in wrestling with a 
strong man can scarcely be victorious or even offer steady resistance. The  
manufactories which constitute the commercial and industrial supremacy 
(of England) have a thousand advantages over the newly born or half-grown 
manufactories of other nations. (List, 1841a, p. 299-300) 
 
 
7.25 A sudden & universal republic of merchants  
 
List criticises the view of Cosmopolitanism as a theory that surrenders 
the interest of production to that of exchange, 
 
… commerce must be regulated, according to the interests and wants of 
agriculture and manufactures, not vice-versa.  
But the school has exactly reversed this last dictum … This perversity of 
surrendering the interests of manufactures and agriculture to the demands 
of commerce without reservation, is a natural consequence of that theory 
which everywhere merely takes into account present values, but nowhere 
the powers that produce them, and regards the whole world as but one in-
divisible republic of merchants. (List, 1841a, 259)521 
 
So, List claims that commerce must be regulated according to the 
needs of production, and not the way around - as the radical free trade 
school prefers to have matters.  
For a long time the recognised goal of the free trade school has been 
to establish a world government, in order to secure global free trade. 
This was pointed out by List (Cf. List, 1841a, p. 120ff) and by Wilhelm 
Roscher (Roscher, 1877, § LXVII) concerning the explicit ideas of J.B. 
Say and Quesnay on a universal republic.  
List agreed with this goal, but as mentioned he criticised the method 
these economists envisaged for attaining this goal since immediate im-
plementation would lead to a monopoly under the strongest producer 
and merchant, namely England.  
List claims that English promotion of free trade is only pretence for 
cynical national egotism. England is the master of all markets, and 
                                       
521 This quotation has also been used in the section, Generalisations play 
down regulation and nation, in chapter 3. 
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equal treatment of her manufactures and those of weak nations will on-
ly lead to the destruction of the weak and a global monopoly for Eng-
land, both economically and politically. All states therefore have a 
common interest in defence against England‘s ‗whims‘, 
 
A nation which makes goods more cheaply than anyone else and pos-
sesses immeasurably more capital than anyone else is able to grant its cus-
tomers more substantial and longer credits than anyone else. In competi-
tion with its rivals such a nation will also be able to command the lion‘s 
share of the market in poorer and less advanced countries. 
By accepting or by excluding the import of their raw materials and other 
products, England - all powerful as a manufacturing and commercial coun-
try - can confer great benefits or inflict great injuries upon nations with rel-
atively backward economies. What England does depends upon whether her 
economic policy is inspired solely by self-interest and national passions and 
prejudices or whether her policy is inspired by a higher morality and by no-
bler aims. The latter is hardly to be expected at all times and in all circum-
stances. 
All states have a common interest in defending themselves against the 
damage that England, enjoying world economic supremacy, can arbitrarily 
inflict upon their industries. 
On the other hand England, with her advanced economy, could inaugu-
rate the gradual establishment of greater freedom of trade throughout the 
world. But this freedom would not be achieved by insisting that states in 
the second and third phase of industrialisation should open their home 
markets to unlimited competition from English manufactured goods. 
Should England pursue such a policy she would be pretending to foster 
the wider interests of mankind while really fostering her own selfish inter-
ests. Free competition between the advanced factories of England and the 
relatively backward factories of other manufacturing countries would - as 
we have already shown - simply lead to the destruction of the industries of 
the weaker states. This would mean that the countries in question would 
not merely give up all prospects of economic expansion in the future but 
would actually lose the progress that they had achieved in the past towards 
the establishment of a more advanced economy.  
It is surely reasonable to suggest that no nation should try to hasten the 
future economic advance of the human race by sacrificing the progress that 
it has already made towards establishing its own national economic inde-
pendence. Such a policy, far from being advantageous to humanity in gen-
eral, would be to the sole advantage of the dominant economic nation. 
Manufacturing states which have reached the second or third phase of 
industrialisation might hope to extend free trade by uniting with the dominant 
nation but such a policy should be adopted only if the special economic in-
terests of the countries concerned are adequately safeguarded. (List, 1837a, 
pp. 47-48) 
 
Before the turn of the 21st Century and the rise of newcomers like 
China, the establishment of the United Nations and the closely related 
IMF, WTO and the World Bank, together established a universal alt-
hough informal credit cartel, as long as other creditor nations demand-
ed that the rules of these institutions had to be followed. The sprout of 
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a global government that started to grow in Bretton Woods in 1944, was 
about to bloom.  
We then seemed to have reached, in principle, a world government 
dominated by the strongest nations, and practical establishment of this 
through an informal ―union‖ of creditors. Loans were often given by 
creditor countries on the condition that the debtor country followed the 
IMF‘s ‗conditionalities‘. This union was using debt as the leveller for po-
litical concessions of more open markets in the debtor countries, for the 
creditor countries, a policy as old as the Phoenicians and probably be-
yond.  
One may regard the development after the fall of Bretton Woods as a 
reversal of the historical process from a productive monopoly capitalism 
back to pre-1931 financial capitalism. Anthony Sampson calls the Brit-
ish phenomenon in the 1980s a, 
 
… return to the freedom and internationalism of the Edwardian times be-
fore it broke apart seventy years ago. (Sampson, 1993, p.115, in the section 
called; ‗The City Transformed‘) 
 
But at the zenith of the British Empire its productive foundations 
had been allowed to rot. So too at the zenith of the American domi-
nance, she has allowed her productive foundations to whiter away. And 
with the rise of China, India etc. the former global elite has become di-
versified and the future is again more open and undetermined, as US 
Security advisor Zbigniew Brezinski warned in 2010.522  
                                       
522 At a recent Council on Foreign Relations speech in Montreal, … Zbigniew 
Brzezinski warned that a ―global political awakening,‖ in combination with 
infighting amongst the elite, was threatening to derail the move towards a one 
world government. 
Brzezinski explained that global political leadership had become ―much 
more diversified unlike what it was until relatively recently,‖ noting the rise of 
China as a geopolitical power, and that global leadership in the context of the 
G20 was ―lacking internal unity with many of its members in bilateral antago-
nisms.‖ … 
―For the first time in all of human history mankind is politically awakened – 
that‘s a total new reality – it has not been so for most of human history.‖ 
Brzezinski continued, ―The whole world has become politically awakened,‖ 
adding that all over the world people were aware of what was happening politi-
cally and were ―consciously aware of global inequities, inequalities, lack of re-
spect, exploitation.‖ 
―Mankind is now politically awakened and stirring,‖ said Brzezinski, adding 
that this in combination with a fractured elite ―makes it a much more difficult 
context for any major power, including currently the leading world power, the 
United States.‖ 
During a subsequent question and answer session, Brzezinski was asked if 
he thought another organization should replace the United Nations as the de 
facto ―one world government,‖ to which Brzezinski responded, ―There should 
be such an organization,‖ before pointing out that the UN was not it in its cur-
rent role. (Watson, 2010) 
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Furthermore, as yet another indication of the changing global power 
balance, the IMF in 2010 redrew its recommended policies. 
 
 
7.26 Global free trade - gradually 
 
Regarding European continental defence against insular English su-
premacy, List writes that global free trade is the only solution, 
 
… the idea of the Continental System was born because of England‘s exces-
sive economic power and because of the possibility that England might 
misuse this power. … 
An attempt to set up a new Continental System, however, would endan-
ger the prosperity not only of England but of all nations and -as we have 
shown in the last chapter - the only satisfactory solution to the problem 
would be the establishment of world free trade. (List, 1837a, pp. 51-52) 
 
Adam Smith agreed that sudden deregulation would have disastrous 
effects and wrote on the matter of trade that, changes in trade policy 
must be slow, 
 
Changes of this kind should never be introduced suddenly, but slowly, 
gradually, and after a very long warning.  (Smith, 1776, book IV, ch. II, p. 
44, in Liberty Fund‘s edition, p. 471)    
 
So it seems that Smith‘s radical followers, more than Smith himself, 
were adherents of such sudden measures.  
List agreed with Smith on the desirability of global free trade and also 
on gradual changes. But List went further. He claimed that instant de-
regulation and radical free trade would lead to a monopoly under the 
strongest nation, technologically and economically (Cf. List, 1841a, p. 
126), in order to promote the potential wealth of the individual develop-
ing nations as well as the global common good.  
Although List was a believer in free trade, he was not naïve in this 
pursuit. List here claims that until the world is united in one federation 
under the same law, we must expect national emulation of protectionist 
policies and even wars. Furthermore, List claims that the question of 
universal free trade cannot be seen as separate from, but rather as 
tightly connected to the question of political unification of all nations 
under one law, 
 
Thus history shows that restrictions are not so much the inventions of 
mere speculative minds, as the natural consequences of the diversity of in-
terests, and of the strivings of nations after independence or overpowering 
ascendency, and thus of national emulation and wars, and therefore that 
they cannot be dispensed with until this conflict of national interests shall 
cease, in other words until all nations can be united under one and the 




same system of law. Thus the question as to whether, and how, the various 
nations can be brought into one united federation, and how the decisions of 
law can be invoked in the place of military force to determine the differences 
which arise between independent nations, has to be solved concurrently 
with the question how universal free trade can be established in the place 
of separate national commercial systems. 
The attempts which have been made by single nations to introduce free-
dom of trade in face of a nation which is predominant in industry, wealth, 
and power, no less than distinguished for an exclusive tariff system—as 
Portugal did in 1703, France in 1786, North America in 1786 and 1816, 
Russia from 1815 till 1821, and as Germany has done for centuries—go to 
show us that in this way the prosperity of individual nations is sacrificed, 
without benefit to mankind in general, solely for the enrichment of the pre-
dominant manufacturing and commercial nation. (List, 1841a, p. 114) 
 
Before deregulation could take place, List argues that less nations 
therefore had to be lifted up to the level of the leading nation (Cf. List, 
1841a, p. 127). This had to be done gradually through legal and regula-
tory arrangements, nationally and internationally (Cf. List, 1841a, p. 
125). This would involve, among other instruments, limited and differ-
entiated protection at home and international legal agreements.  
List writes that in the meantime the less advanced nations that feel 
themselves capable must be allowed to raise themselves by artificial 
means and adopt the system of protection, 
 
In order to allow freedom of trade to operate naturally, the less advanced 
nations must first be raised by artificial measures to that stage of cultiva-
tion to which the English nation has been artificially elevated. In order that, 
through that cosmopolitical tendency of the powers of production to which 
we have alluded, the more distant parts of the world may not be benefited 
and enriched before the neighbouring European countries, those nations 
which feel themselves to be capable, owing to their moral, intellectual, so-
cial, and political circumstances, of developing a manufacturing power of 
their own must adopt the system of protection as the most effectual means 
for this purpose. (List, 1841a, pp. 131-132) 
 
But List also believed that the logic of the capitalist system would 
eventually contribute to the civilisation of all of mankind, but the task 
of civilising the barbarian nations can be fulfilled only by political unity. 
In the meantime, an abundance of skilled people in the developed coun-
tries would emigrate and seek employment in the less developed coun-
tries. Likewise the abundance of capital in the developed countries 
would emigrate to more profitable endeavours in less developed, as he 
had observed both English people and English capital immigrate to the 
USA,  
 
The farther we advance in this perception, and the more the uncivilised 
countries come into contact with the civilised ones by the progress made in 
the means of transport, so much more will the civilised countries compre-
hend that the civilisation of barbarous nations, of those distracted by inter-
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nal anarchy, or which are oppressed by bad government, is a task which of-
fers to all equal advantages—a duty incumbent on them all alike, but one 
which can only be accomplished by unity. 
That the civilisation of all nations, the culture of the whole globe, forms a 
task imposed on the whole human race, is evident from those unalterable 
laws of nature by which civilised nations are driven on with irresistible 
power to extend or transfer their powers of production to less cultivated 
countries. We see everywhere, under the influence of civilisation, popula-
tion, powers of mind, material capital attaining to such dimensions that 
they must necessarily flow over into other less civilised countries. If the cul-
tivable area of the country no longer suffices to sustain the population and 
to employ the agricultural population, the redundant portion of the latter 
seeks territories suitable for cultivation in distant lands; if the talents and 
technical abilities of a nation have become so numerous as to find no longer 
sufficient rewards within it, they emigrate to places where they are more in 
demand; if in consequence of the accumulation of material capital, the 
rates of interest fall so considerably that the smaller capitalist can no long-
er live on them, he tries to invest his money more satisfactorily in less 
wealthy countries. (List, 1841a, pp. 125-126)  
 
 
7.27 A gradual & universal republic of peoples 
 
List discusses the question of future free trade and a universal republic 
in particular in chapter 11: Political and Cosmopolitical Economy, 
 
Unquestionably the idea of a universal confederation and a perpetual 
peace is commended both by common sense and religion. … All examples 
which history can show are those in which the political union has led the 
way, and the commercial union has followed. (List, 1841a, p. 123)  
 
The unification of the Republic of the Seven United Netherlands, the 
USA, Germany, South Africa and now of the EU may be examples that 
counter this, since economic integration by way of transportation, trade 
and trade agreements had foregone political integration. But also in 
these cases political action have to some extent preceded or least paral-
leled economic results, as with the Coal and Steel Agreement in Europe 
and the Rome treaty. 
The intentions of List should be obvious from these three chapter 
headings of his 1837 thesis called The Natural System of Political Econ-
omy: 
 
7. The Common Interest of all Manufacturing States in Free Trade  
25. Transition from the Policy of Protection to the Policy of as much Free 
Trade as possible 
26. How best to introduce and foster Free Trade  
 
As opposed to radical free trade revolutionaries or Cosmopolitans as 
List called them, List was a reformist in the matter of trade liberalisa-
tion. So was Smith, but without acknowledging the overall implications 
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of the infant industry argument since Smith showed little understand-
ing of the immaterial factors of production and therefore of both the im-
portance and the fragility of know-how and learning.  
List argues that a universal union of nations should safeguard every 
nation‘s interests by legal provisions, but until this has been made a 
fact, every nation must take its own legal precautions. (Cf. List, 1841a, 
p. 181, see immediately below) and secure these national interests in 
the international community through law preceded by international 
trade congresses. List defended a gradual approach taking due consid-
eration to the different circumstances, and accordingly different policies 
needed, of the various nations, and ―but the solution of this problem is 
a work of immensely long duration‖, 
 
The highest ultimate aim of rational politics is … the uniting of all na-
tions under a common law of right ... is to be attained only through the 
greatest possible equalisation of the most important nations of the earth in 
civilisation, prosperity, industry and power, ... but the solution of this prob-
lem is a work of immensely long duration.  ... As yet, the apportionment of 
territory to the European nations does not correspond to the nature of 
things. ... If every nation was already in possession of the territory which is 
necessary for its internal development, and for the maintenance of its polit-
ical, industrial, and commercial independence, then every conquest of terri-
tory would be contrary to sound policy, ... A just and wise apportionment of 
territory is, however, at this day not to be thought of... (List, 1841a, p. 410) 
 
A radical free trade approach, consisting of a generalised deregulato-
ry economic policy, does not consider the vastly different situations of 
the various nations. This policy will therefore always serve the estab-
lished and strongest, List argues. Instead, a step-wise integration of the 
nations of the world, in line with the development of industry and trade 
guided by government policy, ought to be followed. He goes into detail of 
how to go about this in his Natural System (Cf. List, 1837a, especially 
ch. 26: How best to introduce and foster Free Trade, p. 125). 
List called himself an adherent of the national principle as opposed to 
the global principle - or cosmopolitanism as List termed it.  
But in my opinion his principle was more continental as with Hamil-
ton. After Napoleon‘s Continental System, however, this phrase would 
be politically incorrect and rendered useless in political propaganda. On 
the other hand, in the German speaking nations, List is known as a lib-
eralist. But as mentioned, List‘s opinion was that free trade only was a 
good idea as long as the threat of military wars and trade wars did not 
exist. As long as these did exist List advised regulatory remedies to suit 
the situation.  
Although List saw national protection as a crucial economic instru-
ment for the individual national economy, it was still only an instru-
ment in order to reach the ultimate goal of universal free trade. (Cf. List, 
1841a, ch. 11, p. 126) The difference between him and Smith on the 
issue of trade therefore narrows down to taking the different circum-
stances of nations into consideration and that these circumstances ul-
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timately reflect different mental and socio-economic circumstances. 
Whereas Smith does not differentiate, List does. 
 
 
7.28 A universal confederation of nations 
 
List was a child of a time dominated by cosmopolitan ideas, and wrote 
that so far few have understood the necessity of free trade, 
 
So far there are only a few people, even in the most enlightened coun-
tries, who have grasped the fact that perpetual peace and universal free 
trade are both desirable and necessary. (List, 1837a, p. 31) 
 
And in this he followed the influential philosopher Immanuel Kant, 
who Wilhelm Windelband refers to such, 
 
And since history represents the outer social life of humanity, its goal is 
the completion of right and law, the establishing of the best political consti-
tution among all peoples – a goal whose attainment, as is the case with all 
ideals lies at an infinite distance. (Windelband, 1893, p. 559)  
 
List says that it would be unwise to act as if a universal union of na-
tions existed, before it actually did, but this is what the Popular School 
requires, 
 
In proportion, however, as the principle of a universal confederation of 
nations is reasonable, in just the same degree would a given nation act con-
trary to reason if, in anticipation of the great advantages to be expected 
from such a union, and from a state of universal and perpetual peace, it 
were to regulate the principles of its national policy as though this universal 
confederation of nations existed already. We ask, would not every sane per-
son consider a government to be insane which, in consideration of the 
benefits and the reasonableness of a state of universal and perpetual peace, 
proposed to disband its armies, destroy its fleet, and demolish its fortress-
es? But such a government would be doing nothing different in principle 
from what the popular school requires from governments when, because of 
the advantages which would be derivable from general free trade, it urges 
that they should abandon the advantages derivable from protection. (List, 
1841a, p. 181) 
 
List argues that the first to promote free trade were the Physiocrats of 
the early 18th Century with which the term ‗laissez faire‘ is associat-
ed.523 List writes that just like the Physiocrats, Smith and Say did not 
deal with (national) political economy, but with Cosmopolitical economy 
- as if nations did not exist and instead a world government did exist, 
 
                                       
523 The term ‗laissez nous faire‘ (leave us alone in doing our business) has, 
however, been attributed to the Dutch merchants in their heydays of the early 
17 Century and also to French business men during the regime of Colbert. 
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Quesnay (from whom the idea of universal free trade originated) was the 
first who extended his investigations to the whole human race, without tak-
ing into consideration the idea of the nation. He calls his work ‗Physiocratie, 
ou du Gouvernement le plus avantageux au Genre Humain,‘ his demands 
being that we must imagine that the merchants of all nations formed one 
commercial republic. … 
Adam Smith(1*) treats his doctrine in a similarly extended sense, by 
making it his task to indicate the cosmopolitical idea of the absolute free-
dom of the commerce of the whole world in spite of the gross mistakes 
made by the physiocrates against the very nature of things and against log-
ic. Adam Smith concerned himself as little as Quesnay did with true politi-
cal economy, i.e. that policy which each separate nation had to obey in or-
der to make progress in its economical conditions. He entitles his work, 
‗The Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations‘ (i.e. of all nations of the 
whole human race). He speaks of the various systems of Political economy 
in a separate part of his work solely for the purpose of demonstrating their 
non-efficiency, and of proving that ‗political‘ or national economy must be 
replaced by Cosmopolitical or world-wide economy.‘ 
Although here and there he speaks of wars, this only occurs incidentally. 
The idea of a perpetual state of peace forms the foundation of all his argu-
ments. Moreover, according to the explicit remarks of his biographer, 
Dugald Stewart, his investigations from the commencement are based upon 
the principle that ‗most of the State regulations for the promotion of public 
prosperity are unnecessary, and a nation in order to be transformed from 
the lowest state of barbarism into a state of the highest possible prosperity 
needs nothing but bearable taxation, fair administration of justice, and 
peace.‘ Adam Smith naturally understood under the word ‗peace‘ the ‗per-
petual universal peace‘ of the Abbé St. Pierre.  
J. B. Say openly demands that we should imagine the existence of a univer-
sal republic in order to comprehend the idea of general free trade. (List, 
1841a, ch. 11, p. 119-120)524 
 
Wilhelm Roscher mentions Fourier and Robert Owen as other sup-
porters of a, 
 
… universal confederate republic … (Roscher, 1877, § LXVII) 
 
James Steuart also touches upon the subject of a universal union, 
and List‘s debt to him is often overlooked, except by Kobayashi (Koba-
yashi, 1967).  Steuart says that open trade is disastrous and can only 
take place under a universal monarchy, 
 
Laying, therefore, trade quite open would have this effect; it would de-
stroy, at first at least, all the luxurious arts; consequently, it would dimin-
ish consumption; consequently, diminish the quantity of circulating cash; 
consequently, it would promote hoarding; and consequently, would bring 
on poverty in all the states of Europe. Nothing, I imagine, but a universal 
monarchy, governed by the same laws, and administered according to one 
                                       
524 A tiny part of this quotation has been used in the section, Power in inter-
national trade, in chapter 6. 
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plan well concerted, can be compatible with an universally open trade. 
(Steuart, 1767, book 1, ch. xxix) 
 
But in the meantime, Stuart advised protection of industry by privi-
leges and prohibitions as the only way to establish new manufacture. 
List writes, 
 
James Stewart says (Stewart, 1767, book 1. chapter xxix.): ‗In order to 
promote industry, a nation must act as well as permit, and protect. Could 
ever the woollen manufacture have been introduced into France from the 
consideration of the great advantage which England had drawn from it. If 
the king had not undertaken the support of it by granting many privileges 
to the undertakers, and by laying strict prohibitions on all foreign cloths? Is 
there any other way of establishing a new manufacture anywhere?‘ (List, 
1841a, ch. 29, p. 340, note 1) 
 
List claimed that the teachings of Smith‘s followers were more suita-
ble for the internal affairs of a nation (seen as the universe) than for in-
ternational affairs. But so long as some nations act according to na-
tional egotism, this is folly, List writes, 
 
If the school represents the free competition of all producers as the most 
effectual means for promoting the prosperity of the human race, it is quite 
right from the point of view which it assumes. On the hypothesis of a uni-
versal union, every restriction on the honest exchange of goods between 
various countries seems unreasonable and injurious. But so long as other 
nations subordinate the interests of the human race as a whole to their na-
tional interests, it is folly to speak of free competition among the individuals 
of various nations. The arguments of the school in favour of free competi-
tion are thus only applicable to the exchange between those who belong to 
one and the same nation. Every great nation, therefore, must endeavour to 
form an aggregate within itself, which will enter into commercial intercourse 
with other similar aggregates so far only as that intercourse is suitable to 
the interests of its own special community. (List, 1841a, p. 172) 
 
List argues that a universal union can only be developed gradually, 
and that the system of protection is the ―most efficient means of fur-
thering the final union of nations‖, and ―true freedom of trade‖. National 
protection is therefore an instrument to reach the ultimate goal of uni-
versal free trade,  
 
Only with the gradual formation of this union can free trade be devel-
oped, only as a result of this union can it confer on all nations the same 
great advantages which are now experienced by those provinces and states 
which are politically united. The system of protection, inasmuch as it forms 
the only means of placing those nations which are far behind in civilisation 
on equal terms with the one predominating nation (which, however, never 
received at the hands of Nature a perpetual right to a monopoly of manu-
facture, but which merely gained an advance over others in point of time), 
the system of protection regarded from this point of view appears to be the 
most efficient means of furthering the final union of nations, and hence also 
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of promoting true freedom of trade. And national economy appears from 
this point of view to be that science which, correctly appreciating the exist-
ing interests and the individual circumstances of nations, teaches how eve-
ry separate nation can be raised to that stage of industrial development in 
which union with other nations equally well developed, and consequently 
freedom of trade, can become possible and useful to it. (List, 1841a, ch. 11, 
p. 126) 
 
List says that we must expect other nations to hope that they can de-
velop themselves by the same methods as those employed by the Brit-
ish, and not ideology can stop them from trying, 
 
We would be prepared to agree with those economists if it were true that 
the nations concerned had decided to seek salvation under the supremacy 
of England and were prepared to surrender their rights as sovereign na-
tions. In fact it is hardly to be expected that nations would do this even if 
one could convince them that England is really greatly superior to all other 
countries. If the existence of such an attitude can be proved - and it is cer-
tainly not universally held - then we must expect the French, Americans, 
Belgians, and other peoples to cherish the hope that they can promote their 
industrial, social, and political development by the same methods as those 
employed by the British. In that case no mere doctrine can be expected to 
prevent a country from adopting such a policy. (List, 1837a, p. 188) 
 
In order to allow freedom of trade to operate naturally, the less advanced 
nations must first be raised by artificial measures to that stage of cultiva-
tion to which the English nation has been artificially elevated. (List, 1841a, 
ch. 11, p. 131) 
 
List argues that the radical free traders‘ wish for rapid progress to-
wards universal free trade would end in despotism. A universal republic 
with a geographically balanced economy is more likely if all nations are 
allowed to develop slowly. He argues that the various national opposi-
tions to this radical policy,  
 
… believe that humanity may make slower progress because of their protec-
tive commercial policies but they consider that their own economic advance 
will be more balanced than would otherwise be the case. The protection of 
national industries will enable states to preserve their freedom. The estab-
lishment of a universal republic will be much more likely if all the civilised 
countries in the world - followed in due course by nations which are at pre-
sent relatively backward - were making uniform economic progress. This 
would be much better than a situation in which one country dominated all 
others in industrial and commercial power, because in that case a world 
trading monopoly and a universal despotism would have been established. 
(List, 1837a, p. 188) 
 
 




List argues that, although we all have an allegiance first to our nation 
and only then to the world of nations, still a time comes when all na-
tions are capable of adopting free trade. In a transition period ―a gov-
ernment should work out and announce in plenty of time a definite 
sliding scale for the reduction of import duties‖. Moderate import duties 
will be allowed for revenue purposes. Export subsidies and export re-
strictions will not be allowed.  
 
… our faith in humanity rests upon the solid basis of nationalism. …. We 
are citizens of a nation before we are citizens of the world. … 
A time comes when certain countries and regions are capable of adopting 
a policy of free trade instead of a policy of protection. We propose, however, 
that such countries should retain those import duties which are necessary 
to compensate manufacturers for the burden of taxation that they are ex-
pected to bear. The countries we have in mind are … 
 
To indicate to what extent List emphasised the need for legal ar-
rangements in order to secure free trade in the longer perspective, a 
lengthy quotation is supplied in appendix 1d.525 526 
 
 
7.30 Promote free trade by international law, treaties and con-
gresses  
 
List calls his own contribution to the French Academy of Science‘s 
competition in 1837, ―a somewhat daring suggestion‖; a world congress 
to promote a world treaty on free trade, 
 
The author considers that the explanatory memorandum attached to the 
question posed by the Academy527 justifies him in putting forward his pro-
posal for the holding of a world trade congress although this is admittedly a 
somewhat daring suggestion. 
He hopes that he has paid proper attention to all the points raised in the 
Academy‘s memorandum: 
Will it be possible to establish Free Trade in wartime as well as in peace-
time by an international treaty which - however incomplete - could still be 
regarded as a great step forward in the progress of humanity? (List, 1837a, 
p.127) 
 
                                       
525 Reading the section, I am curious as to why List left out mentioning ‗in-
dustrial nations of the third rank‘, which he mentions elsewhere. Perhaps he 
here included them in the category ‗industrial nations of the second rank‘? 
526 Sections of this chapter has been quoted and commented in the section 
below; Promote free trade by international law, treaties and congresses 
527 1. [List's note See Charles Dupin, "Sur le prix d'économie politique relatif 
aux moyens d'établir la liberté commerciale‖ (December 28, 1836), (Reprinted 
in F. List, Werke (Schriften Reden, Briefe) Vol. IV: Das natürliche System der 
politschen Okonomie, 1837 (1971), pp. 39-44] (Henderson‘s note) 
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List was a staunch believer in legal arrangements in order to solve 
(national and) international trade disputes, and here argues that bal-
anced treaties (with equal advantages) is an alternative to a European 
empire a la Napoleon,  
 
There are only two ways by which Free Trade can be introduced. The first 
is to set up a world state like the European empire that Napoleon tried to 
establish. The second is for countries to conclude commercial treaties. Care 
must of course be taken not to conclude treaties by which one nation en-
joys the oysters while another has to be content with the shells. Commer-
cial treaties must give equal advantages to all the countries which sign 
them. All countries must secure guarantees for the future survival and 
prosperity of their industries. 
France and the United States are two countries which would benefit 
greatly from the conclusion of a commercial treaty.528 (List, 1837a, p. 125) 
 
List attacks the radical free trade school for its resistance to commer-
cial treaties, whereas List argues that they are the best way to gradually 
more free trade, although the historical experience thus far has been 
poor, 
 
In conclusion, we must not omit here to make mention of commercial 
treaties based on mutual concessions of duties. The school objects to these 
conventions as unnecessary and detrimental, whereas they appear to us as 
the most effective means of gradually diminishing the respective restrictions 
on trade, and of leading the nations of the world gradually to freedom of in-
ternational intercourse. Of course, the specimens of such treaties which the 
world has hitherto seen, are not very encouraging for imitation. (List, 
1841a, p. 323) 
 
List insists on balanced treaties, that agreements should not discrim-
inate between the parties,  
 
Commercial unions and commercial treaties are the most effective means 
of facilitating intercourse between different nations. But commercial treaties 
are only legitimate and valuable when they involve mutual benefits. They 
are injurious and illegitimate when the development of a manufacturing 
power in one country is sacrificed in order to gain concessions for the ex-
ports of its agricultural products to another country. These are ―Methuen 
treaties,‖ or ―lion-treaties.‖ (List, 1841b, Introduction, in Hirsch, 1909, p. 
314-315) 
 
In 1837, List argues as he did in his Vienna Memorandum (Cf. List, 
1820, p. 546) that a world trade congress should be called to promote 
the introduction of free trade, and the task should be to pave the way 
                                       
528 1. [List had long been interested in promoting trade between France and 




for commercial and balanced treaties that respect the different stages of 
various nations, 
 
To pave the way for the conclusion of advantageous commercial treaties 
a world trade congress should be convened at which all countries should be 
represented by experienced and well qualified experts. Such a congress 
should consider how the common interests of the various nations can best 
be served and how opposing interests could be reconciled. The congress 
should consider the varied interests of regions and societies at different 
stages of economic development – such as industrialised, agrarian, colonial, 
and primitive societies. It should examine the needs of countries which 
have reached the second or the third stage of industrial development in re-
lation to the world‘s leading manufacturing country. It should consider the 
economic relations between two particular countries and between certain 
groups of countries. The deliberations of the congress would provide infor-
mation to people all over the world concerning economic problems. This 
would encourage governments and legislative assemblies to adopt measures 
which would be to the advantage of all countries and it would enable gov-
ernments to enlighten the citizens of all states on these matters.  
It would, for example, be much easier for the British government to se-
cure acceptance of the repeal of the Corn Laws if this measure were to fol-
low discussions at a world trade congress. The discussions at the congress 
should cover all the matters mentioned in chapter 17. (List, 1837a, p. 
126)529 
 
List argues that the congress should promote free trade in raw mate-
rials (which would again reduce the need for colonies) and promote free 
trade on the seas, which would reduce the need for national navies. 
Thereby List actively ―reduces‖ the most important reasons for criticism 
against his system, 
 
These are topics which are of interest to all countries. The deliberations 
of the congress would throw light on the following topics – the advantages of 
universal free trade in raw materials and agricultural products; the ad-
vantages to be secured by all industrialised countries by agreeing to the 
imposition of uniform import duties on manufactured goods; the ad-
vantages of establishing common measures to secure universal peace, pub-
lic order, and security of persons and property. Above all a world trade con-
gress would facilitate the establishment of the freedom of the seas since it 
would give the lesser mercantile countries an opportunity to appreciate 
their real interest in this matter. (List, 1837a, pp. 126-127) 
 
Uniform import duties on manufactured goods would serve to pro-
mote local production, reduce the need for transportation and promote 
more local diversity- and innovation in production. This again may im-
prove the efficiency of the economic system. Likewise, efficiency would 
be improved when freedom of the seas would give smaller nations the 
                                       
529 Chapter 17 has the following headline: Is it necessary to protect Agricul-




possibility of partaking in world trade – and in the global confederation 
of labour.  
List suggests that France and the United States should take the lead 
in promoting a congress for a liberal trade policy, and England would 
then follow due to the advantages she would reap as well as due to her 
dependence on trade with America, 
 
In chapters 7 and 8 we dealt with this aspect of the problem. We sug-
gested that France and the United States should, in their own  interests, 
take the lead in calling a world trade congress. There are reasons to believe 
that a suggestion of this kind would be supported by all the countries on 
the Continent. If these countries collaborated it can hardly be doubted that 
England, too, would send representatives to the proposed world trade con-
gress, if only to keep abreast with what was happening. In chapter 7 we 
showed how powerful are the reasons which might make England decide to 
adopt a liberal commercial policy. Here we may add that England‘s cotton 
mills have now become very dependent upon the United States for their 
supplies of raw cotton. (List, 1837a, p. 127) 
 
The European Continental nations and the United States have a 
common interest in free marine trade routes through the Middle East 
and worldwide, 
 
All the Continental powers have especially a common interest that nei-
ther of the two routes from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea and to the 
Persian Gulf should fall into the exclusive possession of England, nor re-
main impassable owing to Asiatic barbarism. To commit the duty of protect-
ing these important points to Austria, would insure the best guarantees to 
all European nations. 
Further, the Continental powers in general have a common interest with 
the United States in maintaining the principle that ‗free ships cover free 
goods,‘ … (List, 1841a, p. 420) 
 
List argues that free trade on the seas would reduce wars but is de-
pendent upon acceptance of international law, also at sea, 
 
The great principle of ―free ships, free goods‖ has already been enunciat-
ed by Catherine the Great of Russia and by George Washington. But so far 
it has not been possible to secure the universal acceptance of this principle. 
It is obvious - proof is hardly required - that the universal acceptance and 
strict observation of this principle of international law would remove most 
of the disastrous consequences that war brings to all branches of industry. 
The author can see no way of achieving this aim unless the proposed doc-
trine of international law is universally accepted. (List, 1837a, p. 127)  
 
List argues that if other sea-nations were able to force England to ac-
cept free trade on the seas, this could best be secured by a world trade 
congress. In the twentieth century England will want to promote free 




If, however, there came a time when the maritime powers of the second 
and third rank were in a position to force England to accept the doctrine of 
―free ships, free goods‖ it could be done only if they collaborated closely. 
The best way to secure this co-operation would be through a world trade 
congress, as we have already proposed. Such a conference would be the 
simplest way of showing the nations on the Continent where their common 
interests lay. Even if the nineteenth century should pass without the doc-
trine ―free ships, free goods‖ being generally accepted, the twentieth century 
will surely see its adoption. 
When that time comes England will be the country to advocate the adop-
tion of the principle and people will discuss how best to check the arbitrary 
power of the United States of America.  (List, 1837a, p. 128)530 
 
List argues that nations on different stages of development can trade 
with mutual benefits, where the less advanced nation supply the more 
advanced nation with coarser products, 
 
On that account also, two nations which stand at different stages of in-
dustrial cultivation, can with mutual benefit make reciprocal concessions 
by treaty in respect to the exchange of their various manufacturing prod-
ucts. The less advanced nation can, while it is not yet able to produce for it-
self with profit finer manufactured goods, such as fine cotton and silk fab-
rics, nevertheless supply the further advanced nation with a portion of its 
requirements of coarser manufactured goods. (List, 1841a, pp. 324-325) 
 
Nevertheless, List argues that trade and trade treaties are most bene-
ficial when nations are equally well developed, simply because competi-
tion is then most just, balanced and efficient, as is the case among the 
nations on the European Continent, 
 
Such treaties might be still more allowable and beneficial between na-
tions which stand at about the same degree of industrial development, be-
tween which, therefore, competition is not overwhelming, destructive, or re-
pressive, nor tending to give a monopoly of everything to one side, but 
merely acts, as competition in the inland trade does, as an incentive to mu-
tual emulation, perfection, and cheapening of production. This is the case 
with most of the Continental nations. France, Austria, and the German 
Zollverein might, for instance, anticipate only very prosperous effects from 
moderately low reciprocal protective duties. Also, between these countries 
and Russia mutual concessions could be made to the advantage of all sides. 
(List, 1841a, p. 325)  
 
 
7.31 Contradictions in List’s arguments? 
 
a) A promoter both of protection and free trade?  
 
                                       
530 The last part of this quotation have been used in the section above; A Eu-
ropean defence union 
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The following quotations serve to prove List‘s seemingly contradictory 
positions regarding the first issue of protection versus free trade.  It is 
clear that List himself understood that there was no contradiction in a 
larger setting. This point is made by quotations from List himself: Prac-
tically based protection in the short run serves the ideal of free trade in 
the long run. 
That List was a Cosmopolitan, a free trader and a globalist at heart, 
should be obvious from the following quotations.531  List champions,  
 
… the cause of general free trade, by which Europe alone can reach the 
highest stage of civilisation. (List, 1819, p. 492) 
 
The last point of his criticism against his own beloved industrial sys-
tem as opposed to the Mercantile system (as he names it) was against 
its one-eyed nationalism that disregarded the necessity of free trade 
and the unification of nations. List thereby pays his respects to the 
agenda of his time, the Cosmopolitan- or Libertarian ideology, 
 
7. That chiefly owing to its utterly ignoring the principle of cosmopolitan-
ism, it does not recognise the future union of all nations, the establishment 
of perpetual peace, and of universal freedom of trade, as the goal towards 
which all nations have to strive, and more and more to approach. (List, 
1841a, p. 341) 
 
Chapter headings of his Natural System (Cf. List, 1837a) speak for 
themselves:  
 
The Common Interest of all Manufacturing States in Free Trade (ch. 7),  
Transition from the Policy of Protection to the Policy of as much Free Trade as 
possible, (ch. 25) and  
How best to introduce and foster Free Trade (ch. 26)  
 
Here List argues for free trade regulated by international law, 
 
The great principle of ―free ships, free goods‖ … It is obvious- proof is 
hardly required - that the universal acceptance and strict observation of 
this principle of international law would remove most of the disastrous con-
sequences that war brings to all branches of industry. The author can see 
no way of achieving this aim unless the proposed doctrine of international 
law is universally accepted. (List, 1837a, p. 127) 
 
List accordingly argues for a world federation of free trade ruled by 
law. The issues of commercial free trade and political unification of na-
tions under one law, had to be solved simultaneously, and that this is 
the highest aim of politics, 
 
Thus the question as to whether, and how, the various nations can be 
brought into one united federation, and how the decisions of law can be in-
                                       
531 Some of these quotations have been used elsewhere, in different settings. 
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voked in the place of military force to determine the differences which arise 
between independent nations, has to be solved concurrently with the ques-
tion how universal free trade can be established in the place of separate na-
tional commercial systems. (List, 1841a, p. 114) 
The highest ultimate aim of rational politics is … the uniting of all na-
tions under a common law of right (List, 1841a, p. 410) 
 
List argues that free trade and respect for the law could only be ac-
complished through a world state by way of conquests or much prefer-
ably, through voluntary commercial treaties,  
 
There are only two ways by which Free Trade can be introduced. The first 
is to set up a world state like the European empire that Napoleon tried to 
establish. The second is for countries to conclude commercial treaties. (List, 
1837a, p. 125) 
 
And arguing for a World Trade Organisation as a preliminary action, 
List writes that, 
 
… the only satisfactory solution to the problem would be the establish-
ment of world free trade. 
Since we can hardly expect England of her own free will to make the con-
cessions necessary to secure the establishment of a world customs union, it 
seems to us that the countries which have reached the second and third 
stage of industrialisation should form an association of their own to press 
for the establishment of world free trade which should be the common aim 
of all countries. (List, 1837a, p. 52) 
 
Still he claims that, 
 
Free trade is the fantasy of the merchants engaged in foreign commerce, 
(List, 1837a, p. 58) 
 
Therefore, List was a Cosmopolitan free trade adherent on the one 
side and on the other hand also a protectionist and an economic na-
tionalist. This is clear from the following quotation, where he argues in 
a paradoxical way that, 
 
The system of protection … appears to be the most efficient means of fur-
thering the final union of nations, and hence also of promoting true free-
dom of trade. (List, 1841a, p. 126) 
 
This seemingly contradictory stance is only understandable, by not-
ing that power was unequally distributed internationally. Free trade 
could reign only when equality was established. This was the utopian 
dream. Until equality was reached, protection was the remedy - but 
multilateral agreements was a substitute. 
List claims that history teaches us both that we approach universal 
political and commercial unity, but also that nations that underesti-
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mate protection of its immediate interests, will perish (Cf. List, 1841b, 
Introduction, in Hirst, 1909, pp. 291-292).  
 
 
b) More or less regulation? - State intervention versus free trade 
 
List also claimed, that with increased development comes more state 
intervention,  
 
Statistics and history, however, teach, …, that the necessity for the in-
tervention of legislative power and administration is everywhere more ap-
parent, the further the economy of the nation is developed. (List, 1841a, p. 
172) 
 
This would seem to be counter his claim that free trade is a necessity 
of future progress.  
List therefore seemingly contradictory claims that with increased de-
velopment there is a trend towards more state intervention (more regu-
lation) on the one hand and on the other hand more free trade (less 
regulation).  
Nevertheless, all this may be interpreted as both logical and histori-
cally correct: To harmonise List‘s claims, it would be necessary to differ-
entiate between long-term trends nationally versus internationally. 
When List writes about more intervention, this concerns national is-
sues. When he writes about freer trade, this concerns international is-
sues. 
Furthermore, we may differentiate between long-term trends in trade 
versus in other matters, which is of course possible. We would then, 
hypothetically according to List, have a long term trend towards more 
state intervention, but not in commerce, where the trend is towards less 
intervention.  
This is also what has happened historically. The reason for more in-
tervention generally is a natural and necessary result of growing and 
more complex societies and technologies - almost as a result of ―natu-
ral‖ forces. Reduced intervention in trade, however, is a result of politi-
cal- and economic interests and then finally a result of political deci-
sions. 
Nevertheless, since economic matters increasingly are interwoven, 
the issue and List‘s claims taken together is debateable. Different na-
tional health regulations are just one instance of a non-trade regulation 
that certainly may inflict with trade, and can be used deliberately for 
that purpose. Conversely, trade has important consequences for health, 
such as the spreading of disease, and harmful species of plants and an-
imals. National security issues likewise have implications for trade and 
have been deliberately used in this regard.532  
                                       
532 This was the case when six US port management companies in 2006 were 
to be sold by P&O, a private British company, to DP World, a Dubai state-owned 
company. US authorities refused them from being sold, claiming national securi-
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Nevertheless, it is an historical fact that there is a trend towards more 
state intervention (more regulation) on the one hand nationally and on 





                                                                                                                
ty as the reason. Security reasons were also used against the Chinese telecom-
munications companies Huawei and ZTE, to block them from delivering to US 
infrastructure (Cf. Wolf, 2012). 
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8.01 Summary of criticism  
 
There are some issues in List‘s system that I and others find problemat-
ic and unsolved. They have been dealt with and discussed in the main 
text of the former seven chapters, and the following is therefore only a 
résumé. 
  
Some problematic issues are: 
 
a) Trade and stability  
 
1) List promotes closeness and stability on the one hand and more effi-
cient transport on the other hand. The problem is that the latter un-
dermines the former. This inconsistent tension remains unresolved 
with List. To make sense of List‘s priorities here, he would have to 
claim that closeness takes priority over transport, thereby promoting 
only ―necessary‖ transport, which is sound logistics and economics. 
 
2) List promoted stability on the one hand, and on the other hand he 
also promoted trade liberalization, knowing full well that both of the 
latter undermine the former. This field of tension between ―tradition 
and modernisation‖; between tradition and stability on one side, and 
progress and dissolution on the other side, remains unresolved with 
List, but this is inevitable in a dynamic world. Nevertheless, as many 
other thinkers, List endeavoured to remedy these enduring conflicts 
through pragmatic policies, not getting to static ideological pre-
scripts of ‗protection‘ or ‗free trade‘. In his project he largely succeed-
ed by pointing out some options that were elaborated upon - inten-
sively and extensively - by his successors in Germany and else-
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where, such as Tönnies, Durkheim and Simmel. 
 
3) List promoted 1) self-sufficiency in the short to medium run, and 2) 
trade liberalization in the long run, especially with raw materials, 
while knowing full well that the latter undermine the former, also 
since nations specialize in their production due to e.g. economics of 
scale. List suggested that gradual liberalisation towards ‗free trade‘, 
would overcome this ―schism‖ and the necessity for national self-
sufficiency. 
 
4) List argued that the world gradually moved towards free trade, but 
he also argues that as nations mature and society gradually grows 
more complex, more state intervention is needed. Whether state in-
tervention involves protection, is at all times a matter of definition. 
This is the case both in theory and in practical disputes between 
companies and between nations. - One example might be when Ital-
ian mobile phones were required to withstand minus 40 degrees 
temperature. US security requirements offer more examples.  
 
5) List argued that universal free trade would be realised once all na-
tions had reached an equal level of development. But since nations 
not only progress but also regress, and in unequal pace, the day of 
equality of all might never appear. Universal free trade is therefore 
unlikely to emerge, by economic federation first. In fact, List argues 
that this would be counter to historical experience. According to List, 
a universal federation must be political first, if it were to succeed. 
The present debt problems in the EU displays an example of (a yet 
unfinished) political union.  
 
6) The American protectionists who largely followed List, such as Henry 
Carey and Simon Patten, tried to remedy inconsistencies in List‘s 
system, regarding in particular stability versus free trade. They 
chose to develop the American System into a system of permanent 
high protection, dismissing List‘s hope in a future of global free 




b) Mercantilism and the British System  
 
7) When discussing James Stewart‘s book and Mercantilism, List criti-
cises the Industrial System for generalising protection and to en-
courage a prohibiting system of ineffective monopolies (Cf. List, 
1841a, pp. 340-341) but this is somewhat unfair; even List was well 
aware that Mercantilists like Colbert also favoured domestic compe-
tition for instance by expanding infrastructure and removing inter-
nal barriers to trade: ―The agricultural-manufacturing-commercial 
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State is like a city which spreads over a whole kingdom, …‖  (List, 
1841a, p. 339). 
List in 1827 claims that the American System is opposed to the Brit-
ish System (List, 1827b, Letter I, pp. 17-19). But this reference to 
the British System concerns free trade, whereas, as List repeatedly 
points out, the original British System was a system of regulation; 
protection and Imperial self-sufficiency (Cf. Gipson, 1954, p. 25, and 




8) List argued that it was essential that sovereign nation should ac-
quire colonies, and therefore a merchant fleet to carry on trade with 
the colonies and an able navy to protect that trade. List also argues, 
however, that colonial products have no nutritional value and are 
goods suited for luxury consumption, such as sugar, tobacco, and 
spices.  
If Germany were to be self-supplied without colonies, her population 
would have to agree to dispense with colonial luxuries. That is an ex-
post hypothetical question that cannot be answered a-priori in theo-
ry. 
9) List can be criticised for promoting the colonial system of suppress-
ing non-industrialised countries, but List argues that implementa-
tion of freedom of the Seas would remove the economic reason both 
for colonies and for navies. (List, 1837a, pp. 126-127) He may still be 
criticised, however for promoting colonisation and establishment of 
protectorates for benevolent reasons, intending to civilise less ad-
vanced nations. In this he has had many followers as recent world 
events show, particularly regarding ―interventions‖ in ―barbarous‖ 
countries, whether legitimised by UN Security Council resolutions or 
not.     
10) List does not explain very well why a country in the torrid (hot 
tropical) zone, could not industrialise or re-industrialise. List‘s ar-
gument was not racist but that of climate. Accordingly he argued 
that Texas (settled with people from North-West Europe) was unfit 
for manufacturing (List, 1841a, p. 432). List argument was factually 
and empirically oriented as well as logical, but he has here been 
proven wrong. 
11) In the case of East India, however, List mentions both industriali-
sation before British rule as well as the positive prospects (Cf. List, 
1841a, p. 263, and p. 417), which both should contradict his ―cli-
mate argument‖. Furthermore, List does not mention Indian re-
sistance to British occupation. His attitude towards British policy 
towards India is lenient, and contrasts with List‘s indignant descrip-
tions of British behaviour towards European nations. 
 




12) List is somewhat wrong in writing that Smith totally excluded the 
power dimension, but may be more right when speaking of his fol-
lowers (Cf. e.g. List, 1841a, chapter 4).  
13) List has been criticised for being a forerunner for German aggres-
sion and expansionism (Cf. e.g. Neumann, 1942, pp. 104-106 and 
Earle, 1944, p. 141 n68, and p. 144). This is related to his promo-
tion of the establishment of customs unions and railway construc-
tion, and in particular related to his promotion of the construction of 
able navies. These suggestions were part of List‘s strategy of develop-
ing Germany and the European Continent by copying the British 
success, and setting up a joint defence against British dominance. 
They were naturally but unfortunately seen as threats by that same 
camp. List suggested remedying differences, e.g. by introducing uni-
versal free seas and free trade as well as suggesting an alliance be-
tween Great Britain and Germany, but he was not successful in this 
pursuit. 
14) List has been criticised for being a forerunner for German racism. 
. (Cf. Tenenbaum, 1976, p. 8) This has been proven wrong (Cf. e.g. 
List, 1841a, p. 220 and 220n). This is a confusion of List‘s idealist 
nationalism with the later materialist nationalism and the latter‘s af-




15) List‘s monetary analysis is intuitive and not very refined accord-
ing to today‘s norms. But for his day his analysis is quite impressive. 
For instance, he is rather traditional, but he does not fall into the 
austerity traps that Adam Smith and his followers do. Instead, List‘s 
focus on building production capacity suits the problems of today‘s 
indebted countries well, tormented as they are by trade- and pay-
ments deficits as well as by financial crises. 
16) List clearly understands that productive investment, such as in 
infrastructure, makes the whole economic system more efficient. 
Nevertheless, List omits mentioning the resulting non-inflationary 
character of productive investment, which today is another im-
portant argument for its construction.  
17) Sometimes List explains State credit as a loan, where the State is 
a debtor. List grasps the concept of fiduciary money (List, 1841a, pp. 
281-284), but does not take the step into promote it actively. Some-
times he thereby ignores the important alternative creation of public 
credit, utilising the State‘s legal monopoly of national money issuing.  
 
f) Regulation of interests 
 
18) Henderson criticises that List overstated the capability and power 
of governments to steer economic development (Cf. Henderson, 
1983, p. 163), but this is not a valid reason to refrain from trying. 
507 
 
19) Henderson repeatedly criticises List for his condemnation of the 
merchant‘s role in industry (Cf. e.g. Henderson, 1983, p. 12), but 
List actually often defends the merchant for simply doing his job: ―a 
merchant should not be criticised … It is the nature of things that he 
must buy in the cheapest markets and sell in the dearest‖ (List, 
1837a, p. 99). 
20) List criticises England‘s landed interests for promoting agricul-
tural protection, but he never came upon the idea that these inter-
ests could be compensated here and now, instead of risking bank-
ruptcy now and an uncertain reward for List‘s policy advice in the 
future (Cf. List, 1841a, ch. 20: The Manufacturing Power and the Ag-
ricultural Interest, especially pp. 238, 240, 244, 247, 248, 250). 
21) Similarly, List criticises Dutch merchant interests for promoting 
free trade with English manufactured goods, but he never came up-
on the idea that these interests could be compensated here and now, 
instead of risking bankruptcy now and an uncertain reward for List‘s 
policy advice in the future (Cf. List, 1841a, p. 407). 
 
g) Motivation and method 
 
22) List does not explain the concept of progress, so one is left with 
an impression that he adopted the general contemporary idea that 
advances in technology and organisation would largely go hand in 
hand with higher morals among peoples.  
23) List‘s basic motive for human action remains basically the same 
as that of Adam Smith: Competition for social recognition, through 
amassment of material objects or social position. Admittedly, List is 
more refined in his economic sociology than the economists of the 
English Classical School, but the core is the same. 
24) List‘s criticism of Adam Smith‘s individualism (Cf. List, 1841a, 
pp. 348-349) is too general, in the sense that in this criticism of 
methodological individualism, he does not explicitly differ between 
materialist and idealist points of view; as in individualism regarding 
consumption (related to e.g. private goods), versus individualism re-
garding production (related to e.g. creativity and public goods). 
25) List‘s arguments for the positive effects of morality and religion; of 
Christianity and even more so Protestantism, is meagre and shallow. 




26) Britain‘s internal affairs is often painted in perhaps too rosy col-
ours by List, with scant mention of conflicts. (See e.g. the section In-
dividual freedom and democracy, in chapter 4.) 
27) Henderson criticises List for his exaggerations concerning Smith, 
and for List‘s tendency to make ―assertions without making much ef-








Was Friedrich List‘s criticism of the Cosmopolitan School correct? Yes 
and no. List exaggerated, he knew it and he stated this in writing.  
But it is slightly irrelevant whether the Classical was a scape goat for 
List or not. The most important point is whether List‘s analysis by itself 
was correct or not.  
List was indeed correct in pointing out the importance of the immate-
rial factors. Development during the last few decades of ―information 
revolution‖ has made it crystal clear that knowledge and communica-
tion are indeed front drivers of technological, social and economic de-
velopment. Furthermore, research into the importance of matters relat-
ed to e.g. business stability and social trust, supports List‘s emphasis 
on morality and stability.  
List was also correct in pointing out that the Cosmopolitan School 
largely had ignored the immaterial factors. He was also correct in claim-
ing that this had serious consequences for the understanding of how 
social- and international economies work and how they may be ar-
ranged to produce the best results. 
On the other hand List was not alone in pointing out these matters, 
just as Hegel was not alone in his pursuits. Therefore, Adam Müller is 
among those who deserves more credit and fame than he hitherto has 
received. 
More specifically, List deserves great credit for revealing the material-
istically based errors of Adam Smith‘s theory of capital and growth, 
which was the basis for Smith‘s theory of trade (Cf. also Cannan, 1921 
and Levi-Faur, 1997). Furthermore, there are also good reasons to value 
Friedrich List‘s defence of the Mercantlist standpoint against Adam 
Smith‘s scoffing: The balance of trade matters – for financial stability 
and for sovereignty.  
List‘s explained that a national currency is backed by its power of 
production, in essence its mental powers. A government should expand 
its volume of currency in pace with the growth of industry, and in order 
to strengthen sovereignty he promoted credit to be channelled into pro-
ductive investment, especially into infrastructure. He thereby contrib-
uted to the theory of productive credit creation by the state, which was 
further developed in theory and was practiced a century later (Cf. 
Backhaus, 1985 and Klausinger, 1985). 
List‘s remedy for countries with trade and payment deficits, as well as 
for those countries that did not desire to experience this sorry destiny, 
was to strengthen the powers of production in order to improve the na-
tional competitiveness. Therefore, as Christopher Freeman pointed out, 
List‘s system might as well have been called the National System of In-
novation (Cf. Freeman, 1982).  
Was Friedrich List‘s system coherent? Yes, in general I think it was, 
with some important exceptions noted above.   
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Was Friedrich List‘s system of lasting importance? Yes, in general I 
think it was, with some important exceptions noted above.  The reason 
is that he pointed out the relativity, not of values themselves, but rather 
the relativity of their practical implementation: He was pragmatic. His 
system was therefore dynamic in the sense of being able to adapt to 
changed circumstances.   
In sum, List basically argued that the immaterial factors of produc-
tion were decisive in economics, and that political economy therefore 
fundamentally is a historical and cultural science. In my view, List‘s 
most important accomplishment was this profundity of his quite coher-




Appendix 1  
 
The Logic of List 
 
List’s logic: Goals and measures 
 
The logic of List‘s argument for national economic policies: 
 
1) Ultimate goal: Elevation of human civilisation globally 
 
2) Conditions and sub-goals of importance (all motive- / incen-
tive oriented): 
 
A) Freedom - for creativity and know-how 
B) Morality533 - for communal progress and predictability of in-
vestments534 
C) Wealth    – allowing freedom and morality to flourish 
 




1) General    
a) Gradual and pragmatic reforms  
b) Differentiated system of regulations and trade  
 
2) Practical  
a) Security for civil liberties and property 
b) Policies535 that spur investments into strategic branch-
es536  





   a) Gradual and pragmatic reforms 
b) Differentiated system of trade, approaching free trade 
 
2) Practical  
a) World Trade conferences  
b) World Trade Organisation 
                                       
533 Including trust, stability, and order, as well as endeavour and precision. 
534 Both immaterial and material 
535 Including  regulations, taxation and other incentives. 
536 E.g. education, research, infrastructure, energy, machine tool production 
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c) World Government 
 
The Logic of List’s Productive forces 
 
Theses on: Elevating Labour and Culture: Friedrich List‘s Interna-
tional System for Competition and Mutual Progress 
 
List: The setting for political economy is, 
An international economic system of competing nations.  
 
The trigger for List‘s efforts is a failure to compete; Crisis and so-
cial despair:  
Germany‘s poverty and emigration, and US twin deficits, national 
debt, and repeated crises in banking and industry. 
 
 




The free human spirit creates progress through public regulation 




1) List‘s goal is a ―progress‖ that elevates global civilisation.  
2) The ultimate source of progress is the human spirit, 
3) – which constitutes and reshapes the mental capital.  
4)                                - ―‖-         collaboration.  
5)                                - ―‖-         nation.  
6) The ultimate collaboration lies in true global free trade. 
7) List‘s diagnosis is lacking competitive power.   
8) List‘s remedy is to elevate the quality of labour,  





Economic progress is only achieved by cultural progress.  
 
Or in more popular terms:  
―Use your brains; bring your house in order and get creative & produc-
tive!‖ 
 





In some detail:  
 
THEORY 
(Economic sociology)  
 
1) List‘s goal is ―progress‖; elevating global civilisation,  
by improving individual freedom and morality,  
giving creativity, predictability and prosperity: England was his 
model. 
Ↄ: ―Fortschritt‖ = ―step forward‖, advance – not material ―growth‖.  
 
2) The ultimate source of progress is the individual‘s spirit,  
which yearns for freedom, social recognition and –
advancement,  
- inequality is a spur.  
 
3) The human spirit constitutes and continuously reshapes men-
tal capital; individual & collective; intergenerational & accu-
mulated; ―Geisteskapital‖. 
 
I.e. ―human capital‖; knowledge, know-how, skill, innovation - and institu-
tions; social networks and –traditions; religion, morality, trust, jurisdiction, 
and credit, Counter-factual: Reconstruction problems in archaeology, find-
ing material artefacts only.  
 
4) Mental capital constitutes and reshapes collaboration;  
the on-going confederation of labour (CL): 
 
A. CL reaches its furthermost potential in an urban-industrial 
civilization (UIC), which only develops well through, 
i. Carefully balanced development of all vital sections of 
agriculture, industry and trade - with priority to produc-
tion over finance; 
ii. Establishment of efficient communication (of ideas etc.), 
a) State of the art institutions, regulations, common stand-
ards  
(e.g. grammar). 
b) Towns - and emulation of the density of towns by, 
c) Transport: Physical and communicative; media. 
 
B. An UIC elevates civilisation by demanding high-quality, 
i. Labour with a high moral standard, well-educated 
and -skilled, 
ii. Conditions of work, dwelling and livelihood.  
General welfare and social security promote high morality 
and –skills.  
 
5) CL constitutes and continuously reshapes the Nation,  





A. The Nation is the main vehicle for the individual‘s; freedom, 
happiness and prosperity, delivering collective services that 
an individual cannot,  
i. Traditions, such as in institutions, culture and the arts.  
ii. Improvements of major infrastructure;  
security, health, education, research, transport and communication.  
 
B. The Nation resembles a large factory;  
a national system of innovation and production. 
 
6) The ultimate CL lies in true global free trade, which 
A. Constitutes an international collaborative system of innova-
tion and production.  
B. Makes obsolete the selfish colonial system as well as navies;  
 
7) List‘s diagnosis (e.g.  Germany, USA) is a lack of (national) 
competitive power /productive force  
(poor mental and material capital = low quality of Labour).   
 
8) List‘s remedy is to elevate the quality of labour, by public regu-






I. ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY:537 
- ―Bring your house in order‖ 
 
1) Public regulation - pragmatic promotion of improved common 
standards: Jurisdiction,538 -defence, and -infrastructure, etc., 
- in particular: 
A. Property rights (e.g. security, patents and other semi-
monopolies).  
B. Know-how: Education, training and research 
C. General welfare: Health; conditions of work, dwelling and 
livelihood. 
D. Immigration of resourceful Labour; skilled, trustworthy, en-
terprising  
E. Information: Conferences, -journals and –propaganda. 
F. Excellence: Establishment of exhibitions, competitions, and 
prices. 
 
                                       
537 All these in the Mercantilist /Cameralist tradition. 
538 E.g. injunctions, prohibitions. 
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II. FISCAL- AND MONETARY POLICY:539 
- ―Get creative and productive!‖ 
 
2) Strategic taxation policies (e.g. fees, tariffs, subsidies, grants, 
tax credits). 
The order of importance of their task is, 
 
A. Promote stability, using pragmatic protection.540  
B. Restructure business and industry541, and differentiate ac-
cording to,  
i. Situation: Historical setting / stage of development - 
List: ―infant industry‖, involvement of employment and 
necessary consumption. 
ii. ―Strategic‖ role of a branch:  
 
a)  ―Key‖; necessary for other branches,  
especially machine tools, energy, and infrastructure.542 
b)  ―Attractive‖; giving higher development and -value crea-
tion in the long-run; commanding higher prices due to 
difficult production.  
– List: involvement of better skills, and -machinery.543  
 
C. Provide security for e.g. foreign investors,  
Capital, technology, and spirit of enterprise.544  
D. Fiscal income (tax revenue) 
 
3) Create public money and -credit  
– directed to strategic activities and branches.  
―Productive Credit Creation‖ tradition; Hildebrand, Lautenbach 
etc. 
 
                                       
539 Cf. ―Hamiltonian‖ legacy - directing resources - with Listian ―immaterial‖ 
twist. 
540 Mental capital is a fragile capacity and network, and needs to be wisely nur-
tured and protected against the gusts of the world markets. 
541 The ability to learn offers the opportunity to enter and expand in ―new‖ stra-
tegic and attractive branches - as opposed to the static and ―monocultural‖ re-
sults of ―competitive advantages‖: ―Stick to one‘s last.‖  
542 Basic education, technical schools, research, health, transport, communica-
tion, and credit system. E.g. innovative transport, List: telegraph and electro-
magnetic propulsion, and in our days; ICT (being both machine tool and infra-
structure) and APM/PRT (automated transport). 
543 ―more profitable employment‖, Luxury products elevate quality (cf. Colbert) - 
competition on quality (Germany today) as opposed to competition on price.  
544 Cf. Sergei Witte‘s and Sun Yat-sen‘s legacy: 
―it is my idea to make capitalism  create socialism in China‖ (1922). 
- Cf. point 1 F3 above, on immigration. 
515 
 
4) Ensure favourable interest rates  –  directed … 
 
5) Create state investment  - directed … (e.g. shares in private 
equity) 
 
6) Regulate consumption - to match production - securing unin-
terrupted stability in home markets. Prevent hoarding. 
 
III. INTERNATIONAL POLICY: 
(In the international competition and power game); 
 
7) Promotion of true international free trade through,  
A. Temporary protection in developing nations, increasing,  
i. Long term global competition and -efficiency545 
ii. Demand for enhanced products from developed coun-
tries546 
B. World Trade conferences 
C. World Trade treatises - promoting larger trading areas to 
counter monopoly tendencies and inefficiency 
D. World Trade Organisation 
E. World Government (global rule of law) 
 
CONCLUDING LESSON  
 
Economic progress will only be achieved along with cultural pro-
gress: 
 
Economic progress presupposes, accomplishes and is accompa-
nied by outer- and inner cultural progress.  
 
Ↄ: An industrial revolution goes hand in hand with a cultural rev-
olution, also among nations.547 Economic advance therefore calls 
for a gradual and careful development of high morality and –
skills; individually, collectively and internationally.548 
 
Or again, in more popular terms,  
―Use your brains; bring your house in order and get creative & 
productive!‖ 
Today‘s crisis in the industrialised world illustrates this lesson‘s 
acuteness.  
 
                                       
545 The ‗Infant Industry‘ argument - as opposed to contemporary English mo-
nopoly. 
546 Due to increased buying power in developing nations 
547 England‘s contemporary dominance had to stop. 
548 E.g. Europe‘s cultural revolution started in earnest with the Reformation / 







Appendix 2  
 
Index of List’s treatment of various issues 
 
List elaborated his system of strategic investment and differenti-
ating (temporary) tariffs.  
 
a) Policies in general:  
 
1) The need for stability and uninterrupted production (Cf. 
List, 1841, pp. 294, 298);  
2) Protection and importance of home market (Cf. List, 
1841, pp. 24, 186-187, 191); 
3) Incentives and security for the investor (Cf. List, 1837a, 
p. 89, List, 1841, pp. 167-168, p. 426); 




b) Strategic investment into key branches: 
 
1) Education (Cf. List, 1827d; List, 1837a, pp. 119 and 66-
67; List, 1841a, pp. 139, p. 200, 203-204 and 386–387; 
List, 1841b, p. 179, 315);  
2) Science (Cf. List, 1837a, pp. 64-69, and 79; List, 1841a, 
pp. 48, 128-129,  and 200);  
3) Transport (Cf. List, 1837a, pp. 116-117; 136-137; List, 
1837b, in general but especially e.g. p. 67; List, 1838 in 
general but especially e.g. pp. 2 and 7; List, 1841a, pp. 49, 
116-117, 200 and 323);  
4) Energy (Cf. List, 1837a, pp. 62 and 136-137; List, 1837b 
in general; List, 1838 in general);  
5) Machine tools (Cf. List, 1837a, p. 117; List, 1841a, pp. 
151 and p. 314); 
6) Key branches that supply input factors for other branches 
(in addition to the five mentioned above), such as pig iron 




c) Differentiated tariffs according to:  
 
1) Stability task of tariffs primary (Cf. List, 1827b, p. 111; 
List, 1837a, pp. 32-33; List, 1841a, p. 294 ff: Chapter 24: 
The Manufacturing Power and the Principle of Stability and 
Continuity of Work);  
2) Structural task of tariffs secondary; education tariff pro-
motes skills (i.e. ‗infant industries‘) (Cf. List, 1827b, pp. 
48-49; List 1841a, p.111);  
3) Fiscal task of tariffs ‗tertiary‘ (Cf. List, 1837a, p. 36);  
4) Higher value added (Cf. List, 1837a, pp. 116-117); 
5) Necessity of averting inefficient monopolies (Cf. List, 
1837a, p. 81, 1841, pp. 81, 169-171); 
6) Historical setting (Cf. List, 1837a, p. 145, 1841, p. 115, 
130, 314, 329);  
7) Time, i.e. a bell shape of tariffs along time axis (Cf. List, 
1837a, pp. 115; 145, 1841, p. 314); 
8) Special key branches with skill, experience (Cf. List, 
1837a, p. 145, List, 1841, pp. 178-179);  
9) Special key branches with machinery, capital involved 
(Cf. List, 1837a, p. 145, List, 1841, pp. 178-179); 
10) Special key branches like machine tool industry (Cf. List, 
1841, p. 314);  
11) Special key branches supplying necessity of life, i.e. arti-
cles of general consumption (Cf. List, 1841, p. 311); 
12) Large home market and potential for success. (Cf. List, 
1837a, p. 115); 
13) Special key branches supplying employment (Cf. List, 
1841a, p. 179); 
14) Not protect low-wage labour-intensive industries (as long 
as there is alternative employment) (Cf. List, 1837a, p. 
116); 
15) Necessity of state credit and interest free loans as a kind 
of subsidy or negative tariff (Cf. List, 1841, pp. 296, 300, 
315);  
16) State investments into infant industry (e.g. as shares of 
equity capital), interest free loans, preferential interest 
rates to the investors (Cf. List, 1841, pp. 117, 315); 
17) Temporary subsidies to promote infant industry (Cf. List, 






Appendix 3  
 
Larger quotations from Friedrich List  
 
The subheadings below are borrowed from the respective sections 
of the main text, where smaller extracts of these quotations are 
used. 
 
2.21 English Nominalism versus List’s Realism 
 
The more I am convinced of the superior talents and of the great 
learning of President Cooper, the more I am astonished to see him 
build up on such false ground, a system of political economy, by 
which he intends to enlighten a whole nation about its interest 
and to prepare the youth of that nation for political life; a system 
which would lead this nation to ruin, to suicide. A few words are 
sufficient to expose the gross error in which Mr. Cooper fell in 
this fundamental phrase, blinded by his zeal for keeping up the 
old theory. Mr. Cooper confounded a grammatical being with a 
moral being, or what the civilians call a moral person (a chartered 
society, a plurality of men, possessing common rights and obliga-
tions, common interests and institutions). A grammatical being is 
a mere name, signifying different things or persons, being only 
united in the use of language, in order (as Mr. Cooper says) to 
avoid limitations, descriptions, etc. The names bar, yeomanry, 
mob are such grammatical beings; the persons denoted by this 
name possess neither social rights nor social obligations; they 
cannot prosecute a law suit under this name before a court, nor 
can they be accused. But the American nation can, as Mr. Cooper 
may learn from the title of many indictments. A being which 
elects presidents and representatives, which possesses a navy, 
land, and debts; which makes war and concludes peace; which 
has separate interests respecting other nations, and rights as well 
as obligations respecting its members, is not a  mere grammatical 
contrivance; it is not an inert grammatical being; it has all the 
qualities of a rational being and real existence. It has body and 
real possessions; it has intelligence, and expresses its resolutions 
to the members by laws, and speaks with its enemy not the lan-
guage of individuals, but at the mouth of cannon.  
With this false foundation the whole system of Mr. Cooper falls to 
pieces. In vain are his ingenious reflections and parallels, in vain 
all his learned allegations; common sense rejects his reasoning, 
as emanating from a false principle. It is a very instructing con-
templation, to see a man of such superior talents build up a sys-
tem of political economy on a ground which, as a lawyer and phi-
losopher, and as a learned politician, he must condemn. What 
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would Mr. Cooper, as Attorney-General, have said, if the counsel 
of a defendant had opposed to one of his indictments, that the 
American nation is a mere grammatical being, a mere man; which 
only by the contrivance of man is converted into an existing and 
intelligent being, and which therefore cannot prosecute a lawyer 
before a court?  
 
Very respectfully, your most humble, obedient servant, 
FR. LIST.  (List, 1827b, p. 89) 
 
3.07 Counterproductive saving 
 
―He has not taken into account, that by the policy of favouring 
native manufacture a mass of foreign capital, mental as well as 
material, is attracted into the country.  
He falsely maintains that these manufactures have originated in 
the natural course of things and of their own accord; notwith-
standing that in every nation the political power interferes to give 
to this so-called natural course an artificial direction for the na-
tion's own special advantage.  
He has illustrated his argument, founded on an ambiguous ex-
pression and consequently fundamentally wrong, by a fundamen-
tally wrong example, in seeking to prove that because it would be 
foolish to produce wine in Scotland by artificial methods, there-
fore it would be foolish to establish manufactures by artificial 
methods. 
He reduces the process of the formation of capital in the nation to 
the operation of a private rentier, whose income is determined by 
the value of his material capital, and who can only increase his 
income by savings which he again turns into capital. 
He does not consider that this theory of savings, which in the 
merchant's office is quite correct, if followed by a whole nation 
must lead to poverty, barbarism, powerlessness, and decay of na-
tional progress. Where everyone saves and economises as much 
as he possibly can, no motive can exist for production. Where 
everyone merely takes thought for the accumulation of values of 
exchange, the mental power required for production vanishes. A 
nation consisting of such insane misers would give up the de-
fence of the nation from fear of the expenses of war, and would 
only learn the truth after all its property had been sacrificed to 
foreign extortion, that the wealth of nations is to be attained in a 
manner different to that of the private rentier.  
The private rentier himself, as the father of a family, must follow a 
totally different theory to the shopkeeper theory of the material 
values of exchange which is here set up. He must at least expend 
on the education of his heirs as much value of exchange as will 
enable them to administer the property which is some day to fall 
to their lot. 
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The building up of the material national capital takes place in 
quite another manner than by mere saving as in the case of the 
rentier, namely, in the same manner as the building up of the 
productive powers, chiefly by means of the reciprocal action be-
tween the mental and material national capital, and between the 
agricultural, manufacturing, and commercial capital. 
The augmentation of the national material capital is dependent 
on the augmentation of the national mental capital, and vice 
versâ.   
The formation of the material agricultural capital is dependent on 
the formation of the material manufacturing capital, and vice 
versâ. 
The material commercial capital acts everywhere as an intermedi-
ary, helping and compensating between both.‖ (List, 1841a, pp. 
227-228) 
 
3.30 Public regulation of the merchant interest 
 
… we wish to guard against any suggestion that we have failed to 
be objective by stating categorically that we fully appreciate the 
importance of commerce for the development of a country‘s pro-
ductive powers and cultural progress. 
It is by commerce that new products appear on the market and 
that new demands for consumer goods are created. To secure 
these goods primitive peoples become accustomed to work and 
this in turn leads to progress in morality, religion and law. It is 
the merchant and not the missionary who stimulates backward 
primitive peoples in their advance towards a more civilised exist-
ence. 
It is the merchant who fosters the development of agriculture 
which, but for his efforts, would continue to languish in the most 
miserable fashion. It is he who prepares people to enter a new 
stage of economic and social existence. It is his efforts which 
strike at the very roots of prejudice, fanaticism, physical and in-
tellectual idleness, the harmful privileges of nobles, and the arbi-
trary rule of despots. He gives primitive peoples the will and the 
ability to improve themselves, because he provides them with new 
goods and so awakens in them the desire to make these goods 
themselves. He also provides them with the means to introduce 
and to develop their own domestic industries. (List, 1837a, p. 98) 
 
―A merchant would have no scruples in selling factories to for-
eigners. In the event of a slump a merchant - true to the principle 
of buying in the cheapest market and selling in the dearest - would 
be quite capable of raising capital by selling an industrial enterprise 
in his own country and using the money by buy cheaply in a for-
eign country goods that their owners were forced to sell as trade 
was depressed. The merchant could then dump these goods in his 
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own country and condemn thousands of workers to unemployment 
and starvation. The tragic consequences of his actions would cause 
him little concern. As a supporter of the theory of value he carries 
on his business with the sole object of making a profit at the end 
of the year. If he feels it necessary to excuse his conduct he resorts 
to a platitude and simply argues that the misfortunes that he has 
helped to bring about are due to circumstances beyond his con-
trol. 
If he cannot profit from his country‘s prosperity a merchant will 
speculate on its misfortunes such as famine or war. He profits from 
the export of beasts essential for farming. He profits from the sale 
of the machinery and stock of bankrupt industrial enterprises. He 
profits from the emigration of factory managers, and unemployed 
urban and rural workers. He even profits from the sale of arms to 
his country‘s enemies. He speculates and makes money by engag-
ing in all these dubious activities. He poisons entire nations and 
communities with his brandy and still continues to proclaim his 
adherence to the policy of "laissez faire et laissez passer". … 
It is in the very nature of things that a merchant should defend 
absolutely unrestricted freedom of trade in this way, even if his 
actions are utterly at variance with the interests of commerce in 
general. If a fox were a member of a legislative assembly he would 
protest that it would be an infringement of natural law to pass a bill 
forbidding the consumption of poultry and pigeons. 
The merchant appeals to "natural law" to condemn anything 
which hampers his business. He thinks that there is nothing 
wrong in a man of honour engaging in smuggling. Indeed he ac-
tually flatters himself that contraband trade is a proper and hon-
ourable way of enforcing the "natural law" that society has bro-
ken. 
To such an extent are merchants debased by their determination 
to make a profit at any cost that not only individuals but groups 
of merchants - such as shipowners, shipbuilders, and insurance 
companies - will unite to make money out of the thousands of 
people and the millions of francs worth of goods that are lost at 
sea every year. These men are thieves and robbers. 
It will need the intervention of a statesman of high character to 
ensure that any clash of interests between the mercantile com-
munity on the one hand and a nation, society, or humanity on 
the other is resolved in favour of the latter. 
It has been repeatedly observed that merchants engaged in for-
eign trade will inevitably side with their country‘s enemies as 
soon as they see that such a course of action will benefit them 
financially. 
A merchant, unlike a philosopher, is no citizen of the world. If his 
own country sinks into a wretched and shameful state of bank-
ruptcy and slavery, a merchant will take himself off to a foreign 
country with all his possessions. Merchants deserted Venice, Por-
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tugal, and the Hansa Towns as soon as these states declined. Ad-
am Smith has no illusions concerning the behaviour of merchants 
(see Book III, chapter 4). 
Measures of state control designed to maintain the quality 
of manufactured goods which are exported are advantageous to 
commerce in general but they are detested by individual mer-
chants who complain bitterly of any interference in their business 
and reiterate their demand for a policy of "laissez faire et laissez 
passer". Commerce in general obviously benefits from canals and 
railways and merchants normally are strongly in favour of their 
construction. But he loses all interest in the project as soon as he 
becomes a shareholder in a canal company or a railway company. 
Now he is interested only in making a profit from a rise in the 
value of his shares.‖ (List, 1837a, pp. 100-101, footnote omitted, 




4.26 Confederation of labour 
 
―The school is indebted to its renowned founder for the discovery 
of that natural law which it calls 'division of labour,' but neither 
Adam Smith nor any of his successors have thoroughly investi-
gated its essential nature and character, or followed it out to its 
most important consequences. 
 The expression 'division of labour' is an indefinite one, and must 
necessarily produce a false or indefinite idea.  
… on the other hand, may be called with equal correctness a un-
ion of labour; … 
The essential character of the natural law from which the popular 
school explains such important phenomena in social economy, is 
evidently not merely a division of labour, but a division of differ-
ent commercial operations between several individuals, and at the 
same time a confederation or union of various energies, intelli-
gences, and powers on behalf of a common production. The cause 
of the productiveness of these operations is not merely that divi-
sion, but essentially this union. Adam Smith well perceives this 
himself when he states, 'The necessaries of life of the lowest 
members of society are a product of joint labour and of the co-
operation of a number of individuals.'(1)1 What a pity that he did 
not follow out this idea (which he so clearly expresses) of united 
labour. 
 If we continue to consider the example of the pin manufacture 
adduced by Adam Smith in illustration of the advantages of divi-
sion of labour, and seek for the causes of the phenomenon that 
ten persons united in that manufacture can produce an infinitely 
larger number of pins than if every-one carried on the entire pin 
manufacture separately, we find that the division of commercial 
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operations without combination of the productive powers towards 
one common object could but little further this production. 
 In order to create such a result, the different individuals must 
co-operate bodily as well as mentally, and work together. The one 
who makes the heads of the pins must be certain of the co-
operation of the one who makes the points if he does not want to 
run the risk of producing pin heads in vain. The labour opera-
tions of all must be in the proper proportion to one another, the 
workmen must live as near to one another as possible, and their 
co-operation must be insured…. 
The popular school, because it has regarded the division of opera-
tion alone as the essence of this natural law, has committed the 
error of applying it merely to the separate manufactory or farm; it 
has not perceived that the same law extends its action especially 
over the whole manufacturing and agricultural power, over the 
whole economy of the nation. 
 As the pin manufactory only prospers by the confederation of the 
productive force of the individuals, so does every kind of manu-
facture prosper only by the confederation of its productive forces 
with those of all other kinds of manufacture. For the success of a 
machine manufactory, for instance, it is necessary that the mines 
and metal works should furnish it with the necessary materials, 
and that all the hundred different sorts of manufactories which 
require machines, should buy their products from it. Without 
machine manufactories, a nation would in time of war be exposed 
to the danger of losing the greater portion of its manufacturing 
power. 
 In like manner the entire manufacturing industry of a State in 
connection with its agricultural interest, and the latter in connec-
tion with the former, will prosper the more the nearer they are 
placed to one another, and the less they are interrupted in their 
mutual exchanges with one another. The advantages of their con-
federation under one and the same political Power in times of 
war, of national differences, of commercial crises, failure of crops, 
& c., are not less perceptible than are the advantages of the union 
of the persons belonging to a pin manufactory under one and the 
same roof. 
 Smith affirms that the division of labour is less applicable to ag-
riculture than to manufactures. (2)1 Smith had in view only the 
separate manufactory and the separate farm. He has, however, 
neglected to extend his principle over whole districts and provinc-
es. Nowhere has the division of commercial operations and the 
confederation of the productive powers greater influence than 
where every district and every province is in a position to devote 
itself exclusively, or at least chiefly, to those branches of agricul-
tural production for which they are mostly fitted by nature.‖ (List, 









The Common Interest of all Manufacturing States in Free Trade 
 
IN THIS CHAPTER we shall show that even in industrial nations 
there is no need - or very little need - to give tariff protection to 
the production of raw materials and foodstuffs, save under quite 
exceptional circumstances. 
Moreover we have already given at any rate partial proof of the 
fact that many countries would be well advised to be content with 
a purely agrarian economy. This is desirable on the assumption 
that no restrictions are placed either on exporting farm products 
to industrial states or on importing manufactured goods from in-
dustrial states. 
Experience shows that the barbarous or semi-barbarous peoples 
of Asia, Africa, and South America who have become civilised 
most quickly have always been those whom the industrialised 
states have provided with stable administrations, protection for 
persons and property, and freedom of trade. In this way backward 
peoples have been given the opportunity of securing manufac-
tured goods cheaply and of selling their own products to the best 
advantage. Here is a great opportunity to apply the principles of 
the doctrine of cosmopolitan economics in a practical way. Far 
from injuring any country this would bring together the special 
interests of every nation in a valuable common enterprise. 
It might, at first sight, appear to be asking too much to expect 
England to open her colonies to the commerce of all nations and 
to renounce the advantages to be gained by using her sea power 
to force distant backward countries - such as the states of South 
America - to submit to treaties which give her commercial privi-
leges in their markets. 
This is very important for the future prosperity of both advanced 
countries and backward and barbarous peoples. If one regards 
the matter from a more elevated standpoint than the sordid view 
taken by a merchant eager to enjoy the fruits of a monopoly, it 
will be seen that the introduction of the greatest possible freedom 
of trade would benefit not only the states in the second and third 
phases of industrialisation but would confer upon England great-
er advantages than upon anyone else. 
The example of the United States shows how a country that was 
formerly of no importance in world trade, is able to confer great 
benefits upon all countries by developing her agriculture and by 
making great progress from an economic and social point of view. 
The same example illustrates the point that industrial states can 
promote the expansion of shipping, commerce, and manufacture' 
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much more by opening their overseas possessions to the trade of 
all nations than by monopolising the commerce of their colonies. 
The most advanced countries in Europe and North America have 
the greatest possible interest in fostering the opening up and the 
progress of civilisation in all parts of South America, Africa, Asia 
and Australia. In doing so they will enormously increase their ex-
ports of manufactured goods, their imports of foreign products, 
their transit trade, and their shipping. 
On the other hand nothing has proved to be a greater hindrance 
to the progress of civilisation in backward lands than the selfish 
and greedy policy pursued by various rival nations in different 
part of the world. Advanced nations have tried to gain complete 
control over colonies, or exclusive influence over the administra-
tion of backward regions. Sometimes they have gained special 
trading rights by signing commercial treaties with the rulers of 
backward territories. Instead of adopting such policies, all the ad-
vanced industrial countries in the world should adopt the princi-
ple of free trade and equal rights in South America, Asia, Africa, 
Portugal, Spain and the Two Sicilies. A liberal policy of this kind 
would strike at the very root of the evil of economic selfishness. It 
would without doubt lead to a situation in which all industrial 
nations would be happy to see any one of their number undertake 
the task of bringing progress to barbarous peoples. 
Thus England would only gain if France proclaimed a protectorate 
over all North Africa or if Germany embarked upon the task pro-
moting the progress of civilisation in Turkey and the Levant. It 
would be mutually beneficial to all advanced nations if their sur-
plus populations could make use of their skills in these territo-
ries. 
Thus England's gains would be far greater than her losses be-
cause the united manufacturing power of all the industrialised 
countries would be far more effective than the isolated industrial 
power of England alone, especially if that power were hampered 
by the envious rivalry of other states. 
It is obvious that the United States is developing into a maritime 
power which before long will inevitably surpass that of England. It 
is equally obvious that the economic interests of Canada will one 
day be identical with those of the United States. England would in 
these circumstances be well advised to give up voluntarily a su-
premacy that cannot in any case survive for very long. And when 
another nation becomes the dominant economic country in the 
world England will find this predominance as irksome and as un-
pleasant as England's dominant position is for other people to-
day. Consequently in her own interest England should now be 
prepare to share her dominant position with other advanced in-
dustrial countries and should agree to the establishment of a he-
gemony which would secure for her advantages which would be 
both more substantial and longer lasting than those which she at 
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the present enjoys. Moreover new inventions - in transport and 
armaments - will one day deprive England of the advantages 
which she now enjoys because of her insular position. Then her 
naval and maritime power will be drastically reduced, especially if 
she should have to face a coalition of hostile powers. These are 
two very good reasons why England should now be prepared to 
make a commercial alliance with states in the second and third 





The Opposition of Countries to the Dominant 
Nation in Industry, Commerce and Sea Power 
 
AT ALL Times the weaker countries in Europe have collaborated 
to defend themselves against the pretensions of a dominant state. 
This has been called the balance of power. In the same way there 
has been united opposition to England's dominant position with 
regard to industry and trade. England has become so powerful 
economically that she is able to bring good fortune or ill-fortune 
to other nations, so long as those countries act in isolation. 
It is obvious that the idea of the Continental System was born be-
cause of England's excessive economic power and because of the 
possibility that England might misuse this power. Sooner or later 
the countries which have reached the second and third stage of 
industrialisation will have to unite to establish a new Continental 
System if ever England should show any inclination to use her 
superior sea power to injure the manufactures or commerce of 
these countries. 
An attempt to set up a new Continental System, however, would 
endanger the prosperity not only of England but of all nations 
and -as we have shown in the last chapter - the only satisfactory 
solution to the problem would be the establishment of world free 
trade. 
Since we can hardly expect England of her own free will to make 
the concessions necessary to secure the establishment of a world 
customs union, it seems to us that the countries which have 
reached the second and third stage of industrialisation should 
form an association of their own to press for the establishment of 
world free trade which should be the common aim of all coun-
tries. 
France and the United States should take the lead in promoting 
such an alliance. These two countries are closely linked by com-
mercial ties and by their common interest in energetically further-
ing the maintenance of the freedom of the seas. France and the 
United States have similar political institutions and similar eco-
nomic interests. They are natural allies and they should be pre-
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pared to take the initiative in promoting a plan which would ulti-




6.04 The English strategy of confusion and domination 
 
―In England, where the free trade doctrine was born and received 
the greatest support, a recent attempt to put the theory into prac-
tice failed. After the advantages and drawbacks had been careful-
ly weighed, it was decided to leave things as they were. It was evi-
dent that the claims of the supporters of free trade were unfound-
ed. 
What did the great champions of free trade - men like Canning 
and Huskisson - ever do to put into practice the doctrine which 
they so fervently supported? They caused a few laws to be passed 
which proved to be useless and are already a dead letter. They 
reduced a few import duties but always took care that the new 
duties were high enough to safeguard the home market for Eng-
lish manufacturers. They lowered unnecessarily high tariff walls 
but always made sure that import duties remained high enough 
to protect the country from a flood of imports. When they abol-
ished some prohibitions they replaced them with import duties 
high enough to be equivalent to a prohibition. They even dealt 
with the Corn Laws in this way although the abolition of the im-
port duties on cereals would have been of great benefit to their 
country. Did they ever do anything to reduce import duties on the 
products which France, Germany, or Switzerland would like to 
sell in the English market? No, they did not. 
These men actually proclaimed that they had taken a great step 
forward towards free trade. But their hypocrisy was obvious since 
their true purpose was simply to trick those countries into mak-
ing tariff concessions on the English goods which they imported. 
Even (the United States), the world‘s youngest state, which has 
applied the most modern principles and inventions of our age to 
achieve unparalleled economic growth, has not been able to adopt 
the policy of free trade. 
Sensible impartial observers have to admit that although England 
preaches free trade, she practises something very different. What 
England means by free trade is the right to sell freely all over the 
world both her own manufactured goods and the produce of her 
colonies while at the same time she erects hostile tariff barriers to 
prevent foreign goods from competing with her own products in 
the home market. It must in fairness be admitted that the way in 
which England treats the rest of the world is no different from the 
way in which other nations treat their weaker neighbours who are 
in no position to retaliate. 
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There is therefore a real danger that the strongest nations will use 
the motto "Free Trade" as an excuse to adopt a policy which will 
certainly enable them to dominate the trade and industry of 
weaker countries and reduce them to a condition of slavery.549 
All over the world people misuse the term "Free Trade". They use 
it to deceive people while lining their own pockets under the cloak 
of patriotism. The vast mass of humanity cannot be expected to 
grasp the full implications of high politics or the differences be-
tween commercial, political, and social freedom. 
Inside a country the policy of free trade is beneficial provided that 
it simply means that citizens are free to manufacture what they 
please and are not restricted when moving their produce from one 
place to another. But free trade in foreign commerce is far from 
beneficial. Indeed it is the equivalent of commercial slavery. Free 
trade in this sense - if introduced unilaterally - permits foreign 
competitors to ruin native industry while denying to native manu-
facturers the right to compete on equal terms with foreign rivals 
in markets abroad. Such "freedom" leaves us to the tender mer-
cies of foreigners. Our industry and commerce are dependent up-
on their laws and regulations. (List, 1837a, pp. 24-25 
 
 
6.25 From protection to free trade 
 
CHAPTER TWENTY FIVE 
 
Transition from the Policy of Protection  
to the Policy of as much Free Trade as possible 
 
WE REGARD ourselves as citizens of the world, but our faith in 
humanity rests upon the solid basis of nationalism. We can cer-
tainly envisage a situation in which a country would find freedom 
of trade preferable to a restrictive fiscal policy. We are citizens of a 
nation before we are citizens of the world. We devote our faculties 
to the energetic pursuit of the culture, welfare, fame, and security 
of the nation to which we belong. We strive towards the same goal 
for humanity. But the fortunes of humanity must be compatible 
with the fortunes of our country. We cannot support any policy 
that would harm our country in order to benefit the whole world. 
This is because we owe to our country our culture, our language, 
                                       
549 1. Montesquieu in his Esprit des Lois writes: "Free trade is not a licence 
granted to merchants to do as they please. It is a servitude imposed upon 
them. If the state imposes restrictions upon the individual merchant, it does so in 
the interest of commerce in general. Trade is never subjected to greater re-
strictions than in free nations, and it is never subjected to fewer restrictions 
than in nations under despotic governments." And again: "England restricts the 




our livelihood, and our intellectual values. Nature has implanted 
in our hearts the desire that future generations should enjoy the 
same benefits from the nation as we enjoy today.  
A time comes when certain countries and regions are capable of 
adopting a policy of free trade instead of a policy of protection. We 
propose, however, that such countries should retain those import 
duties which are necessary to compensate manufacturers for the 
burden of taxation that they are expected to bear. The countries 
we have in mind are: 
1. All purely agrarian countries which - for reasons given in chap-
ter 10 - are not yet capable of developing industries even with the 
aid of a tariff. By trading freely with industrialised states these 
agrarian countries can more quickly develop their economies. 
2. All colonies, all primitive regions, and all backward barbarous 
regions. 
3. The leading industrial state in the world, because the high 
quality and the low prices of its manufactured products enables it 
to dominate the home market and to compete successfully in for-
eign markets. 
4. Those industrialised states of the second rank which consider 
that they are strong enough to compete with the leading manu-
facturing country. 
5. All countries in the world as far as commerce in raw materials 
and foodstuffs is concerned. 
In this transition period, as in previous transition periods, a gov-
ernment should work out and announce in plenty of time a defi-
nite sliding scale for the reduction of import duties. It should also 
be prepared if necessary to impose import duties again if foreign 
competition should at any time threaten the nation's industrial 
forces. 
In this connection the following observations may be made: 
Import duties levied purely for revenue purposes should never be 
levied at so high a rate as to lead to a perceptible decline in con-
sumption. 
Export subsidies are a miserable palliative which cannot remedy 
the injurious effects of pernicious import duties on raw materials. 
Export subsidies direct to foreign countries capital and industry 
which might be much more usefully employed at home. Since 
they encourage fraud they are, from a financial point of view, 
harmful to the state. Finally export subsidies are not only useless 
and unnecessary but they force other countries to retaliate and to 
introduce such subsidies themselves. 
Restrictions on the export of raw materials, foodstuffs, or manu-
factured goods cannot be justified by logical arguments or on 
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Schumpeter despises certain theories more than any in the field of 
business cycles; those of underconsumption and of oversaving. He 
repeatedly says that they are myths and can hardly be considered 
scientific. It is striking, however that he produces no arguments against 
these theories, but actually several in favour of them - and he notes 
that Marx (his favourite in this area) held such ideas as well (Cf. 
Schumpeter, 1954, pp. 740-750; and pp. 1129-1135) 
Already the Mercantilists held theories on insufficient demand. They 
held that employment and prosperity were aided by spending, in par-
ticularly on luxurious goods, and furthermore that saving was damag-
ing because it decreased employment and output. Friedrich II of Prussia 
accordingly argued in his Anti-Machiavel that money must circulate, 
 
Any private individual and any king who does nothing but pile up and 
bury money, understands nothing of the art of enrichment: it is necessary 
to make the money circulate to be really rich. (Friedrich II, 1740, ch. xvi) 
 
Ironically the Physiocrats who Smith held so high, are also seen as 
the first inventors of the idea of over-accumulation and underconsump-
tion (Cf. Meek, 1951 who quotes James Mill). Also Jean Charles Lé-
onard de Sismondi and Thomas Malthus paid more attention to the 
problem of consumption than to other economists at the time. Sismondi 
says concerning an entrepreneur,  
 
If it be then asked why he stops, he will answer, like the workman, that 
money is wanting, that money does not circulate. (Sismondi, 1815, Ch.2, 




Malthus dealt with the issue, in 1836, five years before List (Cf. Mal-
thus, 1836, Introduction).550 Joseph Schumpeter credits Malthus and 
Sismondi with being the originators of the underconsumption theory of 
the oversaving type (Cf. Schumpeter, 1954, p. 740), while Marx claims 
that all Malthus did in his Principles was to copy Sismondi. 
Malthus and Sismondi represent, however, two distinct versions as 
Sismondi regards low wages as a cause of instability whereas Malthus 
was of the opinion that the landed aristocracy could better fill the func-
tion of efficient demand through its consumption of luxuries. This was 
in line with his ideas of the iron law of wages that Ricardo developed 
further, emphasising the danger of population growth.  
J.B. Clark and J. K. Rodbertus were later to follow up the track that 
Sismondi pointed out, although being less hostile to the danger of la-
bour-saving machinery than Sismondi (Cf. Clarke, 1924). He was prob-
ably the first to discuss the problem of an underconsumption created 
glut on the basis of income distribution between the two factors of pro-
duction in the industrial process, capital and labour. Also, in German, 
French, "British periphery", and early American (German oriented at 
the turn of the 20th Century) economic thought, there was a continuous 
discussion of related financial phenomena. 
 As against the classics, H. Carey points to the potential disturbing 
causes to consumption when claiming about cotton production that, 
 
                                       
550 Malthus,  writes in this Principles of Political Economy: 
Adam Smith has stated, that capitals are increased by parsimony, that eve-
ry frugal man is a public benefactor, and that the increase of wealth depends 
upon the balance of produce above consumption.  That these propositions are 
true to a great extent is perfectly unquestionable.  No considerable and con-
tinued increase of wealth could possibly take place without that degree of fru-
gality which occasions, annually, the conversion of some revenue into capital, 
and creates a balance of produce above consumption; but it is quite obvious 
that they are not true to an indefinite extent, and that the principle of saving, 
pushed to excess, would destroy the motive to production.  If every person 
were satisfied with the simplest food, the poorest clothing, and the meanest 
houses, it is certain that no other sort of food, clothing and lodging would be 
in existence; and as there would be no adequate motive to the proprietors of 
land to cultivate well, not only the wealth derived from conveniences and lux-
uries would be quite at an end, but if the same divisions of land continued, 
the production of food would be prematurely checked, and population would 
come to a stand long before the soil had been well cultivated.  If consumption 
exceed production, the capital of the country must be diminished, and its 
wealth must gradually be destroyed from its want of power to produce; if pro-
duction be in a great excess above consumption, the motive to accumulate 
and produce must cease from the want of an effectual demand in those who 
have the principle means of purchasing.  The two extremes are obvious; and it 
follows that there must be some intermediate point, though the resources of 
political economy may not be able to ascertain it, where, taking into consider-
ation both the power to produce and the will to consume, the encouragement 
to the increase of wealth is the greatest.‖ (Malthus, 1836, Introduction ) 
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Overproduction cannot exist, but underconsumption may and does exist. 
The more that is produced, the more there is to be consumed; and as every 
man is a consumer in the exact ratio of his production, the more he can 
produce the better it will be for him and his neighbour, unless there is 
some disturbing cause, preventing the various persons desiring to consume 
from producing what is needed to enable them to effect their exchanges 
with the planter, to the extent that is necessary to their comfort. (Carey, 
1851, p.103). 
 
In opposition to the ignorance of the classical school, not only of the 
financial sector, but also of its independence, we have Rudolf 
Hilferding's Finance Capital. It is a classic discussion of how capital 
came to liberate itself from production, after having been tied to it since 
merchant capitalism and simple accumulation ("buy cheap sell dear") 
dominated the markets. Chapter 4 has the telling title The periodic 
tendency of capital to liberate itself and lie fallow (Cf. Hilferding, 1910 
pp.151-167) where he discusses the reason why capital is pulled out of 
productive circulation, a process which he calls "the liberation of money 
capital".  
Roscher argued that consumption lagging behind leads to 
commercial crisis, 
 
The growth of a nation's economy depends on this: that production 
should always be, so to speak, one step in advance of production, … Now, 
the politico-economic disease which is produced by the lagging behind of 
consumption, and by the supply being much in advance of the demand, is 
called a commercial (market) crisis. (Roscher, 1877, § CCXV) 
 
 Roscher first mentions Say and the Mills as classical economists 
who deny the possibility of a general glut, and he argues that changed 
distribution of national income can lead to a general glut, 
 
Most theorists deny the possibility of a general glut, … J.B.Say … Every 
producer who wants to sell anything brings a demand into the market ex-
actly corresponding to his supply. (J. Mill.) Every seller is ex vi termini also 
a buyer; if, therefore production is doubled, purchasing power is also dou-
bled. (J. S. Mill.) Supply and demand are in the last analysis, really, only 
two different sides of one and the same transaction. … (Roscher, 1877, § 
CCXVI) 
 
All these allegations are undoubtedly true, in so far as the whole world is 
considered one great economic system, and the aggregate of all goods, 
including the medium of circulation, is borne in mind. The consolation 
which might otherwise lie herein is made indeed to some extent 
unrealizable by these conditions. It must not be forgotten in practice that 
men are actuated by other motives than that of consuming as much as 
possible. … There are, everywhere, certain consumption-customs 
corresponding with the distribution of the national income. Every great and 
sudden change in the latter is therefore wont to produce a great glut of the 




The latter point of general improvement in the industrial arts is 
reminiscent of today's so-called paradigm shift in the IT sector. 
In his famous chapter 23 of The General Theory, John Maynard 
Keynes quotes A.F Mummery and J. A Hobson‘s book from 1889, Phys-
iology of Industry, who came to the same conclusion as List that saving 
may be dangerous for a nation, 
 
We are thus brought to the conclusion that the basis on which all eco-
nomic teaching since Adam Smith has stood, viz., that the quantity annual-
ly produced is determined by the aggregates of Natural Agents, Capital and 
Labour available, is erroneous, and that, on the contrary, the quantity pro-
duced, while it can never exceed the limits imposed by these aggregates, 
may be, and actually is, reduced far below this maximum by the check that 
undue saving and the consequent accumulation of over-supply exerts on 
production; i.e., that in the normal state of modern industrial communities, 
consumption limits production and not production consumption. (Mum-
mery and Hobson, 1889, p. vi.) 
 
Mummery and Hobbes says, 
 
We also note that the charge of commercial imbecility, so freely launched 
by orthodox economists against our American cousins and other Protection-
ist Communities, can no longer be maintained by any of the Free Trade ar-
guments hitherto adduced, since all these are based on the assumption 
that over-supply is impossible. (Mummery and Hobson, 1889, p. ix.) 
 
The Norwegian heretic Bertram Dybvad Brochmann held very parallel 
ideas although writing in a more religiously moulded fashion attacking 
the modern worship of Mammon. His ideas changed somewhat over the 
years, and in 1956 he wrote an essay called Real Economy Contra 
Fictive Economy. Saving in the Time of Abundance. Why Norway goes 
bust. (Cf. Brochmann, 1956) For instance he writes that ―consumptive 
investment‖ should be promoted instead of monetary saving to promote 
technical development, 
 
General saving leads today to mutual sabotage. … Conclusion: … 
Personal saving of money in the form so far practised, should in the future 
not be stimulated, since this, as shown above, restrains the circulation of 
money and leads to less turnover and lower activity in general. …  People 
should in contrast be induced to buy useful and durable things. This form 
of saving should be stimulated instead of the old method of general saving 
of money. This is not alone a necessary rearrangement, but an absolutely 
necessary rearrangement if we are to be able to receive the technical goods 
of today and tomorrow, and is this not what Men want? Development hardly 
lets itself be set back. (Brochmann, 1956) 
 
Ragnar Frisch551 in 1947 repeats this view of Brochmann and of 
many monetary heretics, but is not as radical and thorough, 
                                       
551 Ragnar Frisch was the first editor of Econometrica, elected the first presi-




Saving for one singular individual and for society as a whole are two 
completely different things. They should really not be denominated with the 
same term, it is looks confusing. ... It is only by a productive arrangement 
that society as a whole can implement saving. (Frisch, 1947, p.41, my 
translation)552 
 
What Ragnar Frisch writes below, in 1934, could in the main also 
have been written today, the monetary system has failed in its mission 
to make buyers and sellers find each other, and provokes a vicious self-
enforcing circle of austerity, 
 
It should have been the function of the monetary system to make the 
buyers and sellers able to find each other. … But the monetary system has 
failed in its historic mission. … we have a monetary system which does not 
foster the exchange activities among transactors during depressions, but on 
the contrary, gives effects which force the individuals to curtail theirs activi-
ties even further. … groups are forced mutually to undermine each other's 
position. Each is forced to curtail its demand for the goods produced and 
services rendered by the other groups which, in turn, will cause still further 
contraction of demand for its own products, and so on. This meaningless 
vicious circle is what I understand by the incapsulating phenomenon. 
(Frisch, 1934; quoted in Andvig 1980) 
 
 
Credit creation adjusted to productive capacity 
 
An immediate expansion of the money supply would, however, most 
easily take the shape of fiat money. List does not discuss fiat money, 
which was promoted by G. Fichte and Adam Müller. 
Mercantilist ideas of coinage shortage was an originator of the idea 
that ‗money matters‘ and expansion of the money supply triggers an 
expansion of production (Cf. Heckscher, 1931). An early exponent of 
"money matters‖ is Gerard de Malynes (1586-1623) who claimed that an 
expanding money supply would not only increase the price level, but 
also decrease the interest rate and stimulate the economy (Cf. Malynes, 
1601 & 1622).  
Opposed to the Ricardian/Mill tradition, the monetary ‗cranks‘ also 
believed that ―money matters‖ or to put it differently that money is an 
exogenous factor in the economic system and thereby capable of 
creating an effect; influencing the workings of the system.  
                                       
552  The text in the Norwegian original, reads as follows: ―Sparing for et en-
kelt individ og for samfunnet som helhet er to helt forskjellige ting. De burde 
egentlig ikke betegnes med samme navn, det virker bare forvirrende... Det er 
bare ved en produktiv foranstaltning at samfunnet som helhet kan få i stand 




After WW I, there were many heretics, for instance Foster, Catchings, 
Douglas, who saw underconsumption (over-saving) as the cause of 
depression and monetary expansion as a remedy.  Douglas came up 
with several suggestions, one was a general basic minimum citizen 
salary. Paul Krugman's suggestion to helicopter money over Tokyo goes 
even further. 
The monetary heretics from Arthur Kitson in the 1890s, claimed that 
money suffered from serving several (potentially mutually exclusive) 
purposes at the same time. The attainment of these purposes often 
mutually excluded each other. Money serves the purposes of exchange, 
wealth measurement and wealth storage. The last purpose may 
undermine the first. This is why several monetary heretics, such as 
Silvio Gesell and Rudolf Steiner, promoted the idea that the value of 
money should decrease with time in order to provoke spending over 
saving. 
Silvio Gesell (Cf. Gesell, 1904) Rudolf Steiner (Cf. Steiner, 1921) and 
Bertram Dybvad Brochmann (Cf. Brochmann, 1922, 1923, 1956) 
believed that money in circulation would have to be reduced in value 
over time – an institutionalised kind of inflation - through instruments 
like stamped money. This would spur spending and circulation.  
The monetary cranks in the 1920s and 1930s also generally held that 
stimulating demand through increasing the money supply could cure 
slumps and unemployment. They came up with various suggestions of 
how to go about this, some curious and some quite ingenious. Keynes 
was an astute student of these ideas and devoted chapter 23 of his The 
General Theory to these ‗crank‘ theories (Cf. Keynes, 1936, ch.23).   
One would in the tradition of Adam Smith, claim that investments 
have to be financed by saving in advance, or using another expression, 
financed by the Labour Fund i.e. surplus that has not been consumed.  
David Hume, claimed that issuing new money mainly would lead to in-
flation, 
 
… augmentation [in  the quantity of money] has no other effect than to 
heighten the price of labour and commodities … In the progress toward 
these changes,  the augmentation may have some influence, by exiting 
industry, but after prices are settled  … it has no manner of influence. 
(Hume, 1742, Part II, Essay IV, OF INTEREST, § 3) 
 
The Nobel laureate Frederick Soddy agrees that saving has to precede 
investment. This is a surprise since Frederick Soddy, dedicated his 
Wealth…to the modern father of British monetary heretics, Arthur Kit-
son. Soddy often holds view similar to orthodoxy. This is clearly true in 
this case as well. Soddy writes, 
 
If the issue of money precedes abstinence … This raises prices and tends 
after a short while to reduce employment and production even below the 




This is only correct if the orthodox precondition of full capacity 
utilisation is fulfilled.  
If it not, there is room for money expansion without inflation, 
especially if new money is channelled into branches with most excess 
capacity. Credit can be created and expanded until this capacity has 
been used fully without danger of inflation. This was a main point of 
Arthur Kitson, who forcefully attacked the abstinence theory that Soddy 
holds so dear. (Cf. Kitson, 1894)  
The practical problem concerning issuing credit is to measure the 
exact prevalent productive capacity and issue credit correspondingly. 
This can never be anything but a process of intelligent guesswork based 
on statistical analysis. Post WW II efforts to measure GDP e.g. by Frisch 
was an attempt at handling this point. 
There is also the possibility of improving capacity to produce with 
targeted injections of credit: If productivity is raised this will cause 
prices to fall, i.e. deflation as opposed to the claimed inflation.  
Hutchinson writes,  
 
Arthur Kitson concluded that 'credit should be based on the productive 
capacity of the whole of society' (Kitson, 1894). To this end, the medium of 
exchange should be free from government control or the control of powerful 
individuals. 
Kitson developed the second theme of underconsumptionism by 
attacking the theory that trade and industry must necessarily be financed 
from savings, i.e. from abstinence and the surplus of the idle rich. 
Consumption, and not abstinence, was the means to stimulate production 
and create wealth. (Hutchinson, 1997, p.27) 
 
This last argument is valid only in a closed system, such as the glob-
al economy or in an autarkic state. Whenever trade occurs with outside 
and between systems, the troublesome issues of trade and payments 
deficits arise. 
Major Douglas and later Keynes, also claim that new credit for in-
vestments (productive consumption) does not have to come from saved 
income alone, but must rather be issued on the basis of the societal 
free and unused capacity to produce. This is not a matter of saving (ab-
stinence from unproductive consumption) preceding productive con-
sumption (investment) and therefore producing before financing. It is a 
matter of financing before producing and thereby issuing credit before 
the productive ability is installed (Cf. Bjørseth, 1934, p. 150; Keynes, 
1930, II, p. 220). It illustrates how modern fiat money is just that; fiat, 
and fiat in the future.  
Productive investments can be financed with claims in future 
production. It is especially so if investments are highly productive and 
lead to a fast capacity expansion. Therefore, the orthodox argument of 





Credit channeling to increase capacity 
 
List argued that some sectors should have preferential treatment due to 
their importance for other sectors, such as education, communication  
(Cf. List, 1841, p. 297) and machine manufacture (Cf. List, 1841, p. 314 
and p. 151). He argued that the State should involve itself in financing 
such schemes.  
Channelling credit into expansion of capacity to produce means that 
both this capacity and accordingly also credit over time can be 
expanded, in principle over time without any limits – apart from for 
instance resources limits, such as space. The sectors that readily mark 
themselves as targets for capacity expansion are sectors which other 
sectors especially depend upon, such as transport and machine 
manufacture. 
Keynes clearly acknowledged the importance of improving capacity to 
produce that List called the productive power and claimed as the true 
wealth of a country as opposed to its monetary riches. It is a common 
mistake to believe that Keynes only was interested in short run 
problems as if he thought financial policy could not affect long term 
growth. However, although Keynes argues that authorities must keep 
up demand in the short run (‖In the long run we are all dead.‖), he also 
argues explicitly that authorities must use financial policy to create 
investments being the most important source of growth in the long 
term.  
Keynes argued that ‖productive consumption‖ must be furthered, 
especially through ‖large scale‖ public investments financed by "cheap 
and abundant credit". Keynes says furthermore that,  
 
Loan expenditure must spread its beneficent influence around the world. 
(Keynes, 1933, ch. 3, pp. 20-22; see also Keynes, 1926, ch. IV; and Keynes, 
1930, Vol. II, Ch. 28, 29, 37).   
 
Schumpeter has similar ideas about the basic role of capital, being 
the catalyst of socio-economic transformation into a more efficient 
structure, 
 
Capital is nothing but the lever by which the entrepreneur subjects to his 
control the concrete goods which he needs, nothing but a means of diverting 
the factors of production to new uses, or of dictating a new direction to 
production. This is the only function of capital, and by it the place of capital 
in the economic organism is completely characterized. (Schumpeter's own 
italics. Schumpeter, 1934 (1961), p.116, in chapter III: 'Credit and Capital. 
The Nature and Functions of Credit.') 
 
Ragnar Frisch developed what he termed The Oslo Channel Model 
where he argued that aggregate treatment of investment evades the real 
problem of differentiating between possible investment projects, in 




In a decision model it is absolutely inadequate to consider ‗investment‘ as 
some sort of aggregated figure (perhaps to be compared with some other 
aggregated figure such as ‗saving‘). To work with such aggregated concepts 
would be evading the real problem of economic policy discussions. One of 
the most crucial aspects in a truly decisional analysis of the national 
economy is precisely to find out what sorts of investments to make. 
Practical planners are every day feeling the embarrassing problem of 
picking amongst a great number of investment projects. A comparison 
between different categories of investment must, therefore, stand in the 
center of the analysis.  
… 
There are four types of data to be included as direct repercussions in a 
project description.  
… 
Third, a set of coefficients describing the effects which he project will 
have on the capacities of production when the fruits of the projects – if and 
when it is started – begin to emerge. It is essential to take account of the 
time shape of this capacity effect. (Frisch, 1962, pp. 108-109) 
 
 
Monetary ‘cranks’ re-introduce finance 
 
The monetary ‗cranks‘ may generally be classified as underconsumption 
theorists. They re-introduced the financial sector into British economic 
analysis: Kitson, Douglas, Soddy, Keynes, besides German and 
American monetary cranks like George, Gesell, Knapp, Hayek, Mises, 
Friedman etc.  
The Scandinavians had the Norwegian Brochmann and the Danish 
Kristensen, apart from the academic economists who focused on mone-
tary issues like the Swedes Wicksell and Casell. Douglas, Soddy, 
Brochmann and Kristensen are not even mentioned in Schumpeter's 
History…, 1954 - in spite of them indirectly playing an important role, 
although hidden from most academics' attention. (Cf. Schumpeter, 
1954) 
The ideas of some of the cranks, rather than others, later became 
main stream and the link between the initiators and the successful is 
not hidden. Keynes, for instance, openly acknowledges his debt to Ge-
sell (Cf. Keynes, 1936, p.353-358) - though Gesell was more of an anar-
chistic thinker (In the sense of Free Banking - FB) than Keynes was, 
with his more statist / mercantilist oriented ideas (in the sense of Na-
tional Banking - NB). In this way Keynes would be closer to Douglas 
and to Soddy.  
The Norwegian Bertram Dybvad Brochmann also had hidden influ-
ence through the first Nobel laureate in economics (1969), Ragnar 
Frisch. Frisch borrowed, without ever stating so in public, Brochmann's 
ideas on national accounting, but Frisch left out Brochmann's inclusion 
of the household sphere, natural resources and energy. Frisch also 
wrote about the monetary questions and was like Keynes very open to 
the ideas of the heretics (Cf. Frisch, 1933; Frisch, 1934; and Andvig, 
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1980). As is generally acknowledged Frisch developed ideas similar and 
in parallel to Keynes.  
Also Frisch emphasised that "consumer demand was the driving force 
of the system" and that "attempts to save could curtail consumption 
without giving rise to any investment". Frisch says, "One should in oth-
er words, attempt to create an indirectly planned economy." (quoted in 
Andvig, 1980, pp.11-12) 
 
 
Banking and capital control 
 
Modern adherents of the monetary cranks do exist. Friedman‘s idea of 
air-bombing an economy with money (Cf. Friedman, 1969) is repeated 
by Paul Krugman‘s ideas for a solution to the Japanese banking crisis.  
Hayek‘s idea on Free Banking (Cf. Hayek, 1976 and elaborated in 
Hayek, 1978), which he picked up from the Scottish reputed Treasurer 
in France, John Law, argued (with approval from Adam Smith) that 
private banks would be more responsive to the trading needs of the 
markets than would a central bank monopoly. Although theoretically 
more efficient, it may also be claimed that private banking would 
increase instability. 
For alternative decentralised solutions, Hayek could have consulted 
the British monetary cranks, of which Arthur Kitson was the pioneer 
(Cf. Kitson, 1894) - and Frederick Soddy's intellectual mentor. They 
attacked the money issuing monopoly of the Bank of England that paid 
more attention to the value of money as against gold than to the 
situation in industry. 
In the late 1930s (with Roosevelt's New Deal etc.), WW II and the post 
war period the NB cranks (Keynes etc.) gained the upper hand for some 
time. The practice, however, most often was that of neutral central 
banking (CB) as opposed to more true NB with deliberate discrimination 
between various economic activities regarding the premises for credit. 
The trend in the WW II - and post WW II period was to move from NB 
via CB to FB. Therefore, starting in the late 1960s and gaining force 
around 1970, the FB cranks (Hayek, Friedman) have been increasingly 
influential, as regulation has been and is being scaled back - both on 
the national and the international scenes.  The NB period seems to have 
been somewhat successful in curtailing over-accumulation and in pro-
moting growth of production and consumption.  
However the problem seems to have returned with increased force in 
the new FB period. With FB over-accumulation in the financial sector 
has been increasing. The NB solution was to channel surplus into pro-
duction and reproduction by controlling the capital flows. In the short 
run the solution was to channel the flow into demand - and in the long 
run into fixed capital investments. FB may be seen as an outgrowth of 
the classical school that did not pay attention to monetary problems. 
Although the FB school does pay attention, in practice it only legitimis-
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es the old practice of non-intervention that was a result of the igno-
rance of the former classical school. 
The quarrel between the NB and FB schools was the usual dispute 
over ―who picks the winners‖ question, and this time regarding the con-
trol of capital flows. The role of public goods was an additional question 
focusing on the role of large-scale investments that would need the in-
tervention of a macro-actor (as opposed to "micro" entrepreneurs and 
consumers) to ensure the interests of the general public. 
On the other hand, as noticed above, FB also represented a criticism 
of the deflationary austerity policy of the gold oriented central banks at 
the time it emerged in late 19th Century and the post WW I period. 
Besides, in the eyes of the critics, the NB solution paid overly attention 
to large-scale projects neglecting small local entrepreneurs and thereby 
contributed to market concentration and anti-social monopoly rents.  
One lesson may be that the role and effect one institution and 
remedy had at one time may be different today. However, also today we 
may observe central banks inclined to pursue austerity policies and 
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